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Abstract 
The thesis sets out to study the pluralism implicit in authoritarian political systems, 
and gives particular emphasis to state -society relations. It considers the kinds of 
management strategies employed by state leaders in authoritarian systems to limit political 
pluralism and contain independent organisational activity of society. It also looks at 
societal responses to state management strategies. 
The focus of the thesis is Suharto's New Order rule and state strategies to manage 
heterogeneous Muslim constituencies. The thesis is divided roughly into two parts. The 
first part considers Suharto's "corporatist" strategies -backed by coercion -which aimed 
to contain and neutralise in state structures "autonomous" political activities of Muslim 
organisations. One major objective of containing Muslim interests was to weaken 
oppositional tendencies and to marshal interests behind Suharto's presidency. 
The second part of the thesis deals with how authoritarian corporatist structures 
increasingly were confronted with societal pressures or pluralist challenges for greater 
participation in the country's political institutions. The opening assumption of the thesis is 
that authoritarian institutions are poorly equipped to deal with multiplying interest 
demands once societal capacities or strength move beyond a certain threshold. To test this 
assumption, this part of the analysis draws on theoretical insights from scholarship on 
regime transitions (democratisation). The analysis considers how authoritarian corporatist 
institutions -in the long term -find it increasingly difficult to cope with diversifying 
societal demands for participation. 
In the Indonesian case, the convergence of infra -elite struggle during succession 
crisis, increasing political activation of societal interests against the authoritarian order, 
and economic crisis all conspired to bring Suharto's New Order to an end. The political 
activation of state and society eroded the institutions of corporatist containment and 
exclusion. As part of his survival strategy, Suharto tried to pit incorporated Muslim 
interests against pro -democracy and opposition groups. However, these efforts were 
ineffectual and only contributed to the sense of political crisis. Eventually, these Muslim 
interests began to exit from their corporatist containment and join the forces for change. 
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abangan Nominal Muslims 
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of 
the Republic of Indonesia) 
AJI Alliance of Independent Journalists 
Akrab Aksi Rakyat Bersatu (Unified People's Action) 
aliran kepercayaan mystical belief systems 
AMPI Angkatan Muda Pembangunan Indonesia (Indonesian 
Development Generation of Youth) 
azas tunggal sole ideological foundation or unifying principle 
BAIS Badan Inteljin Strategis (Strategic Intelligence Agency) 
B AKIN Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency) 
BAKOMUBIN Badan Koordinasi Mubaligh se- Indonesia (Indonesian Co- 
ordinating Body of Muslim Preachers) 
Bakorstanas Badan Kordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional 
(Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National 
Stability) 
Banser paramilitary wing of GP Ansor 
Bapilu Badan Pengendalian Pemilu (General Election Controlling 
Body) 
Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National 
Development Planning Agency) 
Bernas Barisan Nasional (National Front) 
BIA Badan Inteljin ABRI (ABRI Intelligence Agency) 
BKPRMI Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia 
(Communication Board of Indonesian Mosque Youth) 
BKSPP Badan Kerja Sama Pondok Pesantren (Pondok Pesantren 
Co- operation Body) 
BMI Bank Mualimat Islam 
BMOIWI Badan Musyawarah Organisasi Islam Wanita Indonesia 
(Indonesian Islamic Women's Consultation Body) 
BPPMI Badan Pembina Perpustakaan Masjid Indonesia (Indonesian 
Agency for the Promotion of Mosque Libraries) 
BPPT Badan Penkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency of 
Applied Technology Research) 
Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistic Affairs Agency) 
CEDES Centre for Information and Development Studies 
CPDS Centre for Policy Development Studies 
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
dakwah Islamic propagation 
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic 
Dakwah Council) 
DEMA Dewan Mahasiswa (University Student Councils) 
Depdagri Departmen Dalam Negeri (Department of Home Affairs) 
Dephankam Departmen Pertahanan Keamann (Department of Defence 
and Security) 
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Dewan Pembina Supervisor's Council 
Dharma Wanita Women's Service/Duty- an official association of wives of 
civil servants 
DI/TH Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Darul 
Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army) 
DMT Dewan Mesjid Indonesia (Indonesian Mosque Council) 
DPA Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme Advisory Council) 
DPKSH Dewan Penegakan Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum (Security 
and Law Council) 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Parliament) 
Dwi-fungsi Dual Function -ABRI doctrine stipulating a dual role of 
defence and politics 
F -ABRI Fraksi ABRI (ABRI fraction in the parliament) 
Famred Front Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi 
(Student Action Front for Reform and Democracy) 
Fatayat Younger women's wing of NU 
fatwa Pronouncement or ruling by Islamic authority 
FBST Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All- Indonesian Labour 
Federation) 
FKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Dakwah (Communication 
Forum for Dakwah Institutes) 
FKOI -KK Forum Komunikasi Ormas Islam (Islamic Communication 
Forum for Mass Organisations) 
FKPPI Forum Komunikasi Putra -Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia 
(Communication Forum for Sons and Daughters of ABRI 
Veterans) 
FKSMJ Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (Jakarta 
Communication Forum of Student Senates) 
Forum Kota City Forum 
FUNGSI Forum Ummat Islam Pendukung Konstitusi (Muslim 
Supporters of the Constitution Forum) 
Furkon Forum Ummat Islam untuk Keadilan dan Konstitusi (Forum 
for Upholding the Constitution and Justice) 
GBHN Garis -Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of State 
Policy) 
GMKI Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian 
University Student Movement) 
GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
Nationalist University Student Movement, the students' wing 
of the former Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI) 
Golkar Golongan Karya (Government party) 
GP Ansor Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (NU's Ansor Youth Movement) 
GPII Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Movement of Indonesian 
Islamic Youth) 
GPK Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disturbance 
Movement) 
GUPPI Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam (Union of 
Efforts to Improve Islamic Education) 
halal permitted 
Hankam Pertahanan Keamanan (Defence and Security -Dwifungsi's 
first function) 
Hansip Pertahanan Sipil (Civil Defence) 
haram prohibited 
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HIP Hubungan Industri Pancasila (Pancasila Industrial 
Relations) 
HKTI Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers' 
Harmony Association) 
HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (the Association of Islamic 
University Students) 
HNSI Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia (All- Indonesian 
Fishermen's Association) 
LAIN Institut Agama Islam Negari (State Islamic Tertiary 
Institutes) 
ICKI Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia (Association of 
Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals) 
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) 
IPPNU Ikatan Putri -Putri Nandlatul Ulama (Association of 
Daughters of NU) 
Iptek Ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi (science and technology) 
IPTN Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (National Aircraft 
Industry) 
KADIN Kamar Dagang dan Industri (the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry) 
KAIIIVII Korps Alumni HMI (Corps of HMI Alumni) 
KAMNII Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Muslim 
University Students Action Front) 
Kassospol Kepala Staf Social Politik (ABRI's Chief of Social -Political 
Affairs) 
KAWI Kesatuan Aksi Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women's 
Unified Action) 
KBB Keluarga Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Family - 
supporter organisations for Masyumi) 
kekaryaan Sending ABRI personnel to non -military posts 
kelompok sempalan religious splinter groups 
kerukunan (harmony: a key word in the State's Pancasila discourse, 
which refers to an "organic" or hierarchically ordered 
harmony of social relations) 
keterbukaan Political Openness 
kewaspadaan (Vigilance: the concept refers to ABRI' s approach or 
"doctrine" of vigilance) 
KIPP Komite Independent Pemantau Pemilu (Independent Election 
Monitoring Committee) 
KISDI Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian 
Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World) 
KND Koalisi Nasional untuk Demokrasi (National Coalition for 
Democracy) 
KNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (National Committee of 
Indonesian Youth) 
Kokar Korps Karyawan (Corps of Functionaries) 
Kokarmendagri Korps Karyawan Menteri Dalam Negeri (Corps of 
Functionaries for the Ministry of Internal Affairs) 
Komando Jihad Islamic Holy War Command 
Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia (National Human 
Rights Commission) 
Komrad Komite Mahasiswa dan Rakyat untuk Demokrasi (Student 
and People Committee for Democracy) 
vii 
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command) 
Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban 
(Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and 
Order) 
Korpri Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Corps of Civil Servants 
of the Republic of Indonesia) 
Kosgoro Koperasi Serba Gotong Royong (Total Self -help 
Cooperative) 
Kostrad Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army 
Strategic Reserve Command) 
KOWANI Kongres Wanita Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Women's 
National Congress) 
KPRP Komite Perjuangan Rakyat untuk Perubahan (People's 
Struggle Committee for Change, a front organisation for 
PRD) 
KUD Koperasi Unit Desa (Village Cooperative Unit) 
kyai (religious scholars who run a system of traditional Islam 
boarding schools mainly in viral Java -also written KII as 
the designated title) 
LDII Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of 
Islamic Propagation) 
LDK Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Dakwah Institutes) 
Lemhanas Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional [National Resilience (or 
Defence) Institute] 
LTPT Lembaga Ilmu Pen getahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute 
of Sciences) 
LKMD Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community 
Resilience Institution) 
LMD Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (Village Consultative 
Institution) 
LMMY Liga Mahasiswa Muslim Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta League of 
Muslim University Students) 
LP3ES Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi 
dan Sosial (Social and Economic Research, Education, and 
Information Institute) 
LPPTKA Lembaga Pemhinaan dan Pengembangan Taman Kanak- 
Kanak Al- Qur'an Indonesia (Al- Qur'an Kindergarten 
Guidance and Development Institute) 
LSM Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Self -reliant Community 
Institution) 
Malari Malapetaka 16 Januari [16 January (1974) Affair] 
MARI Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (The Council of Indonesian 
People) 
Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslim Indonesia (Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims) 
MAWI Majelis Agung Wali -Gereja Indonesia [Indonesian (Catholic) 
Council of Bishops] 
MD1 Majelis Dakwah Indonesia (Indonesian Dakwah Council) 
Mimbar Bebas Free Speech Forums 
MKGR Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (Self -help 
Family Association, a founding organisation of Golkar) 
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative 
Assembly) 
Mubaliq /dai Islamic preacher 
viii 
Muhammdiayah organisation representing the modernist wing of Indonesian 
Islam 
MITI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama) 
Munas Musyawarah Nasional [National (Consultative) Congress] 
Muslimat Elder women's wing of NU 
NICK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Normalisation of Campus 
Life) 
NU Nandlatul Ulama (Revival of the Religious Scholars - 
Indonesia's Iargest Islamic "traditionalist" organisation) 
Opsus Operasi Khusus (Special Operations) 
OTB Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk (Formless Organisation) 
P3M Perkumpulan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat 
(Association for Pesantren and Community Development) 
P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamanan Pancasila 
(Guidelines for the Comprehension and Implementation of 
Pancasila) 
Pam Swakarsa Pengamanan Swakarsa (Civilian Security Militia) 
PAN Fartai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
Pancasila the five (panca) guiding principles (sila) of the Republic of 
Indonesia 
Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia (the Indonesian Christian Party) 
Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) 
PBB Fartai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Party) 
PCPP Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila 
(Association of Pancasila Development Intellectuals) 
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party) 
PDI -P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia -Perjuangan (Indonesian 
Democracy Party of Struggle) 
PDR Partai Daulat Rakyat (People's Sovereignty Party) 
pembangunan Development 
pembinaan guidance, supervision 
Persis Persatuan Islam (Unity of Islam) 
Perti Persatuan Tarbiyah Islam (Association of Islamic 
Education) 
pesantren school of Koranic studies for Muslim students, mostly 
boarders 
Petisi 50 Petition of 50 Group -an opposition group consisting of 
fifty members of retired officers and civilians 
PGI Persekutuan Gereja -Gereja di Indonesia (Communion of 
Indonesian Churches) 
PORI Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia (Teachers' Union of the 
Republic of Indonesia) 
PII Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Organisation of Indonesian Islamic 
Secondary School Students) 
PK Fartai Keadilan (Justice Party) 
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) 
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) 
PKK Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Association for 
Promoting Family Welfare) 
PKP Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party) 
PKU Partai Kebankitan Umat (Community Awakening Party) 
PMIT Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim 
University Students Movement -NU' s university students 
associations) 
PMKRI Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (Catholic 
University Students Association of the Republic of 
Indonesia) 
PMP Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education) 
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) 
PNU Partai Nandlatul Ulama ( Nandlatul Ulama Party) 
PPBI Pusat Perjuangun Buruh Indonesia (Indonesian Centre for 
Labour Struggle) 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) 
PRD Partai Rakyat Demokrasi (People's Democratic Party) 
PSII Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Union Party) 
PUDI Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (Union of Indonesian 
Democracy Party) 
PT 7 Partai Umat Islam (Muslim Community Party) 
Rapat Akbar mass meeting 
Ratih Rakyat Terlatih (Trained People-civilian militia established 
by ABRI) 
Repelita Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five Year 
Development Plan) 
RMI Rabithalul Mai'ahidil Islamiyah (NU's pesantren 
organisation) 
Rois Am Chairman of the Central Syuriah; effectively president - 
general of NU 
santri devout Muslims 
SBSI Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Workers' 
Welfare Association) 
Shar'iah Islamic law 
SI Sarekat Islam (United Islam) 
SKU Satuan Karya Ulama (Ulama Functional Union) 
SMID Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia Demokrasi (Solidarity of 
Indonesian University Students for Democracy) 
SOKSI Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia (Central 
Organisation for Indonesian Socialist Functionaries) 
SPSI Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All- Indonesian Workers' 
Union) 
Syuriah NU's supreme Islamic law council 
Tanfidziah Executive board of NU 
tut wuri handayani A Javanese expression to describe how a father supports his 
young children from behind as they learn to walk 
ulama Muslim religious scholar 
umat the Muslim community 
WALUBI Perwakilan Umat Budha Indonesia (Representation of the 
Indonesian Buddhist Community) 
WMAB Wadah Musyawarah Antarumat Beragama (Inter -Religious 
Consultation Forum) 
Yayasan Abdi Bangsa Foundation of Devotion to the Nation 
YKPK Yayasan Kerukunan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan (National 
Brotherhood Reconciliation Foundation) 
YLBHI Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian 
Legal Aid Institute) 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The concern of this study is state -Islamic relations during the period of 
President Suharto's so- called "New Order" regime (1966 -1998). The main period 
under consideration is the decade of the 1990s up to and including the interim 
administration of President B.J. Habibie (May 1998 -October 1999), which many saw 
as a continuation of Suharto's New Order. In particular, the study concerns the 
regulation of state -Islamic relations and, culminating from such regulation, the 
interactions between segments of the state, Muslim groups, and other social- political 
organisation. 
The study is located in a broader framework of analysis about regime 
maintenance and survival, and regime decay, under authoritarian systems of rule. The 
political context informing this study is the increasing challenges to Suharto's 
presidency during the 1990s both from within and outside of the state, especially from 
the growing organisational forces of political pluralism. We examine Suharto's 
management of Islam as part of his strategy to limit political participation, to restrict 
independent organisation and to maintain his regime. In Indonesia, Muslims comprise 
an estimated 90 percent of the population, yet this majority status has never translated 
into corresponding support for Islamic political parties at general elections. 
Nonetheless, Islamic organisations are an integral part of the county's heterogeneous 
associational Iife and Muslim political interests have both made strategic 
accommodations with state power and constituted a major source of resistance to 
government authority at different points in Indonesian history. A study of state- 
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Islamic relations gives us one important example of how the Suharto regime managed 
state and society as a whole. 
Key issues discussed include: (1) the changing nature of state regulation of 
Islam as part of institutional and political adaptation to new challenges arising both 
from within and outside the state, and (2) the specific kinds of institutional linkages, 
which help define the nature of the political system, and influence (if not determine) 
interactions between elements of the state and societal interests. We will apply to this 
study the concept of "corporatism" (for an exploration and definition of this concept 
see the literature review in chapter two) as the main framework of analysis for 
examining these institutional linkages and interactions between the state and Islam 
vis -à -vis other group interests. This includes identifying the group interests that 
institutionally are linked to the state and the interests which remain largely outside 
and autonomous of the state and what bearing this has on political interactions. 
The Thesis 
A corporatist "framework of analysis" provides us with an important starting 
point for understanding how Suharto's regime managed state -Islamic relations. 
However, such a framework does not explain an entire social -political reality. Deeper 
historical and socioeconomic factors are responsible for the development, strength 
and diversity of organisation in a given society. For Suharto, the bringing of interests 
into corporatist structures was a means of limiting but not entirely extinguishing the 
organised pluralism in society. The aim was to keep political participation and 
interest -demands low by channeling group interests into state supervised structures 
and effectively locking them out of power sharing arrangements. During the 1 970s 
and 1980s, the strategy of containing social -political organisation and suppressing 
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opposition appeared to be largely successful. However, by the mid -to -late 1990s, 
corporatist forms of organisation were proving incapable of containing societal 
interests as increasing demands were being made for political participation and the 
right to organise independently of the state. During Habibie's administration, 
corporatist structures were Iargely dismantled or rendered irrelevant in an emerging 
multiparty system. 
Therefore, in examining the significant changes in politics, the thesis goes 
well beyond a purely corporatist framework of analysis and examines some of the 
broader developments in society, as authoritarian structures were placed in tension 
with the emergent organisational pluralism. The central thesis is that state 
management of Islamic political interests demonstrates a shift in the pattern of 
corporatism being applied from a strategy based on the restrictive exclusion of 
interests (1970s- 1980s) to a more inclusionary one (1990s)- albiet with key 
exclusionary mechanisms still in place. This partial shift in strategy reflected the need, 
as part of regime maintenance, to respond to the demands of an expanding pluralism 
of social -political organisation. However, the shift in strategy, which aimed to keep 
political interests within the corporatist net, ultimately was unable to contain the burst 
of organised activity. 
The following questions form the core of this inquiry, although they are not 
addressed systematically under particular headings or themes in the thesis, but 
anticipate and inform the final thesis conclusions. (A further understanding of the 
framing of these questions and terminologies is given in the literature review.) 
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First line of inquiry 
1. To what extent did different Islamic organisations and interests embrace or 
resist capture in corporatist frameworks by the state? 
2. Did incorporated interests at any point constitute opposition from within the 
state? 
By determining the extent of co- optation into, or resistance to, corporatist 
arrangements we are better positioned to assess the kinds of interactions that occur 
between different components of state and society, including the accommodations, 
tensions and conflict that take place between these components. To assist us with our 
assessment, we need a second line of inquiry concerning whether capture in state 
structures provide target constituencies with strategic access to political goods and 
what kinds of interactions this access might stimulate between group interests. 
Second line of inquiry 
3. A shift to greater incorporation of Muslim interests in the 1990s clearly 
involved Suharto's regime making political concessions to this target 
constituency. However, the question remains, did capture result in significant 
political benefits and opportunities for the incorporated interests, or were these 
interests mostly denied strategic access to political goods? 
4. As a result of competition for access to political goods, did incorporation in 
state structures spark or intensify antagonisms between captured interests and 
other social -political interests? 
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If corporatist strategies stimulate conflict between group interests this leads to a third 
line of inquiry of whether, and under what conditions, such conflict results in the 
fragmentation of group interests or to the political organisation of group interests (and 
to greater associational pluralism) in contest over political goods. 
Third line of inquiry 
5. By the late 1990s, the regime's corporatist strategies had failed to contain the 
growth of associational pluralism or neutralise opposition. However, did the 
corporatisation of interests in any way actually contribute to the pluralisation of 
social organisation? 
6. Under what circumstances and in what ways might corporatism have 
contributed to pluralisation of organisational activity? For example, did state 
capture of Muslim interests contribute to organisation and counter -organisation 
of group interests, or to a politicisation of these interests? 
A fourth line of inquiry concerns the role of incorporated Muslim interests in 
strengthening authoritarian structures or contributing to societal pluralism during 
periods of rapid social, economic, and political change and crisis. 
Fourth tine of inquiry 
7. What was the role of Muslim interests and organisations in contributing to the 
growing pluralism of anti- regime organisation, or in reinforcing the 
authoritarian structures of the Suharto regime? 
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8. In responding to the growing pluralism, did the positions adopted by Muslim 
interests depend on the extent to which they had been captured in the state's 
corporatist structures? 
9. Alternatively, did other factors, which were not contingent upon a person's or 
organisation's place in state structures, play a greater role in determining 
Muslim political responses to authoritarian institutions under challenge? 
Final question 
10. To what extent can we attribute failures of corporatism to the manner in which 
this was coerced organisation? Are factors external to these corporatist 
structures, such as intra- elite divisions and economic crisis, more responsible 
for the failures? An alternative way of viewing this question is to consider 
whether the different factors challenging authoritarian rule demonstrated the 
inherent weaknesses of the state's corporatist arrangements. 
Thesis layout 
The thesis is organised into two main sections or themes and is set out roughly 
in chronological order. The first theme concerns regime initiatives to place corporatist 
constraints on social organisation. The corporatist frameworks served similar 
purposes and functions discussed in literature on "state corporatism" in Latin 
America, Southern Europe, Africa and East Asia. These functions and purposes are 
discussed in the literature review. 
The second theme concerns tensions between corporatised organisation and 
other forms of social organisation, and the interactions that this creates between 
different elements of state and society, The Indonesian experience with corporatism 
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largely followed a path noted by authors of both corporatist and "regime transition" 
literature (see literature review) of growing pluralism and societal strength seriously 
challenging and eventually undermining authoritarian institutions, including 
corporatist organisation. 
In line with these themes, chapter two assumes the form of a literature review 
and explores scholarship on corporatism and regime transitions in developing 
countries. This chapter provides the background argumentation and analysis used 
throughout the thesis. Chapter three examines the establishment of corporatism in 
Indonesia and the kinds of ideological rationales and institutional structures that 
underwrote the state's organisation of group interests. Chapters 4 -6 analyse Suharto's 
strategies for the management of Muslim political and social organisation. Chapter 
seven represents an introduction to the second theme of the thesis as its examines 
growing intra-elite rivalry which brought into conflict corporatised Muslim interests 
and segments of the state (parts of the military and civilian bureaucracy). Chapters 8 -9 
look at the phenomenon of mounting pluralist (elite -level and societal) challenges to 
Suharto's rule leading to his resignation. Chapter 10 analyses Habibie's presidency 
both in terms of continuity with, and departure from, Suharto's regime and examines 
the unravelling of corporatist arrangements. The conclusion makes correlations 
between the regulation of state -Islamic relations, regime maintenance, pluralist 
challenges, and regime decay. 
The thesis is a result of detailed study (during two years of fieldwork) of various 
corporatist and "independent" Islamic organisations in their interactions with other 
key elements of state and society, carried out in the years 1994, 1996, and 1997. I 
interviewed a wide spectrum of Muslim political and organisational leaders, scholars, 
inteIIectuals and national political leaders (both Muslim and non -Muslim). My 
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interests in this line of inquiry began with an attempt to understand the possible 
connection between the political, ideological and intellectual posturing of Indonesian 
Muslim leaders and the institutional and power structures of the Suharto regime. In 
the first year of my research, I interviewed these people regarding current and past 
political events, as well as documented people's political and religious stances and 
attitudes on the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia. I became particularly 
interested in how a Muslim leader's location as a member of an independent 
organisation, or as someone more closely aligned to the state, might have affected 
their stance on certain issues. 
Political developments in Indonesia began to unfold so rapidly in the second 
year of my research that it caused a shift in the focus of my inquiry. By this stage of 
the research, I became keenly interested in the role of the Suharto regime in 
organising Muslim interests. However, the mounting challenges to Suharto's rule led 
me also to consider the role of the state in organising Muslim interests against anti - 
regime forces. Subsequent political developments leading to Suharto's resignation in 
May 1998 reinforced my desire to understand the relationship between the state, 
political Islam, and other social interests during Suharto's last years. 
Although there has been scrutiny of the Suharto regime's policies towards 
Islam, and to regime manipulations of Islamic political organisation, not much 
attention has been given to specific strategies adopted by the regime to structure state - 
Islamic relations vis -à -vis other social organisation. Authors such as Boland, Noel., 
van Dijck and Buyung Nasution have outlined historical developments in the political 
and ideological struggle of Muslim organisations and interests in Indonesia to build 
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and define the nation -state in rivalry with other Muslims and non -Muslim interests.' 
A number of scholars have studied political developments between the state, Islam, 
and non -Muslim group interests during the "New Order" period of President Suharto 
(1966- 1998). For example, Kamal, Vatikiotis, McVey, Jones, Samson, Ward, Hefner, 
Schwarz, Syamsuddin and Adnan have looked at Muslim political, ideological, 
intellectual and organisational responses to nation -state building and government 
policy concerning Islam.2 Studies by Barton and Fealy, van Bruinessen, Noer, Tanja, 
and Federspiel have analysed in detail major Islamic organisations, including their 
relationship with larger political structures of the state.3 
. B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982; 
Deliar Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900 1942, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University 
Press, 1973; C. van Dijk, Rebellion Under The Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, Leiden, 
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal -, Land en Volkenkunde, 1981; Adnan Buyung Nasution, The Aspiration 
for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio -legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956- 
1959, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992. 
2 
. Mohammad Kamal Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in 
Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980; Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian 
Politics under Suharto: Order, development and pressure for change, London. New York, Routledge, 
1993; Ruth T. Mc Vey, `Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics," James P. Piscatori (ed.), 
Islam in the Political Process, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; Sidney Jones, "The 
Contraction and Expansion of the `Umat' The Role of the Nandlatul Ulama in Indonesia," Indonesia, 
No.38 (October 1984); Allan A. Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," Thesis (Ph.D.), Berkeley, 
(Microfilm) University of California, 1972; Allan A. Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and 
Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, Political Power 
and Communications in Indonesia, London, University of California Press, 1978; Ken Ward, The 1971 
Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia), Clayton, Vic, 
Monash University, 1972; Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle 
for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia: 56 (October 1993); Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: 
Indonesia in the 1990s, St Leonards, NSW, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1994; M. Din Syamsuddin, 
"Religion and Politics in Islam: the case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order," Thesis 
(Ph.D.), Ann Arbor, Los Angeles, University of California, 1991; M. Din Syamsuddin, "The 
Muhammadiyah Da'wah and Allocative Politics in the New Order Indonesia," Studia Islamika: 2 (2) 
1995; Zifirdaus Adnan, "Islamic religion: Yes, Islamic (Political) Ideology: No!, Islam and the State in 
Indonesia," Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Clayton, Vic, Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990. 
3 . Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), Nandlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in 
Indonesia, Clayton, Vic, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996; Martin van Bruinessen, NU: 
Tradísí, relasi -relasi Kuala, Pencarian Wacana Baru, Yogyakarta, LkiS, 1994; Deliar Noer, Partai 
Islam Di Pentas Nasional, 1945 -1965, Jakarta, Grafiti, 1987; Victor Tanja, HMI: Himpunan 
mahasiswa Islam, Sejarah Dan Kedudukannya di tengah Gerakan -gerakan Muslim Pembaharu di 
Indonesia, Jakarta, Penerbit Sinar harapan, 1982; Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic 
Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, 1970; Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadiyah: A Study of an 
Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia," Indonesia: 10 (10 October 1970). 
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My contribution is to examine regime initiatives for the corporatist restructuring 
of Islamic political parties and interests and the kinds of interactions that this has 
generated between Ïslamic organisation and other social organisation, including 
segments of the state. Although scholars have applied to their analyses of Indonesian 
politics corporatist frameworks, there is no single substantial study on the 
corporatisation of Muslim interests.4 A major contribution of the hook is to examine 
the inter -relationship between Suharto's management of state -Islamic relations and 
pluralist challenges to Suharto's rule. This part of the study, in particular, provides 
original analysis and a new perspective on recent developments in Indonesian politics. 
Finally, such a study could also provide scholarship with a useful comparison to the 
strategies adopted by other leaders of developing countries in their dealings with the 
political resurgence of Islam. 
° . See chapter three concerning literature on corporatism in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature: State corporatism and pluralist 
challenge 
The purpose of the following review of literature is to set the parameters of 
analysis and argumentation of the thesis. We begin with some concepts and 
definitions and then develop argumentation and review of literature on corporatism 
and regime transitions. 
1) Concepts/Definitions 
A) State and Society 
One definition of the state is "a set of organisations invested with the authority 
to make binding decisions for people and organisations, juridicially located in a 
particular territory and to implement decisions using, if necessary, force. "' The state 
consists of its formal -legal institutions and office- holders (the bureaucracy, the 
Executive, the Legislature, the police, the courts, the military, and intelligence). 
However, one of the problems in defining the state is that the boundaries between 
state and society are somewhat blurred because of interpenetration between state 
agencies, officials, and other social groups and individuals. For example, do we 
consider private clients of state patrons part of the state or part of society? Where do 
we situate quasi- public organisations and institutions (e.g., television networks and 
airlines with part -state ownership)? Where do we locate private individuals and 
. Joel S. Migdal, "The state in society: an approach to struggles for domination," Joel S. Migdal 
et.al. (eds.), State power and social forces: Domination and transformation in the Third World, 
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.11. Dietrich Ruechmeyer and 
Peter B. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions 
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groups that sit on government advisory bodies and commissions and have direct input 
into policy- making? Are corporatist organisations a function of state or society? In 
short, the state consists not only of its formal -legal institutions, but also of informal 
institutions and non -office holders.2 
Migdal conceives of the state as a differentiated and complex organisation 
"imbedded" in society. He argues that different parts of the state and society engage, 
and disengage, each other in a mutually transforming manner in multiple social arenas 
of domination, opposition, accommodation, and cooptation. Different parts of the 
state tend to pull in different directions; "one component of the state might align itself 
to an affiliated or linked social group against another component of the state. "3 In 
short, state and society interpenetrate one another, as well as contest who makes the 
binding rules and norms of society. This study uses Migdal's concept of state and 
society in its analysis of political interactions and change. 
Despite interpenetration of state and society, society consists of formal and 
informal organisations, movements, networks, and cells, which are not directly part of 
the state. In advanced liberal democracies the concept of "civil society" is frequently 
applied to denote a vigorously organised, pluralistic and autonomous society with its 
rich array of private professions and associations, which stand midway between 
communities and the state. Civil society supplements political parties in a multi -party 
Underlying Effective Intervention," Peter B. Evans et.al. Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.46 -7 quoted in Migdal. 
Atul Kohli and Vivien Shue, "State power and social forces: on political contention and 
accommodation in the Third World," Joel S. Migdal etal. (eds.), State power and social forces, p.294; 
Joel S. Migdal, "Why Do So Many States Stay Intact ?" Peter Dauvergne (ed.), Weak and Strong States 
in Asia -Pacific Societies, St Leonards, Canberra, Allen & Unwin, Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1998, pp.19 -35; Eric A. Nordlinger, `Taking the State 
Seriously," and Joel S. Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States: power and Accommodation," Myron 
Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development, Boston, Toronto, 
Tittle, Brown and Company, 1987, pp.353- 389; 396, 398. 
. Joel S. Migdal, "The state in society: an approach to struggles for domination," and Naomi 
Chazan, "Engaging the State: associational life in sub -Saharan Africa," Migdal et.al. (eds.), State 
power and social forces, pp.8 -9, 17, 256 -7. 
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democracy, as it independently informs and participates (through lobby, forum, 
petition, and organised protest) in the political system.4 This study uses the concept of 
"societal pluralism" in the sense just described of the independent array of private 
associations not directly linked to the state. 
States are discussed in terms of their degree of autonomy from other social 
organisation, or the degree to which society penetrates the state, or how penetrative 
states are of society. East Asian states are seen as highly- interventionist, controlling 
states, which deeply penetrate society and retain a high degree of autonomy: many 
African states are considered as weak and penetrated, with low autonomy. However, 
what constitutes a "strong" or "weak" state, or whether an authoritarian regime, which 
relies on violence against its citizenry, is in command of a strong or weak state is still 
a matter of debate.5 
B) Authoritarianism 
Although there has been a wide variety of authoritarian regimes historically 
(including one -party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships), they all 
tend to be deficient in key institutional features present in liberal democracies. In 
greater or lesser degree, they lack well institutionalised and peaceful competition 
(including institutionalised opposition parties) for political office through regular free 
and fair elections. Semi -opposition and regular (often -manipulated) elections are a 
feature of some authoritarian political systems, while they are denied in others. In 
authoritarian systems, power is concentrated in the Executive with limited, if any, 
4.. Larry Diamond et.al , "Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy," Diamond et.al 
(eds.), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder, London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990, pp.21 -22. 
5 . Dauvergne, "Weak States, Strong States," Dauvergne, Peter (ed.), Weak and Strong States in 
Asia -Pacific Societies, St. Leonards, Canberra, Allen & Unwin, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
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separation or differentiation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the 
Judiciary. Authoritarian systems are short on responsive and accountable government 
(and commonly suffer from endemic corruption of the bureaucracy), lack a 
transparent legal system, and tend (in varying degree) to infringe citizen's liberties 
and rights. Authoritarian regimes are noted for enforcing "limited pluralism," by 
denying legal scope to civil associations and parties, and restricting the participation 
and competition of citìzens.6 
C) Corporatism 
Broadly speaking, corporatism is a system of interest representation that 
results in the "planned integration" of society's associational interests into the 
decision -making structures and policy arena of the state. The state plays a leading role 
in regulating, creating, and setting the ground rules for the organised internal activities 
of given interest categories, and the external interactions between groups and between 
those groups and the state. In its ideal -typical form, corporatism, through the 
recognition, licensing, and compulsory membership of designated categories by the 
state, ensures the controlled emergence, and numerical limitation, of organised 
interest demands, rather than the spontaneous and autonomous expansion of interests 
as in pluralist political systems. 
To borrow, mostly, from Schmitter's often quoted definition: it is an interest 
system in which the membership is organised into a "limited number of singular," 
constituent units, or functional categories, whose "internal structure of authority" and 
Studies, Australian National University, 1998, pp.1 -9; Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States," pp.391- 
430; Harold Crouch, "Indonesia's `Strong' State," Dauvergne, Weak and Strong States, pp.93 -110. 
6 . Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," 
The Washington Quarterly: 12 (1) (Winter 1989), pp. I43, 147; Diamond et.al., °Introduction: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy," pp.10,14; Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," 
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decision -making is hierarchically ordered. These categories are fragmented (to 
weaken their autonomous capacities) through a kind of "vertical pillaring," with the 
objective of destroying cross -class loyalties. They remain "non- competitive" within 
and between "sectorally compartmentalised" categories (e.g., trade union, peasants' 
association, religious organisation, and guild -like professional associations). 
Typically, state -chartered associations of professional categories at their different 
levels of activity (branch, sub -branch, factory unit) belong, automatically, to their 
respective peak organisations at the national level and, sometimes, are linked to a 
bureaucratic centre of government. The designated professional associations and 
producer organisations become agents of the state, and are given a "representational 
monopoly" over their constituent members. They act to enforce political decisions, 
and discipline and control the behaviour of the membership in accordance with the 
imperatives and goals of the social- economic order (promoted by the state). It is here 
that they acquire their prescriptive designation as intermediaries in channelling the 
two -way traffic of state directives and societal messages. The state also "subjects" the 
associations to "controls" both on their "leadership selection" and on the articulation 
of autonomous interest inputs. It does this in order to discourage challenges to the 
state from "popular and particularistic" demands, and especially to guarantee the 
suppression of class contlict.s 
Before proceeding with the analysis, the question arises as to the explanatory 
value of corporatism in describing social -political relationships. Chalmers offers a 
Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, New York, Free 
Press, 1970. 
. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch 
(eds.), The New Corporatism: Social- Political Structures in the Iberian World, Notre Dame, London, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1974, pp. 86, 93 -4, 103. 
8 
. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" pp.93 -104; Peter J. Williamson, Varieties of 
Corporatism: A Conceptual Discussion, Cambridge, London, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, pp. 8 -11, 20 -23; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," James 
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succinct answer to this question and is therefore worth quoting at length. Chalmers 
explains 
i. Corporatism starts with the state and defines group interests in 
terms of their relations to the state. Corporatism's heuristic 
contribution has been to emphasise the central importance of state - 
group ties for explaining a variety of outcomes. 
ii. Corporatism requires one to look not only at the interests of the 
state, but also at the structure that defines the relationships 
between various interests, the organisations that represent them, 
and the bureaucracy. 
iii. Corporatists also consider the "state" not as a single entity with a 
single interests, but rather as a "naturally" divided entity, made up 
of particular relationships with the major economic groups and 
professions (or however interests are defined). The state cannot be 
isolated from civil society: It is defined by the series of links that 
form both the state and the societal groups. 
iv. By focusing attention on the importance of state -initiated 
structuring of group -state relationships, corporatism draws 
attention to the choices being made by those who design those 
links.9 
M. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, London, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1977, p. 49. 
9 . Douglas A. Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), New 
Directions in Comparative Politics, Boulder, London, Westview Press, 1985, pp.67 -8. 
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I am using corporatism in the structúralist sense just described -as an 
explanation of the shifting state -societal linkages and political contests and 
accommodations therefrom -as well as the policy implications of corporatism. I am 
also using corporatism as an interpretive tool of the many fluid inter -relationships of 
state -societal political actors and their choices. 
2) Review of Literature and argumentation 
A) Varieties of corporatism 
Recent theorists have identified corporatism as branching out into at least two 
main varieties. Williamson distinguishes these as "consensual -licensed" and 
"authoritarian -licensed ";10 Schmitter categorises them as "societal corporatism" and 
"state corporatism ";11 O'Donnell calls them "privatising" and "statising. "12 These two 
varieties have their roots in early theorising and in the divergent paths taken by 
corporatist systems in continental Europe and further afield. The consensual -licensed 
type corresponds to advanced liberal- capitalist countries such as Great Britain, West 
Germany, France, Canada, Australia, the US, and new democracies in the Third 
World. The statising type corresponds to countries under dictatorship or authoritarian 
rule at different points of history, including Petainist France, Fascist Italy, Nazi 
Germany, and Greece Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and some of the 
countries of Africa and Asia.13 
In consensual -licensed (societal) corporatism the impetus for organisation 
largely comes from society, as semi -autonomous, self -regulating professions manage 
their preserve of activity but within a broad framework of principles and rules 
Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism, p.16. 
. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" pp.104 -105. 
z 
. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," p.44. 
13 , Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism. 
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stipulated by the Central State. This variety of corporatism is the culmination of an 
evolutionary process as it gradually, and unevenly, supplants the decaying institutions 
of pluralism within liberal democratic polities. It follows an organisational process 
and logic, whereby interests of society penetrate the state, as these interests open up to 
their representation "institutional areas of the state. "14 It, therefore, corresponds to 
strategies of co- optation and inclusion of interests as state and society "seek each 
other out" for the sake of establishing a mutually beneficial social- economic 
environment. Theorists and advocates of this variety, with varying emphasis, tend to 
place defined limits on state intervention in the crafting of a non -pluralist political 
order. 15 
By contrast, the studies of O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Williamson show that 
authoritarian -licensed (state) corporatism is imposed from above by a highly 
interventionist state noted for its bureaucratic centralism, which seeks to deeply 
penetrate society and thereby control it by strictly subordinating it to the state. Under 
authoritarian- licensed systems, interest associations become "auxiliary and dependent 
organs" of the state apparatus, often through the linking of them to the relevant 
bureaucratic centres of government that have jurisdictional authority over their 
respective preserves of activity.16 Authoritarian regimes introduce corporatist devices, 
write Silvio Baretta and Helen Douglas, "under conditions of high mobilisation, in 
which the demands of the popular sector cannot be kept in hounds simply by 
indiscriminate use of coercion. "17 The regime captures the organisational hases of 
14 . O'Donnell, "Corporatism Question of the State," p.48. 
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Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism, pp.22 -29; Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" 
pp.105-107, 126. 
10 
. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," pp.48 -65; Schmitter, "Still the Century 
of Corporatism ?" pp.105,108,124; Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism. 
17 . Silvio Duncan Baretta and Helen E. Douglas, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin 
America: A Review Essay," James M. Malloy (Ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin 
America, Pittsburgh, London, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, p.522. 
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independent activity, demobilises them, and thén reintegrates them into a strictly 
subservient, and neutralised, position within the newly constructed socioeconomic 
and political order. To quote Schmitter, regime leaders seek to fill the '`resulting 
organisational vacuum with compliant worker syndicates [in the case of labour], "18 
which, through sole license, are established to pre -empt any alternative, future 
independent organisational activity. Finally, Baretta and Douglas identify three 
principle purposes of state corporatism: 1) to provide a means of control or active 
domination of social groups; 2) to provide a channel of communication between state 
organs and social groups, and; 3) to secure support for the regime.19 
Incusionary -exclusionary corporatism 
The idea that an authoritarian- licensed (state) variety of corporatism can be 
distinguished as a unique category has gained strong currency in literature on 
developing countries of the Third World. Building upon O'Donnell's distinction 
between "incorporating populist- authoritarian" systems and "excluding bureaucratic - 
authoritarian" systems, Stepan has identified two subtypes of " inclusionary" and 
"exclusionary" corporatism within authoritarian political systems.20 Inclusionary 
forms of corporatism are tied to authoritarian populism and the exclusionary variety to 
bureaucratic- authoritarian regimes. As with all analytical categories, a great deal of 
variation occurs between these ideal sub -types, and this depends on the country under 
analysis, given their diverse political histories and institutional systems,21 
18 
. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" p.124. 
19 . Bretta and Douglas, "A Review Essay," pp.520 -52I. 
20 . Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1978, pp.74, 79 -82; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and the 
Bureaucratic -Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley, University of 
California,1973. 
21 Philippe C. Schmitter, "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey," and Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, 
Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe," Guillermo O'Donnell et.al. (eds.), Transitions from 
19 
Nonetheless, some common features and patterns of behaviour could be found in 
many countries of the periphery (in Latin America, East Asia, and Africa).22 
Populist leaders of authoritarian states tended to establish inclusionary 
corporatist arrangements in order to install their regimes. They did this through the 
controlled mobilisation of cross -class popular support, and by organising its 
incorporation and subordination into the structures of the state, behind their 
leadership. They tended to draw on nationalism as a means of rallying support to their 
cause and destroying old economic classes (whether they were land -owning classes or 
colonial capitalists) and creating new ones. Consequently, they introduced programs 
of nationalisation of industry and the application of heavy state protectionism of 
domestic producers with which to underwrite rapid industrialisation. The combination 
of political activation, which tended to get out of hand, and protectionist industrial 
policy often resulted in rapid deterioration of the economies of Third World countries 
and caused widespread social -political instability. In particular, mass mobilisation of 
social interests, linked to competing demands of the incorporated groups on the state, 
weakened the Populist State and eroded its ability to mediate conflicts.23 In 
Huntington's analysis, the pre- existing authoritarian structures lacked sufficient 
institutional capacity to cope with the high level of societal activation, or to absorb 
and regulate the diversifying and conflicting demands of society.24 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Baltimore, London, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986, p.4; 
zz O'Donnell, Modernization and the Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Stepan, The State and 
Society; Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth -Century Egypt, New 
York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989; Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, "Corporatism in China: 
A Developmental State in an East Asian Context," Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger (eds.), 
China After Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia ?" Armonk, New York, 
London, M.E Sharpe, 1996; Vivien Shue "State power and social organization"; Chazan "Engaging the 
State ". 
23 
. Stepan, The State and Society; O'Donnell, Modernization and the Bureaucratic - 
Authoritarianism". 
. Samuel P. Huntington, The third -wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman, 
London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
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This, according to O'Donnell and Stepan caused a "drastic defensive reaction" 
that led to the installation of the Bureaucratic -Authoritarian State and/or new 
institutional arrangements for the exclusion of the popular classes.25 In collaboration, 
stability -minded military leaders and technocrats typically responded to these crises 
by seeking to stabilise the economies, to bring about a new social -political order, and 
to expand the state apparatus in terms of its "scope, penetration, and coercive 
capacity.s26 They embarked on ambitious reconstruction of the political system, and 
dismantling of the old party -linked institutions. They did this in support of 
programmatic, guided economic development as they tried to convince international 
donor agencies and investors to inject much needed capital into the ailing economies. 
They installed their regimes through a combination of strategies, including the often - 
ruthless suppression of left -wing forces and the demobilisation of politically activated 
popular classes, including the peasantry and labour. They introduced exclusionary- 
corporatist institutions as an integral part of their de- politicisation campaigns, to serve 
as structural barriers against any future re- activation of the left and opposition. In 
particular, Stepan argues, in response to the breakdown of previous patterns of 
domination, these regimes drew on so- called "organicist" principles -postulating an 
organic unity between state and society -with which to construct new legitimacy 
formulas.27 They did this both in rejection of liberal ideas of procedural democracy 
and competition and Marxist notions of class conflict, and in support of the new mode 
of domination.28 In the transformation to exclusionary arrangements in non- 
xs O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State "; Stephan, The State and Society; James 
M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia," Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism 
and Corporatism, pp.464 -481; David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Who Does What, to Whom, and 
How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism," Malloy (ed.), 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism, pp. 503 -4. 
'6 . Stepan, The State and Society, p.79. 
. See chapter three for an explanation of "organicist" principles. 
za Stepan, The State and Society, p.58. 
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communist countries, the "communist threat," the need to eradicate "subversion," and 
to create national security and stability, were the most common rationales given for 
the installation of the new, anti -Communist, military- technocratic regime.29 
It appears, however, that the presence of inclusionary and exclusionary 
subtypes of corporatism is not necessarily dependent on authoritarian regime types, 
and elements of these subtypes can be found at different stages of political 
development and appear in varying order. One reason for this is that regimes seeking 
renewal alternate between different policy instruments, with inclusionary mechanisms 
sometimes being engaged when exclusionary ones lose efficacy and ruling elites 
decide to incorporate new social groups in support of the regime.30 
B) Pluralist Challenges to state corporatism 
As the last points suggest, state -society interactions tend to be fluid, with regime 
leaders needing to readjust management strategies vis -á -vis other social organisations 
in order to adapt successfully to changing social reality. In Migdal's terms, state and 
society transform one another as different segments of state and society interact in 
multiple arenas of struggle and accommodation.31 Components of the state may 
successfully capture parts of society or segments of society might, alternatively, 
capture parts of the state as different social organisations interpenetrate one another. 
Typically, state corporatism is established in order to maximise state autonomy from 
society and minimise penetration of key state agencies by other social organisation. 
29 Vedi R. Hadiz, Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia, Perth, London, New York, 
Routledge, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 1997, pp.26 -32; O'Donnell, "Corporatism and 
the Question of the State," p_57. 
30 Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism; Andrew Maclntyre, "Organising Interests: Corporatism in 
Indonesian Politics," (Working Paper No.43), Canberra, National Library of Australia, August 1994, 
pp.12 -18; Vedi R. Hadiz, "Challenging State Corporatism on the Labour Front: Working Class Politics 
in the 1990s," David Bourchier and John Legge (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, 
(Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No.31), Clayton, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University, 1994, pp.198-200. 
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However, given the fluidity and complexity of social relations, the question arises as 
to how long regime leaders can maintain state corporatist strategies of capture or 
under what specific circumstances state corporatism might disappear. 
Thus, a central issue for consideration is tensions that occur in the relationship 
between the inhibiting state corporatist structures and the pluralist tendencies in a 
given society. Authoritarian regimes, by definition, permit (or tolerate) islands of 
pluralism that are not directly linked to, or regulated by, the corporatist framework. 
Schmitter observes that "interest inter -mediation systems," within a single polity, can 
have "legal heterogeneity," with regimes "regularly" enforcing "discriminatory 
norms" upon different group interests, affecting their freedom to associate. The 
regime tolerates, and sometimes encourages, the "spontaneous and autonomous 
collective action for some groups, while repressing, coopting, or channelling it for 
others. "32 For example, labour unions might be repressed and channelled. Meanwhile, 
business and entrepreneurial associations might be allowed a high degree of 
autonomy and self -regulation. Similarly, single target constituencies might be subject 
to varying degrees of regulation and autonomy with, for instance, some parts of a 
religious establishment finding themselves subject to tight regulation, and other 
sections seemingly escaping, or resisting, the purview of the state. State Corporatist 
(re)structuring can be characterised as one of a shifting relationship in which the state 
seeks to extend its control over society, through its increasing capture of independent 
organisational bases, while some segments of society develop strategies to evade 
capture, and/or exist on a continuum of unincorporated, partially co- opted, to more 
fully co -opted categories. Possible tensions can arise from this associational 
31 Midgal, "The state in society," pp.7 -29. 
3z Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in 
Western Europe," Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist 
Intermediation, Beverly Hills, London, Sage Publications, 1979, p. 69. 
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heterogeneity, and particularly arise from two main distorting tendencies of 
corporatism, which are located at its inclusionary and exclusionary poles. 
To begin with, at its inclusionary pole, if corporatism becomes too 
incorporative, competing interests can use their acquired positions in the state 
structure to increase their demands on the state. Bianchi, in his study of corporatism in 
Egypt, and Ding, in his examination of China, contend that the risk is that 
incorporated interests can extend their influence and veto powers over state policy, as 
well as hijack the policy goals of their intended incorporation and supplant them with 
their own "private" objectives.33 In this way, the growing intrusion and penetration of 
"external" interests threaten the autonomy of the state and its leaders. As occurs with 
authoritarian populist regimes, the state is rendered less able to mediate the 
conflicting interest demands and is confronted with erosion of its institutional 
integrity by the diffusion of multiple interests within the state. Ding calls this 
phenomenon "institutional parasitism." He records how a "counter- elite" of 
intelligentsia- incorporated perhaps, but by no means co -opted into the state's 
institutional structures -- attacked the policy goals, power relations, and institutional 
apparatus of the Communist state from within the state.34 Corporatism, which over - 
incorporates, or is too inclusionary, can behave in a similar manner to Ding's 
"institutional parasitism." 
Schmitter identifies a similar problem confronted by societal corporatism. He 
argues that incorporated interests tend to call for much greater participation than 
permitted by the established arrangements, as these arrangements are revealed as 
providing only "pseudo -participatory" mechanisms. Inclusionary arrangements are 
"bombarded with demands for more direct and authentic forms of participation, 
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undermining both the stability of their established internal hierarchies of authority and 
their claim to democratic legitimacy." 35 
Regime leaders can react to "institutional parasitism," and to pressures for 
participation, by seeking to maintain an "imbalance" of forces between dominant, 
aspiring elites, and the subordinate excluded forces. Regime leaders play off against 
one another corporatised and pluralist interests in an eminently divide- and -rule 
strategy. Bianchi argues that heterogeneous systems of "representation," which 
combine corporatist and pluralist components, in fact, can provide authoritarian 
leaders with a more flexible mixture of strategies. It offers them adaptability in 
dealing with interest demands in a manner that will help preserve the power and 
autonomy of the state. Regime leaders can stimulate antagonistic contests between 
corporatised and pluralist sectors by an adjustable range of incentives and 
disincentives that will alternately favour one sectional interest over the other.36 The 
incentives could be in terms of providing or denying legal scope for an organisation's 
activities. They might include giving unequal access to economic and political 
resources, such as promotion to higher office and status, access to patronage and 
economic opportunities, furnishing of contracts and licenses, and the like. Legal 
recognition and access might be conditioned by the extent to which either of the 
contending interests demonstrates loyalties to the ruling elite, provides useful 
services, complies to state directives, and/or threatens the autonomy and interests of 
the state leaders.' 
33 Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism, pp.24, 57; X. L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: 
Legitimacy crisis, 1977 -1989, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.30-31. 
34 Ding, The Decline of Communism in China, pp. 22 -31 
35 Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism ?" p.127. 
36 Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism, pp.2I, 24. 
37 . Chalmers notes that in "Latin America and elsewhere in the Third -World...the military could 
claim that their unequal treatment of various groups in society was to correct the imbalances of the 
prior regime. In other words, the contrast in treatment accorded different segments of the population 
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Thus, Bianchi contends, "pluralism" (non- incorporation)38 can "serve as a 
form of punishment for group leaders who refuse to collaborate in state -controlled 
corporatist arrangements and as a vivid reminder of the marginal, precarious, and 
impotent roles awaiting collaborators who might try to exploit the privileges of 
corporatism in an independent manner. "39 This might include regime leaders choosing 
to expel, or marginalise, to paraphrase Bianchi, those over -ambitious "allies" who, 
through their incorporation, aspire to becoming "full coalition partners.s40 Regime 
leaders therefore exploit heterogeneous interest systems as a way of ensuring a 
permanent, but shifting, asymmetry of contending classes and group interests (both 
state and non -state). 
In the long term, however, such a strategy is limited in its utility. On the one 
hand, according to Bianchi, this kind of facilitation of controlled competition can get 
out of hand. State offers of special treatment and concessions to one associational 
constituency generates resentment among the neglected groups, which then organises 
to demand greater participation (inclusion) in the public decision -making processes 
and power- sharing arrangements. This results in a tendency for contending interests to 
vie for political predominance, which, in turn, can trigger a "chain reaction" of 
organisation and counter -organisation of differentially affected group interests 
(especially between pluralist and corporatist ones). 41 
under corporatism is not only possible, but expected." Chalmers, " Corporatsm and Comparative 
Politics," p.63. 
38 
. Bianchi's usage of "pluralism" can be misleading in this context and perhaps too loosely 
applied. E understand him to actually mean that the regime can deliberately exclude groups from 
incorporation in the existing state arrangements and thereby deny them access to state facilities and 
patronage. These groups then constitute part of an under -organised and relatively impotent 
associational pluralism. "Non- incorporation" or "exclusion" might have been more appropriate words 
to use than pluralism in this context. 
39 Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism, p.24. 
4o Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism. 
41 
. Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism, p.21. 
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On the other, at its exclusionary pole, corporatism tends to alienate broad 
classes and categories of people. These classes have no strong attachments or 
commitment to the established institutional arrangements or official ideologies, and 
therefore eventually organise outside of the formal political system and mobilise 
independently against it. One consequence of state policies of exclusion, in fact, is the 
creation of significant islands of unmediated, unincorporated, and therefore, relatively 
autonomous activity. Once the resentment and disaffection of broad sections of 
society finds common cause, either through unforeseen triggering events, or through 
cumulative processes that engender extended group awareness and shared goals, the 
isolated islands of autonomous activity can crystallise into coordinated group actions. 
The actions tend to focus on the deep structural inequalities caused by policies of 
exclusion and the attendant maldistribution of political and economic resources. They 
often call for an end to the established political and economic order and its 
incumbents in power.42 
In a nutshell, the highly discriminatory and exclusionary structures of the state 
engender different levels of disaffection with the political status quo, and eventually 
bring pluralist societal forces into conflict with the established and corporatised forces 
of the Authoritarian State. 
Scholarship on regime transitions has sought to explain the phenomenon of 
expanding pluralism in authoritarian polities, and the attendant trend away from 
undemocratic systems of governance to more democratic -pluralist ones during the late 
twentieth century. There are divergent approaches to the subject, with different 
explanations, but also a significant degree of overlap, about how this pluralism came 
42 
. Stepan, The state and society, ty, PP 43, 80 -81; Bianchi, Unruly Co rporatism, pp. 22 -25; 
Hoogvelt, Ankie M. M. Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of 
Development, Basingstoke, London, The MacMillian Press Ltd, 1997, pp.233 -4; Minxin Pei, From 
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about and impacted on authoritarian structures. One line of argument, with 
Huntington's book "The Third Wave: Democratizationi43 making an important 
contribution, and including authors like Diamond, Lipset, Linz, Pei, Ethier, Chazan 
and Shue, maintains that socioeconomic development and market forces in much of 
the Third World were responsible for the rapid expansion of civil associations and 
interest groups in those societies.44 
The increasing complexity and diversification of a national economy, set within 
the specific context of a deregulated global economy, produces pressures for market 
reforms domestically. The introduction of outward- oriented market reforms, often in 
response to economic crisis, accelerates the overall process of interdependence and 
interrelation between local and global economies. Sustained market forces depend on 
devolution of economic decision -making and generate new, expanding sources of 
non -governmental power and wealth outside the direct regulatory control of the state. 
Greater resources are made available For distribution throughout society resulting in 
major gains for private interests vis -à -vis the state. With a significant gain in 
resources come commensurate political leverage and influence and "countervailing 
capabilities" of society against the state. Sustained industrialisation, accelerated 
market forces, intensification of inequalities, and economic crisis, especially if 
occurring simultaneously, serve to raise the political consciousness of broad sections 
Reform to revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Societ Union, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp.54 -6. 
63 . Huntington, The third wave. 
44 . The underlying assumption is that modernisation, with significant levels of industrialisation and 
economic development, creates new pluralist and autonomous forces within an increasingly complex, 
differentiated, and competitive society. Society's standards of living rise dramatically, as do literacy 
rates, education, and ùrbanisation. The middle class sections of society expand, the working class 
becomes more combative, and new social groups and organisations emerge. Diamond et.al, 
"Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy," pp.18 -23; Pei, From Reform to revolution, 
pp.1 -3, 19 -21, 52 -58; Diane Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic 
Consolidation: theoretical Indicators," Diane Ethier (ed.), Democratic Transition and Consolidation in 
Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia, Basingstoke, London, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 
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of society. It stimulates their mobilisation into pólitics as social groups increase their 
demands on government for social justice and participation. The expanding pluralism 
and associated demands tend to cause a power shift in the upper levels of society and 
requires a renegotiation of social relations to meet the more complex social realities.45 
Although not disagreeing with "transition" literature concerning the link 
between the existence of vigorous civil association and democracy, Schmitter argues 
that "transition from authoritarian rule is clearly not merely a matter of economic 
development or societal complexity, as earlier literature on the `social requisites of 
democracy' put it." 
What is relevant to an understanding of these differences [between 
different countries] are the obscure historical conditions that have given 
rise to independent territorial communities, especially towns and cities, 
and to distinctive functional identities, especially of social classes, 
economic sectors, and professions. Ethnic and Iinguistic groups, religions 
and sects, voluntary associations and social service organizations, gender 
and generational groupings have also prominently contributed to the 
institutionalized social pluralism that supports a strong civil society.46 
According to this line of argument, a country with a strong history of civil 
associations independent of the state, which has subsequently come under 
authoritarian rule, stands a much better chance of democratising than do countries 
1990, pp. 10 -12, 18; Chazan, "Engaging the State," pp.272 -6; Shue, "State power and social 
organisation," pp. 74 -5, 82 -3. 
45 - Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism," pp146, 149; Diamond et.al., " Intoduction: Comparing 
Experiences with Democracy," p.19; Huntington, "The third wave," pp.59 -72; Pei, From Reform to 
Revolution, pp.42 -60; Ethier "Introduction: Processes of Transition," pp.10 -12, 18; Chazan, 
"Engaging the State," pp.272 -6; Shue, "State power and social organisation," pp.82 -5. 
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lacking viable civil associations.47 (However, a word of caution is in order, as 
vigorous civil society might be a pre- requisite of functioning democracy but not a 
sufficient condition. Functioning and stable political institutions {legislatures, the 
judiciary, and political parties} need to link civil society to the state and competition 
needs to be institutionalised, as well as involve moderation, compromise and 
widespread respect for civil liberties and human rights.) 
Other scholars give an additional explanation of growing pluralism in 
authoritarian polities. Hoogvelt argues that people's experience with the structures of 
political exclusion and poverty, combined with structural adjustment programs 
(economic reform), sparked urban movements and militant protest actions against 
social injustice and authoritarianism. In particular, regime -led economic reform made 
under structural adjustment agreements with international funding agencies caused an 
upsurge in associational activism in developing societies, as urban populations were 
deprived of state support, urban services, and subsidies.48 Chazan argues in the case of 
many countries in Africa that there was a growing diversity of associational activism 
since the adoption of structural adjustment.49 In their study of China, Unger and Chan 
note that economic reform policies "jeopardised" workers' benefits and led to 
organised worker resistance and militant actions by the 1990s.50 
Thus, middle class and entrepreneurial elements of society, and to some extent 
labour, increasingly conduct their activities outside the tutelage of the existing 
corporatist structures, which originally were instituted to contain societal pluralism, 
46 
. Schmitter, "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions," p.6. 
47 . Recent literature on regime transitions, largely, is in agreement with Schmitter's point, as this 
literature takes into account the specific configuration of civil societies and state in the countries under 
study. Diamond, Developing Democracy; Huntington, The third wave; Pei, From Reform to 
Revolution; Shue, "State power and social organization "; Chazan, "Engaging the State ". 
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and they compete with, and exploit, the weaknesses of the authoritarian institutions.51 
With respect to labour, regimes that initiate reforms commonly devolve authority 
within the centralised corporatist structures to local -level organisations, partly in 
response to new economic imperatives and partly in response to an upsurge in 
complaints against the unrepresentative arrangements. Whereas the goal of the regime 
invariably is to extend its corporatist net over social organisation by becoming, or 
appearing, more responsive to target constituencies, relaxation of controls tended to 
have the opposite effect. Chazan notes that in Africa "specific groups carved out their 
own spheres of autonomous action...[andl several officially controlled social 
institutions detached themselves from state control. "52 Unger and Chan argue that, as 
China's central leadership gradually devolved authority to the regions, corporatist 
arrangements showed signs of shifting from state to societal corporatism. They began 
to parcel out into more numerous, semi- independent entities and reflect the concerns 
and demands of their designated membership. In particular, during the mid- 1990s, 
"local union branches broke loose of central control and led strikes. "53 Overall, the 
different studies addressing regime transition indicate that, whereas in the 1960s and 
1970s central state (Corporatist) controls stunted the development of autonomous 
associational life, increasing associational capacity during the 1980s and 1990s was 
undermining authoritarianism and state corporatist structures in many developing 
countries. 
51 Pei, From Reform to Revolution, p.49. 
52 Chazan, "Engaging the State," p.274. 
53 
. Unger and Chan, "Corporatism in Cina," p.122. Deyo argues that labour in Tawain, South 
Korea, and Singapore underwent similar re- organisation, with "continuing differentiation and 
complexity [of proliferating new trades and industries] necessitating] a more decentralized structure 
based on enterprise paternalism and company unions" Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labour 
Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of 
California Press, 1989, pp.144 -5. 
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Scholars have given different weight to factors responsible for transitions such 
as economic liberalisation, crisis, intra -elite rivalry, political reform, social 
mobilisation, and foreign intervention. There is also debate on the prospect of 
democracy deepening, consolidating and/or suffering reversal in former non- 
democracies.54 Nonetheless, there is considerable agreement on certain empirically 
observable phenomena. First, economic liberalisation typically is followed by the 
introduction of some civil liberties and (if somewhat limited) renegotiation of social 
relations between components of state and society. Second, economic liberalisation 
acts to politicise state -society linkages and produces pressures for political reform or 
political openings. Increasing internal complexity of the state affects the state's 
organisational integrity, especially as the state undergoes a "pluralisation of 
departmental perspectives" and "rivalries." Correspondingly, regimes often 
experience internal division, or rupture of consensus, among the top leadership and its 
key supporters concerning the policy orientation and power -sharing arrangements of 
the regime. At the same time, there occurs mounting pressure for change from 
below.55 According to Huntington, liberal reformers seek to defuse the growing 
opposition to the regime by introducing minor changes, as they want to "create a 
kinder, gentler, more secure and stable authoritarianism without altering 
fundamentally the nature of the system. "56 These changes can include a loosening of 
repression, introduction of some civil liberties, greater toleration of criticism and 
sa Diamond, Developing Democracy; Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition "; Pei, From 
Reform to Revolution; Iloogvelt, "Globalization"; O'Donnell et.al. (eds.), Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule; Chazan, "Engaging the State "; Shue, "State power and social organisation "; 
Amitav Acharya, "Southeast Asia's Democratic Moment," Asian Survey: XXXIX (3) (May /June 
1999); Huntington, The third wave. 
ss Huntington, The third wave, p.122; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule; Pei, From Reform to Revolution, p.71; Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition "; Migdál, 
'Why Do So Many States Stay Intact ?" p.19. 
56 Huntington, The third wave, p.129. 
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public debate, reduction of censorship, and allowing civil society greater scope to 
conduct its affairs 57 
Third, if industrialisation and market processes produce latent social forces that 
progressively impinge on the political process and challenge state autonomy, political 
reform unleashes those forces at an accelerating speed. Initial political openings, as a 
side effect, produce escalating levels of social -political mobilisation. This is largely 
because: 
1) the Iifting of controls provides opportunities for opposition groups to exploit, 
and within which to operate and grow in organisational size, autonomy and 
strength, as they begin to test the limits of regime toleration of their activities; 
2) decline in repression results in a widespread loss of fear on the part of society, 
and a consequent preparedness to intensify demands on the system, and 
mobilise against it if those demands are not met, at the risk of persecution of 
its individual members. 
3) limited reforms raise considerably people's expectations that more, far - 
reaching liberalisation will be forthcoming, as well as increase aspirations for 
a fuller inclusion into a re- fashioned, or new, political system.58 
Pei argues that, with few exceptions (e.g., the Meiji Restoration, Bismark's Germany, 
Attaturk's modernising reforms), authoritarian rulers lose control of the regime - 
initiated reforms. The institutions of authoritarianism suffer decay, because they no 
longer are able to absorb, co -opt, channel, counter, or neutralise the diversifying 
demands and challenges of society.59 On the other hand, Ethier contends that an 
57 . Huntington, The third wave, p.129. 
38 . Huntington, The third wave, pp. 134, 136; Pei, From Reform to Revolution, pp.21, 54 -5; Ethier, 
"Introduction: Processes of Transition, "pp.7 -8. 
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absence of compromise on, or commitment to, reform on the part of the regime and 
interest groups can result in only provisional and arbitrary reforms, which can he 
"annulled at any time by the regime." 60 Huntington also argues that rising 
expectations for further change can lead to "instability, upheaval, and even violence; 
[which] in turn, could provoke an antidemocratic reaction and replacement of the 
liberalising leadership. "61 
Moreover, the ability of society based movements to dictate, or significantly 
influence, political developments in the transition process depends on various factors. 
These factors, together, constitute the strengths and weaknesses of social opposition 
groups relative to state resources and power. Such factors, writes Pei, include the 
organisational size, strength, autonomy, and value orientations of societal interests 
that constitute an opposition force. Autonomy is gauged in terms of a social group's 
capacity to undertake independent collective actions, in pressing its demands on the 
state, and to resist total "assimilation or co- optation" into the official (corporatist) 
structures and value orientations.62 A measure of a group's strength, among other 
things, is its "membership size, organisational and entrepreneurial capacity, and 
access to political and economic resources" -which includes its influence in the mass 
media. Value orientations refer to the commitment of a group to principles of 
participation and democracy, in contrast, for instance, to those groups that give 
priority to legitimate governmental order at the expense of such principles.63 
According to Pei, important to societal activation is the initial size and arena of 
reform. In particular, "the size of the opening matters less than the arena of the 
opening._ a relatively small or weak opening in a significant or strategic area [e.g., 
. F,thìer, "Introduction: Processes of Transition," p.12. 
61 . Huntington, The third wave, p.134. 
62 Pei, From Reform to Revolution, p.54. 
63 Pei, From Reform to Revolution, pp.55 -6. 
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NGOs, the Press, Labour] may unleash, after a short period, enormous amounts of 
stored energy in that particular area. "64 Liberal elements capture significant parts of 
the Press, NGO advocates and student dissidents are emboldened to take up the cause 
of labour and exploited classes, and independent labour unions begin to flourish and 
organise industrial actions. What begin as specific demands, reflecting local 
grievances for improvement in welfare provisions, land and labour rights, and better 
wages and working conditions broaden out into larger -scale democracy movements 
calling for an end to oppressive authoritarian rule. 
These emerging cells of civil society grow into a torrent of opposition coalitions 
that can coalesce into a major movement. Members of the intelligentsia, student 
activists, NGO advocates, and anti- regime dissidents start to identify with each 
other's causes and build cross -class, cross sectional linkages that serve to undermine 
the hierarchical ordering of state corporatist structures. However, the dismantling of 
exclusionary corporatist institutions does not necessarily result in their replacement 
with viable democratic institutions. If a new regime succeeds in replacing the old 
authoritarian regime, it still needs to build a new linkage system between state and 
society; one that will open new channels of participation to those groups seeking or 
demanding inclusion in the political system without undermining the system's 
stability. 
There is no logical point at which we should end analysis and review of 
literature and there is much that can be added about regime transitions towards more 
democratic -pluralist political systems. However, the main purpose of the discussion 
concerning transitions is to provide some background observations to subsequent 
04 . Pei, From Reform to Revolution, p.53. 
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analysis in chapters. This discussion now turns to chapter three and a consideration of 
how the Suharto regime implemented state corporatist arrangements and strategies. 
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Chapter 3 
State Corporatism and Indonesia under Suharto 
1. Concepts 
As a pattern of state -group interest regulation, corporatism does not exist 
separately from other forms of organisation in society. Corporatism and societal 
pluralism (the spectrum of independently organised interests in society) are two sides 
of the same coin in analysing state and society. The analysis of corporatism in 
Indonesia therefore is divided into the two themes set out in the introduction. Chapters 
3 -6 deal with the first theme concerning the establishment of an exclusionary pattern 
of state corporatism as it was applied to political groups generally (chapter three) and 
to Muslim groups, in particular (chapters 4 -6). Chapters 7 -10 explore the second 
theme concerning wider political relationships between corporatised Muslim groups, 
the state, and other social -political groups, with emphasis on the growing pluralist 
challenges to the state. 
The two terms used throughout the study, in line with theory on varieties of 
state corporatism, are "exclusionary corporatism" and "inclusionary corporatism." 
Regular reference will be made to the idea that group interests are "incorporated" into 
state structures and "channelled" into government programs, thereby diverting the 
interests from political activities. This use of language is not inconsistent with the 
framework of analysis, as exclusionary corporatism channels interests in a manner 
that locks the interests out of power and restricts their participation. Incorporation has 
a broader meaning than inclusion, as the former concept covers all intiatives to bring 
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group interests into state supervised arrangements whether the intitives are aimed at 
excluding interests from, or including interests in, political institutions and power. 
Suharto's management of state- society (interest group) relations will variously 
be called corporatist "strategy," "initiatives," "arrangements," and "(re)- structuring." 
"The strategy of corporatist `containment' and/or `capture - refers to the idea that the 
purpose of state corporatism is to bring (capture) independent organisations and 
interests into state structures and prevent them from exiting from those structures 
(containment) or from organising independently of the state. The containment of 
interests was part of broader initiatives for the "de- politicisation" of state and society 
aimed at severing ties between elite -level politics and grassroots interests. The 
argument will be made that in the 1990s there occurred a politicisation or "re- 
politicisation" of state and society as members of the political elite sought to organise 
outside of corporatist arrangements and reconnect politically with grassroots interests. 
Thus, "re- politicisation" refers to people organising outside and independently of the 
prescribed political arrangments in order to more fully participate, contest office, and 
make demands on the political system. 
A final point of clarification is needed. Analysis of corporatism does not 
provide explanation of the workings of the entire political system. The political 
system under Suharto can he characterised as "exclusionary," with the manipulation 
of electoral politics, the stacking of political institutions with Suharto loyalists, and 
the use of repression against dissent also considerably reinforcing what might best be 
described as a policy of political exclusion. Thus, when reference is made to there 
being a "mix of exclusionary strategies," "including corporatism," this is shorthand 
for the various types of political exclusion of group interests undertaken by Suharto. 
In particular, corporatist organisation of group interests provides authoritarian regimes 
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with a means of reducing the need for indiscriminate coercion. Nonetheless, 
authoritarian leaders frequently resort to direct repression of dissent when corporatism 
fails to neutralise organised opposition. Lastly, some organisations highlighted in this 
study might not be "purely" corporatist but nonetheless exhibit key features, or 
behave in a manner, that appears to reinforce an exclusionary corporatist pattern of 
organisation. In describing such organisations or Suharto's strategy for restructuring 
such organisations, the phrase "along corporatist lines" will be used. 
2. Establishing a corporatist framework in Indonesia 
Several scholars have applied corporatist frameworks to their analyses of 
Indonesian politics. What follows are a review of this literature and an explanation of 
state corporatist organisation, with emphasis on its development under the New Order 
regime of President Suharto. 
Reeve, in his book entitled "Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative To The Party 
System," has made a major contribution to scholarly understanding about the 
development of non -party, functional group representation in Indonesia. Reeve has 
shown how Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, motivated by his vision for a one - 
party state, and by the need to create a broad base of support with which to underwrite 
his executive control over a newly- defined political system,2 promoted functional 
group representation as an alternative to party based democracy.3 From 1956 -1956, 
. David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative To The Party System, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1985. 
z 
. Sukarno was not content with remaining a figurehead president, and parliamentary democracy 
had provided him with no formal channels to play the more central role he desired in shaping the 
political future of the nation. Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, pp.109 -122. 
. Indonesia's short experiment with parliamentary democracy in the 1950s Ieft the political parties 
largely discredited. The parties were seen as divisive, faction- ridden, and self -seeking, with the rise and 
fall of successive, short -lived cabinets only adding to widespread perceptions that they were incapable 
of establishing a stable political order. More than thirty parties contested the 1955 general election, 
which saw four main parties -the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PM), the Muslim modernist part 
(Masyumi), the Muslim traditional party (Nandlatul Ulama), and the Indonesian Communist Party 
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Sukarno promoted the idea of establishing a "guided democracy," which, in one 
formulation was to include a National Front as a co- ordinating body for functional 
groups under his leadership. The thinking behind functional groups was that all 
groups and interests that comprised the nation would be incorporated and linked to the 
state according to the function and/or profession they performed.4 A major part of 
Sukarno's strategy entailed coaxing voluntary mass organisations ( orinas) to sever 
their ties with their mother parties and to enter the parliament and other institutions as 
members of functional groups. Together with regional and other non -party 
professional categories, the orinas would be drawn into a single national party or 
council based on common "functional" interest. On 5 July 1959, Sukarno introduced 
by presidential decree an authoritarian order called "Guided Democracy," which 
formalised greater presidential power and reduced to ten the number of political 
parties.5 
In the late 1950s, army leaders began to form their own functional groups in 
rivalry with Sukarno. From 1957 to 1959, they established a number of cooperation - 
bodies (BKS) with the aim of de- linking mass organisations from affiliation with the 
(PKI) -gain 84 percent of the national vote. The failure of any party to obtain sufficient votes to govern 
in its own right generated deep scepticism at the prospect that Indonesian politics would continue to 
function on the basis of unstable, coalition cabinets. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional 
Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962. 
4 . Ideally, interests would no longer find representation in the political system through their party 
affiliation. 
5 . Sukarno formed a presidential cabinet, with the party leaders gaining no ministerial posts. One 
month later, the composition of a National Planning Board, consisting of a chairman, three deputies, 51 
Golkar and 22 regional representatives and containing no formal party representation, was announced. 
This was followed by the issuance of a number of presidential decisions and government regulations in 
1960, including the formation of a Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MFRS- or National 
Front) comprising of the existing DPR plus 94 regional and 200 Golkar representatives. In March, 
Sukarno issued a decree suspending the national and provincial parliaments (DPR and DPRD) and 
appointed new ones. Regional and Golkar members obtained the lion's share of 425 seats against 130 
party representatives in the new DPR. Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, p.164 -5; Leo Suryadinata, Military 
Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar, (Monographs in International 
Studies), Athens, Ohio, Ohio University, 1989. 
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political parties and bringing them under army control.6 In 1964, they brought the 
various BKS into a Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golkar), which 
was primarily intended as an anti -communist/anti- labour front and as a mechanism to 
assist the army integrate into the political structure. The leaders pursued strategies of 
counter -mobilisation against the Left, as well as the demobilisation of labour in 
contrast to Sukarno's populist mobilisations. 
The installation of Suharto's military- backed New Order regime exhibited 
many of the features attributed to countries undergoing a change of regime -type from 
authoritarian populist to bureaucratic -authoritarian regime.8 After an abortive coup of 
1965, which Suharto blamed on the Communists, the army ruthlessly eliminated its 
main rival, PKI, in a bloody massacre followed by a counter coup. The army moved 
against Sukarno and his radical nationalist supporters, and purged the civil service, 
military, and political institutions of "old order" forces. The army leadership 
transformed Golkar in accordance with its new strategy to demobilise and pre -empt 
6 . These included a Youth- Military Cooperation Body, a Labour- Military Cooperation Body, a 
Peasant -Military Cooperation Body and a Press -Military Contact Body. In January 1958, the army 
founded the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB), as a coordinating body for BKSs 
and subsequently promoted it as the sole national organisation for functional groups. This brought the 
army leaders into direct confrontation with Sukarno, who intervened in its choice of leaders and openly 
disparaged the organisation. Sukarno created the National Front in 1959 to replace FNPIB, and the 
army and PKI became major competitors in the Front. Sukarno Ieaned more and more to the Left, and 
towards a pro -China/anti -West foreign policy, and PKI increased its militancy and influence until it 
virtually dominated the National Front. This led to a polarisation between pro -PKI and anti -PKI forces 
as the military prepared to retaliate. Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, pp.119 -120, 146 -148. 
. Sukarno's proclamation of Martial Law in March 1957 in order to combat secessionist rebellions, 
and the anti -Western campaigns against the Dutch in West Irian and the British in Malaysia provided 
the army with an extensive role in civilian affairs. The army also took managerial control of Dutch 
estates and enterprises under a virulent program of nationalisation aimed at launching Indonesia on the 
path of an import- substitution phase of industrialisation. With the anticipated termination of martial law 
in 1962, the army leaders needed to find a rationale and legal basis for the military's continuing role in 
civilian affairs and to defend its economic interests. 
8 
. I am not arguing that the Suharto regime was a bureaucratic- authoritarian one. My roncern is not so 
much with regime types, as it is with explanations of internal structures and interactions of the political 
system. For an argument concerning the relevance of applying bureaucratic authoritarianism to 
Suharto's New Order see the study by Dwight Y. King, "Indonesia's New Order as a Bureaucratic 
Politiy, A Neopatrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic -Authoritarian Regime: What Difference Does It 
Make ?" Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds.), Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen 
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the re- emergence of autonomous political organisation and left -wing movements that 
Sukarno had activated during the previous populist phase. Their exclusionary 
strategies created a de- politicised environment to help prepare the ground for 
accelerated economic development.9 
Ward, Emmerson, Suryadinata and others have shown how the Suharto regime 
re- fashioned Golkar into the regime's electoral machine and, together with the 
introduction of new election and party laws, vote rigging, and manipulations ensured 
that it would achieve landslide victories at general elections. Ali Murtopo (a military 
officer), a close adviser to Suharto and member of the president's personal staff 
(SPRI), was the main strategist who developed Golkar's election strategy and the 
corporatist framework. Murtopo exerted considerable influence from the mid -1960s to 
the late- 1970s, after which his political fortunes declined. He had worked under 
Suharto's command during the West Irian campaign as a member of Special 
Operations (OPSUS, an informal intelligence section of the Army Strategic Reserve, 
Kostrad). He used OPSIJS as a base for conducting his election strategy and Golkar 
interventions, and established the General Election Controlling Body (Bapilu) as his 
main vehicle for managing the general election of 1971. The Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) was also a power base for Murtopo.1° 
Ward describes how Murtopo gathered around himself intelligence personnel 
and a number of modernising intellectuals and technocrats, including Catholics, 
intellectuals from Gadja Madah University in Yogyakarta (Central Java), and a group 
Contributions to the Debate, Interim Reports Series No.62, Ithaca, New York, Cornell Modern 
Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1982. 
9 . Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988. 
Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java case Study, Cheltenham, Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1974, pp.2 -49; Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: 
Weakness in Strength," Karl D. Jackson and T,ucian W. Pye (eds.), Political Power and 
Communications in Indonesia, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1978, 
pp.99 -109; Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture, pp.23 -41. 
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of intellectuals from Bandung (West Java). In 1971, the Murtopo group established 
the largely Chinese -Catholic run think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS). Together these modernisers elaborated upon an OPSUS -led scheme 
of political restructuring with which to underwrite programs for economic 
development." Part of their strategy included obtaining a clear victory for Golkar at 
the first general election of 1971 so that Golkar could then implement the planned 
institutional reconstruction.'2 
Emmerson illustrates how the Minister of Internal Affairs, Amir Machmud 
(also a military general) implemented the Golkar strategy, beginning within his own 
department, as part of a broader effort to eliminate party influence from the 
government bureaucracy. The aim was to create a new cadre of de- politicised civil 
servants and to imbue them with internal discipline and undivided loyalty to a 
centralised chain of command, presided over by President Suharto (the supreme 
commander of the armed forces). In line with the Golkar strategy, Machmud required 
staff at the Ministry to join a Corps of Functionaries for the Ministry (Korps 
Karyawan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Kokarmendagri), or face the threat of dismissa1.13 
During the 1971 election campaign, Ali Murtopo organised rival Korps 
Karyawan (Kokar) in governmental departments, ministries and institutions and, after 
the election, they were fused into a single organisation, the Corps of Civil Servants of 
the Republic of Indonesia, Korpri.14 Machmud issued Governmental Regulation (PP 
ii Ward, The 1971 Election, pp.2 -49. 
'2 Murtopo promoted Golkar as the only social -political force that was capable of uniting 
functional groups under a single banner at the elections, and the only one oriented to the government's 
development program. As such, he tried to establish Golkar's monopoly of representation of community 
groups and cast the political parties in the role of ideologically divisive and anti -development forces. 
Ali Murtopo, Strategi Politik Nasional, Jakarta, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1974, 
pp.67 -101. 
s 
. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context," pp.105 -106. 
4 . Murtopo and Machmud, in fact, were rivals as each sought to gain control of civil servants. 
Machmud seemed to score a victory as he became head of Korpri's most powerful supervisors' council 
(Dewan Pembina). 
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No.6/1970), requiring civil servants to swear their sole allegiance ( "mono- loyalty ") to 
the government and cut their ties with the political parties. In practice, at general 
elections, civil servants were organised into voting for Golkar, and faced dismissal if 
they refused to comply,15 
The Korpri strategy undermined the strength of some of the political parties 
and the trade unions, by depriving them of substantial bases of support. For example, 
the Indonesian National Party (PNI) had drawn much of its support from the 
bureaucracy, and the Islamic party, Nandlatul Ulama (Awakening of Religious 
Scholars), had entrenched itself in the Department of Religion. Under the new 
provisions, independent trade unions also were refused access to Korpri members, and 
therefore were greatly weakened. In reality, however, state leaders were unable to 
enforce rigidly mono -loyalty provisions, as some government employees (especially 
from the Department of Religion) continued to vote for the parties.16 
The Korpri initiative was part of a wider strategy of the "Big Golkar Family 
(Golkar, Korpri, and ABRI)," to enable the military and the bureaucracy to penetrate 
all levels of Indonesian society from the national level downward to the province, 
district, sub -district and village levels. This coincided with greater military intrusion 
into the government bureaucracy, with military officers holding civilian office as 
governors, and district heads. These officials were charged with bringing about a 
Golkar victory at local and national elections. Before the 1982 election, village chiefs 
became Korpri members under a new regulation, which effectively linked village 
15 
. Presidential Decision no. 82/1971 made membership of Korpri compulsory for civil servants, 
employees of state corporations and employees of private corporations in which the government held 
part ownership. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context, pp.106 -109; Ward, The 1971 
Election, p.12. 
16 . Interview with Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara [Coordinator of Cabinet Presidium Personal Staff 
of the President (1966- 1968); Secretary of State (1968 
- 1972); Minister of Religious Affairs (1978- 
1983)1, 22 September 1997. 
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headmen to the national government and helped facilitate the mobilisation of rural 
populations behind Golkar.17 
Complementing this militarisation and Golkarisation of state and society, was 
the introduction of the "floating mass" concept in 1971, whereby the political parties 
were denied access to their traditional constituencies below the district level. Golkar 
established non -party functional and professional organisations with which to re- 
channel the interests of the rural population. Between 1973 -1974, the government 
required various professional and community organisations to merge into state - 
dominated, non -competitive national peak bodies (wadah tunggal) to represent the 
respective community interests in relation to the state. For instance, the army- 
controlled Central Coordinating Body for Farmers' Mass Organisations (BKS Tani) 
was transformed into a more centralised and unified Indonesian Farmers' Harmony 
Association (HKTI) and six fishermen's organisations were amalgamated into the All - 
Indonesian Fishermen's Association (HNSI). After several trial attempts, the All - 
Indonesian Federation of Labourers (FBSI) was established as the sole association for 
the labour movement. In 1985, FBSI was transformed into a more centralised and 
monolithic organisation called the All- Indonesian Workers' Association (SPSI). The 
state gave license to a re- defined Congress of Indonesian Women (KOWANI) and a 
re- defined Teachers' Union of the Republic of Indonesia (PGRI).18 
The functional groups system gave the government bureaucracy the means to 
by -pass the political parties and make direct links with society. Antlov, Cederoth and 
Sullivan argue that in reality there was a sharp discontinuity between the peak 
organisations and rural communities, which were organised into a plethora of village- 
17 
. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp.45 -6, 96 -7. 
18 
. Typical of the new emphasis on function, PGRI had to change its orientation from workers' 
union to professional organisation and its program, like those of the other peak organisations, had to 
45 
level cooperative and vigilance bodies along quasi -military lines. Instead of having 
their interests channelled upward through these functional institutions, rural 
communities were shut -off from national politics and decision -making above the sub- 
district level. Instead, the functional institutions acted as mechanisms for sending state 
directives downward, and for managing and supervising Iower- level social 
activities.19 
Suharto's regime sought to contain the political parties within the corporatist 
framework, resulting in the law on party simplification of 1973, wherein the existing 
nine political parties were forced to merge into two state -sponsored parties. Four 
Muslim parties joined a new amalgam, the United Development Party (PPP) and two 
nationalist, two Christian, and a socialist party entered the Indonesian Democracy 
Party (PDI). PPP and PDI were the only two parties officially permitted to contest the 
five -yearly general elections against the much stronger Golkar machine. Ward, Liddle 
and Suryadinata have demonstrated that military and bureaucratic backing of Golkar, 
interventions in party leaderships, security vetting of party candidates, election fraud, 
vote -buying and intimidation all helped ensure that Golkar obtained landslide 
victories at the polls and that the parties remained fragmented and weak.20 
The general elections aimed to garner for the New Order rulers a modicum of 
legitimacy, and Golkar's dominance was seen as a test of Suharto's ability to impose 
his will on the political system. One year after each general election, a People's 
support the government's five -yearly development plans (Repelita). Murtopo, Strategi Politik Nasional, 
pp .67-101; Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, p.70. 
19 . Hans Anlov and Sven Cederroth, "Introduction," and Hans Antlov, "The Village Leaders and the 
New Order," IIans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (eds.), Leadership On Java.' Gentle Hints, Authoritarian 
Rule, Surrey, Curzon Press, 1994, pp.7- 19,73 -96; Norma Sullivan, "Master and Managers: A study of 
gender relations in urban Java," (unpublished manuscript), Singapore, National University of 
Singapore, Central Library, 24 February 1995, pp.52 -76. 
. Ward, The 1977 Election; William R. Liddle, "The 1977 Indonesian Election and New Order 
Legitimacy," (unpublished manuscript) Canberra, The Australian National University, Menzies Libräry, 
1977; Leo Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia, Singapore, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 1982. 
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Consultative Assembly (MPR) would convene to "elect" the president and vice 
president and decide on the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) for the next five - 
year term. The initial composition of the MPR was 920 members, consisting of the 
460 members of the DPR (People's Representative Council) and 460 appointees 
(including a quota of regional, special and functional representatives). At that time, 
the DPR comprised of 360 elected members from Golkar and the parties in 
accordance with their share of the votes at general elections, 75 ABRI appointees, and 
25 Karyawan (civilian) appointees. In 1984, the membership of the MPR inceased to 
1000 and the DPR to 500, with ABRI increasing its seats to one hundred in both. 
Overwhelming victories for Golkar at elections, and the system of appointees, many 
of them handpicked by the president, ensured that the MPR remained stacked in 
favour of the New Order rulers and the legislative bodies behaved as rubber stamp 
institutions for the passing of laws. It also guaranteed President Suharto's 
unchallenged re- election to the countries top job every five- years.21 
The development of a corporatist framework overseen by Golkar occurred 
over a protracted period, as these institutions experienced repeated reorganisations, 
which were directed toward achieving more monolithic structures under the 
centralising control of the state.22 Suharto retained control of Golkar and 
21 
. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp.65, 97, 101. 
22 After 1965, military officers loyal to Sukarno still dominated Sekber Golkar's central executive 
board, and hence reorganisations of Golkar were aimed partly at replacing these men with Suharto 
loyalists. Sekber Golkar changed from an unwieldy federation of almost 300 member functional 
organisations, to around 200 affiliates, and then in October 1969 to an amalgam of seven basic 
organisations (kinos), as party men also were purged from Golkar. For instance, Amir Machmud issued 
Permen 12 (December 1969), which was directed towards cleansing functional groups of party men and 
affiliations, and giving Sekber Golkar at least half the seats in provincial and regional legislatures. After 
the 1971 election, a change of name to the shortened title Golkar accompanied further reorganisation. 
Golkar's First National Congress in September 1973 witnessed a power struggle between its 
heterogeneous membership, especially between Murtopo's group and the Department of Defence, 
Hankam. Amir Murton (a Hankam man) became the new General Chairman preventing Murtopo's 
group from dominating Golkar. Golkar experienced another modification, including the creation of a 
dual structure of executive boards and supervisors' councils (Dewan Pembina) at central, provincial and 
regency levels. The supervisors' council (headed by military men) was the decision- making body and 
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progressively offset the military's influence within it. For example, at Golkar's 
Second National Congress in October 1978, he became chairman of the supervisors' 
council, and active military officers were no longer permitted to hold office in Golkar. 
At the Third National Congress in October 1983, the supervisors' council became the 
supreme council with veto rights over the policies and decisions of the central 
executive board, the right to freeze the board, and the right to appoint leaders of other 
boards. Sudharmono (a close confidant of Suharto and Secretary of State) became 
General Chairman of the organisation. He presided over a new strategy for Golkar 
based on supplementing indirect membership through affiliate (functional) 
organisations of Golkar with the registration of individual membership. The aim of 
the strategy was to build a cadre party with a mass membership as a support base for 
Suharto. Golkar began to look like a ruling party, with the injection of a greater 
civilian membership.23 
Robison argues that Golkar's transformation, which was well in process by the 
4th National Congress in 1988, was part of a strategy to shift "the nature of state 
corporatism from one dominated by the officials and institutions of the state to one 
dominated by new social groups,s24 represented by Suharto's family. The intention 
was that the military and civilian bureaucracies were to become subservient primarily 
to the family interests of Suharto and a new oligarchy within the reorganised 
structures. In the face of Suharto's declining support from the military, another 
objective was to recruit strategic members of the rising middle classes into the regime 
the central executive board implemented decisions. This dual structure enabled the military to supervise 
their civilian counterparts and to undertake "cultivation, control and direction" of Golkar. 
2s 
. Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp.107, 127; David Reeve, "The Corporatist State: The Case 
of Golkar," Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Clayton, Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990, p.52. 
- 
24 . Richard Robison, "Organising the transition: Indonesian politics in 1993/94," Ross H. McLeod 
(ed.), Indonesian Assessment 1994: Finance as a Key Sector in Indonesia's Development, Canberra, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 1997, p.52. 
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and convince them that the existing corporatist structures served their career 
ambitions and interests. 
However, Golkar never attained the status of a mass -based party and its 
aggressive recruitment of party cadres fell well short of projected targets.25 At 
Golkar's Fifth National Congress in 1993, Suharto replaced some military leaders in 
Golkar with civilian figures, with a compliant Harmoko becoming the first civilian 
general chairman of Golkar. Another civilian leader, and Suharto protege, the 
Minister of Science and Technology, B.J. Habibie, headed a seven -person committee 
of formateurs, which was responsible for selecting the new Golkar chairman and its 
Executive Board.26 
Robison explains that an important aspect of the new arrangements was that 
state- sponsored mass organisations, such as the youth fronts KNPI (National 
Committee of Indonesian Youth) and AMPI (Indonesian Development Generation of 
Youth), as well as mass organisations outside of the state apparatus and functional 
groups were cultivated as support groups for Golkar. For example, two of Suharto's 
children, Sid Rukmana and Bambang Trihatmodjo, who held senior positions in 
Golkar, had their own supporting youth fronts.27 Both the Golkar chairman and Siti 
Rukmana dispensed massive patronage to constituencies in the race for grassroots 
support. New regulations introduced in 1995 brought about regeneration within 
Golkar. Fealy notes that the regulations aimed to displace about 60 percent of its 
older, long- serving Golkar members of the DPR with "younger high- profile leaders 
zs Moreover, the Golkar's Fourth National Congress in 1988, Suharto, in an apparent compromise 
with he military, approved the election of an army general, Wahono, as the new General Chairman of 
Golkar. ABRI also launched a successful campaign to install military personnel to head Golkar at the 
sub -national level. 
zs 
. Many of the civilian membership were drawn from a newly formed corporatist organisation, the 
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), chaired by Habibie. Robison, 'Organising the 
transition," p.53. 
n 
. Robison, "Organising the transition," p.57. 
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from mass organisations who can maximise Golkar's appeal to the under -40s voters 
who constitute the majority of the electorate. "28 
The changes to Golkar brought about not only a shift in the balance of power 
in favour of civilian family interests of Suharto and his close associates. It also 
created a ruling party that sought to draw upon increasingly heterogeneous sources of 
support that was, at face value, more inclusionary in nature and, to some extent, 
outside of the corporatist structures. Maclntyre argues that there would most likely 
occur a shift from the New Order's exclusionary corporatist framework to a more 
inclusionary one, rather than a shift to democracy, given the mounting pluralist 
pressures for change in the 1990s.29 Nonetheless, under Suharto, Golkar continued to 
preside over a political system organised along exclusionary lines, which denied the 
right of Indonesians to organise independently and did not open new channels of 
participation in the formal political system. It appears that Suharto's strategy from the 
late -1980s until the late -1990s was directed towards securing his unchallenged 
dominance over the political system, and reducing the political influence of ABRI, 
rather than making Golkar more responsive to the grassroots. It was also a strategy 
directed towards absorbing and deflecting the growing demands within society for 
democratic participation and change, by co- opting strategic middle classes into 
existing political structures. 
Studies by Hadiz, Lambert and others on The New Order regime's structuring 
of labour reinforce this general picture of corporatist organisation. Despite a short 
period in the early -to -mid 1990s of a relaxation of controls on labour and the 
2e Greg Ferly, "Indonesian Politics, 1995 -96: The Makings of a Crisis," Gavin T. Jones and 
Terence H. Hull (eds.), Indonesian Assessment: Population and Human Resources, Canberra, Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, p.21, 
z9 Andrew Maclntyre, "Organising Interests: Corporatism in Indonesian Politics," (Working Paper 
No.43), Canberra, National Library of Australia, (August 1994). 
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introduction of some reforms, which devolved limited authority to industry sector 
unions, the overall corporatist structure remained exclusionary in nature.36 
2. Ideological and structural underpinnings of corporatism in Indonesia 
A) The State philosophy of Pancasila 
Bourchier illustrates how European -derived corporatist thought found its way 
to Indonesia. Mostly European- trained Indonesian law scholars adapted major strands 
of corporatist thought to local circumstances. Corporatist values of organic- statism31 
were written into Indonesia's Constitution of 1945 and found strong expression in the 
state philosophy of Pancasila (five principles). New Order strategists turned Pancasila 
into an "ideological" project for the containment and exclusion of alternative 
ideologies deemed as threatening to the political fabric and stability of the nation. 
Communism, Islamic ideology, and Liberalism were identified as antithetical to a 
collectivist ideal of organic -statism as contained in Pancasila, which was to provide a 
3o Vedi R. Hadiz, Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia, Perth, London, New York, Asia 
Research Centre, Murdoch University, 1997; Vedi R. Hadiz, "Challenging State Corporatism on the 
Labour Front: Working Class Politics in the 1990s," David Bourchier and John Legge, Democracy in 
Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, Clayton, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994; 
Robert Lambert (ed.), State and Labour in New Order Indonesia, Perth, University of Western 
Australia Press, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 1997. 
31 . In line with historical developments, corporatist theorists appealed to an ideal that had existed in 
medieval European society of organic community, in which landlord and peasant coexisted and co- 
operated in a "family- like" unity of harmonious and hierarchically ordered society. Each person had 
his/her ranking on the ladder of fixed social status and knew his/her station in life. The predominant 
economic activity was the guild system, in which each person was identified by the specialised 
occupation they performed. People assumed their duties and privileges from their respective location 
within this integrated social order. Contributing to the debate, Stepan, in his book entitled "State and 
Society (1978)," showed that the idea of organic community/state belonged to a corpus of political 
thought, which he called "organic- statism ". He traced the origins of organic -statism to Aristotle, Roman 
Iaw, and medieval law. European philosophers, who were predisposed to nationalism, contributed to 
this body of ideas, with contemporary Roman Catholic social philosophers (in the late- 1970s) also 
becoming strong exponents of the theory. Organic -statism posited a strong role for the state in 
achieving social order and harmony, the common good and political community, and provided an 
abstract model of governance. In concrete terms, corporatism is an institutional pattern that sometimes 
draws its theoretical supports from organic- statism. David Bourchier, "Lineages of Organicist Political 
Thought in Indonesia," Thesis (Ph.D.), Clayton, Department of Politics, Monash University, June 1996; 
Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1978, pp.27 -8, 41; For a comprehensive coverage of the European 
theoretical contributions to corporatist (organic -statist) thought see Peter J. Williamson, Varieties of 
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single political culture to underwrite the new corporatist arrangements. During the 
197Os, state leaders introduced Pancasila Moral Education (PMP) and Guidelines for 
the Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila (P4) indoctrination courses. 
Through these courses, the state leadership sought to instill in military personnel, civil 
servants, teachers, students and broader society the main values contained in the 
official political culture. The courses emphasised a so- called "integralist" conception 
of state -societal relations that placed great emphasis on the family unit as the nucleus 
of paternalistically guided, hierarchically "ordered" and "harmonious" society. Like 
Stephan's "organic- statism," integralism was a conception of state and society 
constituting an organic unity with the state having a strong role in establishing social 
order. The courses and " integralism" stressed inter -connecting duties and obligations 
of citizens to their immediate family, which tied Indonesians in ever -wider concentric 
circles of allegiance and loyalty to the state, itself conceived as the larger family. The 
"integralistic" conception of the state became an underlying functional logic of 
Golkar, and "the whole idea of the collectivity of the nation" was "expressed through 
functional groups" of the `Big Golkar Family. "32 These values were also a central part 
of European, Latin American, and East Asian corporatist thought. 
In Indonesia, the state and society conceived as a family meant that there was 
little room for dissent. Dissent was seen, at best, as an act of disobedience of a 
naughty child deserving of punishment and scorn. At worst, dissent was viewed as 
subversion that required heavy stricture and removal from the family (imprisonment 
or worse). These organicist values were used as an instrument of ideological 
Corporatism: Theory and Practice, Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, 
Sydney, Cambridge IJniversity Press, 1985, pp.20 -103. 
32 Reeve, "The Corporatist State," p.161; Bourchier, Lineages of Organicist Political Thought, 
pp.228 -246. 
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persuasion 33 In the mid- 1980s, the state mandated Pancasila as the sole ideological 
foundation of all organisational life in Indonesia, effectively prohibiting organisations 
from adhering to alternative ideologies in their party platforms and programs. 
Pancasila Industrial Relations (HIP) codified the ideal of harmonious relations 
between state, employer, and worker conceived as a mutually beneficial partnership in 
which all parties sought industrial peace and productivity. Workers' strikes were 
regarded as being in "contradiction with the principles" governing HIP34 Both ABRI 
and Golkar became purveyors and defenders of state ideology and political culture. 
B) The Department of Defence and Security 
This analysis would not be complete without examining the military 
institutions and doctrines that underwrote Indonesia's exclusionary social -political 
order after 1965. The armed forces (ABRI) and the Department of Defence and 
Security (Dephankam), developed a number rationales and structures giving sanction 
to its expanding role in civilian affairs, some of them dating back to Sukarno's years. 
Although these rationales were developed outside of a corporatist framework, 
Dephankam brought some of them into Golkar, corporatist institutions and the 
broader community as it intensified its indoctrination of civilian society and 
militarisation of civilian institutions. 
ABRI's propaganda machine constantly reminded Indonesians of the 
military's indispensable role as a saviour and creator of an independent Indonesia 
during the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. ABRI claimed the right to a 
33 
. John Sullivan, Local government and community in Java: an urban case -study, Singapore, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp.97 -109, 172 -185, 201 -207; John, R. Bowen, "On the Political 
Construction of Tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia," The Journal of Asian Studies: XLV (3) (May 
1986). 
34 
. Vedi R. Hadiz, "State and Labour in the Early New Order," and Edi Cahyono, "The Unjuk Rasa 
Movement," Lambert (ed.), State and Labour in New Order Indonesia, pp. 33, 109 -113. 
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special role in civilian affairs based on this period as a people's army fighting 
guerrilla warfare and as the effective government in many parts of rural Java.35 Army 
leaders developed a major doctrinal rationale for ABRI's role in civilian affairs called 
the "dual function" or dwi-fungsi doctrine.36 The doctrine encompassed a security and 
defence role as a military organisation and a "social -political" role in ideological, 
political, social, economic, cultural and religious spheres of national life. 
It was, however, through the development of an elaborate territorial command 
structure that the military exerted its pervasive influence on society. From 1958 to 
1962, army leaders developed the doctrines of "territorial warfare (perang wilayah)" 
and "territorial management (pemhinaan wilayah)" as a justification for its expanding 
role under martial law.37 During the New Order period, the military extended this 
structure until its tentacles intruded into virtually all aspects of national life at the 
national, provincial, and district levels. The territorial structure paralleled the 
government bureaucracy and party apparatus at each administrative level, providing 
Indonesia with elaborate "double government." ABRI realised its role in civilian 
affairs as kekaryaan (functionaries), through membership of Golkar, and as seconded 
as 
. Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1996, pp.193 -4; 
Sursyadinata, Military Ascendancy, p.7. 
6. The dwi-fungsi doctrine evolved from a speech made on 12 November 1958 by the then army 
chief of staff, General Nasution, who declared that the Indonesian army would take a "middle way" 
between two extremes. It would neither "follow the course of Latin American armies [of military 
dictatorship]" nor take "the passive role prescribed for the military establishments in Western Europe 
[under civilian control]." Nasution provided the first public justification for the military's "integration 
into the political theory and structure of Guided Democracy." He talked of the military exerting a 
positive influence on the polity without overly dominating its institutions and processes. With the onset 
of the New Order, Nasution's "middle way" was transformed into a doctrine of military domination. At 
the First Army Seminar in April 1965, the military began to outline its claim to a dual role or 
"function," which army leaders elaborated upon at the Second Army Seminar in 1966. Reeve, Golkar of 
Indonesia, p.144. 
37 . With the lifting of martial law in 1962, they supplemented their territorial doctrine with the 
concept of operasi karya ( "civic mission ") as justification for their continued role in civilian 
administration. Operasi karya provided the military with a central role in rural development projects 
reaching down to the village level, which was placed on a legal footing with the issuance of Presidential 
Decision no. 371/1962. During the Guided Democracy period, then, ABRI began to establish its 
territorial command structure. 
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personnel to state enterprises and governmental positions as ministers, senior officials, 
governors, regents, and as members of the national and local legislatures.38 
Social- political (sospol) staff sections were brought into the territorial 
structure at all levels from ABRI headquarters to military district commands to 
regulate and monitor the political activities of ABRI's seconded personnel and the 
public. Sospol staff collaborated closely with military intelligence agencies and with 
the social- political directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose minister was 
appointed from the military, in providing political management and training for 
officers in parliamentary factions and to Golkar functionaries. They were responsible 
for political education/indoctrination of the public and for monitoring and regulating 
the development of political parties and organisations. Heading the sospol staff was 
the Chief of Social- Political Staff (Kassospol), a key post in ABRI headquarters.39 
Clearly the security -intelligence apparatus underwrote Indonesia's political 
institutions. 
The many, overlapping political, intelligence, military and kekaryaan -Golkar 
structures provided ABRI with far- reaching supervision over the ABRI Ieadership, the 
bureaucracy and society. The military's extensive apparatus of territorial management 
was quite clearly directed towards internal- security objectives of protecting Indonesia 
domestically from "ever- present actual or latent" threats. The internal security 
approach had as one of its central projects to root out competing "antagonistic" 
ideologies, identified at different points during the New Order as "individualism and 
liberalism," "communism," and "religious fanaticism. "40 New Order leaders 
commonly mobilised its security and social -political apparatus against political 
3s 
. Lowry, The Armed Forces, pp.187 -8; Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military: Structure, Procedures, 
and Effects on Indonesian Society," Jackson and Pye (eds.), Political Power and Communication, 
pp.57 -81. 
39 Lowry, The Armed Forces, pp.184 -6. 
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agitators, dissenters, and pro- democracy movements and sought to discredit them by 
branding them as the "Extreme Left," the "Extreme Right," "anti- government 
subversives," or some other underground dark forces. Thus, the spectre of constant 
threat served not only the regime's legitimacy purposes, but also justified a more 
active policy of discrediting and eliminating opposition. ABRI also recruited and 
organised civilian militia under the auspices of "Total People's Defence" and Civil 
Defence (Pertahanan Sipil, Hansip).41 
The term most commonly applied for military management and supervision of 
society, as developed in its territorial doctrines, was pembinaan. Pembinaan carries 
the meaning "to construct" or "to develop" and is particularly associated with the 
meaning to give paternal guidance to subordinates through instructions or directives. 
A high- ranking civil servant is a pembina, or one who gives guidance and directives. 
Pembinaan became associated closely with projects for ideological and institutional 
reconstruction and indoctrination of society. Ideological guidance ( pembinaan 
mental) began as a project to rehabilitate communists, who had been incarcerated 
after 1965, and bring them back into mainstream political culture developed by the 
New Order. This terminology was then adapted to projects for the management and 
reconstruction of political party life. For example, in his book entitled "Strategi 
Politik Nasional (National Political Strategy: 1973)," Ali Murtopo explained the two- 
fold political strategy for the management of party life and of broader society. The 
first was to re- educate Indonesians and re -orient parties' programs away from the 
ideological and political predilections of Sukarno's Guided Democracy period 
towards a new consciousness and "professionalism through programs oriented to the 
40 . Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, p.187. 
41 
. Lowry, The Armed Forces, pp.111 -112, 147 -150; Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, p.191; Richard 
Tanter, "Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence and Security Agencies in Indonesia," Budiman (ed.), ,State 
and Civil Society, pp.213 -271. 
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government's economic development goals. "42. The second was to construct new 
political arrangements, as discussed (above). 
Implicit in these two aims was continued vigilance against, and eradication of, 
rival ideologies. Dephankam's terminology found its way into Golkar, with the 
supervisors' council (Dewan Pembina) first being dominated by Hankam men, and 
into the other corporatist institutions. Murtopo noted that ABRI, through its 
kekaryaan role and as a Pembina, would provide ideological and political re- 
education to the Indonesian community to enable its, and ABRI's, full participation in 
development 43 Thus, as a dominant member of Golkar, ABRI had brought into its 
kekaryaan role some of the ideological baggage of its territorial management doctrine. 
Pembinaan sections were established within each of the corporatist institutions 
linking them directly to relevant (pembinaan) secretariats within government 
departments, which performed supervisory roles over the organisations' programs and 
activities. It appears that one of the objectives of pembinaan was to facilitate the 
controlled mobilisation of citizens into the political system, in aid of official 
development programs and for specific political projects, such as state- sponsored 
denouncements of rival ideologies and political movements.44 
3. Conclusion 
Although regime leaders put in place an exclusionary corporatist framework, 
the institutions did more than just exclude. They became important mechanisms of 
state (military) management and supervision of society, instruments of ideological re- 
orientation, and vehicles for the controlled mobilisation of Indonesians into state - 
guided political and economic projects. The military also was the primary institution 
42 . Murtopo, Strategi Politik Nasional. 
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that developed an exclusionary political framework and elaborated supporting 
doctrines and mentalities of exclusion. These were in line with its perceived security 
role of defending the Indonesian state and its people from antagonistic elements and 
ideologies, and were part of its ideological arsenal that provided legitimacy to the 
military's expanded role in civilian affairs. 
49 Murtopo, Strategi Politik Nasional. 
44 . This theme is explored in chapters four, five, and eight of the thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
State management of Muslim associational life 
1. Introduction 
The next three chapters deal with the New Order state's management of Islam 
through corporatist capture and other policies of exclusion. The analysis treats the 
state's structuring of the Muslim "constituency" as an example of authoritarian 
political control of, and limitations on, political- social pluralism within Indonesia's 
associational life. However, because of the heterogeneous nature of autonomous 
Islamic associations, and the tendency for some segments of the Muslim constituency 
to resist regime initiatives, the regime's mechanisms were initially partial attempts to 
capture the Islamic sector in state structures. Although, in the short term, they were of 
an ad -hoc nature, usually starting as politically expedient responses to specific 
challenges and threats, they increasingly became determined attempts at coherent 
restructuring of Muslim interests. They represented recurring initiatives by state 
officials to exert regulatory control over politically recalcitrant segments of this 
heterogeneous religious sector as well as to bring Islam's social, religious and 
political life within state -defined parameters. In particular, state officials were 
concerned to capture Muslim interests and place them into state structures in order to 
exclude them from power sharing arrangements. They sought to remove people's 
attachment to isiamíc political- ideological goals and activities, and to rechannel them 
in support of state -defined goals for economic development and political stability. 
While bearing these objectives in mind, this chapter examines three targets of 
exclusionary strategies: The Islamic parties, Islamic education, and what can be called 
the government's religious "harmonising" program. In each of the target areas 
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discussed, the regime adopted a similar management approach insofar as the three 
areas were subject to the same set of policy objectives, political constraints, and 
organisational principles. That is, Suharto sought to contain and restrict independent 
political activities, religious movements, and rival ideologies that might challenge 
state autonomy, cause instability, and disrupt economic development. 
The chapter begins with a study of Suharto's initiatives to bring the Islamic 
parties into state -chartered merger within corporatised party arrangements and, in 
doing so, to create a de- politicised environment conducive to stability and 
development. Second, the chapter examines measures to remove the influence of the 
Islamic parties and student organisations from university campuses and to reorient 
students' activities and education to development priorities. As part of mono -loyalty 
provisions aimed at cutting the ties of civil servants to political parties, academics 
were obliged to join the sole public service union, Korpri, and teachers had to join the 
compulsory teachers union. Eventually, as part of de- politicisation of campuses, 
students were required to channel their activities through student coordinating bodies 
and through the university hierarchy in place of independent student organisations. 
Islamic student organisations were a major target of this reorganisation. 
Third, the chapter considers how religious organisation, in many respects, 
assumed the form of corporatist mergers. That is, in pursuit of harmonising inter - 
religious relations and state- religious relations, Suharto gave recognition to state - 
chartered institutions representing the five officially sanctioned religions. Then he 
created a peak inter -religious council, which was intended as the sole consultation 
body between representatives of the religious institutions and the state. This part of 
the analysis also looks at the regime's initiatives to circumscribe what constituted 
religious orthodoxy and practice, to increase its regulatory control over Islam's 
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community /religious affairs, and to discourage 
- and eliminate unmediated religious 
movements, splinter groups and sects that threatened to disrupt economic 
development and cause instability. As a result, religious tendencies that fell outside of 
official definitions of religious interpretation and practice either were persuaded to 
join the mainstream religions, and find representation in the state -sanctioned 
institutions, or risk prohibition. In short, they were "harmonised," through merger, 
into organisational structures representing mainstream religions to ensure that they did 
not become sources of political instability or opposition to the regime.1 
The analysis also considers that, as a concomitant to the restructuring, Suharto 
progressively enforced ideological conformity of Islamic political parties, 
organisations, and the state -chartered religious institutions to the state's "organicist" 
ideology of Pancasila. It is important to bear in mind that Pancasila was an ideology 
of containment and exclusion, which was antithetical to Marxism and Islamic political 
ideology.2 Compulsory Pancasila courses emphasised the virtues of respect for 
authority, harmony of social relations, hierarchical order, patriotism and commitment 
to economic development. A common thread runs through each of these target areas 
discussed. That is, Suharto was concerned to establish political control over 
unmediated political, social, and religious organisation and to enforce ideological 
conformity either to Pancasila or to mainstream religious belief, as acknowledged by 
Pancasila. In other words, political- religious practice was brought into state - 
delineated parameters, and corporatist structuring played a role in the capture of 
unmediated organisation. 
. The analysis does not consider the range of state interventions in the leadership choices and 
organisational operation of the five religious institutions, as this would move the discussion away from 
its specific focus on Muslim interests. Chapter four deals in detail with the state -chartered institution 
specifically created to channel the interests of Muslim ulama (religious scholars and leaders). 
2 . Moreover, as argued in chapter three, "organicist" thought commonly provided ideological 
support for corporatist systems of interest representation. 
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A final point needs to be made before proceeding with the analysis. That is, 
efforts to restructure Muslim interests spanned a 30 -year period, in which the 
relationship between the ruling coalition of state officials and independent Muslim 
groups shifted from an antagonistic one (1968- 1987), to one of rapprochement from 
the late 1980s onwards. In the first period (the focus of this chapter), the objective of 
corporatist strategies was to demobilise and politically exclude Muslim interests from 
power sharing arrangements. In the second period (discussed in chapter five), 
President Suharto was behind initiatives to incorporate a hitherto neglected but 
increasingly important Muslim middle -class sector. We will discuss the implications 
of this shift in corporatist strategy in following chapters. 
2. Islamic organisations 
Before proceeding with the main analysis a brief account of Islamic 
organisations in Indonesia is necessary. The main trends and movements in 
Indonesian Islam belong to the Sunni branch of orthodoxy, originating in the Arab 
hinterlands, as opposed to the splinter branch of Shi'ism, which spread to parts of 
Persia. Indonesian orthodoxy has coalesced into two major movements: the kaum 
muda ( "young group ") or santri moderen (modernists) and kaum tua ( "old group ") or 
.santri kolot (the traditionalists). 
Islamic modernism in Indonesia grew out of an Egyptian reform movement 
and in response to early indigenous nationalism at the turn of the century. It drew 
substantial inspiration from the reform ideas of the anti -colonial, pan -Islamist Jamal 
al -Din al- Afghani (1839 -1897) and the "Father of Modernism" Muhammad Abduh 
(1845- 1905). Representing Islamic modernism at home were organisations such as 
Sarekat Islam (United Islam, SI) and the Muhammdiayah, both founded in 1912,.and 
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Persatuan Islam (Unity of Islam, Persis) founded in 1923. The modernist 
organisations mostly catered to a social -economic class of educated urban elites and 
merchant traders. They gave priority to education, social welfare programs and 
dakwah (religious propagation) activities.3 
Muhammadiyah is the main modernist organisation today with an estimated 28- 
30 million members. It was founded in Yogyakarta (Central Java) by K.H. Ahmad 
Dahlan, a traditionalist scholar who became inspired by the reformist ideas of 
Muhammad Abduh. Muhammadiyah expanded to other urban centres first on Java 
and then onto the Outer Islands, with a strong presence in Sumatra. It now has an 
impressive network of organisational infrastructure, which includes youth and 
women's organisations, schools, teachers' academies and universities, medical clinics 
and hospitals, orphanages and other social welfare activities. After the declaration of 
independence by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, modernist youth organisations 
were established. These included Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Movement of Islamic Youth, OPE) in 1945, Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian 
Islamic Secondary School Students, PII) in 1946, and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam 
(The Association of Islamic University Students, HMI) in 1947.4 
Two prominent religious scholars (kiai), Wahab Chasbullah and Hasjim 
Asj'ari founded the Nandlatul Ulama (Revival of the Religious Scholars, NU) in 1926 
in order to protect the economic and social -religious interests of pesantren (religious 
. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900 -1942, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1973; Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century 
Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 
1970. 
4 . James L. Peacock, Purifying the Faith: The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam, 
Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, California, 1978; M. Din Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics in 
Islam: The case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order," Thesis (P.h.D.), Ann Arbor, Los 
Angeles, University of California, 1991; Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadiyah: A Study of an 
Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia," Indonesia: 10 (10 October 1970). 
63 
boarding schools) and Islamic traditionalism from modernism at home and abroad.5 In 
the last seventy years, NU has become a diverse and complex organisation with a 
decentralised structure largely based on the personalistic and informal networks and 
authority of individual kiai who run a system of traditional Islam hoarding schools 
mainly in rural Java. Much of the authority of NU kiai has been hereditary. N17 has an 
estimated membership of over 30 million people.6 
Muhannnadiyah, NU and other Islamic organisations joined the Masyumi 
party, founded in 1945, after the declaration of independence (17 August), to 
represent Muslim interests in competition with newly forming parties, especially the 
Indonesian National Party (PNI). NU withdrew from Masyumi in 1952 because of 
conflict with modernist politicians over leadership roles and Masyumi since was 
dominated by Muslim modernist leaders. Masyumi had a prominent role in the 
cabinets of parliamentary democracy of the 1950s. In 1960, President Sukarno banned 
Masyumi on the grounds that its leaders had supported a regional rebellion in 
Sumatra. Meanwhile, NU leaders were brought into Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" 
government.' NU has a long history of rivalry with modernist organisations based on 
political and religious disputes, although Greg Barton argues that the 
traditionalist/modernist dichotomy and antagonisms are less relevant today.s 
. In particular, NU was established as a direct result of a decision to defend and represent the 
interests of traditionalists in the Hijaz after the Wahabbi leader, Abdul -Aziz ibn Saud had captured 
Mecca and restricted Syafi 'i rituals and education there. 
6 . Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds.), Nandlatul llama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in 
Indonesia, Clayton, Vic, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996; Martin van Bruinessen, NU: 
Tradisi, rela.ri- relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wancana Baru, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 1994. 
7 . Deliar Noer, Partai Islam Di Pantos Nasional, 1945 -1965, Jakarta, Grafiti, 1987; Ruth T. 
McVey, "Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics," James P. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the 
Political Process, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
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of Islamic Thought in Indonesia: A Textual Study Examining the writings of Nurcholish Madjid, 
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However, to this day, organisational affiliation remains an important source of 
political cleavage between the modernists and traditionalists. 
The discussion now turns to efforts by Suharto's New Order regime to restrict 
and contain the political participation of organised Islam. 
3. Managing the Islamic parties 
A) The modernists (Parmusi) 
Politically activated Islam was a prominent target of Suharto's initiatives to 
de- politicise state and society. New Order leaders sought to dismantle Islam's party 
base and re- channel it into new vehicles within a corporatised party system. These 
initiatives first focused on Muslim modernist interests. Army leaders were concerned 
to undercut the autonomy of political modernism.9 They were suspicious of politically 
organised Islam and were determined to prevent modernist leaders from re- 
establishing Masyumi. Masyumi party leaders had a popular grassroots following that 
potentially could mount a challenge to army power. Second, army leaders objected to 
Masyumí's political -ideological goals for the realisation of a state based on Islamic 
law, especially in constitutional struggles for inclusion of the so- called Jakarta 
Charter. (The Jakarta Charter required that all Indonesian of Muslim faith adhere to 
Islamic law.) Third, they suspected Masyumi of having given clandestine support to 
the Darul Islam revolt for a separate Islamic state in West Java. Fourth, they blamed 
Masyumi for the role performed by its most prominent leaders Muhammad Natsir, 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap in giving support to the regional 
rebeIIion in Sumatra. 
9 . Kamal Muhammad Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization In 
Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982, pp.82- 
3; Harold Crouch, "The Indonesian Army in Politics: 1960 -1971, Thesis (Ph.D.), Department of 
Politics Monash University, 1975, p.571. 
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Army leaders nonetheless viewed with sympathy calls by Muslim modernist 
leaders for the re- establishment of a political party to represent their interests. A 
modernist party made amenable to the Suharto regime could prove useful, as it would 
help counterbalance the considerable influence of NU at future general elections. 
Suharto settled on a strategy of permitting the formation of a new party, the 
Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), which was registered as a political party by 
Presidential Decision No.70 of February 1968.1° 
Through a series of interventions in the selection of leaders, and manipulations 
of the party by Murtopo's OPSUS, Suharto ensured the effective emasculation of 
Parmusi as an independent political force. Suharto made it clear that party lists were 
to include no senior Masyumi leaders. The Muhammadiyah leaders, H. Djarnawi 
Hadikusomo and Lukman Harun, were appointed party leader and secretary general 
respectively, as a temporary expedient. However, attempts by old guard modernists to 
establish Masyumi's control over Parmusi at its first congress in Malang in 1968, 
resulted in army interference in leadership selection. Tn 1969 the pro -army appointees 
to Parmusi, Jaelani. Naro and Imran Kadir, instigated an internal party coup to oust 
Djarnawi's leadership. Both figures were known to be close to Ali Murtopo and the 
coup was thought to be part of Murtopo's OPSUS. The impasse that this created 
prepared the ground for Suharto to intervene and impose an amenable figure, M.S. 
Mintaredja (a state minister), as party chairman (Presidential Decision No.77/1970).11 
Rising to leadership positions in Parmusi were young educated Muslims from 
Muhammadiyah Youth and HMI, who possessed educational and technical skills (in 
0 . Harold Crouch, "The Indonesian Army in Politics," pp. 573 -576; Solichim Salam, Sedjarah 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Jakarta, Lembaga Penjelidikan Islam, 1970, p.29. 
u 
. In one manoeuvre, Mintaredja enlisted a close colleague in Surabaya to dissolve the East Java 
Executive of old guard leaders and form a new one under his own leadership. Ken Ward, The 4971 
Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study, Cheltenham, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974, 
pp.115-6, 118 -120; Crouch, "The Indonesian Army in Politics," pp.577 -8. 
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economics, engineering and law); skills, which, generally, were not held by older 
Masyumi leaders. These young Muslims were well placed to take advantage of the 
kinds of "technocratic- dominated," "construction- oriented" policies of the New Order 
and fitted in well with the government's preference of promoting into government 
positions administrators who had no party affiliation.12 
Part of the regime's corporatist strategy also entailed the dismantling of 
Masyumi's party base -the array of supporter organisations called the Keluarga 
Bulan Bintang (the Moon and Star Family) -and re- attaching them to Parmusi. In 
doing so, they hoped to channel Muslim modernist energies into the new vehicle, 
whilst excluding Masyumi's senior politicians and cutting the Bulan Bintang masses 
from old party loyalties. During the 1971 election campaign, Parmusi allied itself to 
Golkar and the army against NU and PNI, which helped split the Muslim political 
community and dissipate its energies. Before the election, Muhammadiyah had 
announced its formal withdrawal from politics, disassociated itself from Masyumi 
and, together with HMI, withdrew its support from Parmusi. Muhammadiyah leaders, 
many of them ex- Masyumi figures, were disaffected by regime manipulations of 
Parmusi. Although Parmusi failed to become an effective vehicle of Muslim support 
for the regime, Suharto succeeded in emasculating Islamic modernism as an 
independent political force and transfering the electoral vote to Golkar. Consequently, 
Parmusi fared poorly at the election, gaining only 5.4 percent of the vote compared to 
Masyumi's 20 percent share at the last elections in 1955» 
12 
. Minteradja tried to persuade the Muslim youth that the modernists' struggle for implementation 
of Islamic prescriptions was misplaced and wasted Islam's energies that could be better spent on 
economic development goals. He promoted the young Muslims into executive positions within Parmusi 
as they replaced disaffected Masyumi leaders who were preoccupied with realising Islam's political 
objectives. Mintaredja's initiatives paralleled those of Murtopo, who used his OPSUS to craft Golkar's 
election strategy and growth- oriented development programs. Ward, The 1971 Election, p.128; Kamal, 
Muslim Intellectual Responses, pp.84 -5. 
13 
. van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, pp.93, 103. 
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In conclusion, Parmusi was a first tentative step in the direction of state - 
corporatised Muslim interests, which sought to fragment and weaken the political 
independence of modernism represented by Masyumi and pave the way for non -party 
led economic development. 
B) The traditionalists (NU, PPP and general elections) 
Although state leaders emasculated modernist party politics, Ward argues that 
army -Golkar efforts to split NU initially were unsuccessful. For instance, initiatives 
by GUPPI (Union of Efforts to Improve Islamic Education) -a state backed merger of 
religious scholars and leaders -to win the allegiances of the pesantren community 
over to Golkar's election campaign aroused among NU member's intense resentment 
and retaliations as they felt their own organisational base threatened by Murtopo's 
Opsus.14 Among the reasons for this failure was that NU's sprawling and 
decentralised organisation, and staunch independence of ulama, proved much more 
resistant to state intervention and co- optation than the Islamic modernist and 
nationalist organisations. Before the elections, NU was the only party left intact after 
army purges and party manipulations had eliminated PKI, emasculated PNI and 
sidelined the modernist parties. Although a dominant, pro -army faction in NU assisted 
Suharto's New Order come to power, it soon became the party in opposition as it 
vigorously resisted Golkar's campaign and restrictions on the parties which hurt NU's 
electoral prospects. One of the younger NU leaders, Subchan, led NU as a party of 
opposition against Golkar and its unfair campaign tactics of intimidation and fraud in 
10.. Ward, The 1971 Election, pp.42 -3; Basing his figures on an interview with a GUPPI leader 
Djamhari, Cahyono notes that in 1971 about 3,000 pesantren had joined the GUPPI, at the 
organisation's third congress 5,000 -odd pesantren were affiliated with the GUPPI. According to the 
GUPPI's official figures, in 1980, 7,779 pesantren had joined the organisation. "Daftar Lembaga- 
lembaga Pendidikan GUPPT Seluruh Indonesia Tahun 1980," Heru Cahyono, Peranan Ulama Dálam 
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the lead up to, and during, the 1971 general election.15 NU's share of the vote (18.67 
percent), although insignificant in comparison to Golkar's landslide victory (62.8 
percent), convinced Suharto that the party represented an Islamic bloc that posed a 
future threat to the New Order's monopoly on power.16 
This was the context of Suharto's introduction of the "floating mass" concept, 
which ensured that NU, and other parties, could no longer organise politically below 
the district level where most of its constituency lived.17 Implementation of the 
"floating mass" concept can be considered as a central plank of the state's 
exclusionary policy, which paved the way for, or at least complemented, a corporatist 
re- ordering of party organisation. In 1971, Golkar also launched the slogan, "politics 
no, development yes" as a way of indicating the future direction of party organisation. 
Suharto had worked with caution, step -by -step to simplify the party system 
and forced them to reduce their number. In 1973, the Muslim parties, NU, Perti 
(Association of Islamic Education), Parmusi and PSII were merged as the United 
Development Party (PPP). Thenceforth, PPP was part of the Golkar (plus- two -parties) 
system as a very unequal and distrusted partner in development. NU became the 
dominant element of PPP, with 61 percent of the seats and effective veto over the 
other combined elements, particularly Parmusi (subsequently called Muslimin 
Indonesia, MI).18 As such, five years after state incorporation of the modernists, the 
traditionalist NU was included in the corporatist party arrangements. 
Golkar, 1971 -1980: dari Pemilu sampai Malori, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992, pp.87 -89, 114- 
115. 
15 . van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, pp. 74, 78 -9, 85, 91, 92, 109. 
16 
. van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, p.74; Riswandha, "The Evolution of Political Party," p.197. 
. Riswandha Imawan, "The Evolution of Political Party Systems in Indonesia: 1900 to 1987," 
Thesis (Ph.D.), Dekalb, Illinois, 1989, p.198. 
18 
. Sidney Jones, "The Contraction and Expansion of the `Umat' and the Role of the Nandlatul 
Ulama in Indonesia," Indonesia: 38 (October 1984), p. 10. 
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Since the merger, PPP comprised opposing tendencies between the modernist 
and traditionalist camps, with the main battle -lines in the future drawn between the 
MI and Nil factions. This appeared to be part of a deliberate strategy by Suharto to 
foster conflict within the parties in order to fragment them while seeking to minimise 
conflict between political parties and Golkar.19 The pro -government Parmusi 
Chairman, Mintaredja, became PPP's first general chairman.'° 
An immediate, unanticipated outcome of the party fusion was that, whereas 
the mergers seriously damaged PDI, between 1973 and 1978 PPP's Islamic identity 
provided the party with a degree of cohesion.21 The 1977 general election brought 
PPP and the government's machine Golkar into direct conflict as they aggressively 
competed for the hearts and minds of Indonesians, with each party rallying support 
based on the two opposing claims of "Islam" and "development." For instance, the 
Rais Aam of NU's Religious Council and Chairman of PPP's Religious Council, Bisri 
Sjansuri, declared that "in order to uphold the religion and law of Allah, every 
Muslim who takes part in the 1977 general election...but especially a member of PPP, 
is legally obliged to vote PPP when the time comes.i22 Sjansuri's religious opinions 
seemed to carry some influence within the party and Golkar failed to make a dent in 
19. As Riswandha pointed out, the party fusion caused a "bottle- neck" through which "elements of 
the composite parties had to struggle to promote candidates" for a small number of seats in the regional 
and national legislatures. Riswandha also observed that the security and intelligence operations of 
Bakin and Kopkamtib, including direct intervention in the choice of party leaders and "spreading of 
controversial issues," "were to keep conflict alive within political parties, so the parties could not 
consolidate power to challenge the government." Imawan, "The Evolution of Political Party Systems," 
p.184. 
2° 
. Idham Chalid (the General Chair of NU) became party president and Bisri Sjansuri (President of 
Nit's Religous Council) chairman of PPP's religious council (Majelis Syuro). van Bruinessen, NU: 
Tradisi, pp.103 -104; Syamsuddin Haris, "PPP and Politics under the New Order," Prisma: 49 (31) 
1990, pp.11 -12. 
zl Leo Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia, Singapore, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 1982, pp.25,28; William R. Liddle, "The 1977 
Indonesian Election and New Order Legitimacy," (unpublished manuscript), Canberra, The Australian 
National University Menzies Library, 1977, p.13. 
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traditional strongholds of the Islamic parties, such as Aceh, South Sumatra, South 
Kalimantan and East Java.23 
In an effort to neutralise the Islamic appeal of PPP, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Amir Machmud, and the Commander of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, led a 
campaign alleging the existence of an anti -government conspiracy in the form of a 
Komando Jihad (Islamic Holy War Command). Party leaders interpreted statements 
made by Sudomo as offering a pretext for security forces to arrest Muslim party 
politicians at whim, as well as seeing in it an implied connection between PPP, 
although publicly denied by Sudomo at the time, and Muslim "extremists" who seek 
to establish an Islamic state. According to Liddle, the 1977 elections were conducted 
along the lines of the 1971 elections insofar as the government continued to make use 
of intimidation, coercion, propaganda directed against the parties, security screening 
of candidates, arrests, manipulation of party organisations, election regulations, party 
laws and campaign restrictions.25 In particular, screening of candidates by the state 
intelligence coordinating organisation, Bakin, was meant to ensure that the MPR/DPR 
would be stacked with loyalists, which would facilitate Executive control over the 
passing of legislation. In short, government coercion, which aimed to cower and drive 
into retreat the opposition, was part of its policy of exclusion to ensure that it 
maintained preponderant control of the MPR and DPR through an overwhelming 
Golkar victory. By contrast, the increasingly corporatised parties were locked into a 
system that, through engineered elections, greatly restricted their access to legislatures 
and government office. The mix of state strategies, including corporatism, to control 
23 . van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, pp.103 -104; Riswandha, `The Evolution of Political Party," p.202. 
. LiddIe, "The 1977 Indonesian Election," pp.13 -14; Faisal Ismail, "Pancasila as the Sole Basis 
for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations; an Account of Muslims' Responses," Studia 
Islamika: 3 (4), 1996, pp.8 -10. 
25 Liddle, `The 1977 Indonesian Election," pp.22, 25. 
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the parties and elections represented an ongoing process that sought to ensure the two - 
way political exclusion of PPP from society and the state. 
The government was concerned by PPP's increased vote, as Golkar's share of 
the vote dropped marginally to (62.1 percent, down 0.7 percent), while PPP gained 
29.29 percent (up 2.18 percent) of the final vote.26 Suharto was not willing to have a 
"loyal opposition" party in parliament that could disrupt enactment of government 
legislation. Vindication of the government's concerns came in 1978, when the 
dominant faction of PPP, NU, led a walkout from the MPR General Session in protest 
over two decrees. One decree gave religious status to mystical belief systems (aliran 
kepercayaan), equal to that of the official religions, and incorporated them into the 
Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN). This decree was aimed at reducing the 
strength of Islam by offering an officially approved, alternative form of organisational 
representation to non -practicing Muslims, who might otherwise have felt obliged to 
register under the religion of Islam. The other decree introduced Pancasila (P4) moral 
instructions, which Muslims perceived as being an attempt to turn Pancasila into a 
religion, particularly as it could displace religious lessons in schools.27 NU staged a 
second walkout in 1980, as it refused to participate in the passing of new election laws 
in Parliament, which NU leaders viewed as undemocratic.28 At its national conference 
in 1981, NU unequivocally defied (the by now almost routine) national consensus by 
. van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, p.105; Liddle, "The 1977 Indonesian Election," p.17. 
27 
. The government required its citizens to profess one of five religions that were sanctioned by the 
state ideology of Pancasila. Official recognition of aliran kepercayaan would give Indonesians a fifth 
choice and would threaten to erode the claim of Muslim leaders that around 90 percent of the 
population professed the faith of Islam. van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, p.106; Zifirdaus Adnan, "Islamic 
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declining to endorse Suharto for a third Presidential term, or to endorse his title of 
"Father of Development.s29 
The challenge posed by the NU faction of PPP convinced Suharto that more 
interventions were required to push NU further to the political margins. He began by 
replacing Mintaredja with Jaelani Naro, who had instigated the earlier coup in 
Parmusi, as general chairman of PPP. Naro was imposed on PPP to discipline the 
party and to neutralise the influence of NU within it.30 Corporatist restructuring of 
interests allows the state to manoeuvre itself into a position of greater autonomy and 
prevent potential challenges to its power, by readjusting an "imbalance" of contending 
group interests. Naro's subsequent manipulations of PPP appeared to conform to this 
principle of reordering. Thus, Naro sought to resolve an ongoing dispute between the 
MI and NU elements over leadership of DPR commissions, by preparing a 
Provisional Candidate List for the 1982 general elections, He delivered the list on 27 
October 1981 to the National Election Board, and unilaterally reallocated seats away 
from NU. NU lost seven of its seats to MI in the list of candidates for the next DPR 
election, which eliminated its commanding position of being able to over -rule the 
decisions of the other constituent members. These members now held a combined 
majority by one seat. The most outspoken government critics were placed at the 
bottom of the list of candidates effectively removing them as possible successful 
candidates for the 1982 elections.3' NU leaders threatened to withdraw from PPP, 
which elicited a harsh rebuke from Ali Murtopo, who accused them of seeking to 
replace Pancasila and the national flag.32 At this point, the state leaders seemed 
unprepared to allow a large Islamic faction to extricate itself from the authorised party 
29 
. Jones, "The Contraction and Expansion," p.11. 
30 
. Jones, "The Contraction and Expansion," pp.10 -11. 
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system, as NIJ's continued inclusion must have furnished the New Order political 
system with a semblance of legitimacy. 
Both before and during the election campaign of 1982, the army and Golkar 
intensified their efforts to intervene in, and manipulate, the political process to defeat 
PPP. In September 1981, Ali Murtopo had pressured Korpri civil servants to vote for 
Golkar. More restrictive campaign regulations were introduced (Presidential Decision 
No.3/1982) and parties were severely circumscribed in what they could discuss at 
rallies. The army introduced a program to enter rural areas (called "ABRI masuk 
desa ") in order, among other things, to mobilise support for Golkar against alleged 
"anti -Pancasila Forces. "33 Meanwhile, PPP had been excluded from establishing 
branches in rural areas by the "floating Mass" policy. The measures constituted a 
reinforcement of the state's corporatist/exclusionary policy, as they sought to deny 
PPP what limited access it had to the electorate. Meanwhile, PPP supporters became 
increasingly militant with the belief that their election chances had improved, which 
resulted in frequent violent clashes between Golkar and PPP supporters. For example, 
the greatest conflict erupted at the Lapangan Banteng rally of 18 March in Jakarta, 
which turned into a riot with hundreds of students and youths being arrested.34 
Religion was again the issue at stake; but this time, Golkar tried to project itself as 
Islamic as PPP. The Golkar emblem had Arabic characters, and the Minister of 
Internal Affairs and member of Golkar's supervisor's council, Amir Machmud, 
donated money for mosque building programs. The outcome of the election was that 
Golkar improved its landslide victory (64.34 percent), while PPP's share of the vote 
declined (27.78 percent).35 
33 Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 Election, pp. 44 -48. 
34 . The Chief of Kopkamtib security operations, Sudomo, instructed his troops to shoot rioters on 
the spot. 
. Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 Election, p.56. 
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To sum up, Suharto's regime resorted- to a mix of strategies aimed at 
weakening IsIam's capacity for independent political activity and to gamer a victory 
for Golkar at the general elections. Among these strategies were state interventions in 
the parties, electoral manipulations, intimidation and coercion. The restructuring of 
Islamic parties within a corporatised party framework -dominated by Golkar- 
helped ensure the political exclusion of Islamic parties from effective participation in 
power sharing arrangements. However, as we have seen, PPP (especially the NU 
faction) was not a completely submissive political force and did contest elections, but 
with no real hope of winning power. To some considerable extent, then, the regime's 
corporatist measures appear to have been responding to the challenges posed by NU 
and PPP, and therefore were ad -hoc in nature. The next section, which deals with 
post -1982 developments and the regime's enforcement of Pancasila ideology, looks at 
Suharto's increasingly determined attempts to restructure Muslim associational 
interests. 
C) Replacing Islamic identity with corporatist ideology 
Bitter opposition of PPP at elections and in parliament led Suharto to 
implement measures aimed at separating Islamic organisational activity more firmly 
from its ideological base, although these efforts had been under way for, at least, the 
past decade. For example, before the PPP merger in 1973, the government obliged the 
Islamic parties to add " Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution" to their party 
constitutions.36 PPP had to reaffirm its "double basis" of state ideology and Islamic 
identity, with the aim of diminishing the importance of the latter. The Minister of 
Internal Affairs tried to prohibit the use of PPP's party symbol (the Ka'bah) at the 
36 . Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, p. 10. 
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1977 elections, but PPP refused to comply and threatened to boycott the election.37 
After the NU-led walkout in 1978, the government embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to induct civil servants, professionals, students and "the masses" into 
indoctrination courses in the state ideology of Pancasila, coordinated nationally. In 
particular, the courses -called Guide to Understanding and Implementation of 
Pancasila (P4)- sought to unify citizens perceptions regarding state ideology, 
especially concerning development. In other words, the courses aimed to lessen 
people's identification with alternative ideologies such as Islam (and Marxism and 
Liberalism). Morfit argued that Pancasila (P4) was primarily an ideology of 
containment and exclusion, as it ensured that both communism and the political goals 
of Islam remained "outside the arena of permissible political activity.i38 
Chapter three has considered how the New Order leaders propagated "state - 
organicist" notions of corporate harmony through Golkar channels and the state 
ideology of Pancasila and how this conformed to a pattern of corporatist ideology and 
organisation. The P4 courses represented such an attempt to underwrite Islam's 
organisational existence with "organicist" ideologies as an adjunct to the corporatist 
reordering of organisational life. The connection between state ideology and 
organisation became clear when Pancasila was declared as the sole ideological 
foundation (azas tunggal) of all organisations in Indonesia. Before elaborating upon 
this connection, however, the chronology of the introduction of azas tunggal will be 
discussed. 
The government viewed PPP's continued adherence to its "double" basis, 
writes Faisal, as "proof' that the Muslims were not completely committed to 
37 . Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, p.12; Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 Election, 
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Pancasila.39 Suharto announced his concerns in a speech before an ABRI leadership 
meeting at Pekanbaru, Sumatra in March 1980. In the speech, Suharto spoke of a 
national "consensus" in 1966 between ABRI and the political parties concerning 
Pancasila as the state ideology. He maintained that the consensus had not been fully 
"successful" because "there was still a party [PPP] using other principles (azas) in 
addition to Pancasila. This led to a `question mark' with regard to their commitment 
to Pancasila.. "40 He referred to the (NU -led) walkout over the P4 policy in 1978 and 
the Election Law Amendment Bill in 1980, as two obvious points of tension between 
the government and PPP, although he did not mention the party by name. 
The sole basis law was submitted to Parliament in 1982, after the elections, 
and passed by the MPR General Session of 1983 in Enactment No.Il/1983.41 PPP held 
its first congress in Jakarta in 1984, eleven years after its founding, at which it 
announced three broad objectives. They were, "to consolidate Pancasila as the sole 
foundation "; "to conclude the process of the PPP merger" and "to become more 
development oriented.s42 Pancasila formally replaced PPP's ideology of Islam. In line 
with Law. No.1/1985 passed in Parliament, which prescribed the use of symbols 
related to Pancasila at the next elections, the party eventually substituted a new "Star" 
symbol for its Islamic Ka'bah.43 (Although these changes appeared to reduce support 
for the party at the 1987 election they did not prevent party faithful from identifying 
PPP with Islam in the 1992 and 1997 general elections.) The parliament passed two 
other laws: Law No.3/1985 and Law No.8/1985, enforcing the azas tunggal on all 
social and political organisations, including Golkar. 
39 IsmaiI, "Pancasila as the Sole Basis," p.11. 
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It is worth studying the texts of the two laws for a moment as they outline 
priorities of the state leadership, and make important connections between these 
priorities, for the reorientation of Indonesia's organisational memberships. The two 
laws were concerned with achieving ideological conformity and reordering (along 
corporatist lines) of Indonesia's associations. For example, Law No.8/1985, and Law 
No.18/1986 for the implementation of Law No.8, outlined the conditions for the 
corporatising of non -party, community organisations. The clauses read that, based on 
profession, function, or religion, community organisations of similar type were 
"obliged" to gather together "in merger or association" under wadah pembinaan 
(umbrella organisations). These compulsory peak organisations, at the national, 
provincial and district levels, would exercise sole representation of farmers through 
the Indonesian Farmers' Harmony Association (IIKTI), youth through the Indonesian 
National Youth Committee (KNPI), women through the Indonesian Women's 
National Congress (KOWANI) and so forth.44 The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), 
established in 1975, was intended as the single national organisation to represent the 
interests of ulama vis -a -vis the state. The state administration had finally legislated 
what had been de facto policy, which sought to shut off parties from their lines of 
communication with the grassroots and provide the bureaucracy with a near 
monopoly over channels of representation via corporatised non -party entities. 
Pembinaan (guidance) was a key concept employed by state leaders and was 
defined (Laws 1985 and 1986 and elucidation of Laws cited above) as an initiative to 
44 "Undang- Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1985 Tentang Organisasi 
Kemasyarakatan Dengan Rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa Presiden Republik Indonesia "; " Penjelasan 
Atas Undang - Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1985"; "Peraturan Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia Nomor 18 Tahun 1986 Tentang Pelaksanaan Undang - Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1985 "; and 
"Penjelasan Atas Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 18 Tahun 1986 Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Undang -Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1985, Peraturan Perundangan -Undangan Kehidupan 
Beragama Seri B ( Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Dan Ketentraman Beragama," Jakarta, Departmen 
Agama, 1994, pp.1 -28. 
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"guide, protect and urge" organisations to achieve an `independent" and "healthy" 
growth in the service of "national objectives." The main national objective was stated 
as gaining the "increased" and "active participation of all Indonesians in national 
development" with a view to achieving a "Pancasila society" underwritten by the 
1945 Constitution. The "receptacles of guidance" were to act as "instruments" with 
which to "channel the thoughts and opinions of citizens" for the realisation of national 
development, through state- directed education, "thought training" and development of 
their memberships. Law No_I8 outlined the functions, rights and duties of community 
organisations. These included the obligation of the leaderships to ensure their 
members attended Pancasila (P4) indoctrination courses and fostered national unity by 
placing national interests above those of individual or group interests. The 
government required each organisation to have a constitution, which had to include 
Pancasila as their sole (political) ideology, but did not interfere in the religious belief 
of established organisations. Organisations had to register with, and supply 
membership lists to, the Minister of Internal Affairs. The government authorised the 
Minister, Governors and Regents to remove the leadership of, or disband any 
organisation as a last resort, if they engaged in "harmful acts" and after the giving of 
"positive guidance and education" had failed to establish compliance to the sole 
foundation law.45 Muslim organisations that refused to abide by the new regulations 
(PII and a breakaway faction of HMI) were prohibited under instructions from the 
Minister of Internal Affairs.46 
The effect of these laws was that, from 1985 onwards, the ideological 
delineation of corporatism, which had started with Golkar and was applied to the 
parties, especially PPP, was now extended across to all organisations in Indonesia. 
as 
. See previous footnote. 
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The azas tunggal legislation was the pinnacle of the government's corporatist 
initiatives aimed at achieving ideological and associational conformity to state 
development goals. 
PPP's congress of 1984 had included as one of its broad objectives, 
"concluding the party merger," which, in practice, meant NU's exit from PPP. NU 
chose to withdraw from PPP because regime intervention in the party had proven too 
detrimental to NU's political and economic interests.47 At its 1984 congress in 
Situbondo, NU announced its formal withdrawal from PPP and its return to the NU's 
founding spirit of 1926 as a purely social- religious organisation. NU succumbed to 
regime pressure and at the congress passed a resolution accepting Pancasila as the 
organisation's asaz tunggal, or sole foundation. However, NU retained Islam as its 
undergirding religious conviction rather than ideology per se.48 NU also confirmed 
that it accepted the unitary Republic of Indonesia as the final form of the state and, by 
implication, no longer struggled for specific Islamic provisions.49 
The withdrawal of NU freed its individual members to stay with PPP or join 
Golkar and PDI. The new president of NU, Achmad Siddiq, issued a .fatwa (non- 
binding legal opinion) declaring that it was "not the duty of NU members to choose 
PPP" and "not forbidden to choose Golkar or PDI" at the polls.50 (His ruling reversed 
Sjansuri's earlier fatwa of 1977, which obliged NU members to vote PPP.) Naro 
strengthened his position as party leader after the withdrawal of NU, with positions on 
PPP's leadership board allocated accordingly (23 for MI, 12 for NU, 4 for Perti and 2 
46 . Adnan, "Islamic Religion: Yes," p.464. 
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for PSII).51 In 1987, PPP removed references to Islam in its party constitution and 
struggle program. For instance, the reference to "Islamic brotherhood" in PPP's 
constitution was replaced with a typically New Order phrase, "fostering brotherhood" 
(membina rasa persaudaraan).52 
PPP no longer held a monopoly of representation regarding the Muslim 
constituency, and its loss of specific Islamic identity and lack of clear program saw its 
political fortunes decline as Golkar picked up Muslim votes. The outcome of NU's 
withdrawal from PPP was that the party only received 16 percent of the vote at the 
1987 general elections, down 11 percent from its 1982 results. Golkar achieved a 
phenomenal 73.17 percent landslide victory.53 The Secretary General of Golkar called 
PPP's behaviour at the elections "more Golkar than Golkar," as the party sought 
accommodation with the government.54 PPP demonstrated the extent of its post- 
election submissiveness to Suharto by seeking government consultation concerning 
the choice of future party chairman. The final choice of PPP chairman, worked out 
between party leaders and the Minister of Internal Affairs, was Ismail Hasan 
Metareum of the MI faction, who went on to lead the party for two consecutive 
periods. The NU leader for Central Java, Matori Abdul Jalil became Secretary 
General and, despite his ouster, Naro managed to place three of his loyalists in 
leadership positions.55 
Many NU leaders, especially politicians who had had their careers advanced 
through PPP, continued to identify with and support the party after NU's institutional 
withdrawal. Consequently, established patterns of rivalry between NU interests and 
51 . Nasir, "Islam under the New Order," pp.17 -18. 
52 Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, p.21. 
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the MI (modernist) faction continued to plague the party. In particular, at the next PPP 
congress Matori contested the party chairmanship, but was defeated by the regime's 
preferred candidate, Ismail Metareum. The NU chairman, K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid 
(1984- 1999), came into regular conflict with Ismail because of the former's efforts in 
the 1987 and subsequent election campaigns to weaken PPP. On more than one 
occasion, Abdurrahman sent signals to his constituency not to vote PPP.56 In 1988, 
Abdurrahman was appointed to the MPR as a member of the Golkar faction.57 During 
the 1992 and 1997 general elections regular, violent clashes occurred between PPP 
and Golkar supporters from the NU support bases in Java. Thus, it seems that, as an 
outcome of corporatist reordering and azas tunggal, divisions were created between 
NU supporters of PPP and NU supporters of Golkar.55 
In conclusion, the reordering of Islam's political, ideological and 
organisational existence involved a process that was at least two decades in the 
making. The analysis centred on the argument that implementing exclusionary 
corporatism was part of Suharto's strategy to undermine the autonomy of Muslim 
parties and organisations and severely restrict and delineate their participation in the 
political system. One of the functions of exclusionary corporatism is precisely that of 
capturing the organisational bases of independent group activity to politically 
demobilise, fragment and neutralise them within new, state -controlled structures. The 
56 Interview with Aisyah Hamid Baidlowì (Chairwoman of NU- Muslimat), 11 March 1997; M. 
Ryaas Rasyid, "Indonesia: Preparing for Post -Soeharto Rule and its Impact on the Democratization 
Process," Southeast Asian Affairs 1995, pp.155 -6; "Gendang Politik Mulai Bertalu, Manuver pun 
Marak," Forum Keadilan, 10 Febuary 1997. 
57 
. Martin van Bruinessen, "The 28`h Congress of the Nandlatul Ulama: Power Struggle and Social 
Concerns," Barton and Fealy (eds.), Nandlatul Ulama, p.146. 
58 . Meeting with GP Ansor leaders in Bangil, East Java, 10 August 1997; interview with Haji 
Ahmad Jaman (leader of GP Ansor Kotamadia Pasuruan), 10 August 1997; Meeting in Situbondo of 
East Java chapters of NU, 5 August 1997; Annual meeting of the leadership of Muslimat for the 
Greater Jakarta Region, 3 April 1997; meeting at P3M, entitled "Menemukan `Jangkar' Politik Gus - 
Dur," 11 April 1997; "Laporan Situasi Daerah Kodia dan Kabupaten Pasuruan Selama Kampanye 
Dalam Rangka Pemilu 1997," Pengurus Cabang NIJ, Kabupaten Pasuruan, Bangil dan Kotamadia 
Pasuruan, 7 May 1997. 
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purpose of such reordering for the authoritarian regime is to create structural barriers 
to people's effective political participation and thus limit challenges to state power. 
This was the purpose of organisational restructuring in Indonesia. In addition, we 
considered how Suharto intensified his corporatist initiatives by demanding 
conformity to the state ideology of Pancasila. In doing so, he sought to reinforce state 
power, as this conformity was intended to discourage rival ideologies (in this case 
Islamic political ideology) from contending with state ideology for hegemony. 
Exclusionary corporatism also serves as an alternative to more direct forms of 
coercion and suppression, which might otherwise be required to keep societal 
demands low. 
Moreover, regimes derive some legitimacy from the limited representation 
offered to selected interests by their incorporation in state -chartered organisations. 
Suharto was intent on obtaining political legitimacy for his regime, and corporatised 
party arrangements which locked political interests into the system but shut them out 
of power appeared to give the regime a semblance of legitimacy. However, NU 
withdrew from organisational membership of the corporatised PPP and its exclusion 
from state structures raised questions about the future viability of these arrangements. 
Would NU become a force of direct opposition to Suharto and to the political system? 
Or would Suharto find other means of alternately incorporating in, and excluding 
from, state structures significant components of NU, thereby fragmenting them and 
neutralising potential challenges to state autonomy? 
A provisional answer to the (above) questions is that another purpose of 
exclusionary corporatism is to contain competition and conflict between rival interests 
within the tightly controlled boundaries of the political system. In this context, 
Bianchi argues that mixed systems of representation in which there coexist 
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significant corporatist and pluralist (unincorporated and semi -incorporated) 
components -can help preserve state autonomy, as the regime plays off the 
differently structured interests that contend for power. After its withdrawal did NU, 
then, constitute an unincorporated or semi -incorporated component brought into 
contest with corporatised modernist interests in PPP, in what Bianchi (and Schmitter) 
called "mixed systems of representation "? It is true, as discussed, that in order to 
offset NU's strength, Suharto sought to readjust the balance between competing MI 
and NU factions in PPP. NU's withdrawal from PPP also seemed to create divisions 
between PPP and Golkar supporters in NU (see the discussion in chapter six). 
Although Suharto's political restructuring of Muslim interests might not have been 
responsible for all existing lines of conflict, the competing corporatised (PPP) and 
unincorporated (NU) components did seem to lend themselves to Suharto's divide and 
rule tactics. In addition, the corporatised party system seemed to provide the 
boundaries and context for future contest -including contests between those interests 
incorporated in state structures and unincorporated groups. 
Following chapters elaborate upon these kinds of theoretical issues in context 
of growing conflict between elite political interests, both within and outside of the 
state. Meanwhile, the analysis turns to a consideration of the regime's reorganisation 
of Islamic education, which was partially achieved through corporatist structures and 
ideological reorientation programs but also through direct forms of coercion. 
4. Managing Islamic education 
This part of the analysis argues that de- politicisation of campus life -which 
corresponded with national trends for the removal of party influence from the political 
system -and reorientation of Islamic education went hand in hand. That is, the regime 
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tried to develop a cadre of administrators and technocrats, both in the government 
bureaucracy and educational institutions, who would have no attachment to the 
political parties and would contribute to the state's development goals. The analysis 
will consider how New Order modernisers viewed both "political" Islam and 
"traditional" Islam as obstructions to their vision for a standardised, national system 
based on Western models of education. In turn, education was an integral part of 
preparing citizens to become the next generation of "construction- oriented" 
technocrats, intellectuals and administrators, who would share the anti -party bias of 
New Order leaders. Thus, by stages, the regime brought academic and, to a lesser 
extent, student life within the state's exclusionary corporatist arrangements, 
disengaged it from independent political and organisational activity, and sought to re- 
orient it to the New Order ideology of Pancasila and development. 
A) The problem of Islamic education 
Before proceeding with the main analysis, a very brief historical context of 
Islamic education under Suharto is in order. One of the most perplexing problems for 
Indonesian administrations was how to integrate Indonesia's "dual" system of 
education, that had the Department of Religion overseeing religious education and the 
Department of Education and Culture administering general education. The historical 
process of establishing a common standard of education, in the cause of creating a 
distinctive national identity, national unity and patriotism, was a complex one. It 
entailed successive attempts to narrow the gap between the two systems, which 
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included the accommodation of an increasing proportion of secular (science and 
general) subjects into the Islamic schools and tertiary institutes.59 
By the 1970s, the Department of Religion's largest policy area of concern was 
that of modernising the Islamic education system to bring it more into line with 
Western interdisciplinary curricula from primary and secondary through to tertiary 
levels. In March 1975, the Ministers of Education, Religion and Internal Affairs 
signed a joint decision on the universalisation and standardisation of education, with 
Islamic education thenceforth being based on the general curriculum. In seeking to 
standardise the education system, education ministers met with considerable 
resistance from Muslim political and community interests. For example, Daud Jusuf 
(the Minister of Education and Culture between 1978 and 1982), explained that, in the 
face of Muslim opposition, the regime shelved most of the Minister's initiatives 
(discussed below) to standardise and secularise education. In June 1988, the next 
Minister of Education, Fuad Hasan, submitted to parliament a controversial draft bill 
on education,60 which omitted any mention of religious education. The bill created a 
furore among the Muslim mainstream, and pressures from Muslim organisational and 
political interests led to compromise legislation in August. The legislation upheld a 
1966 government decision on the compulsory nature of religious instructions in 
schools.61 
However, on 27 March 1989 (Education Act No.2/1989), there occurred 
significant integration of the state -run education systems with the Ministry of 
Education and Culture assuming responsibility for the administration of most of the 
59 . Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradition & Change: In Indonesian Islamic Education, Jakarta, Office of 
Religious Research and Development, Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1995; Deliar Noer, Administration 
of Islam in Indonesia, (Monograph Series, 58) Ithaca, New York, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1978, pp.24 -41. 
so The hill was first drafted in 1978 and was a continuing source of contention and debate. 
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religious schools hitherto within the jurisdiction of the religious ministry. This 
included taking control of the State Tertiary Institutes for Islamic Studies ( IAINs), 
numbering 14 in total. Since then, the IAINs and other state Islamic schools 
concentrated on providing Islamic education, with general subjects being phased out 
of their curriculum.G2 Religious instructions were phased out of the general 
educational institutions. 
The Iatest reorganisations coincided with a growing political rapprochement 
between the state and Islam. The regime, consequently, presented the reorganisation 
of education as a concession to mainstream Muslim interests, among other things, by 
upgrading religious sciences and studies at state -mn Islamic institutions. The 
upgrading of religious sciences aimed to improve the quality of education at IAINs, 
by adopting the methodologies of Islamic sciences as taught in Western centres of 
Islamic learning, including in Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and Australia. The 
regime sought to turn IAINs into a training centre for religious scholars (ulama) of the 
rural pesantren networks as a means of increasing the state's jurisdiction over Islamic 
educational and community affairs. By promoting Western- educated scholars into the 
government's religious bureaucracy and by sending some of them back to pesantren, 
the regime was hoping to orient the Muslim community away from attachment to 
Islamic political and ideological goals and towards active participation in 
development.63 Thus, the regime progressively developed IAINs and pesantren as 
61 . Mudzhar, Atha M. Fatwas of The Council of Indonesian Ulama: a study of Islamic thought in 
Indonesia, 1975 -1988, Jakarta, INIS, 1993, pp.58 -9. 
62. The removal of general subjects from the Islamic institutes sparked student protests on a number 
of the campuses. Darul Aqsha et.al. (eds.), Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events and Developments 
from 1988 to March 1993, Jakarta, INIS, 1995, pp.385 -441. 
63 It is important to note that state -run Islamic education was not a dominant part of mainstream 
Islamic education, which was conducted by thousands of privately run Islamic boarding schools 
(pesantren) scattered throughout mainly rural Java. State- sponsored initiatives to incorporate education 
into a national system continually confronted the problem of how to deal with the independence of the 
pesantren universe. In seeking to overcome this problem, even before Education Act No.2/1989, the 
regime sought to turn the IAINs into a training centre for religious scholars (ulama), with the intention 
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centres of (often UNDP- funded) commercial enterprise in addition to being centres of 
Islamic learning.64 By 1997, over 75 percent of pesantren had come within the 
jurisdiction of the state education system.65 
We now return to the main analysis of the regime's initiatives to remove the 
political and ideological influence of Islam from education, partially through 
corporatist restructuring and educational reorientation programs. 
B) Reorienting Islamic education 
i. Removing the political influence of NU from education 
New Order initiatives to reorient Islamic education were bound up with efforts 
to remove the influence of the NU party both from the Department of Religion and 
from the religious education system within the department's jurisdiction. We first 
consider the regime's moves to dislodge NU from the department. NU had turned the 
Department of Religion into a bureaucratic bastion for the traditionalists during a 
period of accommodation (late -1950s to mid- 1960s) with President Sukarno's Guided 
Democracy government.66 This was at a time that modernists were agitating against 
Sukarno's government, resulting in the banning of Masyumi, and therefore they were 
greatly disadvantaged by new power relations. NU was thereby able to use the 
department as a major source of patronage and positions and exercise an enormous 
influence over the direction of Islamic education under the department's control 
of returning an increasing number of the state- trained, and especially Western- educated, ulama to teach 
at private pesantren. A survey conducted in 1986 by the pesantren -based NGO, P3M, found that 
graduates of state -run IAINs led around 10 percent of pesantren in Indonesia. Since the Education Act, 
the regime has stepped up these efforts and, in the process, sought to increase the state's jurisdiction 
over Islamic education. Interview with Zamakhsyari Dhofier, 20 November 1997; Dhofier, Tradition 
and Change; "Intellectual Engineering in TAIN," Studia Islamika 2 (1): 1 -6, 1995; Islam in Indonesia: 
A Survey of Events, pp.385 -441. 
64 See previous footnote. 
6s Information drawn from work done by Greg Fealy in April 1997 and May 1999. 
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during this period.67 Before the 1971 general election, New Order leaders, especially 
Ali Murtopo's OPSUS, initially sought to contain NU's influence in the Department 
by coopting its staff into Golkar as a means of separating them from their loyalties 
with the NU party. This was in line with national efforts to establish control of the 
civilian bureaucracy and remove the political influence of both NU and the PM. 
Government decisions on compulsory membership of the Civil Sery ice Corps 
(Korpri) for public servants, and mono -loyalty provisions prohibited all civil servants 
from having party allegiances or voting for them at the elections.68 Teachers of 
Islamic educational institutes, like their secular counterparts, also were drawn further 
into the corporatist arrangements through their compulsory membership of the 
Teachers Association of the Indonesian Republic (PURI). PGRI was formed in 1945 
and brought into Golkar as a professional group in 1973.69 
However, these efforts were initially unsuccessful as the Department staff 
continued to identify with the NU party. The then Minister of Religious Affairs, K.H. 
Muhammad Dahlan (a NU figure), resisted the Golkar strategy of cooptation, 
including his refusal to apply legislation concerning mono -loyalty and the 
requirement that civil servants join Golkar.70 Instead, he placed NU figures in senior 
positions in the Department and its tertiary institutes. He relieved from their posts 
non -NU affiliated staff, such as Mulyanto Sumardi (a graduate from Colombia 
University, USA), Harun Nasution (Dean of the Post -Graduate Program at IAIN in 
66 Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength," Karl D. 
Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London, University of California Press, p.96. 
67 
. Ward, The 1971 Election, p.97. 
68 Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context," pp.105 -109. 
69 Ali Murtopo, Strategi Politik Nasional, Jakarta, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
1974, p.80. 
Andree Feillard, -Traditionalist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's New Order: The Awkward 
Relationship," Barton and Fealy (eds.), Nandlatul Ulama, p.64. 
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Jakarta and graduate from the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University), 
Sunarjo (former Rector of IAIN Jakarta).71 
Following this setback, Murtopo's OPSUS began to recruit technocrats and 
administrators into the religious bureaucracy with which to replace traditionalist 
bureaucrats. Sumardi and other displaced department staff at the IAIN in Jakarta were 
among the Muslim administrators recruited by Murtopo. They sought retaliation 
against Dahlan and joined forces with Murtopo in order to purge NU bureaucrats and 
establish Golkar's control of the department. Before the general election of 1971, 
Sumardi and his colleagues at IAIN founded a forum, the Golkar- linked Korps 
Karyawan Department Agama (Corps of Government Employees of the Department 
of Religion), to assist them with this strategy. They worked closely with the mostly 
Chinese -Catholic run Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which 
Murtopo had turned into a centre for his OPSUS campaigns. In August 1970, 
Sumardi's group met with Murtopo and Sujono Humardani (another of President 
Suharto's personal assistants who was instrumental to GUPPI initiatives) in Bogor, 
West Java. There they agreed on the choice of Abdul Mukti Ali (a long -time 
Department employee, a leading scholar in the educational field, and a known 
moderate with a background in the Muhammadiyah) as the next Minister of Religious 
Affairs to replace Dahl an. 
After his appointment in 1971, Mukti Ali presided over the purging of NU- 
affiliated department staff. He placed Sumardi as Director General of Islamic Tertiary 
Institutes in charge of IAIN's nationally, Sumardi then implemented a process of 
institutional rationalisation by, among other things, replacing (NU- affiliated) IAIN 
71. Ali Munhanif, "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Political Reading 
of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali," Studia Islarnika: 3 (1), pp. 101 -102, 1996. 
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rectors.72 Thus, in the early 1970s, Golkar's strategy to establish "mono- loyalty" in 
the Department of Religion and its tertiary institutes largely was directed towards the 
goal of removing the political and bureaucratic influence of NU, both before and 
immediately after the election. 
new direction for Islamic education 
The purge and corporatist reordering of institutional affiliation was to help 
nave the way for New Order administrators- mostly non -NU aligned Korpri 
members -to reorient Islamic education. Murtopo had outlined this New Order 
priority in his book, "National Political Strategy," which aimed to attain political, 
institutional and ideological supervision of the Indonesian people, especially to gain 
people's full participation in national development. People's participation in 
"accelerated modernisation" would be implemented through their membership of 
Golkar- linked professional organisations for youth, women, farmers, fishermen, 
labour unions, academics, teachers and civil servants.73 In particular, Murtopo had 
pursued a strategy of recruiting non -NU graduates from Western universities into 
academic positions, who shared the New Order's anti -party bias, its vision for a 
secular process of modernisation, and had no background of political activism. 
Once appointed, the modernisers (such as Mukti Ali, Sumardi, Harun 
Nasution, and much later Munawir Sjadzali) embarked on a program to restructure 
Islamic education, partly in order to replace the "legalistic" orientation of classical 
Islamic methodologies with a comparative, "scientific" approach to Islamic studies 
viewed as more conducive to development goals. These modernisers regarded NU's 
jurisprudence- centred approach as being responsible for creating "narrow- minded" 
72 
. Interview with Mulyanto Sumardi (former Director General of Islamic Tertiary Institutes), 27 
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scholars and graduates, who, it was thought, were not equipped to deal with the 
contemporary challenges thrown up by an industrialising and increasingly urban 
society. Suharto's administration also was concerned that this preoccupation with 
"legalistic" approach to Islamic education had encouraged psychological attachment 
to the ideological and political goals of establishing an Islamic state." 
As Minister, Mukti Ali wished to bring about a re- orientation of religious 
education in Indonesia, which dovetailed with the New Order's determination to 
modernise religious education and outlook.75 He was the first in a line of ministers of 
religion to preside over policies for the creation of a cadre of Western educated 
Muslim intellectuals to counter the practice of sending Muslim graduates to 
universities in the Middle East. A graduate from McGill University in 1957, studying 
under the eminent islamicist, Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, at the Institute of 
Islamic Studies, he pioneered the science of comparative religions in Indonesia.76 As 
Minister, he established a McGill unit within the department's research and 
development section in order to advance comparative religious studies. Programs for 
the sending of Muslim graduates of IAINs to Western universities were intended to 
assist the government to create a depoliticised campus environment, in which students 
and academic staff focused their energies on academic pursuits and practical skills 
March 1997; Munhanif, "Religious Thought of Mukti Ali," 101 -103. 
73 
. 
Moertopo, Strategi Politik Nasional. 
° . Interviews with Sumardi, 27 March 1997; Mukti Ali (former Minister of Religious Affairs and 
religious scholar educated at McGill University), 4 January 1994; Harun Nasution (former Rector of 
IA1N Jakarta), 12 June 1996; Daud Yusuf (Minister of Education, 1978- 1982), 24 November 1997; 
Admiral (ret.) Sudomo, 30 October 1997. 
75 . At a practical level, Ali introduced subjects that gave instruction arid training in economically 
productive skills that would aid community development. By the late 19805, senior secondary 
madrasah were giving skills- training programs in electronics, dressmaking, computer skills, welding, 
automotive mechanics, business administration and agribusiness. Munhanif, "Religious Thought of 
Mukti Ali"; Dhofier, Tradition & Change, p.56; Noer, Administration of Islam, p.41. 
6 . Before the New Order, in August 1960, the Department of Religion had appointed Mukti Ali to 
head the Department of Comparative Religion at IAIN campuses in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. 
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and training suitable for industrial occupations.77-More generally, Ali outlined New 
Order religious policy, which would give the government a central role in protecting, 
supporting and guiding religious activities through programs aimed at "strengthening" 
the faith of Indonesians providing they remained "outside of politics "78 
Another McGill graduate, who was to implement and elaborate upon the 
comparative approach, was Harun Nasution, In 1973, Nasution became Rector of the 
IAIN campus in Jakarta serving under Mukti Ali. In 1973, at a meeting in Bandung, 
Nasution was assigned to write a textbook for a new IAIN curriculum, which was to 
be based roughly on the curriculum of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill. The 
result was a textbook entitled "Islam Viewed From Various Aspects, "79 which sought 
to apply a "comprehensive," comparative," and "rational" understanding of Islamic 
knowledge, philosophy, theology, mysticism and history.8° In particular, Nasution 
sought to introduce Mutazila theology and Shi'ite ideas, which he viewed as more 
progressive and modern, to replace, in his opinion, the "stagnant" teachings of 
traditionalist schools- Asy'ariyah (theology) and Shafi'i (jurisprudence) -of Sunni 
orthodoxy. His "heterodox" curriculum was strongly opposed by orthodox Sunni staff 
at the IAIN in Jakarta. Although Nasution had strong backing from senior officials, 
including Mukti Ali and Sumardi, a compromise was reached in which a limited 
number of subjects on classical Islamic jurisprudence and doctrine were retained 
within the new curriculum at the Jakarta campus.ß1 
" . Mulyanto explained that the government was initially forced to abort its program for the sending 
of graduates to Western tertiary institutions because of strong protest by Muslim leaders, who viewed 
the initiative as an attempt to displace religion with secular education. Interview with Sumardi, 27 
March 1997. 
8 . Munhanif, "Religious Thought of Mukti Ali," pp.105 -106. 
79 . Harun Nasution, Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya, Jakarta, Bulan Bintang, 1977. 
8° 
. Interview with Nasution, 13 June 1996; Saiful Muzani, "Mu'tazilah and the Modernization of 
the Indonesian Muslim Community: Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution," Studia Islamika: 1 ;1) 
1994. 
ßi Interview with Sumardi, 27 March 1997; Muzani, "Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution." 
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Nasution's secular- oriented curriculum was related to the government's efforts 
to eliminate the psychological attachment of Indonesian Muslims to ideals for an 
Islamic state. Nasution therefore put forward arguments against political- ideological 
goals for an Islamic state, as both he and Mukti Ali contended that there was minimal 
historical justification for such goals. Nasution saw LAIN campuses at that time as a 
breeding ground for Islamic statist ideals and demands. He also argued that the 
Islamic party, PPP, had done nothing to advance the interests of Islam. Instead, he 
advised Indonesian Muslims to place their trust in Suharto and the New Order; they 
should make accommodations with state power, as Muslim interests would be served 
through such a strategy. 82 Nasution's statements were in reference to a government 
clampdown (under the auspices of a program called "campus normalisation ") on IAIN 
and university campuses in 1978, which sought to remove the political influence of 
PPP and student associations from tertiary institutes. 
The analysis next discusses campus normalisation as an example of the 
regime's efforts to depoliticise campus life and to extend state control over 
unmediated Muslim student organisation. Normalisation policy also reinforced earlier 
efforts to orient the activities of staff and students away from politics and in support 
of modernisation. 
iii. Normalisation of Campus Life 
After PPP's challenge at the 1977 election, waves of student unrest on Islamic 
and secular campuses in 1977 and 1978 elicited a harsh crackdown by the military 
and an intensification of coercive measures to contain political activism. In an 
atmosphere of heightened tension and antagonisms between Muslims and the 
82. Interview with Nasution, 13 June 1996. 
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government, in the weeks before the MPR General Session, student demonstrators 
had called for Suharto's resignation and protested against the blatant manipulations of 
PPP at the election. Suharto had already taken a more repressive and exclusionary 
approach to political opposition since the Malari (disaster of 15 January) student riots 
in early 1974.83 On this occasion, with Kopkamtib orchestrating the repression, 
between January and March 1978 the army invaded the more rebellious campuses, 
such as Gajah Mada University in Yogkakarta and the IAIN in Jakarta. It crushed the 
protest and arrested student activists and lecturers.84 
Following this, the government set in train a program of "normalization" of 
campus life that required students to concentrate solely on academic pursuits and "to 
eliminate harmful problems. "85 In this de- politicization of campus life, the 
government also introduced the concept of the '`Three Duties of Tertiary Educational 
Institutions" that stressed "Expertise," Responsibility," and "Corporateness. "86 It 
replaced independent student bodies, the university students' councils (DEMA), with 
administration -dominated activity coordination bodies and prohibited Islamic student 
organizations (especially HMI and the NU's PMII) and other student organisations 
from conducting their activities on the campuses.B7 The coordinating bodies were to 
act as the sole organisational representation for students, who were required to 
channel their future concerns through the university administrations. The 
establishment of coordinating bodies was part of exclusionary corporatist strategy in 
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that the bodies aimed to capture students' activities and create structural barriers to 
their participation in politics. With these arrangements, students were supposed to 
have no political access to the power holders as they became the most recent targets 
of exclusionary, "floating mass" policy. The government placed all campus life under 
the tight control and supervision of the rectors, themselves directly answerable to the 
government. The university authorities also imposed a strict system of permits on 
student activities.88 
According to the former student activist, Azyumardi Azra (currently the 
Rector of LAIN Jakarta), after the clampdown, Harun Nasution enforced Korpri 
membership on IAIN lecturers and obliged them to vote for Golkar in future 
elections.R9 Nasution was concerned that Suharto might do away with the LAIN 
system and his measures aimed to save the institutions and their education system 
from possible extinction. Nasution told how the IAIN in Jakarta was accused of being 
a centre of Komando Jihad and struggle for an Islamic state. "We [the LAIN 
administration] held dialogues with students to convince them that an Islamic state 
was not the only acceptable form of state [according to Islamic political 
87 . Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia, p.348. 
Sa Abdul Azis, "Meraih Kesempatan Studi Kasus Kelompok Keagamaan Mahasiswa University 
Indonesia," Penamas: Beragama Cara Mahasiswa, Jakarta, Balai Penelitian Agama dan 
Kemasyarakatan: 20 (VII) 1995, p.6; Fuaduddin TM., " Kelompok Keagamaan di IKIP Negeri Jakarta 
dalam Perspektif Gerakan Keagamaan Kampus," Penamas, p.21; Haidlor Ali Ahmad,"Kelompok- 
Keló mpok Keagamaan di dalam dan di Sekitar Kampus ITS," Penamas, pp.40 -41. 
. Azyumardi explained that student protests were over "alleged government hostility to Islam," 
including its efforts to incorporate aliran kepercayaan into the GBHN, restrictions on student activities 
since the "Malari" riots of 1974, and government manipulations of PPP during the 1977 election. For 
their part, state officials tried to discredit the protests by accusing Muslim students of seeking to 
establish an Islamic state. This was the view that Harun Nasution subscribed to, but Azumardi rejected 
the accusation as unrealistic. Interview with Azyumardi, 18 November 1996. (Azyumardi was among 
the student activists arrested and imprisoned for his role in the student unrest.) Two decades later the 
former Commander of Kopkamtib operations responsible for ordering the crackdown, Admiral_(ret.) 
Sudomo, was firm in his view that "there were political elements that entered the campuses from 
outside to try to bring the country to an Islamic state." Interview with Sudomo, 30 October 1997. 
96 
ideologies]. "90 In an intelligence operation to discredit the Muslim and student 
opposition, the Commander of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo (1978 - 1983), in fact, 
spread the idea that "political elements" had entered campuses to struggle for an 
Islamic state.91 One of the targets of the Kopkamtib campaign was clearly PPP. As 
Nasution noted, for example, the Islamic Ka'bah sign at the Jakarta IAIN campus had 
to be taken down because it was considered as being "identical with PPP."92 
An Ali Murtopo protégé at CSIS, the Minister of Education and Culture 
(1978- 1982), Daud Jusuf, was the chief architect of campus normalisation under 
Kopkamtib auspices. Although the "normalisation" program was directed towards de- 
politicisation of campuses in general, Daud, a Muslim by faith, expressed a particular 
dislike for the Islamic student organisation, HMI. He explained that HMI had played a 
major role in the protests and riots. HMI "dominated the student councils [DEMA]: I 
wanted to force them [HMI] out" of the campuses. Normalisation was also part of his 
program to reduce religious (Islamic) content at education institutions with the aim of 
creating a national education system, a goal that was yet to be attained.93 He regarded 
many "Islamic" practices as being responsible for holding back Indonesian education 
from achieving international standards. He wanted to create on campus a "scientific 
community" dedicated to scholarly pursuits. As Minister, he therefore abolished the 
Muslim fasting month as a school holiday and refused Muslim requests to increase the 
religious content of instruction in schools. He also attracted controversy when he 
refused requests to build a mosque on the IAIN campus in Jakarta. He explained that 
90 Interview with Nasution, 13 June 1996; Refleksi Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam: 70 Tahun 
Harun Nasution, Jakarta, Panitia Penerbitan Buku Dan Seminar 70 Tahun Harun Nasution 
Bekerjasama Dengan Lembaga Studi Agama Dan Filsafat, 1989, pp.44, 48 -9. 
. Interview with Sudomo, 30 October 1997; Julius Pour, Laksamana Sudomo: Mengatasi 
Gelombang Kehidupan, Jakarta, PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1997, pp.234 -8. 
92 
. Interview with Nasution, 13 June 1996. 
93 . Interviews with Jusuf, 24 November 1997; Rambang Pranowo (an official at the RIMAS and 
Haji Affairs at the Department of Religion), 13 March 1997. 
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he "thought it was better to build a laboratory or library," given the poor level of 
educational facilities at the lAIN,94 Thus, initiatives of the Education Minister to 
depoliticise campus life went hand in hand with efforts to de- Islamise and secularise 
education. 
iv. Reorienting education in line with Pancasila 
This section discusses regime initiatives to reinforce the state's political 
control over unmediated student organisation and rival Islamic ideology by 
intensifying its campaign to win Muslim hearts and minds over to Pancasila and by 
seeking to increase its supervision of religious education. 
To begin with, coinciding with the normalisation policy, in reaction to the 
PPP's walkout of the MPR General Session of March over P4 and aliran kepercayaan 
legislation, Suharto appointed General (ret.) Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara as his next 
Minister of Religious Affairs (1978- 1983). This was in line with a general practice of 
placing senior army officers (and intelligence staff) in cabinet and government in 
order to monitor and maintain control over the activities of civilian bureaucrats. 
Alamsjah had been Coordinator of Cabinet Presidium Personal Staff of the President 
from 1966 to 1968 and Secretary of State (1968- 1972). Suharto delegated Alamsjah 
the task of persuading Islamic organisations and educational institutions to accept the 
P4 instructions. According to Alamsjah, Suharto explained to him "As long as 
Pancasila is unclear to Muslims, or some of them cannot accept it, national unity will 
always be fragile. "95 Alamsjah formulated three basic program objectives of religious 
policy. The first was to get all religions to accept Pancasila (P4) instructions. The 
94 . Interview with Jusuf, 24 November 1997. 
vs Suparman G. Parikesit and Krisna R. Sempurnadjaja, H. Alamsjah Ratu Práwiranegara: 
Perjalanan Hidup Senrang Anak Yatim Piatu, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995, p.244; Krisna R. 
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second was to get all religions to support the government's development programs. 
The third was to achieve harmony of religious life for the sake of national stability.96 
He went on regular circuits of Islamic University campuses, IAINs and to 
Islamic organisational meetings and events and sought to win a commitment of 
Muslim students to the government's corporatist ideology by urging compliance to 
P4. He called on students to sharpen their intellectual and technical skills, to remove 
the "bad image attached to Islam," and to participate in development.97 The P4 
campaign on campuses was an intensification of earlier attempts to bring about an 
ideological re- orientation of student life, which hitherto had focused on reducing the 
content of Islamic instructions that were based on classical texts and teaching 
methods. 98 
The next Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali (serving for two 
terms, 1983- 1993), stepped up efforts to win over Muslim adherence and conformity 
to Pancasila ideology. In support of these efforts, he called for the reaktualisasi 
( "reactualisation ") of Islamic doctrine and its Scripture. Reaktualisasi was another 
word for the reinterpretation of Islam's classical texts in light of present contexts and 
issues to bring contemporary relevance to Islam's message and law.99 However, 
Munawir called for a re- actualisation of Islamic doctrine as part of his effort to 
Sempurnadjaja (ed.), H. Alamsjah Ratu Prawíranegara 70 Tahun: Pesan dan Kesan, Jakarta, Pustaka 
Sinar Harapan, 1995. 
96 Interview with Alamsjah Ratu Prawíranegara (Minister of Religious Affairs, 1978 -1983), 22 
September 1997. 
97 . "Sambutan Menteri Agama R.I. Pada Dies Natalis Ke XII IAIN Imam Bonjol Tanggal 29 
November 1978 di Padang, "; and "Sambutan Menteri Agama R.I. Pada Dies Natalis Ke XIV IAIN 
Raden Fatah Palembang Tanggal 21 December 1978," Pembinaan Kehidupan, pp.11 -13, 36 -9. 
98 As well as establishing greater control over student activities on campus, Suharto was 
determined to bring tighter discipline to the Department of Religion. According to Alamsjah, Suharto 
requested him to take control of, reorganize and bring military type administrative discipline to the 
Department of Religion and to bring it once and for all, loyally behind Golkar. As Alamsjah noted, 
Suharto considered Mukti Ali had failed to remove satisfactorily NU's influence from the Department. 
"New Order intelligence services (Murtopo's OPSUS and Bakin) remained suspicious of the 
Department, because only about 30 percent of its staff had supported Golkar at the 1971 and 1977 
elections." Interview with Alamsjah, 22 September 1997. 
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convince Muslims that Pancasila was not antithetical to Islam.100 Munawir sought to 
persuade the Muslim political community that they could implement Islamic values 
without having to establish a theocratic state, and that Pancasila did not threaten to 
replace Islam's religious existence, as some Muslim activists had claimed. 
Munawir propounded his reaktualisasi ideas in response to a specific political 
context. That is, government efforts to enforce the sole foundation law had caused 
strident reactions from Muslim leaders and preachers. The leaders condemned azas 
tunggal as attacking Islam's religious base, and their protests culminated in riots in 
Jakarta's port district of Tanjung Priok. Suharto charged his Minister of Religious 
Affairs with the task of assisting to overcome the tensions and suspicions of 
Pancasila. Munawir explained that the government's main approach to overcoming 
"Islamic political extremism" was through the introduction of educational programs 
that aimed to deepen people's understanding of the "essence" or "substance" of 
religion. In this way, it was hoped that Indonesian Muslims would be educated out of 
"narrow" comprehension of Scripture -based formalism, which had led them to attach 
great importance to the ideal of Islamic institutions regulating the affairs of the 
state, l01 
Munawir's reaktualisasi agenda coincided with government efforts to 
persuade Muslim to accept the P4 instructions. Persuasion was adopted only after the 
state had engaged its repressive instruments as security forces shot hundreds of 
protesters at Tanjung Priok and arrested and imprisoned outspoken opponents of azas 
v9 
. Muslim theologians and scholars in Indonesia also referred to this process of interpretation as 
kontekstualisasi (contextualisation) of Islam's texts. 
too Munawir Sjadzali, Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran, Jakarta, University 
of Indonesia Press, 1990. 
01 . Bahtiar Effendi, "Islam and the State in Indonesia: Munawir Sjadzali and the Development of a 
New Theological Underpinning of Political Islam," Studia Islamika: 2 (2), pp. 109 -112, 1995; 
H.Munawir Sjadzali, Bunga Rampai Wawa.san Islam Dewasa Ini, Jakarta, Penerbit Universitas 
Indonesia, 1994, pp.42 -48. 
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tunggal. The state's repressive instruments were invariably at the ready to underwrite, 
or prepare the ground for, institutional and ideological systems of compliance. 
Munawir also re- instituted the policy began by Mukti Ali and Sumardi (but 
also dropped by them because of opposition to the policy within the IAINs) of 
sending IAN graduates to Western institutions. He shared with his predecessors the 
vision of developing IAIN graduates, who would "broaden their academic horizons 
and learn the critical approach to science, including religious science. "102 He presided 
over pedagogical approach that acknowledged Islam as an important source of moral 
values for state and society. Thus, in 1987, he launched a new type of senior Islamic 
high school that provided 70 percent religious and Arabic studies in its curriculum 
and only 30 percent secular subjects. This initiative was a partial reversal of earlier 
policy that saw Islamic schools offer 30 percent religious subjects and 70 percent 
secular subjects respectively:03 Ministerial Decree No.I22 of July 1988, saw the 
reorganisation of studies at the 14 IAINs and marked the phasing out of general 
subjects taught at the institutes and the closure of General Teacher's Training 
departments.'04 From the late -1980s through to the 1990s, the IAINs increasingly 
became centres of the Islamic sciences, developed according to models borrowed 
from Islamic centres of learning in the West. The IAINs provided regular, short-term 
intensive courses to independent ulama in order to upgrade their comprehension of 
the Islamic sciences and to draw them away from classical studies at those pesantren 
which still stressed learn -by -wrote methodologies.105 This policy coincided with the 
growing accommodation between the state and Islam, and Suharto and Munawir 
102 . Interview with Munawir Sjadzali (Minster of Religious Affairs for two terms, 1983 - 1993), 4 
April 1997. 
103 Muhammad Wahyuni Nafis et. al. (eds.), Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam: 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H. 
Munawir Sjadzali, MA, Jakarta, Paramadina, Ikatan Persaudaraan Haji Indonesia, 1995, p.85; Islam in 
Indonesia: A Survey of Events, p.385. 
104 Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, pp.386 -7. 
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presented the course upgrades as evidence of the regime's deepening interest in 
Islam.106 
However, the policy also reflected other considerations -namely, the 
upgrading of religious content at Islamic schools came from an awareness in 
government circles that secular campuses had become a breeding ground for "radical" 
and "fundamentalist" religious sentiment and goals, especially among students trained 
in the physical and technical sciences. Munawir explained that the "fanatical" 
attachment of Muslim students to Islam's political goals arose from students 
(particularly those who had graduated from Islamic schools to secular institutions) not 
possessing sufficient comprehension of Islam.107 Restrictions on campus activities, 
achieved through corporatist reordering of academic and student associations, had 
forced students underground and resulted in a proliferation of unregulated cells and 
study groups on campus. Many of these groups were committed to more fundamental 
and purist goals for the realisation of an Islamic society untainted by secular state.108 
To a large degree, the groups managed to evade the state's security and surveillance 
apparatus, and thus greatly concerned Suharto. 
By contrast, as a consequence of reorientation of Islamic education, 
understandably, graduates of Muslim tertiary institutes and state -run TATN's would 
develop a much broader understanding than their secular counterparts of the 
philosophical, theological and historical roots of religion. Relatively speaking, 
graduates of Muslim institutions, therefore, would tend to hold more moderate and 
tos Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, pp. 397 -404 
106 Interview with Munawir, 4 April 1997. 
107. Interview with Munawir, 4 April 1997; Munawir, Bunga Rampai Wawasan Islam, p.14. 
108 . Two interviews with Imaduddin Abdulrahim, (Islamic preacher, founder of the Salman Mosque 
student movement, and ICMI member), 15 February 1994, 2 September 1996; Rifkì Rosyad, "A Quest 
For True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung," 
Indonesia, Thesis (Masters), Canberra, Australian National University, February 1995. 
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tolerant views of Islam regarding other religions and the state, it was argued.109 In 
short, the focus of state leaders had shifted from suspecting [AINs of being centres of 
Islamic political goals to suspecting secular campuses of becoming potential centres 
of Islamic fundamentalism and resistance.110 This resulted in a rethinking of religious 
education policy insofar as it was seen as beneficial to increase religious content 
under the guidance of the state to help overcome unregulated religious ideology. 
Thus, Munawir's reorientation of religious policy sought to re -take the 
initiative from student groups and Islamic organisations by increasing the state's 
involvement in the moral development and management of Islamic society and 
religious pedagogy. Among its initiatives, the government also tried to counter the 
proliferation of unmediated student groups by coopting preachers who were known to 
conduct activities on campuses and sponsoring them to press the government's 
message at universities. It also established state -guided pesantren kilat (fast -track 
courses in Islamic morality for students) on campuses and organised children from 
their pre -school years onwards into Qu'ran recital clubs and other state -approved 
social -religious activities. In an attempt to capture the unmediated activities of 
students and youth, these activities were organised through Golkar affiliates and other 
state corporatist groupings (discussed further in chapter five)." 
109 . Interviews with Munawir, 4 April 1997; Komaruddin Hidayat (IAIN alumni), 16 October 1996; 
Harun Nasution, 13 June 1996; Nuryamin Aini (Faculty of Islamic Law, IAIN Jakarta), 16 October 
1996. 
Suharto was particularly concerned about the prospect of the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) 
influencing developments in Indonesia, especially Indonesia's student population. 
. Established in 1976, the Pesantren Kilat movement began on campus with the aim of defending 
the faith of Muslim youth from "secularisation movements and the Christian Mission." Rifki, "A Quest 
For True Islam," pp.71,75. By the mid- 1980s, the original movement declined on campus after the state 
arrested some of its leaders for alleged subversive and terrorist activities. Since then, there has been a 
diversification of subsequent pesantren kilat activities in numerous Islamic organisations, mosques and 
government departments. However, it was not until June 1996, after meetings with the Department of 
Education and Culture, the Department of Religion and MUI, that Suharto launched nation -wide state - 
sponsored pesantren kilat courses for the "development of students' religiosity," to "build a better 
generation of Muslim youth." "pesantren Kilat': Building a Better Muslim Youth," Studia Islamika: 3 
(3), pp. 3 -6, I996; Mimbar Ulama: Suara Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 3 May 1996; interviews with 
Ahmad Syafi'i ;a senior researcher at the Department of Religion), 7 April 1997; Toto Tasmara (a 
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In conclusion, the state's political strategy regarding Islamic education was 
determined by the same set of priorities that had led army leaders to pursue a strategy 
for the de- politicisation of the parties and de- Islamisation of politics. That is, the 
state's primary objective was to create stability for the sake of achieving economic 
take -off through growth- oriented development. New Order modernisers like Ali 
Murtopo decided that the best way to guarantee political stability was through 
restructuring the political system and institutions along corporatist lines. This resulted 
in the re- channelling of mass memberships of organisations into professional and 
functional groups, thereby cutting them off from links to the political parties. The 
removal of NU party members from the Department of Religion and its education 
institutes was part of broader efforts to eliminate the dual loyalties of civil servants 
and bureaucrats to the government and the political parties. Compulsory membership 
of Korpri and the teachers' association, PGRI, and the mono -loyalty provisions were 
paramount to these efforts. 
Murtopo, in particular, re- assigned the programs and activities of professional 
organisations to development- oriented tasks and away from political activism. 
Education was one crucial area that progressively came under political control - 
which, to some extent, was achieved through the incorporation of academics and 
teachers into corporatist organisations like Golkar, Korpri and PGRI and through the 
formation of coordinating bodies as the intended sole mechanism for channelling 
student activities on campus. Campus restrictions, however, had forced Muslim 
students to establish numerous study groups and cells that by- passed the authorised 
coordinating bodies and university hierarchy and thereby remained unmediated by the 
state. Subsequent regime initiatives for the moral development of students and youth 
founding member of the Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Body, BKPRMI, which 
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aimed to recapture, in state frameworks, unmediated activities. Like memberships of 
the political parties and organisations, students also were expected to undergo 
intensive ideological reorientation programs (P4). These programs had as their central 
goal the creation of academics, scholars, and students who would spearhead 
modernisation processes and remain disengaged from political parties and 
organisations. 
5. Managing religious harmony 
Similar to state initiatives regarding the political parties and Islamic 
educational institutions, Suharto's administration tried to increase its supervision over 
religious communities and to bring them into state- delineated parameters -especially 
as it sought conformity to Pancasila and to national goals for development and 
stability. Part of these efforts involved corporatist capture through state charter of 
national -level religious institutions. Thus, during the 1970s, the regime assigned 
religious associations as national peak bodies to channel the interests of Indonesia's 
five main religious communities -Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism -religions that were accorded official recognition. There was the 
Indonesian Council of Llama (MUD, the Communion of Indonesian Churches (PGI), 
the Indonesian Council of Bishops (MAWI), the Indonesian Association of Hindu 
Dharma, and the Representation of the Indonesian Buddhist Community ( WALDBI). 
In 1980, the regime brought these five councils into a single Forum for Inter- religious 
Consultation (WMAB). WMAB was intended largely as a dialogue forum between 
coordinates its activities nationally with state -sponsored al-Qur'an recitals), 21 March 1997; "Teaching 
Children to Read the Qur'an," Studia Islamika: 1 (1), pp. 1 -5, 1994. 
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religious communities and through which the regime could communicate official 
concerns and policy to selected spokespersons of the five religions.112 
These institutions provided the regime with one formal means with which to 
regulate and inter- mediate relations between the state and religious communities. The 
regime sought to "harmonise" state- religious relations, after a decade of sporadic 
inter -religious strife and growing antagonisms between the state and Islam (mid - 
1960s to late- 1970s) had raised concerns about stability. As a culmination of these 
concerns, in 1978, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Alamsjah, issued a policy 
statement called "Three Harmonies (Tri Kerukunan)," which was an attempt at 
reorientation and guidance of religious life, so that it would not disrupt social 
harmony and order.113 The most important of the three harmonies was the attainment 
of harmony between the state and religion, especially Islam. The stated aim was to 
assist the government to establish national stability and security by reorienting 
religious life to the priority of national development. Good state -religious relations, it 
was stipulated, depended on the implementation of Pancasila (P4) indoctrination 
courses within society.114 In particular, the aim was to unify and harmonise the 
perceptions of Muslims concerning government policy. It sought to "remove mutual 
112 "Keputusan Menteri Agama Nomor 35 Tahun 1980 Tentang Wadah Musyawarah Antar Umat 
Beragama," and "Keputusan Pertemuan Lengkap Wadah Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama Tentang 
Penjelasan Atas Pasal 3, 4 Dan 6 Serta Pemhetulan Susunan Penandatangan Pedoman Dasar Wadah 
Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama," Sujangi (ed.), Pembinaan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama: 50 
Tahun Kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Departmen Agama RI, Badan Penelitian dan 
Pengembangan Agama, Proyek Peningkatan Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama, 1995/1996, pp.93- 
105. 
13 . Ideals of "Rukun" (harmony) constituted an "organicist" value -also outlined in Pancasila 
PMP and P4 courses -which prioritised hierarchical ordering of social relations, obiedience to 
authority, guidance by wise leadership and consensus. Interview with Alamsjah, 22 September 1997; 
H. Ludjito, "Kenangan Bersama Bapak H. Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara," Krisna R. Sempurnadjaja, 
H. Alamsjah Rani Prawiranegara 70 Tahun: Pesan dan Kesan, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995, 
p.263. 
114 H.R. Djatiwijono SH, " Kesan dan Kenangan Semasa Membantu Bapak H. Alamsjah Ratu 
Prawiranegara," , Sempurnadjaja (ed.), H. Alamsjah, p.274. 
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suspicions between the state and Islam caused by sharp criticism of government 
policy" during the 1977 general election and at the MPR General Session of 1978.115 
Alamsjah identified as a second priority the attainment of internal harmony of 
each religious community, by removing '`internal contradictions," "especially 
doctrinal ones." In practice, this meant that each religion was supposed to have a 
single interpretation of their creed, in conformity with Pancasila ideology. 116 Thus, 
internal harmonising entailed defining and circumscribing what constituted 
mainstream religion, although efforts to define orthodoxy pre -dated the New Order. 
Suharto reinforced a decree, issued by Sukarno, that to obtain legal recognition in 
Indonesia, a religion must demonstrate belief in a transcendent almighty God, possess 
a prophet and have a Holy Scripture as a major point of reference and prayer.117 In 
1966, as an anticommunist measure, the Provisional MPR decided to ban atheism and 
make religious education compulsory.» 
The objective of "internal harmonising" was to bring religious groupings 
under the management of the state thereby eliminating unmediated religious 
tendencies. Suharto used the religious institutions to rubber stamp decisions to ban 
"suspicious" religious movements. The main reason given for official prohibitions 
was that the group in question demonstrated unorthodox behaviour that deviated from 
mainstream religious practice and posed a threat to local and/or national order and 
115. Djatiwijono, "Kesan dan Kenagnan. ", pp.274 -5; Umar Hasyim, Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan 
Beragama Dalam Islam Sebagai Dasar Menuju Dialogue dan Kerukunan Antar Agama, Surabaya, Pt. 
Bina Ilmu, 1991, p.375. 
116. Interviews with Sudomo, 30 October 1997; Alamsjah, 22 September 1997. 
117 . It was actually in 1961 that the Minister of Religion proposed this definition of religion as a 
means of denying legal status to Javanese mysticism. For reasons of social order, Sukarno issued 
presidential decree no.1 /1965 giving official recognition to six religions (the sixth being Confucianism) 
and authorising the prohibition of religious orientations that threatened these religions and /or political 
stability. Under Suharto, in 1966, compulsory membership of an officially sanctioned religion was 
decreed and Confucianism was dropped as one of the acknowledged religions. Neils Mulder, Mysticism 
& Everyday Life in Contemporary Java: Cultural Persistence and Change, Singapore, Singapore 
University Press, 1978, p.6; Semuel Augustinus Patty, `'Aliran Kepercayaan': A Socio- Religious 
Movement in Indonesia," Thesis (Ph.D.), Aim Arbor, 1986, p.97. 
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security. The regime required religious splinter groups (kelompok sempalan) and 
spiritual movements that laid claim to being a religion, but fell outside of the official 
definitions, to merge with one of the five world religions that they most closely 
resembled. For instance, Religious Minister's Instruction No.8 of 1979 outlined the 
state's position regarding Islam. It clarified that, in joint cooperation, the Attorney 
General, the Department of Internal Affairs, Bakin intelligence, Regional 
Governments, MDT and Islamic institutions were to provide intensive "reorientation, 
guidance and surveillance" of Islamic organisations and movements that were found 
to be in conflict with Islamic doctrine.119 These nonconformist/ "deviating" groups 
were to be guided back onto the "correct path of Islamic teachings. "72° If they failed 
to comply, their legal existence remained uncertain and they risked prohibition.121 In 
the name of religious guidance, between 1971 and 1987, the Attorney General's 
Department banned at least 29 religious teachings, practices, movements, and/or 
books.122 Between 1988 and 1990, it prohibited 21, 18 of them related to Islam and 
three to Chri sti anity.123 
However, Suharto sponsored attempts by Javanese mystical orders (kebatinan) 
to attain separate legal status as a religion, later called aliran kepercayaan ( "mystical 
belief systems "), as part of efforts by army leaders, who were themselves inclined to 
119 , Feillard, "Traditionalist Islam and the Army," p.61. 
119. "Instruksi Menteri Agama Nomor 8 Tahun 1979 Tentang Pembinaan, Bimbingan Dan 
Pengawasan Terhadap Organisasi Dan Aliran Dalam Islam Yang Bertentangan Dengan Ajaran Islam," 
Ruku Peraturan Perundangan Tentang Pembinaan Penyelenggaraan Kehidupan Beragama, 
Departmen Agama R.I. Sekretariat Jenderal, 1.990/1991, pp.252 -4. 
2Ó . " Instruksi Menteri Agama Nomor 8 "; Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events 121. Presidential Stipulation No.1/1965, signed by Sukarno, and concerning the prevention of the 
misuse of and /or insult to religion, provided the initial legal basis for subsequent prohibitions of 
religious movements, publications and practices that the state considered as having "deviated" from 
sanctioned religious conduct. This stipulation was incorporated into Presidential Stipulation No.5 of 
1969, which enacted as law numerous of Sukarno's presidential instructions. "Penetapan Presiden 
Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 1965 Tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan Dan/Atau Penodaan 
Agama" and "Undang 
-Undang No.5 Tahun 1969 Tentang Pernyataan Berbagai Penetapan Presiden 
Dan Peraturan Presiden Sebagai Undang -I Indang," Buku Peraturan Perundangan, pp. i -7. - 
1a.2 Buku Peraturan Perundangan. 
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practise Javanese mysticism, to counter the influence of political Islam. In December 
1970, Golkar incorporated aliran through establishing the Coordinating Secretariat of 
Belief Movements (SKK).1224 In 1978, as a concession to Muslim opposition, Suharto 
accorded to belief systems separate organisational recognition as a "culture," not 
religion, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Culture. In 1981, a 
sole national body named the Directorate for the Supervision of the Followers of 
Belief Systems was established.125 
In this way, Javanese mystical sects and other religious orders could obtain 
legality outside of the five religions, but also had to adhere to strict parameters of 
belief and practice as defined by the state.126 The state banned hundreds of mystical 
sects that failed to meet these requirements, especially in the aftermath of the 1965 
coup attempt when it dissolved sects and outlawed forms of mysticism that state 
intelligence agencies had identified as being infiltrated by communists and as 
endangering social order and stability.:27 At first, the responsibility of monitoring and 
banning mystical movements resided with the watchdog authority, Supervision of the 
Belief Movements in Society (PAKEM), established by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs in 1952.128 By 1967, the Attorney General assumed control of PAKEM and 
123 
"Daftar Aliran/Ajaran Kepercayaan Masyarakat Yang Telah Dilarang/Dibejukan Selama 
Periode April 1988 S/D March 1990" (register of banned organisations supplied by MUI). 
124. Neils Mulder, Mysticism & Everyday Life, pp.7 -9. 
125 Mimbar Penyuluhan Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa: Jalur Pembinaan 
Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Jakarta, Departemen Pendidikan Dan 
Kebudayaan, Direktorat Pembinaan Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 
1983/1984, pp.12 -13. 
126 Efforts to define what constituted religion began at least in the early 1950s, well before the 
New Order period. As Mulder observed, "In 1952, the Islam- dominated Ministry of Religion advanced 
a minimum definition of religion containing the following necessary elements: a prophet, a holy book, 
and international recognition. Such a definition would exclude mysticism as a valid religious 
expression and even outlaw its practice..." Mulder, Mysticism & Everyday Life, pp.4 -5. 
¡27 . Interviews with General (ret.) Benny Murdani (former Commander of Kopkamtib and former 
Commander of ABRI), 5 November 1997; General (ret.) Sumitro (former Commander of Kopkamtib), 
23 September 1997; Mulder, Mysticism & Everyday Life, p.6; Soegiarso Soerojo, Siapa Menabur 
Angie Akan Menuai Badai: G30S -PKI Dan Peran Bung Karno, Jakarta, C.V. Sri Muni, 1988. 
.25 
. In 1955, the Ministry of Justice took control of Pakem, apparently in order to Iessen the 
authority of the Ministry of Religion, but also to establish tighter supervision of mystical movements. 
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responsibility for issuing formal bans after receiving instructions from President 
Suharto, who personally assessed the reports of Bahn intelligence concerning the 
activities of suspect religious movements.129 As part of the government's cultural 
assimilation policy, PAKEM also supervised restrictions on Chinese customs and 
rituals, which were to be practised within the confines of the family household and 
not in public.13o 
We have seen how the regime branded as "deviant" religious tendencies that 
fell outside of mainstream religious belief and urged them to merge with authorised 
religion. The stigmatising of groups as religiously "deviant" also became a weapon of 
state officials wishing to garner the support of religious authority behind its security 
operations against grassroots resistance and counter ideologies to the state. On one 
occasion, for example, in February 1989, the government mobilised Muslim opinion 
behind military actions against the alleged Islamic insurgency in and around the 
district of Way Jepara, Lampung (South Sumatra). The army reportedly killed at least 
27 "militants" belonging to a group identified as "Warrior Followers of Allah," led by 
Anwar (alias Warsidi). It denounced the group as a Security Disturbance Movement 
(GPK -a derogatory label often employed by state officials against troublemakers).131 
In an effort to discredit the local disturbance, Government/ABRI spokespersons 
accused Warsidi's group of spreading teachings that deviated from mainstream Islam 
and of trying to establish an Islamic state. Consequently, Muslim community leaders 
Eka Darmaputera, Pancasila And The Search For Identity And Modernity In Indonesian Society: A 
Cultural and Ethical Analysis, Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn, Koln, E.J. Brill, 1988, p.84. 
129. Interview with Murdanì, 5 November 1997. 
'30 
`Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 14 Tahun 1967 Tentang Agama, Kepercayaan 
Dan Adat Istiadat Cina Kami, Pejabat Presiden Republik indonesia," and "Keputusan Bersama Menteri 
Agama, Menteri Dalam Negeri Dan Jaksa Agung Republik Indonesia: No. 67 Tahun 1980; No. 224 
Tabun 1980; No, 111 /J.Á/10 /1980," Peraturan Perundang - Undangan Kehidupan Beragama, Seri C, 
Pembinaan Aliran- Aliran Keagamaan, Jakarta, Departemen Agama RI, Sekratariat Jenderal, 1996, 
pp.11 -14. 
131. "Peristiwa Di Way Jepara: 27 ()rang Gerombolan Komando Mujahidin Tewas, 19 Orang Di 
Tahan, Kapten Inf. Sutiman Gugur," Lampung Post, 10 Febuary 1989. 
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of Lampung chapters of the MUI, NU pesantren; the Muhammadiyah, IAINs, and 
Islamic dakwah organizations reiterated ABRI's calls for "increased community 
vigilance against misleading religious interpretations and deviant sects. "i32 The 
military commander in charge of operations, Hendropriyono, was at the forefront of a 
smear campaign against Warsidi. Before a specially convened meeting of 1,000 
Muslim preachers, pesantren leaders and dakwah institutions, he declared that it was 
"better to call" Warsidi's group "dirty cats" as they had "strayed from mainstream 
religious teachings and used the mask of religion for their own ends. "i33 The regional 
head of NU instructed his community to "always hold fast" to government 
explanations of the incident, not to give outside preachers the chance to deliver 
sermons, and to report Immediately such sermons to authorized agencies.134 
Thus, after the security operations, government spokespersons announced the 
decision to establish tighter ideological control of the Way Jepara community with a 
regime of periodic religious guidance. The Minister of Internal Affairs sought to 
disassociate the disturbance from grassroots protest and instead declared that his 
Department faced the challenge of raising "viIIage community national defense, 
especially in the fields of ideology and politics." :35 The Assistant Rector of LAIN in 
Lampung proposed that the Departments of Religion, Education, and Social Affairs 
and IAIN and MUi should give religious guidance to the community "so that those 
who once felt sympathy for [Warsidi's] movement know that they are wrong" and 
132 "Anggota Muspida Bertatap Muka dengan Tokoh Agama," Lampung Post, 15 Febuary 1989; 
"Bupati Lampung Utara: Laporkan Bila Ada Kegiatan Yang Menyimpang," Lampung Post, 20 Febuary 
1989; '`GPK Anwar, 100% Bukan Ajaran Islam: Orang Kiri Datang Kembali, Bersumber Sebuah Kifab 
Terjemahan," Lampung Post, 28 Febuary 1989. 
133 "Fadillah, Gembong Mujahidin Ditangkap," Lampung Post, 19 Febuary 1989. 
134 One of the problems that greatly irked senior officials was that Warsidi had turned a cluster of 
hamlets into a separate, self -contained community rejecting outside authority. In particular, the issues 
of land dispute /evictions and government concern that Warsidi might influence discontented locals to 
refuse to pay taxes or cooperate with development programs appeared to De the main issues that were at 
stake. "NU Wilayah Lampung Kutuk GPK Anwar di Way Separa," Lampung Post, 20 Febuary 1989. 
'35 
"Rudini: Kasus Talangsari Bukan Akibat Keresahan Sosial," Merdeka, 20 Febuary 1989. 
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"truly know the danger of misleading teachings. "t36 As part of the government's 
guidance of religion, the Lampung Attorney General banned twenty -four religious 
sects, and reportedly placed 11,596 adherents of sects under security surveillance.137 
In the final analysis, the implementation of the state's `internal" harmonising 
objectives had far- reaching implications for local communities. The idea of religious 
deviance was manipulated in order to legitimise state repression, which was then 
followed by intensive ideological guidance and reorientation programs. This 
constituted an extreme form of exclusionary policy, in which the government called 
on the state- chartered MUT and dakwah organisations (which had been corporatised- 
see chapter five), in conjunction with IAINs and local religious organisations to hack 
the state's follow up operations after crushing the localised dissent. Suharto resorted 
to repression in order to restrict the growth of independent religious movements and 
to stamp out religious insurgencies. These efforts reinforced corporatism in that they 
sought to eliminate unmediated religious tendencies and bring them under state 
guidance and control. Thus, as was the case with political parties, religious 
communities had to form corporatist mergers and were subject to ideological 
redefinition and exclusion. 
The third harmony concerned inter -religious relations. Its purpose was to co- 
ordinate the activities of different religions, to unify and harmonise perceptions 
regarding sensitive issues of ritual belief and practice, and to remove "contradictions" 
that might lead to conflict between religions. The inter -religious forum, WMAB, was 
established to mediate points of tension and to guide the behaviour of religious 
'36 "Peristiwa Separa Sangan Terulang: Kelompok Masyarakat Perlu Pembinaan Secara Periodik," 
Lampung Post, 28 Febuary 1989. 
37 "Di Lampung: Sekitar 11.596 Orang dalam Pengawasan, 24 Aliran Dilarang," Lampung Post, 
24 Febuary 1989. 
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adherents so that one religious community did not disturb another (through 
proselytising or defamatory remarks) and cause social instability in the process.138 
Thus, Alamsjah issued ministerial decisions for the regulation of religious life. 
For example, together with the Minister of Internal Affairs, he issued Joint Decision 
No.1 of 1979 concerning "Methods of Implementation of Religious Propagation and 
Foreign Aid to Religious Institutes in Indonesia." The crucial passages of this 
decision were clauses four and six. Clause four stated that "implementation of 
religious propaganda directed at another group already embracing a faith was not 
permitted" if the following methods were used: 
1. Offering enticements with or without giving goods, money, clothing, food and 
or water, medical treatment, medicines, and any other gifts aimed at converting 
adherents of one faith to the proselytising faith; 
2. Distributing pamphlets, magazines, bulletins, books, etc., to those of another 
religion, or: 
3. Conducting house -to -house calls to religious adherents (of another faith).139 
Restrictions on proselytising sought to overcome points of tension and conflict 
that had erupted since the mid- 1960s. Clause six aimed to monitor and control foreign 
aid and foreign missionary activities in Indonesia by placing them under the 
surveillance of the International Coordinating Work Committee at the Department of 
Religion. Suharto was particularly sensitive to the potential challenge to Indonesia's 
sovereignty posed by unregulated influx of foreign aid through religious foundations. 
436 
"Instruksi Menteri Agama Republik Indonesia Nomor 3 Tahun 1981 Tentang Pelaksanaan 
Pembinaan Kerukunan Hidup Beragama Di Daerah Sehubungan Dengan Telah Terbentuknya Wadah 
Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama," Pembinaan Kerukunan, pp.106-110. 
139 . Kompilasi: Peraturan Perundang-Undangan dan Kebijakan dalam Pembinaan Kerukunan 
Hidup Beragama, Department Agama RI, Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama, Proyek 
Pembinaan Kerukunan Hidup Beragama, Jakarta, 1993/1994, pp.137-142. 
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WMAB was the formal mechanism for deliberating upon government 
regulation and control. However, inter -religious strife at provincial, regency and 
district levels was to be dealt with by the respective government authorities, including 
the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Religion and Kopkamtib in 
consultation with local religious leaders.14° The Commander of security operations 
(Pangkopkamtib) explained local disturbances to the inter- religious forum and 
advised the religious councils therein of the public statements it was to issue 
nationally concerning particular incidents. For example, regarding inter -religious 
conflict in Solo (Central Java) in 1980, after clarifications from Pangkopkamtib, the 
five councils issued a statement typical of military propaganda. According to the 
statement, "the whole community was to raise vigilance, awareness and National 
discipline," "to increase implementation of Pancasila," and "to increase 
understanding of religion. "141 The statement recognised the need to perfect a national 
system of education that trained and oriented Indonesian youth to nationalism, 
patriotism, greater intellectual and religious awareness and economic development.142 
Hence, the forum became an instrument of government propaganda and 
indoctrination. 
Alamsjah also issued instructions regarding the tight monitoring of Islamic 
dakwah. For example, Minister of Religion Decision No.44 of 1978 established 
guidelines for the close guidance and surveillance of religious dakwah, including 
sermons given via radio broadcasts. This was followed by Minister of Religion 
Instruction No.9 of 1978 for the implementation of Decision No.44 and by Circular 
No.3 of 1978 to the Heads of the Office of Religious Affairs at Provincial, Regency 
iao Kompilasi: Peraturan. 
14' "Seruan Bersama Dihubungkan Dengan Kejadian Solo Dan Di Tempat-Tempat Lain Yang 
Telah Menimbulkan Keresahan Di Kalangan Masyarakat," Pembinaan Kerukunan, pp.113-118. 
142 "Seruan Bersama Dihubungkan," Pemhinaan Kerukunan, p.117. 
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and District levels. The instructions required that all sermons delivered before an 
audience of over 300 people had to report their program itinerary, and names of 
organisers and preachers to the security forces /police. IMIL'I was instructed to work in 
conjunction with the Department of Religion and other government agencies to 
streamline monitoring efforts. These efforts were to ensure that sermons did not carry 
any anti- government messages, did not stir up inter -religious strife, and were 
consonant with Pancasila ideology. The Department was responsible for reporting 
violations to the police and offenders could receive a maximum sentence of five years 
goal under criminal law.143 
To sum up, as was the case with the other harmonising initiatives, in order to 
achieve harmony of inter -religious relations the state sought to regulate and reorient 
the religious communities, with the WMAB acting as a mediating institution between 
the state and religious communities, and as a channel for communicating the regime's 
concerns and messages to constituencies. Suharto was determined to ensure that inter - 
religious conflict and the potential of Islam becoming a source of local dissent 
{including through political -ideological goals for an Islamic state) did nor disrupt 
stability or undermine development. 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis has considered three different target areas of the state's policies 
of exclusion: The Islamic parties, Islamic education, and the religious harmonising 
program. The three target areas were interrelated as they were subject to the same set 
of policy objectives, political constraints and historical timeframe. In each case, state 
143 "Keputusan Menteri Agama Nomor 44 Tahun 1978 Tentang Pelaksanaan Dakwah Agama Dan 
Kuliah Subuh Melalui Radio," and "Instruksi Menteri Agama Nomor 8 Tahun 1978 Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Dakwah Agama Dan Kuliah Subuh Melalui Radio," "Surat Edaran Menten Agama 
Nomor 3 Tahun 1978," Buku Peraturan Perundangan, pp.181-192. 
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leaders sought to restructure the organisational existence of Islam along corporatist 
lines and subject their memberships to ideological reorientation and guidance to 
conform with Pancasila and in fulfilment of development goals. National trends and 
struggles regarding de- politicisation of the Islamic parties (especially PPP) influenced 
government policy concerning education, which also was subject to de- politicisation 
efforts. In particular, the regime sought to rechannel the Muslim constituency away 
from Islamic political- ideological commitments (especially for the establishment of 
an Islamic state) and towards development priorities. Harmonising of religious 
relations reinforced these broader efforts to attain ideological and institutional 
conformity, through state guidance and regulation, in a depoliticised environment. To 
harmonise meant to unify both perceptions and institutions and to make them accord 
with overall political and ideological restructuring and/or reorientation. The regulation 
and control of religious life was partly achieved through exclusionary corporatist 
arrangements: the delimitation (through establishment of peak organisations) of what 
were permissible religious groups, conduct and activities and the prohibition of 
impermissible groups. 
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Chapter 5 
Incorporated Muslim interests: microanalysis 
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers in detail the state's structuring of Muslim interests into 
nonparty, corporatist entities. Whereas the previous chapter covered Suharto's 
management of Muslim associational life during a period of antagonistic state -Islamic 
relations (1968- 1985), this chapter gives an account of corporatist strategies both 
before and during the period of rapprochement (late -1980s to mid- 1990s). As part of 
the rapprochement, Suharto was behind initiatives to incorporate into state structures a 
hitherto neglected but increasingly important Muslim middle -class sector. The 
founding in 1990 of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), was 
the regime's most ambitious effort to absorb and channel Muslim middle -class 
aspirations. 
ICMI provided a new strategic function of support and legitimacy to Suharto's 
regime as it became one of Suharto's instruments of civilian elite recruitment into the 
state bureaucracy and political institutions (in the face of declining support from the 
mainstream military). This function notwithstanding, the state's approach to organised 
Muslim politics represented a shift of emphasis rather than a major departure from the 
government's policy concerning Islam. That is, the chapter is concerned with how, 
throughout the New Order period, the state's corporatist strategies and initiatives 
consistently had three broad objectives. In the service of the state's stability and 
economic development needs, the first was to co -opt, fragment and neutralise Islam as 
an autonomous political force. The second was to maintain close surveillance of 
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Indonesia's associational life and ensure that it remained within state -circumscribed 
limits. The third was to effect a limited mobilisation of Muslim support for purposes 
such as obtaining clear Golkar victories at the five -yearly general elections and for 
assisting the government with its critical development projects. Before discussing in 
detail the roles and aims of corporatised Muslim institutions, the different types of 
institutions briefly are considered. 
The state's corporatist mechanisms 
Suharto's regime developed a range of corporatist institutions for the capture 
of target segments of the Muslim constituency, such as mosque, preachers', 
intellectuals', ulama (Muslim religious scholars /leaders), and women's associations. 
The institutions were top heavy with state officials or Golkar functionaries in 
leadership positions and /or advisory councils. Like other corporatist associations 
(discussed in previous chapters), they were linked to bureaucratic centres, through 
pembinaan (guidance; supervision) sections -ìn this case to the Department of 
Religion -with the Department of Internal Affairs overseeing their operations. They 
were established at each level of government (national, provincial, and district) and 
their commissions or departments that handled their different organisational activities, 
and their programs and statutes, were kept strictly in line with government policy. 
These programs stressed the importance of giving paternalistic guidance to the 
Muslim community and its religiosity towards achieving harmonious state- society 
relations in fulfilment of stability and economic development goals. 
The management function was reflected in the programs and statutes of the 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), an institution for the incorporation of Islamic 
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religious scholars /leaders. Outlined were the need for mosques to be used as centres 
of '`spiritual and ideological guidance" (pembinaan mental spiritual) aimed at 
"securing the nation -state from the [latent] threats of Communism, Secularism, 
subversion and moral degradation ".2 Accordingly, "national vigilance" was required 
in order to safeguard inter -religious harmony, national security and stability.3 Similar 
statements can be found in the publications of other corporatist organisations and 
government departments.° 
This management translated into a policy of bringing independent Islamic 
associations into state -supervised structures. Numerous organisations comprised a 
system of amalgamations, wherein previously autonomous Muslim organisations 
were absorbed into national peak bodies which, themselves, came under the Golkar 
umbrella. Peak bodies of this type included such Golkar affiliates as the Union of 
Efforts to Improve Islamic Education ( GUPPI), the Indonesian Dakwah Council 
(MDI), the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI), and the Communication Board of 
Indonesian Mosque Youth (BKPRMI). 
To illustrate the kind of amalgamations that took place, BKPRMI-originally 
a voluntary association -was brought, along with Indonesia's other independent 
mosque associations, into the national peak body, DMI. DMI, MDI, and GUPPI were 
among 31 Islamic peak bodies and independent organisations subsumed into the 
. State guidance of Islam and society entailed close monitoring of Islam through the supervision 
(pembinaan) sections for each corporatist institution, which, as discussed in chapter four, had its 
origins in the development of ABRI's intelligence -security role and ideology. 
2 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Wadah Musyawarah Para Ulama, Zu'ama Dan 
Cendekiawan Muslim, Penerbit: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Masjid Istiglal Jakarta, p.I83. 
. 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama, pp.191 -223. 
á 
. Documents and official statements relating to ICMI place great stress on the role of Muslim 
intellectuals in promoting projects of technological development, and the role of Islam in upholding 
national unity, defence and security. " Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Se- Indonesia (ICMI)," Jakarta, January, 1991; `Pointers Pengarahan Panglima 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Dalam Rangka Menerima Pengurus ICMI," Jakarta, 22 
Febuary 1991; Cendekiawan Jadi Tauladan," Suara Karya, 27 August 1993; "Panglima ABRI: 
Keberadaan ICMI Merupakan Kebutuhan," Merdeka, 26 August 1993. 
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Golkar's Islamic Communication Forum for Mass Organisations (FKOI -KK). 
Through Golkar channels, the regime also absorbed a plethora of small, sometimes 
radical, Islamic organisations into larger state supervised amalgams.5 
Another related function performed by the corporatist organisations was what 
might be called "segmental" or "piecemeal" incorporation. That is, rather than 
conducting the daunting task of incorporating in -toto giant, heterogeneous 
associations like NU and Muhammadiyah, the regime sought to incorporate 
constituent members (such as mosque, women's, and preachers' bodies) of the 
voluntary associations into corporatist amalgams. In this way, for example, 
independent Islamic organisations would run the risk of losing control over 
component member bodies which, in turn, would lose their distinctiveness and 
particularity. Additionally, enforced amalgams of this kind could engender greater 
internal contest and fragmentation.6 The state therefore was engaged in a piecemeal 
but progressive capturing and simultaneous disorganising of the community's 
autonomous associational life. 
Through the corporatist organisations the regime promoted an "Official 
Islam," that was consonant with the state ideology, Pancasila, fostered loyalty to the 
nation- state, and eschewed left -wing radical or Islamic fundamentalist ideologies. It 
was vital to nation -state building, modernisation and industrialisation that leaders of a 
secular state gain control of Islamic ulama, mosques and dakwah activities. These 
were the primary markers, locations and carriers of norms in society. Mosques 
. Interview with S.M. Hidayat (Head of MDI Secretariat), 12 November 1997; interview with Toto 
Tasmara (leader of BKRMI), 21 March 1997; "Daftar Anggota Forum Komunikasi Ormas Islam 
Karya- Kekaryaan," Jakarta, 1996. 
6 . ICAO provides a good example of this fragmentation effect, as it drew into itself such a diverse 
and incompatible range of voluntary and corporatist organisational entities and interest groups, that a 
predictable outcome was stimulation of internal antagonisms, contests for power and goal 
disorientation. 
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constituted a major centre of ummat (Muslim community) activity, in which occurred 
most Islamic religious propagation and much political propaganda. Kiai (Muslim 
leaders, often attributed with possession of mystical powers who ran Indonesia's 
thousands of private Islamic boarding schools or pesantren) and ulama wielded 
enormous influence in local communities. By bringing mosques, preachers and ulama 
into state -supervised structures, which offered induction into officially- sanctioned 
religion through pembinaan, state leaders could hope to supplant community norms 
and the authority of independent ulama with its own religious norms, government - 
trained ulama and secular authority. Hence, there was always a close relationship 
between the emphasis placed on development or pembangunan by state officials, and 
the need to supervise the religious life of the nation in the direction of harmonious 
state -society relations, Corporatist restructuring was one project for the achievement 
of these aims. The discussion now turns to an elaboration of the functions and aims of 
these institutions for the incorporation of Muslim interests. 
2. MUI: State incorporation of Muslim ulama 
Since 1970, in a political climate in which the regime was seeking to 
emasculate the parties, Muslim leaders had rejected government proposals to establish 
a nation -wide council of ulama suspecting that it was yet another attempt to restrict 
Islamic political activities. It was five years before the regime could gain the 
agreement of a sufficient number of Muslim leaders to proceed with its plans for the 
council. By May 1975, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Amir Machmud, had 
instructed governors to set up regional councils in nearly all of Indonesia's twenty - 
seven provinces. These councils, along with leaders of independent organisations 
including Muhammadiyah, NU, a few smaller entities, and the incorporated 
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institutions, GUPPT and the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI), were then brought in 
as members of the national MUI.' 
Thus, in July 1975, the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) was established at 
the instigation of the regime in a climate of mutual suspicion and distrust between 
itself and Muslim groups. The government -financed MUI was intended as an 
alternative channel of state -Islamic interest inter -mediation and communication to that 
of the political parties. Giving the address at Mill's founding conference, Suharto 
clarified that the Council was neither permitted to engage in political activities, nor to 
carry out programs, but functioned in an advisory capacity to both the regime and the 
Muslim community. In line with the regime's "floating mass" policy, MUI was not 
allowed to organise below the level of province and establish itself as a grassroots 
organisation. Nevertheless, at the lower administrative level, Muslim leaders were 
incorporated into Ulama Councils (MU) which were under the supervision of the 
Office of Religious Affairs.8 
In an apparent attempt to gain wider community approval for the Ulama 
Council, the regime persuaded the well -known and respected Muhammadiyah leader, 
Buya Hamka, to accept appointment as the Council's first general chairman. The 
independent -minded Hamka remained suspicious of the regime and, in 1981, chose to 
withdraw from the Council rather than compromise his principles when the regime 
insisted that MUT rescind a fatava (authoritative religious opinion) forbidding Muslim 
attendance at Christmas celebrations.9 Since Tlamka's resignation, the regime 
. H. Ramlan Mardjoned, KFL Hasan Basri 70 Tahun: Fungsi Ulama Dan Peranan Masjid, Jakarta, 
Media Dakwah, 1990, p.154. 
$ . Flans Anlov and Sven Cederroth, "Introduction," Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (eds.), 
Leadership On Java: Gentle Hints, Authoritarian Rule, Surrey, Curzon Press, 1994, p.9. 
, "Buya, Fatwa Dan Kerukunan Beragama," Tempo, 30 May 1981. 
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encouraged the appointment of compliant ulama, -some of them bureaucrats, to the 
chairmanship and to leadership positions on the Council's ten commissions.'° 
To keep a watchful eye on the Council's activities, the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Minister of Education and Culture sat 
on the Council's advisory board." According to Mudzhar (an official at the 
Department of Religion), the Council gained access to President Suharto by 
appointment through the Minister of Religious Affairs. It liaised separately with the 
armed forces in a special joint committee, Social Communication (Kosmos), on 
religious issues related to national security.12 
In broad terms, MUI's objectives were stated as strengthening national 
security, increasing religious harmony, and assisting the regime in making a success 
of its development programs.13 One of MUI's main functions was to lend legitimacy 
to government policy initiatives and directives by explaining them in a religious idiom 
acceptable to, and understood by, the wider Muslim community. In effect, it was 
meant to deflect potential objections of Muslim groups that might choose to oppose 
government policy. MUI therefore remained under considerable pressure to justify 
government policy and in order to fulfil the requirement it set up a fatwa commission. 
Its tendency to issue fatwa and pronouncements in support of government 
policy measures left MUI exposed to accusations by independent ulama and Muslim 
intellectuals that it furnished religious opinions and viewpoints primarily in order to 
m Mostly pro -government figures have held senior posts in MUI, including Hasan Basri (a former 
Masyumi party leader) as General Chairman, the fomer Vice -President of Nil's Syuriah Council Ali 
Yafie, the Rector of the state -run Islamic Tertiary Institute (LAIN), Quraish Shihab, and the President of 
Nil's Syuriah Council, KH. Ryas Ruchíyat. "Iv1UI Commission membership lists, Kep- 
18OIMUI /íV/1996," Jakarta. 
11 
' "Cair setelah Tahu Saya dari Madura': Hartono Masuk Dewan Pertimbangan MUI," Jawa Pos, 
12 August 1997. 
12 Interview with Nasri Adlani (General Secretary of MUI), 4 November 1997; Atho M. Mudzhar, 
Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: a study of Islamic thought in Indonesia, 1975 -1988, 
Jakarta, INIS, 1993, p.60. 
13 . 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia, p.102. 
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satisfy the regime's wishes. For example, in 1988 the MUI made itself unpopular by 
siding with the regime during the controversy over rumoured pig -oil extract in canned 
foods and milk powders (Muslims are forbidden to eat pork). MUI leaders appeared 
with state officials on national television and dined on the allegedly contaminated 
products in an attempt to allay community fears.14 A number of independent ulama, 
privately, also expressed their astonishment over the MUI's decision to back a 
government plan to market frogs as a nutritious cuisine, as frogs too were considered 
a forbidden meat by the Syafi'i school (the dominant school of Islam in Indonesia). 
The high profile role played by MUI on the fond issue demonstrated the strategic 
legitimacy provided by the Council as it gave an authoritative Islamic seal of approval 
to the regime's actions that sought to overcome public concerns. In return, MUI tried 
to establish itself as the prime authority on the labelling of food products.'5 
On another occasion, MUI was seen as siding too closely with the regime 
concerning the government -sponsored Porkas- lottery, established in December 1995. 
The Muslim mainstream, including student protestors, several Muslim organisations 
and regional councils of ulama, became upset when MUI refused to back public 
condemnations of the lottery and declined to issue a fatwa banning the lottery. 
Instead, the chairman of MUI's fatwa commission announced that the lottery did not 
constitute gambling (gambling is prohibited by Islam). 16 
14 . See Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council, concerning the issuance of fatwa on the subject of the 
mechanised slaughter of cattle (pp.96 -7), the breeding and consumption of rabbits (p.98), and the 
breeding and consumption of frogs (pp.99 -100). In each case, the MUI fatwa served the purpose of 
assisting the government to overcome points of confusion that might cause controversy surrounding the 
establishment and/or success of commercial projects. "Jika Ulama Tak Boleh Berfatwa," Ummat, 20 
January 1997. 
15 
"Jika Ulama Tak Boleh Berfatwa," Ummat; "Membela MUI, Menyesalkan Menpangan," 
Ummat, 20 January 1997; "Labelisasi Halal: Halal Haramnya dari MUI," Gatra, 1 Match 1997; "Label 
Halal: Mundur Demi Perusahan," Gatra, 28 December 1996; "Wawancara, Ketua MUI K.H. Hasan 
Basri: ` Kaiau Umat Islam Tenteram, Negara ini Tenteram," Forum Keadilan, 23 December 1996. 
16 Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council, pp. 63 -64; Michael R.I. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics -under 
Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change, (New & Updated), London, New York, 
Routledge, 1993, p.133. 
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MUI, however, did not always appear to give rulings -or withhold rulings -in 
support of the regime's position. A case in point was when the issue of the national 
lottery resurfaced into public view in late 1991 and again in late 1993, this time under 
the name of SDSB (Philanthropic Donation with Prizes).17 Suharto's regime refused 
to heed calls to scrap SDSB, in which Suharto's family was thought to have a 
substantial investment, as Muslim students held impassioned nation -wide 
demonstrations against the lottery. MUI broke ranks with the regime and belatedly 
acceded to popular demand by announcing in 1991 that SDSB constituted gambling 
and therefore was forbidden by Islam. In 1993, the government banned the lottery.18 
However, the lottery continued under a new name and, in all probability, it suited 
Suharto to have MUI respond reassuringly to public pressure. By appearing 
responsive, it would enhance the credibility and viability of the Council as an 
instrument of communication between the state and the Muslim community. 
Through its fatwa commission, MUI became an officially condoned religious 
authority that sought to monopolise orthodoxy, guiding the Muslim community and 
guarding it against heterodox doctrines.19 In doing so, MUI fulfilled functions in the 
interests of the state's stability and security goals and functioned as an official 
instrument for countering autonomous Islamic organisation and political movements 
" . The lottery, with its first prize of one billion rupiah, held out the chance to millions of 
Indonesia's poorest section of society of obtaining luxury items otherwise out of their reach. The 
lottery also carried the high social cost of plunging addicts deeply into debt. The deleterious effects of 
the SDSB, and the fact of a disclosure that Muslim organisations were receiving substantial funds from 
the lottery, aroused Muslim community anger and moral outrage. Muslim leaders called on the state to 
scrap the lottery claiming that it constituted gambling and threatened to boycott the general election of 
1992. 
18. It is possible that the armed forces leadership had backed the student demonstration to ban the 
lottery in an attempt to embarrass Suharto. Perhaps MUI was caught in the middle of this intra -elite 
contest and was not simply bowing to popular public pressure. According to Lowry, "The fact that the 
demonstrations were so well coordinated on a national basis...contributed to suspicions that ABRI had 
tacitly supported the organisers in order to demonstrate the latent power of Islam, embarrass the 
government, exemplify the potential for protest movements to tax ABRI's resources to the limit, and 
thereby to justify increases in ABRI manpower." Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, St 
Leonards, Allen Sr. Unwin, 1996, p.198. 
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that could disturb stability and development. It closely liaised with the state's law - 
enforcement, security and intelligence agencies in providing surveillance of the 
Muslim community. For example, as part of this surveillance, it set up a commission 
for research, which investigated the literature and activities of Islamic sects and 
splinter groups that could cause local disturbances. After discussing research 
undertaken, the fatwa commission issued a ruling on whether a group should banned. 
In cases related to security, it handed over its findings to state agencies such as its 
various intelligence units, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of 
Justice, the Attorney General, and the Department of Religion.20 The Attorney 
General issued the formal bans.21 
Thus, MUI performed a complementary role to this intelligence collecting 
process and provided an "Islamic" seal of approval to prohibitions of deviant religious 
tendencies and, in the process, acted as an indirect organ of the state's surveillance 
and control. Surveillance also was exercised through encouraging voluntary informing 
as a type of self -policing. That is, Muslim informants commonly reported to MUI 
suspicious mosque sermons and proselytising that were thought to constitute an insult 
against another religion or to carry anti -government content. The Council then handed 
these reports to the local Regent, the Religious Affairs Office, or other authorities.22 
The fight against heterodoxy was related to the state's own domestic security 
concerns of ensuring that no religious ideas or activities broadened into a larger 
t9 It must be noted, however, that the Ministry of Religious Affairs acted as the principle official 
organ of state -approved religious orthodoxy. 
20 , General (ret.) Benny Murdani (the former Commander -in -Chief of ABRI and former head of 
military intelligence agencies) explains that ABRI worked together in field operations with Bakin and 
compiled reports about Islamic sects and movements that might threaten stability. Once Bakin 
confirmed the reports, it would take the list of groups slated for prohibition to President Suharto. 
Interviews with General (ret.) Benny Murdani (former Commander -in -Chief of ABRI and Kopkamtib 
commander), 5 November 1997; Admiral (ret.) Sudomo (Head of the Supreme Advisory Council, 
former Minister of Politics and Security and former Kopkamtib commander), 30 October 1997; asri 
Adlani, 4 November 1997; 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia, p.135. 
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movement that might express anti -government sentiment or could erupt into religious 
conflict. For instance, MUI joined the Department of Religion in condemning Islamic 
insurgencies such as Warsidi's "Islamic" rebellion in the Province of Lampung in 
198923 and, under the banner of Islam, continuing activities of the Aceh Freedom 
movement.24 
Finally, MUI was to facilitate relations between the regime and ulama to assist 
in the limited mobilisation of Muslim support for development programs. The regime 
realised that ulama could obstruct its development programs in rural areas. A 
government study (September- October 1977) concerning "guidance to town and 
village" noted that the role of religious figures was an integral part of village 
development. The study addressed the problem of how to get the participation of all 
levels of society in development. It concluded that the government ought to gain the 
participation of ulama, the carriers of norms and makers of public opinion, because 
the community regarded their religious advice or fatwa as "the last word" on matters. 
The regime recognised that traditional/direct forms of communication such as the 
delivering of sermons at mosques and pesantrens were proving to be more effective 
than were electronic and printed media for carrying the regime's development 
message.25 
Although MUI did not have an organisational presence in the countryside, it 
could still issue national and provincial fatwa and these rulings could be 
. Interview with Isa Anshari, (Secretary to MUT General Chairman), 15 December 1996. 
v 
. See chapter four. 
24 "Ketua MUI Aceh TJtara Serukan Masyarakat Sujud Syukur," Waspada, 4 March 1997; 
'`Peristiwa Di Way Jepara: 27 Orang Gerombolan Komando Mujahidin Tewas, 19 Orang Di Tahan, 
Kapten Inf. Sutiman Gugur," Lampung Post, 10 Febuary 1989; "Anggota Muspida Bertatap Muka 
dengan Tokoh Agama," Lampung Post, 15 Febuary 1989; "Bupati Lampung Utara: Laporkan Bila Ada 
Kegiatan Yang Menyimpang," Lampung Post, 20 Febuary 1989; "GPK Anwar, 100% Bukan Ajaran 
Islam: Orang Kin Datang Kemhali, Bersumber Sebuah Kitab Terjemahan," Lampung Post, 28 Febuary 
1989; "Fadillah, Gembong Mujahidin Ditangkap," Lampung Post, 19 Febuary 1989. 
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communicated through its ulama to the different levels of society. In particular, the 
Council was called upon to issue fatwa in the sensitive area of family planning. 
Controversy over the use of IUDs (Intra Uterine Devices) was one such example of 
regime mobilisation of Muslim support in aid of its family planning program. In 1971, 
a group of (eleven) prominent ulama issued a religious ruling declaring that Islamic 
law forbade the use of IUDs. The regime realised that the religious decision could 
seriously impair its free and aggressive contraception program. It therefore sought 
vigorously to persuade and pressure the ulama to lend their religious approval and 
justification to the use of IUDs. After years of resistance by religions conservatives, 
this approval finally came in 1983, when the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the 
National Family Co- ordinating Board convened a national conference of ulama. At 
the meeting, MUI reversed the earlier ruling with its own fatwa permitting IUD 
insertion.26 
The regime also called on MUI to advance its development projects through 
the sending of ulama and da'i (preachers) to remote regions and transmigration sites. 
President Suharto launched the program in 1989, which was funded by his and his 
wife's private foundations (Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila, YABMP, and 
25 "Laporan Loka Karya, Bimbingan Beragama Masyarakat Kota Dan Desa," 29 September --1 
October 1977 di Jakarta, Proyek Penelitian Agama dan Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 
Departmen Agama Republik Indonesia, pp2,5,1.5- 18,22 -23. 
. The ulama had originally opposed IUD insertion because Islamic law did not permit a man, 
other than her husband, to see a woman's "aurah." They gave their approval twelve years later with the 
understanding that female medical doctors or paramedical officers would carry out the insertions. The 
MUI fatwa listed twenty -one verses of the al- Qu'ran and Hadiths, followed by ten paragraphs 
explaining the significance of the government's family planning program, and those parts that did not 
violate Islamic law. Munawir Sjadzali explained that "Relying precisely on the words of the Al -Quran 
and Al- Hadith...they [the ulama now] endorse and lend their support to all government programmes on 
population, and using the `religious language' they take an active part, both collectively and 
individually, in the propagation and popularisation of the programmes, through both traditional and 
modern channels." Mudzhar, Fatwa.r of the Council, pp.61,113; H. Munawir Sjadzali, Islam: Realitas 
Baru Dan Orientasi Masa Depan Bangsa, Jakarta, Universitas Indonesia Press, 1993, pp 72 -3; 
Himpunan Keputusan dan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, 1995, pp.103 -112. 
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Yayasan Dharmais).27 The Departments of Religion and Transmigration were 
responsible for implementing the program, using the MUI as a vehicle for recruiting 
the preachers.28 Selected preachers were given the title of "development preachers" 
and underwent a one month preparatory training course. They were not only briefed in 
religious and pedagogical techniques, but were also trained in practical skills and 
community services like farming and plantation skills, marriage counseling, burial 
preparation and how to deal with the sick.29 
Aspects of the regime's pembínaan mental (ideological guidance) curriculum 
for preachers included a strong dose of instructions on harmony, duties and rights to 
the nation, leadership discipline, and morals. It also included courses on national 
security, health and family planning and farm management. The regime sent them 
mostly to oil -palm plantation sites (PER) and to areas for the mining of precious 
metals, fishing farms and forestry estates. 30 
Developing social harmony through religious guidance was central to the 
preachers' activities. Preachers were to assist migrants from different islands and 
ethnic groups to settle and assimilate. In particular, they gave pembinaan mental to 
the newcomers of Muslim faith (the majority of transmigrants) in order to avoid 
27 . In the first phase of the program (1990/1991), the government settled 973 preachers with their 
families at sites. In the second phase (1992/1993 and 1995/I996), 900 placements were made. In the 
third phase (1996/1997), the government succeeded in settling only 208 preachers. "Pelatihan, 
Penempatan dan Pembinaan Transmigran Da'i, Subit Pelayanan Transmigran Tahun [997," Jakarta, 
Direktorat Jenderal Bina Masyarakat Transmigrasi, Direktorat Bina Sosial Budaya, 1997, p.2. 
. Interviews with the Director of Sociocultural Guidance (Department of Transmigration), 10 
November :997; Drs. Muslim ,advisory staff to the Director of Sociocultural Guidance), 10 November 
1997; Subagio (Director of Information at the Department of Religion), 13 November 1997. 
29 . Interview with Anshary, 15 December 1996. 
3a Transmigrants worked on plantations as part of the government's "partnership" policy contained 
in its sixth 5 -year development plan (Repelita VI), wherein private investors supplied finance and 
technology and transmigrants the manpower to work on estates. In aid of development goals, one of the 
preachers' briefs was to assist the government to open areas of production and to establish new 
villages. Because preachers had a basic education (transmigrants were usually uneducated farmers), 
they naturally began to fill new leadership and government positions such as village chief created at the 
sites. Da'i dan Petard Membangun Daerah Baru, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Masjid Istiqlal 
Jakarta, 1993, pp.7-1 1, 22-4, 33, 69, 72, 76, 88, 96; interview with the Director of Sociocultural 
Guidance, IO November 1997. 
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points of tension among the migrant settlers and between them and local 
communities.31 The MUI supplied each preacher with a booklet of guidelines on 
maintaining inter -religious harmony. The booklet contained government regulations 
and decrees on religious propagation, constructing places of worship, mystical sects, 
foreign aid and violation of religious commemorations.32 
The regime wished to ensure that each religious community maintained an 
interpretation of their religion consonant with government development policy. It 
therefore instructed preachers to monitor, in conjunction with state agencies, the 
unrestrained growth of deviant sects or alternative religious interpretations at sites. 
Preachers were charged with the task of bringing deviant religious movements or 
expressions back into the mainstream fold of government- sanctioned religious belief 
and practice and to guide the Muslim migrant community accordingly. The last 
scenario that the regime wanted to see develop was a Muslim leader arriving fresh 
from studies in the Middle East and trying to apply his own brand of "intolerant" 
Islamic law to local communities.33 In short, MUI became an important vehicle 
through which the state tried to expand its supervision, regulation and control over 
Muslim community affairs. It did this in order to ensure that no unmediated religious 
tendencies threatened to disrupt stability and development in regions remote from the 
31 
. The main emphasis of transmigration was assimilation and acculturation as part of the nation - 
building project of establishing more even development. Anecdotal accounts and reports have indicated 
that transmigration and migration created increased competition for resources, which also resulted in 
land alienation of indigenous "minority" communities. Moreover, it appears that estates jointly owned 
by the Suharto family's commercial interests, local conglomerates and multinational companies were 
greatly responsible for land displacement of indigenous farming communities. The project of state - 
guided harmony appears to have been integrally related to an attempt by the powerholders to subdue 
communal tensions that had been spawned by modernisation and land alienation. Interviews with H. 
Zaini Ahmad Noeh (head of the DMI and former advisor to Alamsjah), 8 October 1997; Hidayat, 12 
November 1997; Drs, Muslim, 10 November 1997; the Director of Sociocultural Guidance, 10 
November 1997. 
42 . (Nos. 1/1965, 1/1969, 4/1978, 14/1978, 70 and 77/1978, 8/1979, 1/1979, and MA/432/1981). 
"Petunjuk Bagí Umat Islam Kerukunan Hidup Antar Umat Beragama," Sekretariat Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, Masjid Istiqlal Jakarta, 1986. 
s3 Interview with Hidayat, 12 November 1997. 
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centralised control of Jakarta, thereby limiting associational pluralism and reinforcing 
corporatist reordering.34 
As the above discussion has demonstrated, the regime engaged MIT primarily 
as an instrument of its own policy objectives, despite the fact that the Council 
sometimes appeared to adopt positions contrary to the regime's wishes. Although its 
main role was outlined as mediating the relations of Muslim society and the state, in 
reality MITI largely served as a vehicle for the dissemination of state values and ideas 
and functioned as an instrument of social management. As will be discussed in the 
last part of the chapter, MIDI performed an important role of organising pro- regime 
Muslim groups into public oaths of loyalty to President Suharto nearing the five - 
yearly general elections. Finally, MIDI fulfilled three central functions performed by 
corporatist institutions in Indonesia. That is, first it sought to contain the interests of 
ulama in official structures as part of a broader effort to discourage the autonomous 
articulation of demands. Second, it provided the function of social control, in 
conjunction with military intelligence and other government agencies, through its 
supervision and monitoring of religious behaviour and activity. Third, it drew on the 
authority of the ulama (and preachers) in order to orient the Muslim community in a 
manner beneficial to official development goals by ensuring that religious values 
and/or fanaticism did not obstruct those goals and programs. The IUD program and 
the sending of preachers to transmigration .sites were two examples of this last point. 
3. DMI and BKPRMI: State incorporation of mosques 
At the subdistrict level, state authorities supervised religious activities through 
a mosque congregation board, which each mosque was obliged to have in order to 
34 . Da'i dan Petani Membagun Daerah Baru, pp.7 -11, 22 -4, 33, 69, 72, 76, 88, 96; Interview with 
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guard against unwanted autonomous mobilisation.35 There were, however, probably 
limits to the government's supervisory role as it is debatable whether its agencies 
were able to penetrate a significant percentage of the thousands of privately -owned 
mosques and langgar (small places of worship) located at pesantrens throughout rural 
Java. 
At the national level, the regime sought to regulate mosque activities through 
the Golkar's affiliate -organisation, the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI), 
established in 1972 and situated in the Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta.36 By 1982, DMI 
represented mosque councils of the independent Islamic organisations. The Chairman 
of MUI was vice- chairman (1972 -1984) of DMT and then its senior advisor (1984- 
1994), suggesting -at least since 1975 when MUI was established -a close co- 
ordinating role between the two councils.37 
The program of DMI was stated as co- ordinating, giving guidance, and 
behaving in the spirit of the (wider Golkar) family in its relations with the state and 
the Muslim community. A head of DMI, Z.H. Noeh, explained that the role of the 
DMT was to remind people of their "collective duty to the state" by giving mosque 
associations supervision and instructions pembinaan- regarding their tasks.38 One 
of its main tasks was to train preachers and mosque Imam. Other tasks were to 
develop: (1) people's comprehension of al- Qu'ran; (2) formal and informal education 
and dakwah; (3) a program of health and welfare, and; (4) the skills and role of 
women and youth. It also rehabilitated and built mosques at housing complexes in 
the Director of Sociocultural Guidance, 10 November 1997. 
3s Antlov and Cederroth, Leadership on Java, p.9. 
36 The Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta houses the MUI central office and several other corporates 
institutions. 
37 
. Mardjoned, KH. Hasan Basri, p.201. 
38 . Interview with Noeh, 8 October 1997; Mardjoned, KH. Hasan Basri, p.200. 
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new settlements, transmigration sites, entertainment parks, and university campuses.39 
In short, DMI was one of the various corporatist institutions coordinated by the 
Department of Religion or Golkar, which was instrumental to the state's expanding 
jurisdiction over religious association through the propagation of an Official Islam. 
Having said this, it appears that the tasks assigned to DMI were an indirect but 
nonetheless integral part of the unofficial political functions it performed. That is, it 
became a tool in the regime's strategy to co -opt and neutralise anti -regime Islamic 
organisations and activists by channelling them into social activities. One such target 
of state co- optation through the DMI channel was the Indonesian Mosque 
Communication Body (BKPMI), founded at the Istiqamah mosque in Bandung in 
1977. Under the leadership of Muslim activists, BKPMI had remained Iocked in 
conflict with Suharto's regime. However, a growing rapprochement between Suharto 
and Muslim organisations in the Iate- 1980s, especially after these organisations had 
accepted the government's sole foundation law of 1985, saw the BKPMI become part 
of the state's corporatist structure.40 
In October 1990, BKPMI, upon the urging of the Minister of Internal Affairs, 
joined DMI as a subordinate member.41 The mosque body had to reorient its activities 
in line with government priorities and accordingly was assigned a new role in DMI. 
39 . University campuses in particular have been a continuing focus of concern as unauthorised 
Islamic organisations (usroh groups) have proliferated, using campus mosques as centres for 
organisation. The government was determined to neutralise the popular growth of usroh groups among 
youths, and government -built mosques were no doubt one effort in this direction. Mardjoned, 
KH.Hasan Basrf, p.203, 
. According to Toto, members of the mosque body were youthful idealists -the government 
branded them as "Masyumi" -who delivered strident anti -government sermons in the late 1970s. Its 
anti- government cast was encouraged by the fact that the Indonesian Islamic Youth (Pemuda Islam 
Indonesia, PII), known for its radical polemics against a host of rivals had a large contingent of 
members in the BKPMI. Toto spent a seven -month term in jail in 1978 because the BKPMI joined the 
chorus of Muslim voices opposing the inclusion of Javanese mysticism in the Broad Outlines of State 
Policy (GBHN). In 1981, the government suspected them of involvement in the Imron group's 
hijacking of a Garuda flight to Bangkok It implicated them in other anti -state activities related to the 
Komando Jihad, the Tanjung Priok anti- government riots, and Warsidi's alleged attempts to found an 
Islamic state in Lampung. Interview with Toto, 21 March 1997, 
it 
. Islam in Indonesia.- A Survey of Events, p.283. 
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Reflecting the new role, the regime insisted that the mosque body include in its title 
the word "youth (remaja)." Thenceforth, BKPRMI focused its energies on assisting 
DMI with its program of teaching al- Qur'an literacy and recital to kindergarten 
children and youth groups.42 To perform this task, BKPRMI was fused with another 
national level body, the Al- Qur'an Kindergarten Guidance and Development Institute 
(LPPTKA). 
In August 1991, the director of LPPTKA- BKPRMI announced the 
government decision that Qur'an reading would become a central part of the national 
curriculum for religious education at government and private primary schools in the 
school year 1994/1995.43 In April 1992, Hutomo (Tommy) Mandala Suharto (son of 
Indonesia's President) PT Humpuss group sponsored the National Contest of Qur'an 
Reading for Qur'anic Kindergarten Pupils and Festival of Pious Indonesian Children, 
organised by LPPTKA -BKPRMI. Indonesia's First Lady, Tien Suharto, opened the 
contest and the chairman of MUI gave the closing speech. The program priorities set 
out for the 1993 -1996 period noted that the joint LPPTKA -BKPRMI had established 
15,000 al- Qur'an reading units comprising 2.5 million children throughout the 
country.44 The aim of the LPPTKA- BKPRMI effort was to target children at an early 
age and give them pembinaan mental to inculcate a nationalistic religious piety, 
discipline, and understanding and thus make them future loyal subjects. One of 
BKPRMI's other main tasks was to keep loitering youth or juvenile delinquents off 
the streets and channel them into mosque- oriented social activities such as sports, art, 
morality lessons, and skills training.45 The LPPTKA -BKPRMI initiatives were an 
42 "Teaching Children to Read the Qur'an," Studia Islamika: 1 (1) (April- June1994), pp.1 -5. 
43 . Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, p.401. 
44 . Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, p.135. 
45 "Hasil Keputusan Muktamar III Dewan Masjid Indonesia," Jakarta, Pimpinan Pusat Dewan 
Masjid Indonesia, 1995, pp.56 7. 
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integral part of the regime's overall effort to increase the state's jurisdiction over the 
Muslim community's religious affairs through religious instruction. 
On BKPRMI's board of senior advisors were Suharto's protégé, the Minister 
of Research and Technology, Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie, and Tommy Suharto. For 
his co- operation with the regime, BKPRMI's leader, Toto Tasmara, was appointed as 
the corporate secretary of Tommy Suharto's PT Humpuss Group.46 Tommy's PT 
Humpuss group financed and assisted in some of LPPTKA- BKPRMI's activities. 
4. BAKOMUBIN and MDI: State incorporation of Islamic preachers' dakwah 
activities 
Toto Tasmara also was behind a government/PT Humpuss- BKPRMI initiative 
to bring disaffected preachers from Islamic modernist organisations such as the ex -PII 
(Indonesian Muslim Secondary School Students), Persís (United Islam), and Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council)' into 
corporatist arrangements. The regime considered some of these preachers as holding 
extreme views. In June 1996, the Indonesian Co- ordinating Body of Muslim 
Preachers ( BAKOMUBIN) representing 26 of Indonesia's 27 provinces was 
established. Toto was chosen as chairman of the preachers' body.48 
An official for the Department of Religion attending BAKOMUBIN's 
founding conference declared that "Muslims must be fanatics [in adhering to religious 
46 
. H. Toto Tasmara, Eros Kerja Pribadi Muslim, Jakarta, PT. Dana Bhakti Wakaf, 1995; and 
Menjawab Tantangan Zaman II, Jakarta, PT. Dana Bhakti Wakaf, 1995. 
47 Disaffected ex- Masyumi party leaders establised the Dewan Dakwah in 1967, under the 
chairmanship of Muhammad Natsir (former Prime Minister and Masyumi leader). Through the Dewan, 
They sought to advance their political- religious agendas. Dewan leaders remained highly critical of 
Suharto and the military until the advent of the state -Islamic accommodation in the late -1980s. 
48 . At the conference, attendees set up three makeshift commissions. One commission had the task 
of drawing up the BAKOMUBIN's new program. The main reason expressed at the commission for 
establishing the nationally co- ordinated body was to improve the welfare and income of its preachers. 
Members discussed the need for life insurance, proper medical care, and good and regular sources of 
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belief] but they may not be [political] extremists." He warned the preachers against 
using religion to create inter -community strife and asserted instead that they should 
apply themselves to the task of becoming "problem solvers" in society 49 He 
emphasised that they should no longer limit themselves exclusively to ritual concerns 
and instead become more socially oriented in outlook. He declared that he saw a new 
trend that was good: "engineers were becoming preachers, doctors were becoming 
preachers, and even members of the armed forces were becoming preachers. "50 Again, 
from the outset, BAKOMUBIN's pembinaan role was stressed. Toto announced that 
the preachers' body would aim to create quality cadre and not concern itself with 
building a mass membership. By acclamation, it was decided that the body would not 
involve itself in political activities, meaning that the body would not engage in 
autonomous forms of organisation as either an opposition party, or pressure group.51 
In reality, Suharto's circle used BAKOMUBIN, as it did other corporatist institutions, 
for the attainment of political objectives, such as organising Muslim support for 
Suharto's renomination as Indonesia's President at the five -yearly elections 
(discussed below). 
The regime was responsible for two other corporatist initiatives in the area of 
Islamic propagation: the Islamic Dakwah Council (MDI) and the Communication 
Forum for Dakwah Institutes (FKLD).52 MDI was created by Golkar's central 
funding, which depended on gaining access to influential government personnel. "The Silaturahmi 
Mubaligh SeIndonesia" was held at Asrama Haji Jakarta (Pondok Gede) on 6 June 1996. 
a9 
. Herbert Feith applied the term "problem solvers" in the 1950s for technocratic- minded 
administrators. 
So A speech by an official from the Department of Religion at the Silaturahmi Mubaligh 
SeIndonesia, 6 June 1996. 
51 . A speech by Toto Tasmara at the Silaturahmi, 6 June 1996. 
52 FKLD was established in February 1993 as a national coordinating institute for all Islamic 
missionary organisations. It was placed under supervision of the Director of Information at the 
Department of Religion. Several corporatist institutions participated in its founding including MDI, 
DMI, and ICMI. FKLD was to fulfil a purpose similar to the corporatist institutions (discussed above) 
of regulating relations between the different Islamic propagation institutes and between those institutes 
136 
executive board in mid -1978 and was given the task of overseeing Islamic missionary 
activities.53 The MDI initiative was apparently a response to the fact that Suharto's 
regime had faced fierce competition from PPP during the 1977 general election. This 
competition came especially from its NU contingent, which could effectively 
campaign and launch attacks against the regime through its religious- political activity 
(dakwah) at prayer meetings. Consequently, MDI became a political vehicle for the 
new general chairman of Golkar, Amir Murtono, partly to combat the PPP -NU's 
dakwah campaign efforts.54 
According to Hidayat (a head of MDI's Secretariat) one of MDI's main 
functions was to make overtures to "extreme" Muslim organisations and bring them 
into the Golkar fold. To serve this purpose, MDI joined and oversaw the Islamic 
Forum of Communication (FKOI), which had thirty -one organisational members. 
Hidayat explained that FKOI was an amalgamation of "moderate, conservative, and 
extreme elements" from the Muslim community and had the task of moderating, or 
"softening," Islamic extremism.55 What Hidayat omitted to mention was that the main 
function of MDI (FKOI) was to mobilise these Muslim groups at election time in 
support of the government election vehicle, Golkar. 
Another part of MDI's program was to give guidance or pembinaan to Islamic 
organisations and sects to ensure that they did not deviate from state -sanctioned 
religious life, threaten religious harmony, or threaten to disrupt the government's 
development projects. To this end, MDI sponsored and trained mosque and 
and the regime. Interview with Subagio, 13 November 1997; Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, 
p.302. 
53 Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar, 
Ohio University (Monographs in International Studies Southeast Asia Series, No.85), 1989, p.79. 
54 . David Reeve, "The Corporatist State: The Case of Golkar," Arief Budiman (ed.) State and Civil 
Society in Indonesia, Clayton, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990, p.155. 
ss Interview with Hidayat, 12 November 1997. The co- option by Golkar of "extreme" Muslim 
groups is not a development resulting from Suharto's recent post -1988 courtship of Islam. Such efforts 
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community Imam in remote regions to promote the regime's development message 
and disseminate and help implement its official decisions concerning the regulation of 
religious life. Finally, Hidayat explained MDI screened reports and publications by 
the Department of Religion, and made corrections when it was felt necessary. It did 
this to ensure that the Department's language accorded with the regime's wishes and 
that no Islamic "extremist" ideas "crept into" the reports.56 As such, MDI appears to 
have performed an important supervision role over the affairs of Islam, with the task 
not entrusted solely to the Department of Religion.57 
5. State incorporation of women 
The regime developed an ideal model for the regulation of women's activities 
with the creation of the Dharma Wanita (Women's Service/Duty). Modelled on the 
military wives' association, the Dharma Wanita was established as an organisational 
adjunct to KORPRI for the wives of civil servants. The regime continually stressed 
women's dual role in public and domestic spheres as guarantor of harmonious social 
and family relations, as well as her supporting role to her husband. It expected the 
wives of public servants to maintain "rukun" (harmony) with their husbands in 
support of their husband's important duties. It defined women's primary role as that 
of housewife, to educate the children, and to obey and serve the husband.58 In its 
official ideology and programs, including the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBH1V), 
date back to the pre -1971 election campaign period (e.g., the amalgamation of the Muslim sect Darul 
Hadiths into Golkar just prior to the general election). 
sv Interview with Hidayat, 12 November 1997. 
57 . The former Minister of Religion, General (ret.) Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara admitted that, 
during the early New Order period, state intelligence services did not wholly trust the Department of 
Religion. Continued monitoring of the Department appears to have remained a task of intelligence 
services through to the late- 1990s. 
58 . Women's role as housewife in the family, as depicted in government publications, is exemplary 
of the New Order state's official ideology, which designates the family as the smallest- unit in ever 
widening concentr ic circles to the nation- state. The family is seen as the pillar of society and öf the 
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the regime also assigned women a secondary and complementary role to men of 
participating in the workforce and home industries in advancement of the nation's 
economic development. Women's main public duties were an extension of their 
private household duties, as they were expected to work in areas such as child -care, 
teaching, family planning, and environmental sanitation. 
The regime sought to apply this model and ideology in Muslim women's 
associations. It endeavoured to bring semi- autonomous women's sections of the 
independent Islamic organisations into corporatist arrangements. For example, the 
Director of Information at the Department of Religion supervised the Indonesian 
Islamic Women's Consultation Body (BMOIWI), which regulated the activities of 
Muslim women's groups. It did this in conjunction with the peak association, the 
Indonesian Women's National Congress (KOWANI), the Indonesian Women's 
Unified Action (KAWI) on family planning, and Golkar's Co- ordinating Body for 
Women. Corporatised Muslim women's organisations also carried out their activities 
in conjunction with the Department of Social Affairs, and MUI. Almost all women's 
organisations in Indonesia were co- ordinated nationally through their membership of 
KOWANI.59 
In an attempt to capture at least one area of Muslim women's associational 
life, in the mid -1990s the regime tried to bring women's rural co- operatives into a 
nationally co- ordinated entity (the Women's Chief Co- operative). Prior to this, the 
regime had given a monopoly of representation to village unit co- operatives (KUDs), 
but the rural -based mass Muslim women's organisation, Muslimat -NU, resisted 
nation. Women are seen as the pillar of the family. The harmony of the nation is viewed as dependent 
upon women's maintenance of harmony in the family. 
59. Interviews with Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi (Chairperson of the NU- Muslimat), 11 March 1997; 
Subagio, 13 November 1997; Saifullah Ma'shum and Ali Zawawi (eds.) 50 Tahun Muslímat NU: 
Berkhidmat Untuk Agama, Negara, & Bangsa, Jakarta, Puncak Pimpínan Muslimat Nandlatul Ulama, 
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membership and maintained its own extralegal co- operatives. The regime eventually 
accepted the existence of these extralegal entities, largely because of shortcomings of 
its own co- operatives program.6° However, from this moment on, all Muslim 
women's co- operatives had to accept the name "Anisa" (a Qu'ranic word for women). 
The great risk existed, especially for Muslimat -NU, of confusing and 
alienating its mass supporters, as the supporters would no longer identify the new 
Anisa co- operatives with their parent organisations. The General Secretary of 
Muslimat expressed the apprehension that the separate identities of the different 
women's co- operatives would become one collective state -supervised corporate 
identity easily open to state manipulation.61 
6. Golkar and ICMI: widening the scope of state incorporation 
A) State -Islamic rapprochement 
With the installation of the New Order's fourth development cabinet (1983- 
1988), Suharto's regime began to focus much greater attention on recruiting Muslims 
into the ranks of Golkar. Incorporation of the burgeoning Muslim and non -Muslim 
middle class, civilian politicians, and businesspeople into Golkar was part of 
Suharto's political strategy of expanding his power base beyond the Armed Forces 
and reducing his dependence on them. At Golkar's National Congress of 1983, 
Suharto appointed his close confidant, the Secretary of State, Sudharmono, to 
Golkar's chairmanship. Suharto delegated to him the task of transforming Golkar 
from a "co- ordinating and regulating executive for its myriad constituent 
1996, pp.25 -6; Nani Soewondo, Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia: Dalam Hukum Dan Masyarakat, 
Jakarta, Ghalia Indonesia, 1984, pp.233 
-8. 
Interview with Susy Machsusoh Tosari Witiajar (the Secretary General of Muslimat and the 
wife of the Secretary General of PPP), 4 April 1997; Philip J. Eldridge, Non. -Government 
Organisations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia, Oxford, Singapore, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1995, p.68. 
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organisations" into a party of "active membership;" which included Muslim leaders 
and followers.ó2 Sudharmono became secretary of the President's personal 
foundation, YABMP, which was used as a principle channel of patronage with which 
to court the Muslim community by helping fund its religious activities.63 
Under Sudharmono's leadership, Golkar became the arena of a power struggle 
between its Chairman and the Commander of ABRI, Benny Murdani. However, with 
the appointment of the army general Wahono to the party's chairmanship in 1988, the 
military began to re- establish its dominant role in Golkar and, consequently, the 
Muslim and civilian membership of Golkar appeared to suffer a setback. We can view 
Suharto's subsequent initiatives to widen the scope of capture by bringing a growing 
educated Muslim middle class into corporatist arrangements as greatly informed by 
this deepening military- civilian rivalry.64 
Beginning in the late 1980s, Suharto assiduously courted the Muslim political 
community. The regime made a series of conciliatory gestures and concessions to 
Muslim interests shortly after the political fallout that had witnessed a cooling of 
61 
. Interview with Susy Witiajar , 4 April 1997. 
62 
. Reeve, "The Corporatist State," pp.152, 155; R. William Liddle, "Politics 1992 -1993: sixth term 
adjustments in the ruling formula," Chris Manning and Joan Hardjono (eds.), Indonesian Assessment 
1993, Labour: Sharing in the Benefits of Growth ?, Canberra, Department of Political and Social 
Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1993, p.31; 
Richard Robison, "Organising the transition: Indonesian politics in 1993/94," Ross K. McLeod (ed.), 
Indonesian Assessment 1994: Finance as a Key Sector in Indonesia's Development, Canberra, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 1994, pp.53, 55, 56- 
7; Robison Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat 1945 -1993, (translated by Vedi Hadiz), 
Western Australia, Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change, Murdoch 
University, 1995, pp.59 -60. 
63 President Suharto established several foundations, including YAMP, which served as enormous 
slush funds for investment projects of Suharto, his children and business associates, as well as for the 
ruling party Golkar. John Colmey and David Liebhold, "The Family Firm," Time, 24 May 1999; 
Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, pp.60 -61. 
64 . At the March 1988 MPR session, Benny Murdani led the Armed Forces fraction in opposition to 
Suharto's successful nomination of Sudharmono as Vice -President. A deepening personal hostility 
between Suharto and Benny resulted in the latter being kicked- upstairs to Minister of Defence. At the 
March 1993 MPR session, the Armed Forces appeared to momentarily out -manoeuvre Suharto by 
having their nomination of Armed Forces' Commander -in- Chief, Try Sutrisno, for Vice -President 
pushed through in preference to the President's choice of his close friend and protégé B.J. Habibie. 
Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: democracy, Islam, and the ideology of tolerance, New 
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relations between the Benny -led Armed Forces and the President. For example, in 
1989, Suharto's circle pursued an ambitious mosque building program funded by the 
YABMP, first conceived under Sudharmono's leadership.65 Concessions also came in 
the form of a Religious Courts Law no.7/1989, reinforcing the authority of the Islamic 
courts over family law, and Law no.2/1989 on the national education system, which 
strengthened the compulsory nature of religious subjects. In 1990, after months of 
protest by Muslim leaders and students, Suharto's regime finally agreed that Muslim 
girls could wear the distinctive headscarf at school.66 The regime established 
Indonesia's first Islamic bank and the President embarked on a nationally televised 
pilgrimage to Mecca and returned as Haji Muhammad Suharto. Suharto's pilgrimage 
was an impressive piece of publicity. The President was accompanied by a coterie of 
family members (including his brother -in -law Maj -Gen Wismoyo Arismunandar, and 
his son -in -law Colonel Prabowo Subianto), his close business associate Bob Hasan, 
Armed Forces Chief Try Sutrisno, and cabinet ministers.67 
B) ICMI 
Suharto's conciliation aimed to coopt the Islamic sector and was followed, in 
December 1990, by the founding of ICMI, under the chairmanship of Suharto's 
protégé and trusted loyalist, the Minister of Research and Technology, Habibie. 
Suharto used Habibie, in a similar manner to Sudharmono in that he had called upon 
York, Routledge, 1995, p.85; Liddle, "Politics 1992 -93," pp. 31 -2; Robison, "Organising the 
transition," p.56; Reeve, "The Corporatist State," pp. 168-1'72; Lowry, The Armed Forces, pp189 -190. 
65 According to government figures, in 1969 there were about 36,000 places of worship throughout 
Indonesia. In 1995, the number of mosques and Islamic places of worship alone had phenomenally 
increased to 589,454. Yet the figure in 1998 for mosques built and funded by the YAMP was estimated 
only at 800, with most construction coming from community initiatives. Indonesian national television 
news (TVRI), 6 February 1998. 
66 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, pp.135 -6; Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and 
Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia: 56 (October 1993), 
p.32; Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, St Leonards, Allen & Unwin Pty 
Ltd, 1994, p.191; Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p.86. 
142 
his services as his new patronage dispenser to co -opt the Muslim community and 
counter Benny's formidable influence in the military.68 ICMI became a new 
instrument for the recruitment of civilians into the state bureaucracy, the cabinet and 
the People's Consultative Assembly; a role previously performed by the State 
Secretariat, through Golkar, under Sudharmono's leadership (1983 -1988). 
ICMI not only became a tool in Suharto's strategy to diversify his power base 
before the 1992 general election and 1993 presidential election. It also served the 
political objective of absorbing and neutralising the growing political and populist 
demands of the educated middle- classes.69 Muslims, in particular, for the previous 
two decades had undergone a tremendous cultural and religious efflorescence. The 
heavily circumscribed political structure and suppression of Islamic political activities 
together with the encouragement of religious and cultural aspects of Islam by the 
regime had added to a revival of Islamic consciousness. Mosques and prayer 
meetings, freer than other venues from police surveillance, became an alternative 
arena for the expression of political grievance." The regime's initiatives covering 
mosque, dakwah, and intellectual activities (described above) were therefore 
defensive mechanisms to absorb and counter the growing Muslim restlessness and 
demands for greater political representation. 
The breadth and diversity of membership in ICMI lent itself well to 
exclusionary corporatist strategy aimed at keeping the Muslim community politically 
disorganised and divided. ICMI began as a loose federation of Muslims representing a 
wide spectrum of moderate, reform -minded, conservative, and radical Muslim 
organisations and individual members with divergent views about the association's 
67 
. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto, pp.135 -6. 
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. Liddle, "Politics 1992- 1993," p.33; Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secratariat," pp.59- 
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69 . Robison, "Organising the transition," p.53. 
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objectives. Its heterogeneous membership included Muslims from the 
Muhammadiyah and the Dewan Dakwah, some ex- Masyumi activists, a few NU 
leaders, NGO activists, theologians and scholars, politicians from the PPP, and 
dissenters highly critical of Suharto and government policy. We will henceforth refer 
to this diverse group of newly incorporated, non - bureaucratic members of the 
association as ICMI intelligentsia. It is best, perhaps, to think of the intelligentsia as 
existing somewhere on a continuum of least co- opted, partially co- opted, and fully co- 
opted. The least co -opted members, who remained highly critical of Suharto's regime 
despite their membership of ICMI, might approximate what Ding referred to as a 
"counter- elite" within the state structures (see chapter two). 
Despite their diversity of backgrounds and views, many of ICMI's 
intelligentsia shared at least one common goal. That is, they regarded ICMI as having 
provided them with a useful vehicle for gaining access to those in power, thereby 
enabling them in theory to pursue their own agendas and exert influence on state 
agencies, officials, and policy -making. ICMI also gave them protection from ABRI. 
Most of them were prepared publicly to support Suharto in return for Suharto's 
protection and the political opportunities (patronage) that they hoped such support 
would offer them. They argued that under Suharto's and Habibie's paternalistic 
protection, ICMI would enjoy the necessary hothouse conditions to establish itself as 
part of the New Order's institutional structure. They held a long -term view that ICMI 
could outlive Suharto and Habibie's leadership and look forward to a more 
independent role in a post -Suharto political constellation. Much of the ICMI 
intelligentsia, like Ding's incorporated "counter- elite," therefore, sought eventually to 
70 . Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p.174; Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp.79, 82 -3. 
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displace the official goals of ICMI with their own private agendas and goals.71 
Incorporation in ICMI had occurred during a period of limited political opening - 
itself, largely a product of the growing intra -elite rivalry between Suharto and ABRI 
(see chapter seven). Under these circumstances, there was the risk that Muslim 
interests would become re- politicised after Suharto, for the past two decades, had 
sought to demobilise and neutralise them through strategies of exclusion. 
Suharto's regime was certainly not prepared to let this happen and was quick 
to establish tight control of ICMI and to surround its most independent and radical 
members, the main target of co- option, with government bureaucrats and pro- regime 
Muslim conservatives. By early 1991., Habibie had imposed an organisational 
command structure upon the association to constrain the various political agendas of 
the intelligentsia and provide close supervision over its programs and activities. He 
appointed to managerial positions his trusted staff of bureaucrats and "technologists" 
from the Agency of Research, Technology and Application (BPPT) and from his 
Ministry. In addition, he oversaw the establishment of a Council of Advisors 
(comprising pro -regime figures, retired state and military officials and respected 
Muslim elders) as a moderating and balancing mechanism to the Council of Experts 
(comprised largely of intelligentsia) 72 In August 1993, in his capacity as a private 
citizen, Suharto became the chief patron of ICMI, with three former vice -presidents 
n 
. Interviews with Adj Sasono, (NGO leader who rose to the position of Secretary- General of 
ICMI in 1995 and General Chairman in 2000), 21 January and 16 February 1994; Sri Bintang 
Pamungkas, (parliamentary legislator from PPP and member of ICMI and CIDES), 8 February 1994; 
Amien Rais, (Muhammadiyah leader, Head of ICMI's Council of Experts), 4 January 1994; Nurcholish 
Madjid, (liberal theologian/scholar, founder of the Islamic educational foundation, Paramadina, and 
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72 
. Golkar leaders, cabinet ministers, businessmen and professionals also joined the association. 
The Minister of Religion and his staff, officials from MCI, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the 
Minister of Information participated in ICMI's first steering committee meetings. 
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joining the Dewan Pembina (Supervisor's Council) to oversee the operations of 
ICMI.73 
Thus, ICMI became a vehicle for the recruitment of elite members into the 
state bureaucracy and other centres of power. It became a repository of officialdom as 
membership of ICMT (and Golkar) was viewed as a ticket to career advancement 
within the bureaucracy and cabinet. From the point of view of aspirants to power, 
then, incorporation provided a conveyer -belt to higher positions of office. The 
corporatist organisations also acted as "intermediate channels" of recruitment. As 
such, they behaved like sorting machines, letting through aspirants who could 
demonstrate their loyalty and amenability to Suharto's ruling circle, but shutting off 
channels of recruitment to critics whom incorporation had failed to coopt. 
Two community leaders who had their careers advanced through membership 
of ICMI and MUI, were Kiai Ilyas Ruchiyat and Kiai Ali Yafie, the President and the 
acting President of the Nandlatul Ulama respectively. In September 1992, Ruchiyat 
and Ali were among nineteen pro- regime ICMI figures that gained appointment to the 
People's Consultative Assembly. Ali Yafie, who resigned his position as NU's acting 
President, eventually assumed the office in 1998 of General Chairman of MUI. Ali 
became a prominent preacher officiating at state -held religious ceremonies, 
particularly during the fasting month of Ramadhan at Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta.74 In 
return for moderating his critical voice and conforming to Habihie's policy line, the 
former NGO activist and regime critic (an engineer trained at the Bandung Institute of 
73 
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Technology), Adi Sasono, also gained rapid promotion. He rose to the position of 
Secretary General of ICMI in 1995. 
The down side of incorporation was that the recruitment machine worked as a 
mechanism for sorting out and excluding the most unreliable elements from within the 
intelligentsia. As such, some members of the intelligentsia in ICMI had their various 
aspirations and ambitions for career advancement disappointed. For example, shortly 
after the association's founding in 1990, the outspoken intellectual, Dawam Rahardjo, 
had his sights on becoming ICMI's second -in- command. He had his hopes dashed 
when Habibie announced that he would not create the post of Secretary General, as 
ICMI's command structure did not necessitate this. Instead, he appointed his most 
trusted colleague from BPPT, Wardiman Djojonegoro as the Assistant Secretary.75 
Dawam was very bitter at the time, even after a publicised mending -of- fences 
between himself and Habibie. Dawam also had his sights on the position of Chief 
Editor of the ICMI newspaper, Republika, but Habibie preferred his own candidate in 
the job, a long -time associate Parni Hadi.76 In an interview in 1994, Dawam expressed 
some of his disappointment, saying "if I had become the Secretary General, I would 
have been more prominent [in ICMI] than Habibie...I am critical of the regime. 
Republika is too much under the control and intervention of Habibie and Harmoko 
[the Minister of Information and the General Chairman of Golkar]. It would have 
been impossible for Harmoko to control me, had I become Chief Editor of Republika. 
I can understand why they did not choose me [for the job]. "77 
Members of the intelligentsia ostensibly co -opted in ICMI, who continued to 
level public criticism against Suharto and his regime, risked being disciplined, and 
n 
. Habibie later caved in to pressure by creating the post of Secretary General. 
76 . Interviews with Haidar Bagir (an editor and senior board member on Republika), 11 February 
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sometimes faced heavy sanctions. A well -publicised case was that of Amien Rais. 
Amien had high profile as an outspoken leader of the Muhammadiyah. He appeared to 
take good advantage of his proximity to ICMT's Chairman, becoming Iíabibie's 
foreign affairs advisor on the Middle East. He became Vice -Chairman of the TCMI 
think -tank, the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), and Head 
of the association's Council of Experts. Indonesian observers inferred from Amien's 
public announcements in which he outlined five criteria for the office of Vice - 
President, that he was supporting Habibie for the office.78 However, Amien 
distinguished himself in the press as a vocal opponent of President Suharto. He 
regularly criticised Suharto's long period as President and called for the establishment 
of a reliable mechanism for presidential succession. In late 1996, he publicly criticised 
giant mining operations in Irian Jaya and Kalimantan, which were linked to the 
Suharto family's business interests. In February 1997, Ilabibie, acting on Suharto's 
instructions, removed Amien from his position as ICMI's Head of the Council of 
Experts. Amien later reported how Suharto- through his Attorney General - 
investigated him, accused him of making subversive statements and requested that he 
apologise for his criticisms of the President. Following this, Suharto's circle 
undertook, unsuccessfully, a campaign to defeat Amien's candidacy for the General 
Chairmanship of Muhammadiyah .79 
77 . Interview with Dawam, 27 January 1994; "Setelah Gegap Gempita itu," Tempo, 9 Febuary 
1991, p.23; "Setelah Pengurus Diumumkan," Tempo, 23 Fehuary 1991, p.14; . 
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organisations. Despite state interventions, Megawati was elected as PDT chair in 1993 -although she 
was cast aside in July 1996 -and Abdurrahman Wahid narrowly defeated the state -backed candidate in 
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Suharto's reaction to Amien showed that the President had adopted an 
approach typical of military hardliners by stigmatising dissenters as subversives, 
thereby branding them as threats to national political stability. By doing so, he was 
indicating that dissenters like Amien were disobedient "children," who had behaved 
outside the acceptable norms and behaviour of the "Pancasila" family (state), and 
therefore should be punished. Having misbehaved (by criticising Suharto's New 
Order), Amien was therefore excluded from participation in the formal system, which 
had sought to incorporate strategic middle class interests. 
Amien was not the only dissenter requiring disciplinary action. Another case 
was that of Sri Bintang Pamungkas, one of ICMI's council of experts, who refused 
full co- option into ICMI, preferring instead to maintain his critical distance. Bintang 
was a legislator for PPP, who made repeated calls for an overhaul of the political 
system to reflect people's democratic liberties and rights.8° In 1994, the regime 
retaliated by bringing about Bintang's expulsion from the Parliament. The regime 
accused him of challenging Pancasila, and charged him with helping organise an anti - 
Suharto demonstration during the President's April 1996 visit to Dresden. The court 
sentenced him to thirty -four months imprisonment for violating No.154 of Civil Law 
(KUHP) by insulting the head of state. 
Bintang also established the Union of Indonesian Democracy Party (PUDI) 
before the 1997 general election and outside of the officially sanctioned three -party 
system. He daringly sent PUDI cards to government officials and Members of 
Parliament and advocated a boycott of the general election. He was struck from the 
civil service for violating discipline and, finally, faced subversion charges over 
Amien Rais rapat khusus 30 meat," Harian Terbit, 24 Febuary 1997; John McBeth, "Line in the Sand: 
A Muslim politician's fall from grace shows there are limits to how much religious modernists can 
hope to influence politics," Far Eastern Economic Review, ;www.feer.com) 27 March 1997; interview 
with Marzukí Darusman (leader of Komnas HAM), 6 July 1997. 
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distributing the PUDI cards.81 Bintang's decision to establish PUDI apparently 
crystallised President Suharto's objections against him.82 Although Bintang was on 
ICMI's council of experts, he was regarded by other ICMI members as too outspoken 
in his opposition and could expect little support in his defence against subversion 
charges from the pro- regime Islamic association. He was removed from his 
membership of ICMI. 
At ICMI's second national congress in December 1995, Suharto took steps in 
an apparent move to fragment ICMI' s internal membership and to neutralise 
politically its intelligentsia. He appointed half the 1993 cabinet to the new 114 - 
member board of ICMI. Several figures were regarded as rivals of Habibie (including 
the former Golkar chair, Lt. -Gen. Wahono, the Co- ordinating Minister for Politics and 
Security, Susilo Sudarman, and Suharto's daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana).83 In 
August 1997, after replacing Harmoko as Minister of Information, the former Army 
Chief of Staff Lt. -Gen. Hartono (a rival of Habibie) was appointed to a senior 
supervisory role within ICMI, apparently to bring its intelligentsia under tighter 
control.$4 The new Information Minister was also responsible for tight control and 
surveillance of the press and became a member of MUI's supervisory board, 
8° 
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sa Admiral (ret.) Sudomo explained the reason for Hartono's entry into ICMI, as follows. "We 
created ICMI as a strategy to bring Muslim radicals into `safe channels' rather than leave them outside 
the political system. Extremists like Adi Sasono and Amien Rais infiltrated ICMI. It was intended that 
Habibie would embrace the Muslim extremists and direct them into activities oriented to the 
development of science and technology. They were not supposed to raise religious issues. However, the 
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highlighting his important supervision role within -society, not just ICMI.85 Coinciding 
with Hartono's entry into ICMI, the Indonesian press carried reports of four 
prominent members of ICMI's intelligentsia (Adi Sasono, Watik Pratiknya, Jimly 
Asshidiqie, and Dawam Rahardjo) being struck from the MPR list of candidates. 
Parni Hardi (an ICMI intellectual) was sacked from ICMI' s newspaper, Republika. It 
was deemed that Parrai, the editor of the Republika and close colleague of Habibie, 
pursued a policy line that was too critical of the regime. 86 The ICMI intelligentsia, 
including its Secretary General Adi Sasono, expressed open disaffection over their 
failure to translate Habibie's patronage into cabinet appointments in March 1998.87 
Suharto ensured that ICMI was an effective instrument with which to neutralise 
Muslim political activities. 
Another important function performed by ICMI was that it served as a vehicle 
through which Habibie, a German- trained aeronautical engineer lacking any 
constituency at home could promote his costly projects in the field of high -end 
scientific and technological (Iptek) development among the Muslim constituency.88 In 
Iine with the regime's strategy for the de- politicisation of Muslim interests, Habibie 
brought into ICMI, to off -set the "Muslim extremists ", Interviews with Sudomo, 30 October 1997; 
Murdani , 5 November 1997. 
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the National Resilience Institute (Lemhamnas) of routinising ABRI's vigilance discourse as part of the 
military's social surveillance, intelligence and security operations. Jun Honna, "The Military and 
Democratisation in Indonesia: The Developing Civil- Military Discourse During the Late Soeharto 
Era," Thesis (Ph.D.), Canberra, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific 
and Asian Studies, Australian National University, June 1999, pp.156 -164. 
se 
. "Mbak Tutut: Masuk ICMI kan Bagus: `Yang Penting Jangan Mejelek -jeleki dan Adu Domba "; 
`°Siapa Tahu Malah Jadi Menteri': Siswono tentang Calon Anggota MPR yang Tercoret," Jawa Pos, 
12 August 1997; "Hartono dan ICMI," Gatra, 16 August 1997; "Hartono Berpeluang Ketua Umum. 
ICMI," Kompas Online, 7 August 1997. 
87 . See chapter eight. 
as 
. Ultimately, Habibie's projects such as the state -owned aircraft manufacturing plant (IPTN), a 
shipyard, the controversial purchase and refurbishment of thirty -nine warships from the former East 
German navy, and the promotion of nuclear power plants have required extensive protection and 
massive government subsidies, dependent mostly on the good will of President Suharto. Jamie Mackie 
and Andrew MacIntyre, "Politics," Hal Hill (ed.), Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio- 
Economic Transformation, St Leonards, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1994, p.36. 
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established program guidelines to rechannel the activities of its intelligentsia away 
from overtly political activities and towards his vision for a scientific and 
technological great leap forward in Indonesia. His promotion of Iptek dominated the 
organisation's pronouncements and programs outlined at its national work meetings 
and congresses. He stressed that ICMI had an important role to perform in support of 
Iptek- namely, that of developing Indonesia's potential in human resources with his 
so- called 5K, or "Five Qualities," program: Quality of faith, Quality of work, Quality 
of thought, Quality of expertise and Quality of life. A Department of Human 
Resources and Culture was created to promote and supervise this main area of ICMI' s 
activities.89 Habibie also issued occasional warnings against ICMI becoming a vehicle 
for the fulfilment of Islamic political aspirations, although these warnings were partly 
directed towards assuaging the concerns of ABRI commanders that ICMI represented 
a re- politicisation of Islam.90 Thus, Habibie wrote, "honestly, ICMI never intended to 
place its members in the government structure,..We always stressed ICMI's 5K 
[prole]" 9t 
ICMI had financial backing from the highest political and business centres to 
channel or divert its energies, as outlined at its first national congress, into the 
increased "participation of Muslim intellectuals in the elaboration of the strategy for 
national development. "92 For example, in August 1992 forty -five prominent 
Indonesians, who also became its board members and senior advisors, inaugurated a 
funding entity for ICMI's operations, the Yayasan Abdi Bangsa (the Foundation of 
89 . "Dr. Ahmad Watik Praktiknya: TOME Ito Untuk Bangsa," Panji Masyarakat, 21 -31 December 
1993. 
. 
9° 
. For example, at the ICMI's national work meeting in December 1992, B.J. Habibie and the 
Minister of Internal Affairs both confirmed that the association could not become a- political party in 
the style of the old Masyumi, as it had been "established to contribute to the development of human 
resources of all Indonesians." Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, pp.266, 273; Ramage, Politics in 
Indonesia, p.101. 
Al . Prof. DR. BJ. Habibie, "Keliru, ICMI Jadi Payung untuk Meneari Kekuasaan," Panji 
Masyarakat, 21 -30 July 1994. 
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Devotion to the Nation).93 The foundation launched ICMI's think -tank, the CIDES, 
and its mouthpiece, Republika, which provided two important channels for the 
dissemination of Habibie's Iptek message to Muslims. In addition, earlier in May, 
Suharto's half- brother and Indonesian tycoon Probosutedjo donated a princely sum of 
money from his Mercu Buana Group to support ICMI's program to help small -scale 
Muslim enterprises in the name of combating poverty and raising general living 
standards.94 Probosutedjo's donation was part of Suharto's efforts to absorb and 
thereby deflect the business aspirations and agendas of the intelligentsia by 
implementing programs aimed at giving equity, loans, management, and technical 
assistance to Muslim entrepreneurs who belonged to the "poorest section" of 
society. 95 
92 . Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, p.263. 
93 . Included among the Foundation's members and advisers were Tien Suharto, Vice -President 
Sudharmono, Armed Forces' Commander Tri Sutrisno, the Chairman of Golkar, the Chairman of MUI, 
several cabinet ministers, and national tycoons such as Suharto's son Bambang Trihatmodjo, 
Probosutedjo, and Bob Hasan. "ICMI sets up foundation for Moslem education," The Jakarta Post, 19 
August 1992; "ICMI bentuk Yayasan Abdi Bangsa," Angkatan Bersenjata, 18 August 1992; "Dibentuk 
TAB, Penghimpun Dana ICMI," Media Indonesia, 18 August 1992; "ICMI Bentuk Yayasan ABDI 
Bangsa Untuk Bantu Programnya," Antara, 18 August 1992. 
94 . More importantly, perhaps, was that the donation of funds was aimed at garnering the support of 
Muslims for Suharto's presidency and for Golkar's election campaign. Probosutejo's personal 
donation, in fact, coincided with his efforts to rally Muslim support behind his own campaign for 
Golkar. ICMI and Golkar together frequented Islamic rural pesantren to drum up support for Habibie 
and Golkar before general and presidential elections. "Probosutedjo Sumbang ICMI RP! Miliar," 
Antara, 22 May 1992; "Soeharto's turn to visit `pesantren "' The Jakarta Post, 31 January 1994; 
"Islamic schools receive support from Soeharto," The Jakarta Post, 1 February 1994; "Presiden 
Soeharto: Pesantren Bisa Jadi Kekuatan Perubahan," Merdeka, 1 Febuary 1994; " Presiden Soeharto: 
Pesantren jangan Menutup Diri," Republika, 3 November 1996; "Adi Sasono: Pesantren Merupakan 
Akar Kehidupan Desa," Republika Online, 24 Pebruari 1997; "Harmoko: Pondok Pesantren Menjadi 
Pondok Bangsa," Republika Online, 16 January 1997; "Pesantren Hasilkan Generasi Disiplin dan Taat 
Beragama," Harian Umum Pikiran Rakyat, 6 May 1997; "BJ Habibie Ditanya tentang Kesiapan Jadi 
Wakil Presiden," Kompas Online, 4 November 1996. 
95 . One of the major demands of the intelligentsia had been for the implementation of policies, 
along the lines of Malaysia's New Economic Policy of positive discrimination in favour of Bumiputra, 
that would provide a fairer distribution of Indonesia's economic goods between wealthy Chinese 
capitalists and struggling indigenous traders. Donald J. Porter, "Accommodation or Islamisation: Two 
Responses to President Soeharto's New Order Government within the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI)," Thesis (Honours), 1990; Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, p.265; 
interviews with Sudomo, 30 October 1997; Sucipto Wirosarjono, (former government statician and 
ICMI member), 11 January 1994; Sasono, 21 January and 16 February 1994; Dawam, 27 January 1994; 
Haidar, 11 February 1994; Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994; Lukman Harun (Muhammadiyah leader and 
ICMI member), 23 January 1994; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 7 February 1994; Muslimin Nasution, 
(Secretary to Chairman of Bappenas and ICMI leader), 10 February 1994; Amen, 4 January 1994 and 
Bambang Sudibyo, 4 January 1994. 
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In addition to deflecting Muslim aspirations, some of ICMI's program 
activities became a means through which the state sought to increase its jurisdiction 
over Muslim community affairs in support of New Order development goals. For 
example, TCMT launched a project in co- operation with YABMP, and the Islamic 
Bank (BMI), as well as with the corporatist organisations -the Indonesian Chamber 
of Commerce (KADIN), and MUI -for the promotion of the education of science and 
technology in fifty of the 8,000 pesantren in Indonesia. State officials sought to bring 
an increasing number of pesantren under ICMI's, and therefore the state's, 
supervi si on .96 
7. Mobilising corporatised Muslim entities for Suharto's re- election 
The above analysis has touched briefly on the idea that the state's corporatist 
initiatives were employed to mobilise Muslim support behind the regime at election 
times. This, at least, was the case since the state -Islamic rapprochement in the 1990s 
when the state leadership was behind efforts to co- ordinate corporatised and semi- 
autonomous Islamic sectors for the achievement of such political ends. A striking case 
in point was the mobilisation of support for President Suharto's re- nomination before 
the five -yearly MPR sessions. For example, the former Minister of Religion (1978- 
1983), Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara (in an effort to revive his political career 
96 . "KH. Ali Yafie: Ada Titik Temu ICMI Dan Pesantren Dalam Pengembangan Iptek," Merdeka, 
21 Febuary 1992; "Ismail Hasan Harapkan Kalangan Pesantren Masuk ICMI," Antara, 13 April 1992; 
"ICMI Jatiwaringin Membina Pesantren, Pelita, 13 Febuary 1993; "Semalam di Pesantren Darul Ulum 
Jombang: Dilirik ICMJ Karena Potensial," Pelita, 2 January 1993; "ICMI Kembangkan Teknologi 
Tepat Guna di Pesantren Arafah," Republika, 29 November 1993; "Puluhan Pasang Suami Isteri 
Eksekutif Mengikuti Pesantren TCMT Kebon Sirih," Pelita, 31 August 1993; "Soeharto's turn to visit 
`pesantren "' The Jakarta Post, 31 January 1994; "Islamic schools receive support from Soeharto," The 
Jakarta Post, 1 February 1994; "Presiden Soeharto: Pesantren Bisa Jadi Kekuatan Perubahan," 
Merdeka, 1 Febuary 1994; "Presiden Soeharto: Pesantren jangan Menutup Diri," Republika, 3 
November 1996; "Adi Sasono: Pesantren Merupakan Akar Kehidupan Desa," Republika Online, 24 
Pebruari 1997; "Harmoko: Pondok Pesantren Menjadi Pondok Bangsa," Republika Online, 16 January 
1997; "Pesantren Hasilkan Generasi Disiplin dan Taat Beragama," Marian Umum Pikiran Rakyat, 6 
May 1997. 
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perhaps) organised incorporated groups into public endorsements of Suharto' s re- 
nomination to the presidency at the 1993 MPR session. Beginning in 1990, he 
arranged for twenty -one leaders of Muslim organisations to issue a resolution entitled 
"the Joint Standpoint of the Indonesian Muslim Community" urging the People's 
Consultative Assembly to re -elect Suharto. At least half of the signatories to the 
resolution were members of corporatist organisations such as MUI, MDI, DMI, and 
the Council of Development of Mathla'ul Anwar chaired by Alamsjah.97 
In April 1992, he led a mass prayer meeting reaffirming the 1990 resolution. 
The approximately 3,000 people who attended the mass prayer belonged to thirty - 
seven Muslim and general mass organisations co- ordinated by Alamsjah in the 
"Collective Prayer Group -37." The Prayer Group -37 included conservative leaders 
from the independent Islamic organisations. The leaders of "independent" 
organisations invariably belonged to corporatist organisations. Twenty -four 
organisational affiliates of Golkar, including MDI, GUPPI, and the Satuan Karya 
Ulama (the Ulama Functional Union), as well as the Chairman of MUI and four 
ministers and former ministers signed a statement supporting the mass prayer.98 
The endorsements by ulama in support of Suharto's 1993 re- nomination 
appeared to coincide neatly with the disbursement of Golkar campaign funds to 
privately owned pesantren of influential ulama. By one account, Kiai Badri Masduki 
of the Badridduja pesantren in Probolingo, East Java, collected over 1,000 signatures 
in support of Suharto's re- nomination. Shortly before this, the former armed forces 
n . Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, pp.7 -8. 
9s 
. Other community leaders strongly criticised Alamsjah's initiatives. Alamsjah responded by 
declaring that "political engineering" was sometimes necessary. According to him, the idea of holding 
the mass prayer originated with Golkar's affiliate organisations as it was felt that some Golkar 
members were "reluctant to make a pledge" in support of Suharto "as they had done during [previous] 
presidential elections." His statement expressed the regime's concern over the growing rivalry in 
Golkar, especially between the senior military and junior civilian members, since the organisation had 
opted to draw in a wider range of individual and mass membership. Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of 
Events, pp. 19 -21, 60. 
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commander for East Java, Lt. -Gen. Hartono, had delivered Rp. 70 million to Badri's 
pesantren. Suharto's daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, whilst campaigning for 
Golkar in East and Central Java, offered a large sum of money to the Denanyar 
pesantren in Jombang.99 Ultimately, Suharto's growing reliance upon engineered 
endorsements of Muslim support reflected the deepening rift between the President 
and the military. 
From 1994, in the context of the approaching general and presidential 
elections of 1997 -1998, there occurred a series of similar orchestrated "unanimous 
endorsements" and political prayers for Suharto's renomination. For example, in 
March 1994, Suharto held a meeting with the general chairmen of the main Islamic 
organisations -with MUI playing a leading role -in order to assure them, that despite 
rumours that he might stand down mid -term, he would run again for the presidency. 
The Secretary of State, Murdiono, then arranged a delegation of sixty ulama to meet 
with Suharto at the State Palace.10° 
In September 1995, a delegation of dozens of ulama from the provinces of 
Aceh, North Sumatra, and East and West Java met Suharto at the State Palace and 
offered a prayer for his well being. Again MITI played a prominent role and probably 
co- ordinated the meeting. The chairman of the Aceh branch of MUI led the sixty - 
eight strong delegation from Aceh. In addition, the most senior leader of NU, the 
President Ilyas Ruhiyat, who was also an active member of MUI's managing board, 
led the West Java delegation.101 
99 "Gelombang Doa Ulama di Tstana," Media Indonesia, 17 September 1995. 
1°° 
. "Gelombang Doa Ulama di Istana," Media Indonesia; `Ribuan Warga Ormas Islam -Karya 
Bikin Kebulatan Tekad," Republika Online, 8 June 1996; "Tiras briefs," Tiras, 27 July 1995; "Pemilu 
bukan untuk kepentingan pemerintah: Ulama mendoakan kesehatan Pak Harto," Poskota, 22 March 
1997. 
1 °1 "Gelombang Doa Ulama di Istana," Media Indonesia; `Ribuan Warga Ormas," Republika 
Online; "Tiras briefs," Tiras; ` Pemilu bukan untuk kepentingan pemerintah," Poskota. 
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In June 1996, the Golkar amalgam of thirty -one Islamic groups, FKOI, co- 
ordinated by MDI, arranged a signed political statement recording a unanimous 
endorsement and prayer of support by thousands of Muslims for Suharto's 
renomination. The General Chairman of Golkar, Harmoko, and the General Chairman 
of MUT, Hasan Basri, delivered speeches and witnessed the endorsement. Again, in 
March 1997, 150 Muslim leaders represented in MUI prayed at the State Palace for 
Suharto's good health and next term in office.LO2 ICMI did not join the other 
corporatist organisations in declaring public support for Suharto, possibly because of 
its eagerness to deny earlier allegations that the association was established as a 
support base for Suharto before the 1993 presidential election. However, this did not 
detract from the fact that ICMI still was a major pillar of support for the Suharto 
regime. 
8. Conclusion 
Although the New Order state's corporatist initiatives spanned two -to -three 
decades that witnessed state -Islamic relations shift from antagonism to closer 
collaboration, there emerged a common pattern. Throughout much of the New Order 
period, the regime sought to compartmentalise and fragment Muslim interests by 
capturing components (mosque, preachers', ulama, dakwah, women's, and 
intellectuals' associations) of independent organisations (such as NU, 
Muhammadiyah, Dewan Dakwah, Persis) in state -chartered entities. The amalgams 
were linked to government agencies and to Golkar so that the potential for 
autonomous political organisation was subdued, deflected and under close 
102 
"Gelombang Doa Clama di Istana," Media Indonesia; "Ribuan Warga Ornas," Republika 
Online. 
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supervision. The regime re- channelled organisational activities into state- guided 
development oriented tasks and in support of Suharto's presidency. 
ICMI shared similarities with the other corporatist initiatives. A broad 
spectrum of Islamic organisations and interests were brought into a peak organisation 
for Muslim intellectuals. The grouping together of diverse political interests within 
ICMI appeared to serve further Suharto's strategy of stimulating fragmentation, by 
bringing rival interests into the organisation. ICMI also sought to absorb and re- 
channel the activities the Muslim intelligentsia into development -oriented projects, in 
accordance with Habibie's "iptek" vision. 
However, ICMI was a product of state- Islamic accommodation. It was 
established to co -opt strategic middle- strata elite into the existing power 
arrangements, without providing them with sufficient means to endanger the status 
quo. Tf cooption failed to silence the dissension of individual members, they were 
excluded from incorporating arrangements and punished. More importantly, ICMI 
was an example of the tactical deployment of incorporated Muslim interests as a 
support base with which to counter -balance rival networks of power, such as 
influential segments of the military. This carried implications beyond earlier 
corporatist initiatives- namely, there was a risk that incorporated Muslim interests 
would become re- politicised. This was after Suharto had gone to great pains to de- 
politicise Islam and de- mobilise Islam's autonomous organisational hase. 
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Chapter 6 
Nandlatul Ulama: Between incorporation and independence 
1. Introduction 
The voluntary organisation, Nandlatul Ulama (Revival of Religious Scholars) 
presented major challenges to Suharto's strategy of corporatist containment. Suharto 
was unable to apply corporatist strategies across the entire organisation because of its 
heterogeneous membership, large and sprawling structure, its recent history of 
opposition to the president and longer history of resistance to state interference. 
Instead, Suharto sought to capture, in stages, organisational components of NU. He 
did this as part of his strategy to fragment and weaken autonomous Muslim interests 
and marshal them behind his presidency. This chapter examines Suharto's corporatist 
strategy regarding NU. It looks at how Suharto used corporatist capture to exacerbate 
pre- existing conflicts in NU. In particular, it argues that the incorporation of NU 
leaders in ICMI and Golkar reinforced old lines of cleavage within NU and created 
new points of conflict. 
The concept of incorporation is expanded beyond the meaning of "pure" 
corporatism to include other attempts to capture interests in state frameworks. Thus, 
the analysis considers state initiatives for the corporatist capture of Muslim interests 
along with clientelist forms of co- optation and the absorption of private pesantren 
(Islamic boarding schools) into state arrangements. The reason for expanding the 
concept is that corporatist frameworks were used as organisational channels through 
which Suharto could consolidate more informal types of clientelistic co- optation of 
NU's kiai. In other words, corporatist and clientelist measures were really two parts of 
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a single strategy to regulate the demands of clients, by shutting off (or minimising) 
their input into the political system, thereby preserving the "basic structure 
of...political domination. "' The capture of kiai and ulama in corporatist arrangements 
was therefore more than just another form of clientelism. What is important here is 
that corporatist organisations provided an organisational means of neutralising 
autonomous interest- demands as well as channelling them as support for Suharto. 
However, the reality on the ground is seldom as tidy as theoretical points would 
suggest. 
Much of the study concerns Abdurrahman's chairmanship of NU (1984- 1999), 
because he was representative of, and influenced different trends in the organisation 
and had a major voice in national politics. He was an outspoken critic of Suharto, 
vocal advocate of democracy, and an opponent of Habibie and ICMI. He was later to 
become Indonesia's fourth president and the first to be democratically elected. He 
strongly disagreed with the state -Islamic accommodation through TCMI. He claimed 
that the accommodation, among other things, was an unacceptable attempt to build 
formal links between the state and Islamic politics. He defended NU's independence 
from state encroachments. Significant segments of the NU membership also were 
determined to remain independent from state frameworks. His leadership of NU, 
nonetheless, was often controversial and contested. There were pressures within the 
organisation for him to reconcile with Suharto. Other elements were unimpressed 
with, or openly opposed to, Abdurrahman's leadership. This was partly because of old 
rivalries and partly because of his leadership style, including his inclination to make 
unilateral decisions and controversial public statements that upset many NU leaders. 
. Philippe C. Schmitter quoted in Robert R. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelisni, and Partisan 
Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin american Countries," James M. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and 
Corporatism in Latin America, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977. 
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Suharto's strategies concerning NU were complicated by the changing 
political context of the 1990s. This was a period of intensifying intra -elite conflict and 
growing succession crisis, and Abdurrahman was among those who competed for 
political advantage before an anticipated post -Suharto era. Suharto in turn was trying 
to preserve his power and ensure his own unanimous endorsement as president. 
Consequently, Suharto sought to replace the NU Chairman with a more compliant, 
pro- regime figure. He recruited corporatised Muslim (and other state) interests into 
his campaign to topple Abdurrahman. The outcome of this conflict was that group 
interests were becoming re- politicised, after two decades of de- politicisation, which 
contradicted (and would potentially undermine) Suharto's strategies of containment 
and exclusion. The analysis, therefore, moves beyond consideration of Suharto's 
corporatist strategies and looks at how NU was caught up in the broader power 
struggles on a shifting political terrain. 
2. Suharto's incorporation of NU 
The United Development Party (PPP) demonstrated the difficulty of capturing 
NU in state frameworks, as NU refused to become a compliant member of the 
Islamic- oriented party. Instead, NU opposed certain government decisions deemed 
harmful to the organisation's interests, and vigorously contested the general elections 
in 1971 (before the party merger), 1977 and 1982.2 Heavy state interventions in PPP 
led to NU's withdrawal from PPP in 1984 and to acceptance of Pancasila as NU's 
sole ideological foundation. 
2 . See analysis in chapter four. 
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A) The problem of NU's diversity 
NU was an organisation of immense diversity, complexity and size, claiming a 
membership of over thirty million people, located mainly in rural Java. The 
organisation had a heterogeneous membership in terms of social origins, political 
affiliation, and religious outlook. Its membership included politicians, businessmen, 
NGO activists, youth and women's groups, liberal ulama, conservative ulama and a 
mass rural following of townsfolk, peasant farmers, and santrì (devout Muslim 
students). Much of NU's membership was only loosely affiliated with the 
organisation, holding emotional attachments rather than membership cards. Arguably, 
NU was more easily able to elude government authority and frameworks -because of 
the organisation's loose affiliation and amorphous nature -than the centralised and 
bureaucratic structures of Islamic modernist organisations and the political parties. As 
McVey notes, "adopting modern organisational forms means confronting the modern 
state on its own grounds.s3 
However, NU did not completely neglect modern organisation and established 
its own general schools (madrasah), orphanages, social and education institutes, 
dakwah and mosque bodies, women's and youth associations, with a decentralised 
branch structure that, nonetheless, was subject to many of the edicts and decisions of 
NU's Central Board in Jakarta. The organisational affiliates had a degree of autonomy 
from NU. For example, women's affiliates, Muslimat, Fatayat and IPPNU 
(Association of Daughters of NU) could conduct their own programs and affairs but 
in a manner consonant with the basic outlines of NU.4 Through corporatist 
. Ruth McVey, "Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics," James P. Piscatori (ed.), 
Islam in the Political Process, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.216. 
° . At an annual general meeting of Muslimat on 3 April 1997, the NU leader, Abdul. Latif Rahman, 
gave the opening address and reminded his audience that Muslimat "may not deviate or exit from the 
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organisations, the Muslimat and Fatayat established links and working relations (in 
areas of education, health, welfare, rural development and family planning) with 
government departments independently of NU's Central Board.5 
NU's relative decentralisation largely derived from the personalistic and 
informal networks and authority of individual kiai and ulama. The main social base of 
NU was its system of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) run privately by kiai and 
ulama (religious leaders and scholars) for the spiritual, moral and religious 
development of santri.6 Many kiai had a reputation of being fiercely independent, 
especially from larger political structures of the state, and customarily drew livelihood 
from minor trade, small landholdings, school fees, and community support and 
donations to pesantren coffers.' 
B) Suharto deals with NU's diversity 
Suharto was confronted with a major problem of how to incorporate such a 
large, diverse, and sometimes recalcitrant organisation in state frameworks. Suharto 
(from the mid -1970s onwards) adopted a strategy of progressively capturing 
organisational components of NU. The relative autonomy of affiliates appeared to 
facilitate Suharto's capture of these bodies in a piecemeal but progressive fashion. 
basic outlines of the NU based on its faith of "ahlusunnah wal jema'ah (Sunnism)." However, this was 
a multi -interpretable statement as he stressed that NU's outline meant Muslimat may not join PPP - 
although its individual members were free to do so, but not in the name of Muslimat. 
. Interviews with Aisyah Humid Baidlowi (Head of Muslimat NU), 11 March 1997; Susy 
Machsusoh Tosaci Witiajar (Secretary General of Muslimat), 4 April 1997; Ermalena (Head of 
Fatayat), 1 June 1996. IPPNU had not joined any state corporatist bodies according to the head of the 
organisation. Interview with Dra Hj. Safira Machrusah (Head of IPPNU), 5 April 1997. Saifullah 
Ma'shum and Ali Zawawi (eds.), 50 Tahun Muslimat NU Berkhidmat untuk Agama & Bangsa, Jakarta, 
Pucuk Pímpínan Muslimat Nandlatul Ulama, 1996. 
6 
. The social geography of many pesantren was cemented through participation of kiai and santri in 
Sufi brotherhoods or tarekat. These pesantren had association with at least one brotherhood, which, 
through genealogies (sits/Lk), linked kiai and students in a master -disciple relationship within an 
unbroken spiritual chain to the Prophet. One outcome of genealogies has been the great reverence 
accorded to deceased teachers, saints, and living kíaí, especially those kiai thought to possess 
supernatural powers. Much of the authority of kiai also has been hereditary. 
. McVey, "Faith as the Outsider," PP.206 -210. 
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Thus, as outlined in chapter five, Suharto brought Nil's affiliates, including women's 
organisations, dakwah, mosque, and ulama bodies -and/or members of these 
organisations into peak corporatist organisations like BMOIWI, Golkar, MDI, DMI, 
BAKOMUBIN and MUI. There was also a state -charted pesantren organisation, the 
Pondok Pesantren Co- operative Body (BKSPP). 
NU's departure from PPP in 1984 facilitated Suharto's co- optation of many 
NU members and pesantren leaders. Although NU officials could no longer remain in 
PPP, other NU members were permitted to join any of the three parties (Golkar, PPP 
or PDI). This freed up leaders of NU's affiliate organisations and pesantren to join 
Golkar and to bring their rural support bases with them.8 After the state -Islamic 
rapprochement in the late- 1980s, Suharto intensified efforts to draw NU's pesantren 
into state frameworks and to co -opt individual kiai and ulama with disbursements of 
patronage through Golkar and state channels. Kiai and pesantren were becoming 
increasingly dependent upon state funding. For example, NU's official pesantren 
organisation, Rabithalul Mai'ahidil Islamiyah (RMI, an association of around 4,000 
pesantren, half of Indonesia's approximately 8,000 pesantren) became reliant upon 
state funding for the holding of its national meetings.9 More significantly, by 1997, 
more than 75 percent of pesantren were penetrated by the state education curriculum, 
with uniformed government teachers supplying much of the school staff.10 
Suharto also used corporatist organisations such as Golkar, MDI, ICMI, and 
MUI to penetrate NU's pesantren. He did this to open a breach in the NU 
constituency through which Golkar could enter and win over Muslims to its campaign 
banner. The previous chapter considered how Golkar and other state leaders 
. As argued earlier in the thesis, Suharto failed to co -opt effectively NU in PPP. 
9 . Interview with Dr. Ali Haidar (Secretary General of NU's RMI), 14 August 1997; "Dr. M. Ali 
Haidar: Prosess Demokratisasi Lebih Mudah di Kalangan Nandliyin," Republika, 11 November 1996. 
° . Information drawn from work done by Greg Fealy in April 1997 and May 1999. 
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distributed funds to pesantren before general and -presidential elections. Habibie and 
ICMI were among the multiple state interests that frequented pesantren in attempts to 
drum up political support for Golkar and their own political careers before the holding 
of elections. 
For example, at NU's fourth national meeting of RMI in Jakarta (January 
1994), ICMI, Golkar, and other state interests made concerted efforts to win political 
influence. Several ministers and senior government officials attended the meeting, 
which was formally opened by President Suharto and closed by Vice- President Try 
Sutrisno.t I There was a hive of activity in the month before the national meeting, as 
senior government, Golkar, and military officials did their rounds of pesantren. 
Habibie held a dialogue with 1,200 NU !llama in Madura (an island off East Java), 
and was later made "honorary chairman" of the pesantren body, BKSPP, in Bogor 
(West Java).'2 The visit to Madura appeared to be part of an attempt to build an ICMI 
presence in the island's pesantren, and to win support for his own ambitions to 
become the next Vice- President.t3 
Thus, Golkar and ICMI were part of Suharto's attempts both to capture kiai in 
state frameworks and to buy their votes and loyalties. Two prominent kiai, who 
became targets of co- optation were KH Ilyas Ruchiyat (NU's acting Rais Aam, Katib 
of NU's Syuriah Council) and KH Yusuf Hasyim (a member of NU's Syuriah 
Council). Both leaders ran their own pesantren and still had respect and authority 
within their respective communities, but had benefited from their co- optation and 
joined corporatist organisations. Their pesantren received considerable state funding. 
"Islamic schools receive support from Suharto," The Jakarta Post, 1 February 1994; "Soeharto's 
turn to visit `pesantren "' The Jakarta Post, 31 January 1994; `President Soeharto: Pesantren Bisa Jadi 
Kekuatan Perubahan," Merdeka, 1 Febuary 1994; "Habibie takes credit for government, Moslem 
relations," The Jakarta Post, 1 February 1994. 
12 . Habibie's trip to Madura was motivated by the desire to turn the island into an industrial zone in 
much the same manner that Batam Island was a planned industrial zone under his supervision. 
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Ruchiyat became deputy -chair of MUI and an TCMT member. Yusuf was once a fierce 
critic of the regime and PPP leader in the 1970s and early 1980s.14 He was one of the 
PPP leaders whom Naro had punished with the re- drafting of party lists in 1982.15 By 
the 1990s, however, Yusuf appeared to change allegiances, as he opposed a return to 
PPP, joined ICMI and supported Suharto.16 
Both Yusuf and Ruchiyat11 -and the former deputy chairman of NU's 
Syuriah, Ali Yafie (ICMI and MUT member) -gave public pledges of support for 
Suharto's renomination to the presidency at election times. :8 Along with several other 
ICMI figures, the three leaders were rewarded for their loyalties with appointment to 
the MPR in 1992, but they were not given access to the real decisional structures of 
government. Most of these ICMI figures entered the MPR on a Golkar ticket in 
support of Habibie's ambitions to become Vice- President.19 In this case, ICMI and 
Golkar acted as conduits to broader state structures, in a manner that sought to contain 
interests and channel them as a form of regime support. Tn addition, the endorsements 
of Suharto exacerbated divisions in NU, especially as Abdurrahman opposed the 
pledges.20 Corporatist capture and co- optation therefore could facilitate splits in the 
NU leadership and pesantren communities between those who remained semi - 
independent of the state, and those who joined corporatist organisations, especially 
Golkar and ICMI. 
14 
. "Gaya Hahihie Merayu Ulama," Editor, 10 February 1994. 
1" . Islam in Indonesian: A Survey of Events, p.24. 
15 See chapter four regarding Naro's intervention. 
16 . Martin van Bruinessen, "The 28th Congress of the Nandlatul Ulama: Power Struggle and Social 
Concerns," Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds.), Nandlatul (llama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in 
Indonesia, Clayton, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996, p.145; Darul Aqsha et.al. (eds.), 
Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events and Developments from 1988 to March 1993, Jakarta, INIS, 
1995, pp.24, 118. 
17 
. Ruchiyat, however, refused on one occasion to support a unanimous pledge for Suharto's re- 
nomination. Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, P.20. 
18 . See the previous chapter for an account of Ruchiyat's role in supporting Suharto. For an account 
of Hasyim's public support of Suharto see Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, p.118. 
19 Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events, pp.24 -5. 
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In summary, corporatism and clientelism- appeared to have been mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms. They both sought to weaken the ties and loyalties of NU 
leaders to the organisation, but not to their respective pesantren constituencies, and to 
draw them into ties of loyalty with the state leadership. Corporatism gave 
organisational form to this strategy. For example, not only did partial capture threaten 
NU's hold over affiliate organisations, NU leaders who joined the state -chartered 
organisations were more inclined to support Suharto but without gaining strategic 
input into the political system. 
3. Abdurrahman's leadership of NU 
KH Abdurrahman Wahid was the grandson of two of the NU's founding 
fathers, Kiai Hasjim Asjiari and Kiai Bisri Syansuri. As such, he embodied the moral 
authority of great kiai and the legitimacy derived from belonging to NU's revered 
lineage. He became NU Chairman when NU was seeking conciliation with Suharto 
and withdrew from PPP. He was one of the architects of NU' s conciliation with 
Suharto and supplied some of the main arguments for NU's departure from PPP. The 
incorporation of NU in PPP, he contended, had placed the organisation in a tight 
corner with no political room of manoeuvre. He insisted that NU would be better 
positioned to play politics outside of "the formal structure of New Order politics." 
Withdrawal from PPP gave NU enhanced "freedom of `political' movement ", as it 
was no longer subject to direct state control and interventions.21 
By the early 1990s, after an apparent thaw of relations between Suharto and 
NU, Abdurrahman -Suharto relations rapidly declined. Abdurrahman did a number of 
20 . Divisions in NU, especially those surrounding Abdurrahman's leadership, are discussed below. 
21 
. Two interviews with Abdurrahman Wahid (General Chairman of NU), 13 January 1994 and 15 
July 1996; Closed Discussion entitled "NU and Empowerment of `Civil Society - at Gedung PKBI 
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things that upset Suharto. He became an outspoken advocate of democracy and 
criticised aspects of Suharto's rule. He helped establish and led a discussion group 
called the Democracy Forum in March 1991 to promote democratisation.22 He saw 
NU's vast constituency as a start ing point for a pluralistic, civil society; one based on 
a tolerant society, democracy and respect for human rights. He stressed the strategic 
role NU could play as an independent social force, a countervailing power to the state 
that would gain a better bargaining position in relation to state power. Other liberal - 
minded intellectuals in NU shared similar views to Abdurrahman regarding the 
potential of NU becoming a democratising force or civil society.23 In line with his 
views, Abdurrahman refused to join the state -sponsored ICMI, thereby resisting state 
corporatist strategies and sending a clear rebuff to Suharto. In March 1992, he called 
together a mass rally (Rapat Akbar) of NU supporters to demonstrate to Suharto and 
ICMI that his organisation was still a force to contend with. At the rally, he pledged 
NU's loyalty to Pancasila rather than endorsing Suharto for a fifth term as president, 
despite the indirect pressure on NU to give the endorsement.24 During the 1990s, he 
attacked cosy state -Islamic relations represented by ICMT. 
(Perkumpulan Keluarga Rerencana Indonesia), 15 June 1996; "Ulil Abshar Abdalla: Gus Dur Kadang 
Salah Hitung," Ummat, 25 November 1996, p.37. 
zz The Forum's members included NGO advocates, nationalists, democracy activists and 
representatives of religious minorities. Although a number of state officials denounced the Forum, the 
regime mostly tolerated its existence, as it had been established during a period of regime -initiated 
political opening. Moreover, the Forum was established as a discussion group and therefore did not 
pose a structural or grassroots threat to established power relations. 
23 These include Mohammad A.S. Hikam (a former researcher at LIPI and member of 
Abdurrahman's current cabinet), Dr. Ali Haidar, Sa'id `Agiel Siraj (member of NU's Syuriah Council), 
Gaffar Rahman (former Secretary General of NU), Masdar Mas'udi (Head of P3M), and intellectuals 
belonging to NU's student organisation PMII, among others. Interviews with Masdar Mas'udi, 29 May 
1996; Sa'id 'Aqiel Siraj, 30 October 1996; Gaffar Rahman, (several discussions), July 1996; 
Mohammad Hikam, 10 October 1996; Mohammad A.S. Hikam, "Menelusuri Pemikiran Politik Gus 
Dur: Rerangkat dari Paradigma Civil Society," Jawa Pos, 3 January 1996. "Dr. M. Ali Haidar: Proses 
Demokratisasi," Republika. 
za 
. Finally, he upset Suharto when his tactless criticism of the president, quoted in Adam Schwarz's 
book, "A Nation in Waiting," found their way back to the palace. In 1994, in an open political rebuff, 
the President refused to recognise or meet with NU's new leadership under Abdurrahman's command. 
Fealy, "The 1994 NIJ Congress and Aftermath," pp.274 -5. 
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However, the NU Chairman had not always resisted incorporation into state 
arrangements. For example, before the decline in relations with Suharto, in 1988 he 
joined the MPR as a Golkar candidate.25 As such, one could question whether 
Abdurrahman's attitude regarding state incorporation of Muslim interests depended, 
to some extent, on what concessions he could obtain from Suharto in rivalry with 
other interests in the political system. 
A) Opposition to ICMI 
Abdurrahman's opposition to ICMI was greatly informed by his perceptions of 
his own position within emerging power -struggles. He considered that NU was locked 
in competition with ICMI -which largely represented modernist organisations like 
Muhammadiyah and HMI -as both constituencies competed for political 
predominance. In particular, he was highly critical of what he saw as B.J. Habibie's 
"core group at BPPT" becoming a "new power centre in the 5`h Development cabinet 
(1993)," and using ICMI as a support base.26 Abdurrahman disagreed with Islam 
being used to advance Habibie's political ambitions, especially as the latter had his 
sights on becoming Indonesia's next Vice -President. Habibie was Suharto's favoured 
candidate for the vice -presidency at the 1993 and 1998 MVIPR elections, and he became 
Vice -President in 1998.27 From 1993 onwards, Abdurrahman was irreconcilably 
opposed to the prospect of Habibie becoming Indonesia's future Vice -President. "It 
was inappropriate that he [Habibie] become Vice- President," he said.28 
as 
. van Bruinessen, "The 286' Congress of the Nandlatul Ulama, "p.I46. 
ze Abdurrahman Wahid, "Gerakan Islam Dan Kaum Teknolog," Suara Pembaruan, 5 April 1993. 
n He asked, "Is the Islamic colour only being used b y [ Habibie's group] in government for their 
own purposes ?" Abdurrahman, "Gerakan Islam Dan Kaum Teknolog," Suara Pembaruan. 
zs Instead, the NU Chairman indicated on different occasions in early 1994 and early 1998 (before 
the convening of the MPR session), his preference of Habibie's rival, Try Sutrisno, for re- nomination 
to the vice -presidency. Editor reported in 1994 that Abdurrahman had announced that Try was 
acceptable to the pesantren and to the lower classes (the NU grassroots). The central NU leaders 
cultivated close relations with the incumbent Vice -President, and Try was enthusiatically received on 
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Abdurrahman wanted to bring NU into a stronger bargaining position with the 
state vis -a -vis ICMI. He claimed that he wanted NU to become a "balancing force or 
civil society vis -à -vis the state" so that NU could set the terms of its participation in 
the political system. Co- optation of Muslims through ICMI and Golkar, he argued, 
weakened civil society and strengthened the state. He saw ICMI as only serving to 
"strengthen the position and role of the state bureaucracy [by co- opting a small 
number of ambitious Muslim leaders into the existing power structure], which [he 
said] weakened community initiative and increasingly isolated people from the 
process of decision -making." 29 He therefore opposed Muslims in ICMI supporting 
Golkar and Suharto's New Order.30 Corresponding to Abdurrahman's political stance 
was his commitment to grassroots, small -to- medium scale economic development 
which would help strengthen NU's rural constituency. He therefore opposed the co- 
optation of Muslims through ICMI into Habibie's capital intensive technological 
projects.31 
However, the NU Chairman was also acutely aware of NU's marginal position 
in the political structure relative to Muslims from the modernist organisations.32 He 
wanted to bring NU in from the cold and back into the political mainstream (albeit on 
his terms), after years of NU- government antagonisms that had greatly hurt the 
his regular circuits of the pesantren. In early February 1994, in an apparent display of support for Try's 
renomination as Vice- President in 1998, Abdurrahman led a group of prominent NU leaders to Try's 
residence to request financial aid. `Para Aktor dalam Suksesi 1998," Editor, "Memperebutkan Posisi 
Imanah," Tempo, 12 February 1994. Alternatively, he said that it was better for older generation 
generals like Edi Sudrajat, Benny Murdani and M. Jusuf to become Indonesia's future Vice -President 
in preference to Hahihie. "Wawancara Abdurrahman Wahid: Wong, Saya Enggak Pernah Berubah," 
D &R, 29 November 1996. 
29 . Interview with Abdurrahman, 15 June 1996. 
30 "Dialogue Kepemimpinan Umat Islam (2): Mencari Legitimacy Sendiri -Sendiri," Jawa Pos, 6 
April 1993 
31 Abdurrahman, "Gerakan Islam Dan Kaum Teknolog."  
When Abdurrahman was first elected to the chairmanship of the NU in 1984, he had sought to 
forge an accommodation with Suharto's circle and was able, over the years, to have some NU leaders 
well placed in the government and political parties. Fahmi Saifuddin became an adviser to the 
Coordinating Minister of Public Health, Rozy Munir was given a post of the board that helps draft the 
Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN), and others became active in Golkar, the PPP, and the PDI. 
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organisation's economic and political activities. He had support from NU's business 
people, kiai, and other NU members who wished to improve the economic conditions 
of NU's constituency through improved relations with Suharto. Abdurrahman 
expressed his disappointment at being excluded from the political mainstream. "Look 
at how [the regime] tries to block NU people from entering the key positions in ICMI. 
Influential mass organisations [NUJ are neglected and given peripheral positions in 
ICMI. "33 He confided that it was dangerous for him and NU to remain at the political 
margins, as he was exposed to attacks from state -ICMI interests.34 
To summarise, there were three reasons for Abdurrahman's objections to 
ICMI. First, he regarded the co- optation of Muslims into state structures as the wrong 
sort of accommodation being made between the state and Islam as it strengthened the 
state vis -ä -vis society. What he wanted was a form of accommodation that 
strengthened civil society and increased people's participation in the political system. 
NU's mass rural constituency was the starting point of this vision. Second, he was 
keen to secure a broader role for NU in the political system and state power structures 
and regarded ICMI as a rival group obstructing this goal. These two agendas were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive because he advocated NU's broad participation rather 
than limited co- optation in the system. 
Third, he was opposed to a certain kind of mutual co- optation occurring 
between modernist Islam and the state. That is, as well as Muslims being co -opted by 
Suharto and Habibie, he argued that members of ICMI's intelligentsia were trying to 
enlist the state in aid of their Islamising agendas. He claimed that those who desired 
an Islamic society, mostly Muslim modernists attached to the Muhammadiyah, really 
dreamt of establishing an Islamic state. He was opposed to what he considered to be a 
33 Interview with Abdurrahman, 13 January 1994. 
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resurgence of universal- cum -formal- legalistic Islam, which sought to provide a 
complete set of rules and laws that required the state to regulate the conduct of 
people's lives. At the very least, he argued, Islamic society was offered as an 
alternative system to the current one underwritten by nationalistic commitments. He 
considered ICMI an unwelcome move towards the "re- confessionalisation" of 
politics, after the New Order government had successfully "de- confessionalised" or 
"de- Islamised" Indonesian politìcs.35 
"De- Islamisation" of politics had been achieved largely through strategies of 
corporatist containment. Abdurrahman, however, was concerned that Suharto's more 
recent incorporation of Muslim interests through ICMI had the effect of not 
containing but re- politicising Islamic agendas. (See chapter seven for a discussion on 
ICMI's Islamic agendas.) 
B) Guarding NU's independence: responses to state encroachment 
Abdurrahman extended his attacks against cosy state -ICMI relations to 
criticism of the government's tendency to increase its jurisdiction over the 
community's religious affairs. He accused the government, and its Department of 
Religion, of "over institutionalising" Islam on such diverse issues as the state's 
34 . Interview with Abdurrahman, 30 July 1997. 
35 Several of the ICMI intelligentsia did aspire to establishing and Islamic society in Indonesia and 
some hoped to achieve this objective by first making state officials more deeply committed to Islam in 
their public lives (see chapter seven). According to Abdurrahman, the goal for an Islamic society had 
worrying implications for the rights of religious minorities, as minority groups that refused to comply 
with Islamic laws would fall outside of the law. They would become' discriminated second class 
citizens with reduced rights. Abdurrahman was disappointed by the actions of ICMI intellectuals, 
Amien Rais and Nurcholish Madjid who, in October 1990, joined the chorus of Muslim voices 
demanding that the editor of the Catholic -owned magazine, Monitor, be punished for blasphemy and 
the magazine's license he revoked Interviews with Abdurrahman, 13 Juanuary 1994 and 5 June 1996 in 
Jakarta; "1991: Umat Islam Masih Ruwet," Tempo, 29 December 1991; "Gus Dur Ajukan Dua 
Pertanyaan untuk Purifikasi: Ajaran Islam," Kompas, 19 November 1991; ,Abdurrahman Wahid, 
"Demokrasi, Agama, dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa," Jawa Pos, 7 December 1993; Abdurrahman Wahid, 
"Dialog Kepemimpinan Umat Islam (2): Mencari Legitimasi Sendiri- Sendiri," Jawa Pos, 6 April 1993, 
"Gus Dur: Islam di Indonesia Tidak Kenal Fundamentalis," Suara Pembaruan, 15 September 1995; 
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increasing control of the collection of Islamic alms tax, of the pilgrimage to Mecca, 
the determining of the beginning of fasting month, religious education, the labelling 
of food items as "permitted" (halal) or "prohibited" (haram), and Islamisation of the 
state's laws. He regarded the role of the Department of Religion and MUI in 
regulating the religious affairs of the nation as unnecessary. He made numerous other 
attacks against cosy state -Islamic relations by directing much of his criticisms against 
corporatist organisations like MUI and ICMi. 36 
Abdurrahman's criticism of the state's "unnecessary interference" in the 
internal affairs of the Muslim community reflected an underlying concern of many 
kiaï to guard NU' s independence from the state. Abdurrahman expressed the concern 
that Suharto was using the state, including corporatist organisations like ICMI and 
MUI, in order to encroach upon the NU constituency. 37 ICMI and MUI threatened to 
win the allegiances of his NU constituency. For example, Abdurrahman objected to 
the Rais Aam of NU, Ilyas Ruchiat, being appointed as a deputy -chair of MUI. NU's 
former Secretary General, Ichwan Syam, and its former General Chairman, Idham 
Chalid, were also appointed to MUI's board at its Fifth National Consultation in July 
1995. He complained that, 
With the most senior NU leader becoming an MUI leader, serious questions 
are raised about the ability of NU to maintain an attitude of independence 
from MUI. MUI cannot claim itself as a representative of the entire Muslim 
"Gus Dur dan ' Ideologi Toleransi Jangan Ada Penghianatan Konstitusi," Merdeka, 10 November 
1995. 
36 Interview with Abdurrahman, 5 June I996; "Gus Dur: Masalah Agama Jangan Terlalu 
Dilembagakan," Media Indonesia (CSIS Clipping Service, date obscurred); "Pemerintah Hendaknya 
tak terlalu Banyak Mencampuri Urusan Agama," Pelita; Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam dan Birokrasi," 
Jawa Pos, 13 Febuary 1993; "1991: Umat Islam Masih Ruwet," Tempo; Abdurrahman Wahid, 
"Gerakan Islam Dan Kaum Teknolog," Suara Pembaruan, 5 April 1993. 
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community's aspirations. This is because a great deal of policy products of 
MUI led by KH Hasan Basri is determined unilaterally, without 
consultation with leaders of other Islamic organisations... [including] NU38 
Abdurrahman was also highly critical of the state's encroachment on the NU's 
grassroots support, its rural network of pesantren. The various state- backed incursions 
into pesantren, at least potentially, presaged gradual erosion of Abdurrahman's hold 
on his constituency. Addressing the Buntet pesantren, in Cirebon (1996), the NU 
Chairman repeated one of his common themes by warning that pesantren were losing 
their independence because of an inability to finance their own existence, thereby 
making them dependent on outsiders. Just before his address, the Minister of Defence 
and the Minister of Religion had donated 50 million rupiah to the Buntet pesantren.39 
Beyond Abdurrahman's leadership, NU's membership gave mixed responses 
to Suharto's attempts to woo the pesantren. This was especially the case before the 
1997 and 1998 elections. For example, Ilyas Ruchiyat cautiously rejected speculation 
that the presence of so many high -powered state officials in NU pesantren was related 
to attempts to win influence before the elections. Ruchiyat's pesantren in 
Tasikmalaya was widely known to be in receipt of substantial state patronage. 
Ruchiyat already had been drawn into the state -Islamic accommodation. The Deputy 
Chair of the NU's religious council, KH Sahal Mahfudz, declared that ICMI and 
Golkar would "definitely be received openly at the NU pesantren".4° 
37 . "Abdurrahman Wahid: Terjadi Kolahorasi Amara Agamawan Dengan Pemerintah," Merdeka, 
20 Febuary 1993; Abdurrahman Wahid, "Dialog Kepemimpinan Umat Islam (2): Mencari Legitimasi 
Sendiri -Sendiri," Jawa Pos; "Gus Dur Mengecap Munawir," Jawa Pos, 1 March 1993. 
3R 
. "Gus Dur Kecewa KH Ruchiat Jadi Pengurus MUI," Media Indonesia, 28 July 1995. 
39 . In an interview in 1996, Ali Haidar, complained that even the NU's pesantren association (RMI) 
relied on the government to fund its activities at national meetings, and that the NU was under immense 
pressure to build links of patronage with the power holders." "Dr M. Ali Haidar: Proses 
Demokratisasi," Republika. 
ao 
. "Soeharto's turn to visit `pesantren "' The Jakarta Post. 
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Others were less sanguine. One NU leader asserted that those who adopted the 
"Masyumi approach [a clear reference to ICMT] "41 needed "to be reminded not to 
become disappointed when they failed to influence the pesantren " .42 Another 
pesantren leader, Kiai Yusuf Muhammad, explained that if Suharto, Habibie, or ICMI 
wished to interfere in NU's pesantren "this will be resisted ". 
The mistake that Suharto and Habibie make is that they enter NU's first 
door and think that all the warmth and smiles attended to them means that 
they have successfuIIy won over the religious leaders of the pesantren. 
However, this [friendliness] is only protocol afforded to all guests. The 
other doors in the NU' s pesantren universe remain closed. In short, Suharto 
and Habibie cannot hope to win over the pesantren constituency.43 
A Muhammadiyah intellectual, Mansour Fakih (a man who sympathised with 
Abdurrahman's leadership of NU), criticised the state and ICMI's encroachments. He 
warned, "it appears they [the ICMI members] offer their ideas and interests to the 
pesantren community in a manner that will cause a reaction from those groups that 
feel it [the pesantren] is their jurisdiction. "44 He accused ICMI of siding with the 
power holders against the interests of "other groups," creating the impression that the 
state -backed ICMI was trying to win influence in rivalry with the NU constituency. 
Underlying Mansour's concern was the likely realisation that Suharto's circle was 
. Abdurrahman had actually developed and made popular the idea that ICMI was a neo- Masyumi 
and, like a "Trojan Horse," it sought to infiltrate the state and Islamise politics from within. 
42 . "Agenda Mukernas RMI Ke -5: Upaya Mempertegas Jati Diri Pesantren," Republika, 1 
November 1996; "Dr. M. Ali Haidar: Proses Demokratisasi" Republika. 
a3 Interview with Kiai Yusuf Muhammad (pesantren leader), 3 February L994 at the NU's RMI 
national meeting beginning on 31 January in Jakarta. 
44 "Menanggapi Pernyataan Gus Dur: Umat Islam Hams Perkuat Demokrasi," Media Indonesia, 5 
Febuary 1994. 
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using ICMI to gain access to the pesantren community in aid of its Golkar campaigns. 
A group of thirty -seven NU supporters, calling themselves the Communication Forum 
of Nandlatul Ulama's Youth Generation, also lodged their protest against such 
political campaigning in a signed petition entitled "the Pesantren Must Remain 
Independent 45 
The language of these NU figures (and Mansour) reflected their desire to resist 
Suharto's encroachments made through Golkar and ICMI. Resistance to Golkar also 
originated from supporters of PPP within NU (discussed further below).46 As such, 
there were clearly different categories of "incorporated" interests, with PPP becoming 
a source of opposition at election times. Another factor is that many NU kiai perhaps 
resented the terms and conditions attached to their incorporation. Although they might 
have been keen to receive state funding for their struggling pesantren, they were 
much less likely to accept conditions attached to that funding through their absorption 
into the state -run education system. Another cause of likely grievance was that the 
state leadership often did not follow through with pre -election promises of patronage 
to pesantren. For example, KH Hasyim Muzadi (Head of NU's East Java branch), 
told of how the government promised 10 billion rupiah of funds to KH Kholil As'ad's 
pesantren in Situbondo (East Java) in return for the pesantren's support for Golkar at 
the 1997 election. Situbondo was a PPP stronghold, and Kholil supported PPP. 
Fearful that large funds would simply strengthen Kholil's pesantren as a PPP support 
base, according to Hasyim, the government only delivered on 5 million rupiah of its 
promise.47 
4$ . "Islamic schools receive support from Suharto," The Jakarta Post, 1 February 1994. 
46 AS mentioned in chapter four, the withdrawal from PPP caused an enduring split within NU, 
between those who backed Golkar and those who remained loyal to the "Islamic" party. 
47 . Interview with Hasyim Muzadi, (Head of East Java Provincial office of NU), 5 August 1997. 
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The discussion thus far highlights that NU members responded differently to 
the state's attempts to extend its influence over NU's organisational base -the 
pesantren -and incorporate NU interests in state frameworks. NU leaders who 
opposed state incursions tended to regard ICMI and Golkar as rival political interests 
seeking to win influence among pesantren communities. The NU Chairman most 
clearly represented this tendency. Other NU leaders who appeared to support ICMI- 
Golkar forays into pesantren Iargely had been drawn into state frameworks and 
received state patronage. Although the internal dynamics and external relations of NU 
were not as simple as the incorporated/unincorporated dichotomy suggests, a tentative 
conclusion can be drawn from the discussion. The organisation of Muslim interests 
into state- chartered organisations (Golkar, ICMI, MUI) appeared to facilitate 
Suharto's divide and rule strategy of playing off rival Muslim groups, as NU's 
membership was divided over its responses to state corporatism. 
We return here to Bianchi's argument that mixed systems of representation - 
in which there coexist significant corporatist and "pluralist" (unincorporated) 
components -provide state leaderships with more flexible management choices. State 
leaders can readjust the balance of competing groups (which support or oppose the 
regime) by altering the range of incentives and disincentives (benefits such as 
patronage opportunities, recognition, office or denial of these benefits) between 
differently structured (corporatised and excluded) interests. For example, NU leaders 
who wished to benefit from state arrangements joined Golkar and ICMI and - 
together with many Muslim modernists -supported Suharto. Joining state 
arrangements -as we shall discuss- brought these NU leaders and Muslim 
modernists into conflict with elements in NU that wished to guard their independence 
from the state. 
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4. Creating divisions 
An outcome of Suharto's initiatives to incorporate interests, then, appears to 
have been to exacerbate pre -existing cleavages, and create new ones, within NU and 
further fragment the organisation. First we consider the lines of conflict in NU. Then 
we look at how Suharto's corporatist strategy might have stimulated the rifts. 
A) Internal cleavages 
At different points in history, one of the most salient internal cleavages to 
trouble NU was that between the Religious Council (Syuriah) and Executive Council 
(Tanfidziyah). On paper at least, the Religious Council was the higher authority with 
veto power over the Executive. However, NU has had to recruit outsiders (educated 
elite, politicians and businessmen) into the Executive Council in order to introduce 
necessary skills otherwise not possessed by kiai and ulama. In particular, the ulama 
became resentful of the fact that politicians and bureaucrats in the Executive Council, 
from the early 1970s to the early- 1980s, had dominated NU at the expense of the 
ulama. They were determined to re- establish the paramountcy of ulama and Religious 
Council over that of the Executive Council. These concerns resulted in a growing 
conflict between the so- called "Cipete" group of politicians and ulama, led by the 
long -time General Chairman of NU, Idham Chalid (1956- 1984), and the so- called 
"Situbondo" group of mostly ulama. This conflict resulted in the defeat of the Cipete 
group by the Situbondo group and the government, and the holding a NU's 1984 
Congress in Situbondo (East Java), which elected Abdurrahman to the chairmanship 
and announced NU's formal withdrawal from PPP. The lines of rivalry in NU will not 
be discussed futher as such a discussion is beyond the central concern of the thesis 
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regarding interactions between the state, corporatised Muslim interests, and more 
pluralist social organisation. 
B) Regime- engineered split in NU 
Suharto appeared to exploit NU's internal rifts and corporatist capture was part 
of this strategy. We have considered how Suharto had tried to fragment Muslim 
interests in PPP before the withdrawal of NU in 1984.48 After NU's exit from PPP, 
NU leaders and their followers had their loyalties increasingly divided along party 
lines (Golkar, PPP, and PDI). Political and business interests keen to improve their 
access to state patronage joined Golkar, while PPP loyalists remained with the 
Islamic- oriented party, and a small number joined PDI. 
People's divided party loyalties led to conflicts within NU's constituency. 
Golkar sought to entice and bully NU members into joining Golkar and, according to 
different accounts, this caused a major reaction from PPP supporters 49 For example, 
leaders of NU's Ansor Youth Movement (from branches in Bangil and Pasuruan, East 
Java) pointed out that the freedom to join any party after 1984 "created an unhealthy 
climate of mutual suspicion and contest between Golkar and PPP supporters in Ansor. 
Golkar claimed that Ansor had joined the ruling party. "50 Party -based divisions in NU 
were especially evident at the 1992 and 1997 elections, which witnessed PPP 
°$ . See the discussion in chapter four. 
w. Interviews with GP Ansor, 10 August 1997; KH Nurcholis Musytarí (Deputy Rais Syuriah NU, 
Bangil Branch), 10 August 1997; Hj. Ahmad Jaman (Pembina Ansor Kotamadya Pasuruan), 10 August 
1997; KH Choiron Syakur (Leader of Pesantren Wahit Hasyim in Pasuruan), 10 August 1997; Fathor 
Rasjid (NU leader, Situbondo branch), 4 August 1997; An observer of conflict in Situbondo during the 
1997 general election (he wished to remain anonymous), 4 August 1997; A civil servant (Golkar 
member from NU, who wished to remain anonymous), told of the conflict between Golkar and PPP in 
the pre -election climate (late- 1996), 6 August 1997. 
so Interview with leaders of GP Ansor (H. Nur Cholish: Rois Syuriah NU, Bangil branch; Drs. 
Subani, Ketua PP Ansor Bangil and others), 10 August 1997. 
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supporters in NU clash with NU's Golkar supporters in many of the towns of Java.51 
Nil's exit from PPP and resultant rivalries seemed to be an outcome (if not objective) 
of Suharto's corporatist strategy. 
According to KH Nurcholis Musytari (the Deputy Rais Syuriah of NU's 
branch in Bangìl), after 1984, there also was continued competition between NU 
leaders and the MI faction in PPP. The government ensured that MI candidates gained 
the lion's share of seats -and denied them to Nil's PPP candidates -in most of the 
district parliaments of East Java.52 The denial of political representation to NU's PPP 
candidates shows that Suharto was still seeking to fragment and exclude opposition 
from NU, despite NU's formal withdrawal from PPP. The establishment of ICMI in 
1990 reinforced these efforts by drawing Muslim interests into a nonparty entity in a 
manner that would fragment further Muslim political interests. Thus, Muslim 
modernist and NU supporters of Golkar entered ICMI, as did modernist and NU 
supporters of PPP,53 Most of ICMI's membership belonged to Golkar and Golkar 
cadres were unlikely to permit PPP members to channel their party interests through 
ICMI. Thus, ICMI was primarily a nonparty support base for Golkar as co -opted 
members sought to channel their interests into the political system. 
The partial capture of NU in state -chartered organisations appeared to 
contribute to fragmentation of this constituency. Staunch adversaries of Abdurrahman 
had joined corporatist organisations, sought accommodation with Suharto's regime, 
51 . At the Annual Meeting of Muslimat on 3 April 1997, there were palpable tensions between PPP 
leaders and Abdul Latif Rahman (an NU leader and Golkar campaigner) as they vigorously debated 
various issues. In an open rebuff, several elder PPP leaders walked out of the session in protest over 
NU's continued commitment to remaining outside of PPP. During my travels in East Java, after the 
1997 general election campaign, the hostility between PPP/PDI supporters within NU, on the one hand, 
and Golkar supporters within NU, on the other, was obvious. NU had become deeply divided by this 
campaign. T conducted a series of interviews and meetings (referred to elsewhere in the thesis) during 
my travels in East Java, 4 August 1997 to 13 August 1997. 
sz Interview with Musytari, 10 August 1997. Chapter four showed that the MI faction dominated 
PPP after 1984. 
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and continued to launch attacks against the NU Chairman. Most of the NU leaders 
who joined ICMI were opponents of the NU Chairman. The deterioration of Suharto- 
Abdurrahman relations during the 1990s strengthened the hand of rival factions 
within NU that wished to see Abdurrahman replaced as NU's chairman.54 Prominent 
among his adversaries in NU, who joined ICMI, were Ali Yafie, Fahmi Saifuddin 
(assistant to the Minister of Public Health), Slamet Effendi Yusuf (former leader of 
the NU's Ansor Youth Movement), Yusuf Hasyim (Abdurrahman's uncle), and 
Chalid Mawardi (also Chairman of MDI- Golkar). Ali Yafie and Chalid Mawardi were 
members of the defeated Cipete group 55 This group was prominent among rival 
contenders for NU's leadership mantle at the NU's 28th Congress at Krapyak, 
Yogyakarta in November 1989. 
One example of rifts in NU was the growing antagonism between Abdurrahman 
and Ali Yafie. At the Krapyak congress, Ali was elected to the post of Deputy Rais 
Aam and had his sights on becoming NU's next Rais Aam.56 After the incumbent, 
Achmad Siddiq, had passed away in 1990, Abdurrahman thwarted Ali's efforts to 
become Rais Aam. Abdurrahman thought that Suharto was behind Ali's bid for the 
senior post.57 The national magazine, Tempo, reported that (it was said) Ali spent too 
much time in MUI to be able to assume NU's top post.58 After having his career path 
blocked in NU, Ali channeled much of his activities through MUI and ICMI. He 
Ss The Muslim modernist category includes organisations like Muhammadiyah, Persis, and other 
modernist organisations that belonged to the Muslimin Indonesia (MI) faction of PPP. 
54 . For reasons behind the deteriorating Suharto- Abdurrahman relations see Fealy "The 1994 NU 
Congress and Aftermath," p.266. 
Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi -relasi Kuasa, Pencanan Wancana Baru, Yogyakarta, 
LkiS, 1994, pp.115 -140. 
56 Idham Chalid's Cipete faction competed for NU's top posts. Idham was put forward as a 
counter -candidate to Siddiq, Ali became the deputy president, and Chalid Mawardi, after contesting the 
chairmanship, was made one of the five deputy chairman of NU. Abdurrahman shrugged off the 
challenge by managing to have his favoured candidates maintain control of NU. van Bruinessen, "The 
28`h Congress of the Nandlatul Ulama," pp.140,143 -4, 154. 
57 . Information based on interview of Abdurrahman Wahid by Greg Fealy, early December 1991. 
58 . "Tersandung Musibah Bernomor 901," Tempo, 16 November 1991. 
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resigned from NU in January 1992 in protest over the alleged involvement of 
Abdurrahman and NU' s Secretary General in a national lottery scandal.59 Ali was 
clearly dissatisfied with Abdurrahman's leadership of NU and was a pro -Suharto 
figure, who had become co -opted into the system.C° In the mid- 1990s, he campaigned 
for the idea that NU's and Muhammadiyah's constituencies should he unified under 
the umbrella of ICMI and MUI. Ali's proposal stood in direct contrast to 
Abdurrahman's view that the NU constituency should remain entirely independent 
from state interference or from membership of corporatist organisations. We could 
take Ali's campaign on behalf of MUT and ICMI as one of his, perhaps state -backed, 
attempts to erode Abdurrahman's hold of the NU constituency as well as promotion 
of his own leadership ambitions.61 Ali became Head of ICMI's Council of Advisers in 
1995 and General Chairman of MUI in 1998. 
i. Cipasung Congress and post- Congress developments 
Suharto was determined to remove Abdurrahman from the leadership of NU 
and replace him with a more pliable figure. He did this to secure his own unanimous 
endorsement for re- election as president in 1998, and Abdurrahman had refused to 
w It was alleged that Abdurrahman and the Secretary General had signed a letter requesting fifty 
million rupiah of funding from the managing board of the state -run national lottery, SDSB. SDSB was 
already embroiled in a nationwide controversy, as Muslim student demonstrators were demanding that 
the national lottery he discontinued for reasons that it constituted gambling and Islam prohibited 
gambling. Yafie assumed the moral high -ground on the issue by announcing his own resignation from 
NU hinting that he would only return to the NU after those responsible for requesting SDSB funding 
resign their offices. Amidst calls from several NU branches for the persons responsible to be removed 
from their posts, NU's Secretary General took the rap for Ahdurrahman and tendered his resignation. 
"Jangan Main Advokat- advokatan," Tempo, 16 November 1991. 
w Ali Yafie joined other NU leaders, who gave "unanimous pledges" of support for Suharto's 
presidency. 
et Ali was among the NU kiai who had his allegiances split between his home constituency and 
state interests represented by Suharto's regime, as he became associated with pro- Suharto standpoints 
and was duly rewarded for it. Through his membership of ICMI and MUI, he provided religious 
legitimacy to Suharto's regime on public ceremonial occasions, as did the NU President Ilyas Ruchìyat, 
especially at prayer meetings held at Istiqlal Mosque. Interview with Ali Yafie, 5 February 1994; "Ali 
Yafie: Di Sarang Muhammadiyah," Panji Masyarakat, 1 -10 January 1994, p.12; "Susunan Pengurus 
ICMI Memasuki Abad 21," Republika Online, 10 December 1995. 
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give this endorsement. Suharto responded by bringing ICMI, Golkar, and other state 
interests behind his campaign to unseat Abdurrahman and replace him with a state - 
backed candidate. These efforts coincided with initiatives by ICMI, MUI, and Golkar 
to penetrate pesantren and mobilise support (discussed above). This was a period of 
growing political competition, intra -elite rivalry, and mounting speculation about 
presidential succession -all of which contributed to the politicisation of state and 
society.62 
The campaign to upset Abdurrahman's chairmanship was underway at the 
NU's 29t11 Congress in Cipasung, West Java, in December 1994. The Army Chief -of- 
Staff for Social -Political Affairs, Gen. Hartono (a Golkar and ICMI partisan), the 
ICMI Chairman Habibie, the Chairman of Golkar Harmoko, the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, and Suharto's daughter Siti Rukmana (deputy chair of the Golkar board) were 
some of the senior state officials who backed Abdurrahman's rivals for the 
chairmanship. Fahmi Saifuddin, Chalid Mawardi and the wealthy businessman, Abu 
Hasan (the latter two being former members of the Cipete faction), were the most 
credible pro -government candidates put forward against Abdurrahman's re- 
nomination in a race that deeply polarised the NU constituency.63 
In a determined campaign to unseat Abdurrahman, state officials and segments 
of the armed forces combined the offer of inducements to, and intimidation against, 
NU members at the congress in order to garner a vote against the incumbent. Despite 
the concerted efforts to unseat him, Abdurrahman survived the attempt by winning re- 
election to the NU chairmanship by a slim margin (174 votes to 142) against Abu 
62 
. This issue is considered further in the following chapters. 
63 Meanwhile, the Minister of Defence Edi Sudrajat (who Suharto replaced as Commander-in- 
Chief of ABRI in 1993 with Feisal Tanjung), Murdiono, and other Habibie rivals within the military, 
backed Abdurrahman's renomination to the NU chairmanship. Fealy, "The I994 NU Congress and 
Aftermath," pp.261 -4; Gaffar, "Indonesia 1995: Setting the Tone for Transition," p.57; ' Politik Di 
Batik Bocomya Dokumen," Ummat. 
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Hasan, the strongest alternative candidate. A rival NU hoard was set up under Abu 
Ilasan's leadership, but the board failed to gain sufficient grassroots support within 
NU to enable it to present a serious challenge to Abdurrahman's chairmanship.64 
Throughout much of 1995, Abdurrahman's other major rivals, his two uncles 
Yusuf Hasyim and Shohib Bisri, led an anti -Abdurrahman campaign. Meanwhile, 
pro -Suharto forces -General Feisal Tanjung, Gen. Hartono, Habibìe, and Siti 
Rukmana -regularly visited NU's pesantren constituency and dispensed patronage in 
the form of financial and material rewards to Abdurrahman's main rivals. Greg Fealy 
accurately depicted the congress and post- congress events as "an internal battle for 
control of the N1T'.65 It was in the post -congress fallout of the mid -1990s that 
Abdurrahman and his supporters, as discussed above, leveled much of their attacks 
against ICMI- linked state interference in the affairs of NU's pesantren and in the 
affairs of the greater Muslim community. It is clear, from the various state -backed 
manoeuvres, that ICMI and Golkar interests were drawn into this intra -elite contest in 
support of efforts by Suharto's circle to topple one of Suharto's, and 1CMI's, most 
outspoken critics, Abdurrahman. 
Icy relations continued between Abdurrahman and Suharto throughout most of 
1996. The NU chairman had fostered close relations with the opposition leader 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of the erstwhile President Sukarno who had 
been ousted from power by Suharto). He indicated that Nil might throw its support 
behind PDI at the 1997 general election, and this prospect greatly threatened the usual 
64 . During the congress, Abdurrahman's camp complained of biased reporting in the media, 
particularly by the ICMI- funded newspaper, the Republika, which they claimed had misquoted 
statements about the chairman's chances of re- election and then refused to publish a correction whilst 
the congress was still in train. Fealy, "The 1994 Congress," pp.264, 268, 273. 
es Fealy, "The 1994 Congress," pp.274 -6. 
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orchestrated endorsement of Suharto for the . presidency.66 After Megawati's 
government- backed ouster as PDI General Chairperson on 27 July, which sparked a 
riot in Jakarta, Abdurrahman, together with two retired generals and outspoken critics 
of Suharto, signed a "petition of concern" about the direction of Indonesian politics.67 
During the year, there occurred a series of incidents in Java, in which Muslim 
rioters went on a destructive rampage looting and burning churches in Surabaya 
(June) and Situbondo (October), in East Java, and Tasikmalaya (December) in West 
Java. Many NU leaders, and Christian leaders, suspected that the church burning was 
part of Suharto's attempts to undermine Abdurrahman's leadership of NU.6R The 
regions where the destruction occurred were major areas of NU and PPP support, and 
therefore at risk of giving the public impression that the NU constituency was an 
organisation of religiously intolerant fanatics. Abdurrahman had hitherto based much 
of his reputation on his image as a man of moderation that led a community of 
measured tolerance. Proving that he was unable to control his own community would 
potentially undermine his credibility as both a national leader and as the NU's 
66 From 1992 onwards, Suharto had become increasingly concerned about the growing popularity 
of PDI and the potential electoral threat it posed. Since then, he had intensified his efforts to expand 
Golkar's support base and create a Muslim counter o the nationalist -oriented PDI. 
67 . Meanwhile, ICMI independents joined the chorus of voices that praised the Suharto 
government's handling of events and condemned the "forces of anarchy" as it cracked down on pro - 
Megawati forces. 
68 
. Victims of the church burning -Pastors, priests and their families -and eyewitnesses pointed to 
the organised manner in which militant and tatooed thugs systematically tore down churches. Some of 
the mobs were brought in by trucks from outlying regions. Many suspected that the military had a hand 
in organising the mobs for attacks on churches. Both NU and Christian leaders in Surabaya accused 
Lt. -Gen. Hartono of orchestrating the violence. According to the anecdotal accounts, then, these were 
not simply spontaneous outbursts of outraged Muslim mobs seeking revenge on a rival religious 
community. Interviews with Fathor Rasjid (NU member, Situbondo Branch), 4 August 1997; Hasyim 
Muzadi, 5 August 1997; K.H. Cholil As'ad (a pesantren leader in Situbondo), 4 August 1997; Hanafi 
Maslim (civil servant and NU member), 6 August 1997; Musytari, 10 August 1997; Pendeta Ismai 
Sinlay (Bethel Church of Indonesia, Sidutopo, Surabaya), 13 August 1997; Pendeta Hendrik Tulangow 
(Alfa Omega Pentecostal Church), 13 August 1997; Prof. Dr. J.E. Sahetapy (Spokesperson for the 
Indonesian Council of Churches, POI), 14 August 1997; Thomas Santoso (Sociologist and Christian 
spokesperson, Surabaya), 11 August 1997; Dr. Paul Tahelele (heart surgeon, personal physician to 
Abdurrahman Wahid, and Christian spokesperson), 22 July 1997. 
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Chairman.69 Several local pesantren leaders and PPP supporters in East Java districts 
also believed that Suharto was instigating a campaign to discredit PPP before the 
general election.70 Placed in a tight spot, Abdurrahman eventually pointed the finger 
of blame at a regime- backed plot that (to the incredulity of many observers) he 
claimed was orchestrated by ICMI to destabilise and discredit NU. 
ii. Escalation of Abdurrahman -ICMI conflict 
The analysis next considers that a besieged Abdurrahman continued to 
perceive ICMI as NU's main rival organisation, as he sought to secure his leadership 
of NU from Suharto's heavy- handed interventions. He moved from a position of open 
opposition to Suharto, to a position of conciliation with the regime -all the time 
seeking to place himself and NU in a stronger bargaining position relative to ICMI in 
infra -elite power struggles. Abdurrahman's perception of ICMI as a political threat 
was largely in response to Suharto's divide- and -rule tactics, whereby the President 
had harnessed incorporated Muslim interests (in Golkar and ICMI) to his own partisan 
interests before elections. NU under Abdurrahman's leadership had been greatly 
disadvantaged by the state -Islamic accommodation, and Habibie, the pro- Golkar /pro- 
ICMI generals, and Suharto's daughter had joined efforts to topple the NU Chairman. 
Thus, a culmination of episodes in 1996 spilled over into conflict between 
Abdurrahman and ICMI. In particular, the NU Chairman and ICMI's Secretary 
General, Adi Sasono, exchanged harsh words as the former tried to implicate the later 
e9 
" Faktor & Kesaksian Tragedi Situbondo," Tim Pencari Fakta, GP Ansor iatim, (the report was 
undated) pp.52, 55; "Gus Dur vs `The Green Dragon "' The Jakarta Past, 22 February 1997. 
° . A number of NU leaders and sympathisers in Situbondo (East Java) told of how the Regent and 
ABRI, on various occasions, used heavy- handed tactics against PPP supporters before the spate of 
church burning and then tried to blame PPP supporters for the destruction. Interviews with Cholil 
As'ad, 4 August 1997; Fathor Rasjid, 4 August 1997; A lawyer representing clients who were accused 
by ABRI of instigating the church burnings in Situbondo (he wishes to remain anonymous), 4 August 
1997; Several self- confessed rioters (who wished to remain anonymous), 4 August 1997. 
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in Suharto's (alleged) plot to discredit NU. Abdurrahman startled the Indonesian 
public by announcing that two state -backed operations had been mounted, a "Red 
Dragon" operation to undermine Megawati Sukarnoputri's leadership of PDI 
(discussed in chapter eight) and a "Green Dragon" operation to discredit his own 
chairmanship of NU. The following discussion is concerned with the so- called "Green 
Dragon" operation, inasmuch as it throws light on the Abdurrahman -ICMI conflict. 
Abdurrahman raised the spectre of a Green Dragon operation in response to 
the spate of church burning. He sought to convince his NU members and Christian 
groups that the burning had been orchestrated in order to undermine his chairmanship 
of NU before the elections. In January 1997, he went further and accused a foundation 
called Humanika (the Community Association for Humanity and Justice), the ICMI 
think -tank CIDES, and Adi Sasono of being the main actors behind the Green Dragon 
operation to destabilise and discredit NUM He left open to speculation the possibility 
that Green Dragon also referred to the so- called "Green" or Muslim generals (Feisal 
Tanjung and Hartono).72 
He claimed that Humanika had funded the Tasikmalaya riot. He identified 
Bursyah Zarnubi (a Humanika leader) and Eggy Sudjana (a staff member of the ICMI 
think -tank CIDES chaired by Adi Sasono) as two key figures behind the riot.73 The 
NU' s Ansor Youth Movement produced a "white book," which claimed that Hadi 
Mustofa (a member of the Republika staff), accompanied by four ICMI figures had 
. The following interviews were held in Surabaya, the industrial capital of East Java, unless 
otherwise stated: Abdurrahman, 24 October 1996 (in Jakarta) and 1 August 1997 (in Surabaya); Dr. JE 
Sahetapy, 14 August 1997; Romo Beny (a prominent Catholic leader from Situbondo), 3 August 1997; 
Dr. Paul Tahalele, 27 July and 3 August 1997; Santoso, 11 August 1997; "Abdurrahman Wahid: 'Naga 
Hijau Mendiskreditkan NU "' Forum Keadilan, No.22, 10 Febuary 1997; "Gus Dur vs `The Green 
Dragon "' The Jakarta Post; "KH. Ilyas Ruchiyat: Kita Hams Mengoreksi Diri," Adil, 19 -25 February 
1997; "Konspirasi Naga Hijau di Buku Putih," Forum Keadilan, 10 February 1997. 
72 . Interview with Abdurrahman, 30 July 1997. 
73 . Bursyah and Eggi were underlings of Adi, and Abdurrahman accused Adi of being a founding 
member of the Humanika. 
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also financed the activities of NU members to organise the riot in Situbondo.74 
Abdurrahman's statements and the findings of the "white book" were received with 
widespread disbelief. The significance of Abdurrahman's allegations, however, was 
not so much the accuracy of his version of events. It was more to do with the reality 
that, between 1994 and 1996, Suharto's attempts to undermine his leadership of NU 
had pushed him into a threatened position. With his political survival endangered, 
Abdurrahman and his supporters identified their main rival, ICMI, as the culprit 
behind anti -NU actions.75 
An angered Adi Sasono immediately refuted the allegations. He insisted that 
Abdurrahman had wrongly accused him of being a founder of the Humanika.76 He 
then launched an attack against his accuser by counter -claiming that 
Abdurrahman is the only source of accusation...lt is comical that anyone 
would want to discredit Gus Dur through unrest. If his objective was to 
discredit me or ICMI in Suharto's eyes, we know that he did not succeed. 
Meanwhile, he wants to get close to Suharto [but] he cannot...He still 
remains [locked] outside the mainstream.77 
74 . The white book alleged that "AR ", "AS" an "LH" (people widely interpreted the initials as 
standing for Amien Rais, Adi Sasono and Lukman Harun), and other ICMI leaders were involved in a 
conspiracy to undermine NU. 
7s "Ketika Gus Dur Terpeleset," Paron, 8 February 1997; ` Setelah Humanika Mengadu ke Polisi," 
Ummat, 17 Febuary 1997; "Kiprah Baru Si Abang," Sinar, 22 February 1997; "Mencari Aktor, 
Menuduh Dalang," Forum Keadilan; "Konspirasi Naga Hijau di Buku Putih," Forum Keadilan; 
"Faktor & Kesaksian." 
76 He was instead, he insisted, a founding member of the Humaika (the Community Association 
for Humanity), which was responsible for the rehabilitation of imprisoned communists, had ceased its 
activities in the late- 1980s, and had no connection with the Humanika. Abdurrahman, it appears, had 
confused Humanika with Humaika, which had the effect of discrediting his own allegations. "Setelah 
Humanika Mengadu Ke Polisi," Ummat; "Bursah Zarnubi: Saya Terpukul dengan Tudingan Gus Dur," 
Ummat, 17 Febuary 1997. 
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iii. Probolinggo: Reconciliation between NU and Suharto? 
Before making allegations against ICMI, the NU Chairman had begun in late 
1996 to make conciliatory gestures to Suharto's regime and tried to distance himself 
from Megawati. The convening of the NU -RMI's fifth national meeting in 
Probolinggo, East Java, on 13 November 1996 was the first public indication that 
reconciliation between Suharto and Abdurrahman was under way. The front covers of 
the national press were plastered with pictures of the Indonesian President and the NU 
chairman shaking hands as they attended the national meeting in Probolinggo, East 
Java. Shortly afterwards in Situbondo, Abdurrahman met and warmly shook hands 
with his sworn rival, Gen. Hartono, who had earlier tried to topple him at the 1994 
Congress. NU members expressed a mixture of jubilation and relief at the prospect of 
better NU- Suharto relations in the future. Some of Abdurrahman's rivals in NU and 
ICMI responded with scepticism, contending that the Probolinggo handshake was, in 
itself, a meaningless piece of publicity that did not mean Abdurrahman would gain 
greater access to power.78 
At the national meeting, Abdurrahman declared that NU did not object to 
Suharto being re- nominated as President in 1998. His announcement was an about - 
face on his earlier position adopted since the NU's mass rally in 1992, when he had 
refused to endorse the President's re- nomination at the 1993 election.79 The fact is 
"Adi Sasono: `Kok Gus Dur Sibuk Membuat PembeIaan," Forum Keaditan. 
78 . "Gus Dur dari Luar dan Dalam," Ummat; "Gus Dur sakit, terancam diadili," Swadesi, 18 -24 
Febuary 1997; Muh AS Hikam, "Jabat Tangan dari Probolinggo," Ummat, 25 November 1996; 
"Harapan Pasca- Salaman," Ummat; "Menanti Jabat Tangan Gus Dur -ICMI," Ummat; "Menanti Jodoh 
Habibie 
-Gus Dur," Ummat, 23 December 1996; "Kasad: Cairnya Perseteruan Itu," Gatra, 23 
November 1996. 
79. On 1 March 1992, Abdurrahman held a mass rally (Rapat Akbar) at the Senayan Sports Stadium 
in Jakarta in order to demonstrate to Suharto and his adversaries that he still had unquestionable 
authority as an independent popular leader over his millions -strong NU constituency. He had hoped 
that as many as two million people would attend the rally but only about 150,000 to 200,000 came, 
many others being obstructed from entering the city by the military's security forces. At the rally for 
commemorating NU's anniversary, Wahid reasserted the organisation's loyalty to the Pancasila. 
However, he refused to follow suit with the Muhammadiyah and other organisations by withholding his 
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that the State Secretary, Murdiono, together with the President and Secretary General 
of the RMI, Aziz Masyhuri and Ali Ilaidar, prevailed upon Abdurrahman to attend the 
RMI against the NU Chairman's wishes.80 Abdurrahman was not a willing participant 
in the reconciliation between Suharto and NU. Nonetheless, Abdurrahman offered his 
own explanation of what the rapprochement meant. He insisted that Suharto had 
finally realised that politics could no longer be dominated by ICMI, especially by a 
"militant group" (the Muslim intelligentsia) within ICMI, which had "falsely 
claimed" to represent the Muslim majority. By excluding the largest Muslim group 
(NU) and minority groups from political life, he continued, Suharto had become 
aware that he risked alienating a major support base for his own power. Suharto 
therefore made "a correction" by recognising that "the NU could also represent 
Islam. "81 There was an element of truth to Abdurrahman's statement insofar as 
Suharto realised he needed NU's support if he was to receive unanimous endorsement 
at the MPR. The fact is that Abdurrahman had also identified the central role played 
by Suharto of alternately incorporating (ICMI) and excluding (mostly NU) Muslim 
interests.82 
As was the case with the RMI held in Jakarta in 1994, Habibie and the ICMI 
intelligentsia saw the 1996 national meeting of pesantren at Probolinggo as a chance 
to promote their own interests amidst speculation that Habibie was being groomed for 
the vice- presidency. Habibie introduced Adi Sasono, the Chief Editor of the 
public support for Suharto's next five -year term in office. According to Ramage from late 1991 to 
early 1992, NU had come under considerable pressure to endorse Suharto for another term, and the Ni 1 
chairman's refusal to do so must have come as a major public rebuff to Suharto that deserved some 
kind of retaliation. "Nggak Usah Dukung -dukungan," Tempo, 4 April 1992; Douglas E. Ramage, 
Politics in Indonesia: democracy, Islam, and the ideology of tolerance, New York, Routledge, 1995. 
e0 . Wahid first refused to attend the RMI meeting and insisted he was travelling to Germany, but 
Moerdiono warned him not to go. Information drawn from confidential interviews with RMI leaders 
done by Greg Fealy, April 1997. 
ai 
. "Wong, Saya Enggak Pernah Berubah," D &R. 
87 . "KH Abdurrahman Wahid: `PBNU Tidak Berharap Banyak," Ummat; ' Politik Kemaslahatan 
NIl," Ummat. 
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Republika, Parni Hadi, and Slamet Effendi Yusuf to a packed crowd. He asked the 
Lai and ulama to open the door of pesantren "as wide as possible for the ICMI so that 
it could help bring in appropriate technology to assist the surrounding community ".33 
Habibie donated 50 million rupiah to the RMTs activities. The ICMI members from 
the NU, Salaluddin Wahid ( Abdurrahman's younger brother), Mohammad Thohir, 
and Slamet Effendi Yusuf regarded the Probolinggo meeting as an opportunity to 
bring about a reconciliation between Habibie and the NU Chairman, and they formed 
a "small team" to pursue their objective.84 
Mohammad Tohir was behind an initiative to convene a meeting between the 
ICMI Chairman and the NU Chairman. Abdurrahman replied to the initiative, 
suggesting that he had no objections to the idea, providing that Habibie promised to 
announce at the meeting's close that ICMI would "no longer dominate political 
power ". Later that month, at ICMI's national work meeting, Habibie reacted to 
Abdurrahman's comments by declaring that he could see no reason to meet with the 
NU Chairman. Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo repeated Habibie's disclaimer, with 
Dawam calling the NU chairman "a very arrogant man ".85 
It appeared, after all, that fences could not be mended between ICMI and 
Abdurrahman. His bad relations with Habibie, however, did not prevent him from 
trying to win Suharto's approval. The NU Chairman escorted Suharto's daughter, Siti 
Rukmana (the leader of Golkar's campaign in East and Central Java), on a tour of 
pesantren and made public statements endorsing her credentials as a national leader. 
On 20 January 1997, he declared that it was all right if Siti Rukmana won NU over to 
as 
. "Muskernas RMI Ke -5 di Probolinggo: BJ Habibie Ditanya tentang Kesiapan Jadi Wahl 
Presiden," Kompas, 4 November 1996; " Spekulasi Isu Wapres darf Genggong," Ummat, 25 November 
1996; ` Presiden Soeharto: Pesantren jangan Menutup Diri," Republika, 3 November 1996; "Menag: 
Para Ulama Tak Boleh Berhenti Pada Pendekatan Legal," Suara Pembaruan, 5 November 1996. 
84 "Ir Salahuddin Wahid: Lupakan Khilafiyah Politik," Umcoat; "Spekulasi Isu Wapres darf 
Genggong," Ummat. 
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Golkar.86 It appears that Suharto had tried to establish his daughter's strong presence 
in the PDT and NU/PPP strongholds. The Suharto government, keen to gain 
substantial rural votes for its Golkar campaign, promised to funnel large funds into the 
NU's traditional support base -the pesantren. In this context, the Minister of Religion 
arranged a meeting between Abdurrahman's sister, the Chairperson of NU- Muslimat 
and Golkar member, Aisyah Baidlowi, and Siti Rukmana at which Suharto's daughter 
contributed funds for the construction of the Muslimat's new headquarters.87 
In other signs of rapprochement, in mid -February it was reported that 
Abdurrahman would escort the Minister of Transmigration and Golkar campaigner, 
Siswono Yudohusodo, on a tour of pesantren in West Nusa Tenggara. And later that 
month, he visited his political rival within NU, Abu Hasan, invited him on a trip to 
honour the graves of the NU's founders in Surabaya and Jombang, and eased 
(momentarily) the greatest split that NU had experienced in decades.R8 By early 1997, 
Abdurrahman appeared to have overcome Suharto- backed attempts during and after 
the NU's 1994 congress to unseat him -attempts that had also involved Hartono, 
Habibie and Siti Rukmana. By the same token, he had kept Habibie off -side, and had 
made attempts to manoeuvre himself and his NU constituency into a stronger 
as "Menanti Jodoh Habibie -Gus Dur," Ummat. 
36 "Gendang Politik Mulai Bertalu, Manuver pun Marak," Forum Keadilan, 10 Febuary 1997. 
87 _ Aisyah pointed out that "at election times, Golkar had immense funding to dispense. Muslimat 
saw the general elections as an opportunity to get funding." Interview with Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, 11 
March 1997; The Secretary General of Muslimat, Susy Witiajar, held a quite different attitude to the 
latest events. She said "the Muslimat members were angry over Siti Rukmana's sponsorship of the 
organisation. The price of receiving funding for the building was greater than the actual benefit. I wrote 
to the Muslimat branches that Siti's funding did not tie NU's constituency to choosing Golkar at the 
election." Interview with Susy Witiajar, 4 April 1997; Other sources: "Gus Dur: Muslihat Kecil Sang 
Cucu," Sinar, 22 Febuary 1997; "Abdurrahman Wahid: 'Saya Ingin Membantu Terciptanya Stabilitas," 
Forum Keadilan, 10 March 1997; "Harapan Pasca- Salaman," Ummat; "Meneari Aliansi Politik Baru," 
Ummat, 17 Febuary 1997; "Gendang Politik Mulai Bertalu, Manuver pun Marak," Forum Keadilan; 
"Gus Dur sakit, terancam diadili," Swadesì. 
88 
. `Gus Dur -Abo Hasan akan ziarah bareng," Poskota, 24 Febuary 1997; "Setelah berseberangan 
sejak Muktamar Cipasung: Gus Dur -Abu Hasan berangkulan," Poskota, 22 February 1997; "Gus Dur 
akan boyong Siswono," Harlan Terbit, 12 February 1997. 
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bargaining position with Suharto's circle whilst seeking to diminish the influence of 
the Muslim interests in ICMI. 
Before the Suharto -Abdurrahman rapprochement the NU Chairman had 
mostly defended NU's independence from state encroachments involving Golkar and 
ICMI. However, as Abdurrhaman reconciled with Suharto, he correspondingly 
changed his attitude to Golkar's and ICMI' s forays into pesantren. He said that 
There is no resistance by the pesantren to government efforts to develop 
the pesantren. ICMI expects us to participate [in these efforts] -it need not 
cause a reaction from NU. Also, the local pesantren leaders should not be 
confined to following the policy of PBNU [NU's Central Board]. If they 
choose to join Golkar and work with the government, that is their 
business.89 
The NU Chairman had obviously overstated things when he claimed that there 
was no resistance by pesantren to government incursions. However, he was careful to 
explain that NU was not a monolithic organisation and "there was no fixed pattern of 
relations between NU and the government. "90 
Colleagues of Abdurrahman and NU's membership responded to his apparent 
reconciliation with Suharto and support for Siti Rukmana's Golkar campaign with a 
mixture of concern, bewilderment and betrayal. There were sympathisers and 
supporters who defended his actions.91 For example, at a meeting of P3M (an NU- 
linked NGO), one speaker maintained that Abdurrahman 
s9 
. Interview with Abdurrahman, 24 October 1996. 
90 Interview with Abdurrahman, 24 October 1996. 
9' . Long-term loyal supporters of Abdurrahman expressed their ambivalence over his 
accommodation with Suharto. They said, to paraphrase, we do not really understand what you are 
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has only got close to the government and Suharto to protect NU [from 
state interventions]. Besides, NU must have access to the centre of power. 
You cannot achieve anything for your community if you do not have 
access to the power brokers. 
However, the speaker also noted 
NU already has its long established pockets of political culture and will not 
be greatly affected by what Abdurrahman does or who he invites to NU, or 
who he takes around the pesantren circuit.92 
Not surprisingly, NU's PPP supporters were outraged. The Secretary General 
of Muslimat and PPP supporter, Susy Witiajar, claimed that Abdurrahman had lost a 
lot of credibility at the grassroots. "The Muslimat members [from PPP], in particular, 
are highly critical of his accommodation with Siti Rukmana and Golkar. It is very 
clear that Abdurrahman moved close to Golkar in order to protect his own leadership 
position. "93 The leader of P3M and liberal scholar, Masdar Mas'udi said, "the 
youthful supporters of Abdurrahman feel betrayed by his accommodation with the 
state. They were brought up on his ideas of democracy and democratic struggle, then 
doing, but we trust that there is some logic to it and that it will be in the best interests of NU. Informal 
discussion called "Menemukan `Jangkar' Mutakhir Gus -Dur," at the office of P3M, 11 April 1997. 
oz 
. Discussion at P3M, 11 April 1997. The speaker's name was Ismed Natsir. Ismed was neither a 
formal P3M nor NU member, but he expressed a viewpoint held by others at the discussion. 
9s 
. Interview with Susy Witiajar, 4 April 1997. 
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they witness his actions that contradict the kind of democratic behaviour that they 
were taught by Abdurrahman to believe in. "94 
In summary, in the context of intra -elite power struggles, the NU Chairman 
manoeuvred himself and NU between a difficult position of opposition to Suharto, 
maintaining NU's independence from state arrangements, and securing NU from 
heavy state interventions. He was faced with the problem of how to respond to threats 
and pressures from the state to support Suharto and Golkar, whilst trying to maintain 
the integrity of NU's independence. However, Abdurrahman did not always act alone 
in negotiating a narrow gorge between the available choices. He also responded to 
pressures within NU. On the one hand, we considered how NU's RMI leaders and 
Murdiono pressured Abdurrahman into conciliation with Suharto. For a period, 
Abdurrahman even seemed to embrace accommodation with Suharto by taking 
Golkar leaders on a political tour of the pesantren. 
On the other hand, there were counter -pressures in NU to remain independent 
from Suharto and to oppose Golkar's and ICMI's incursions into pesantren. NU was 
such a large and heterogeneous organisation with different, sometimes opposing, 
political orientations. Under these conditions, it would have been difficult for 
Abdurrahman to maintain a consistent standpoint and still represent all of the 
concerns of the organisation. When he caved -in to pressure to reconcile with Suharto 
he faced the reprobation of pro- democracy elements in NU and defenders of NU's 
independence. 
94 . Discussion at P3M, 11 April 1997. It is important to note that Masdar had been one of 
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5. Conclusion 
The conflicts in NU were partly a product of Suharto's corporatist strategies, 
which affected the different issues and pressures in NU and influenced the standpoints 
adopted by Abdurrahman. Suharto tried to bring as much as possible of Muslim 
interests behind Golkar so that he could achieve unanimous endorsement at the 
presidential election. He attempted this through strategies of corporatist capture, using 
organisations like ICMI, MUI, and Golkar to penetrate pesantren and garner support. 
Corporatist capture served to fragment interests, to reinforce pre- existing cleavages, 
and to create new ones, in NU. Suharto's initiatives to neutralise NTJ's influence in 
PPP after 1984 had a similar outcome of reinforcing and creating divisions between 
members in NU who backed PPP and those who supported Golkar. One purpose of 
the fragmentation strategy appeared to be to weaken oppositional tendencies so that 
interests could be marshalled more easily behind Golkar and Suharto. 
Abdurrahman and other liberal- minded NU intellectuals largely resisted the 
incorporation of NU in state structures because of their commitment to developing 
NU as a civil society and strengthening the economic self -reliance of NU's rural 
constituency. Abdurrahman did not oppose the idea of making accommodations with 
the state provided the outcome would be to strengthen society vis -à -vis the state. 
What he claimed to oppose was the co- optation of Muslims into state structures 
which, he argued, strengthened the state bureaucracy, weakened community 
initiatives, and prevented the political participation of most Indonesians. NU 
intellectuals articulated the democracy discourse in context of the limited political 
opening of the late -to -mid 1990s and the growing competition between rival state 
interests and rival organisations and interests in society (see chapter eight). 
Abdurrahman's close supporters and disciples. 
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Rival interests became increasingly politicised in anticipation of a presidential 
succession. Politics appeared to be moving beyond corporatist containment of 
interests as Suharto brought incorporated groups behind his presidency and played 
interests off against one another. Suharto harnessed state actors, including Golkar and 
ICMI leaders, to his efforts to remove Abdurrahman from the chairmanship of NU. 
However, these efforts failed to displace the NU chairman, and constituted a 
significant defeat for state interventions in the leadership choices of major social and 
political organisations. State interventions also had failed to prevent Megawati from 
becoming general chairperson of PDI (see chapter eight for more on this topic.) 
The regime then changed tactics and began to court Abdurrahman for 
Suharto's renomination to the presidency. Suharto successfully distanced the NU 
Chairman from Megawati and brought him behind Siti Rukmana's campaign for 
Golkar. Despite this success, attempts to bring about reconciliation between 
Abdurrahman and Habibie (ICMI) failed. Abdurrahman continued to see ICMI as a 
main rival constituency. His rivalry with ICMI was based, partly, on his determination 
to defend NU's independence from state interventions. The rift was also due to 
Suharto's corporatist strategy. At the very least, the founding of ICMI served to drive 
a deeper wedge between rival interests and communities, especially as 
Abdurrahman's opponents in NU moved over to membership of ICMI and joined the 
modernists in support of Suharto. The divide and rule tactics pursued by Suharto seem 
to have provided much of the framework of Abdurrahman's retaliations and 
reconciliation, as the NU Chairman sought to bring NU into a better bargaining 
position with state power and to displace the political influence of Habibie's ICMI. 
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Chapter 7 
Intra -elite rivalry: Incorporated Islam (ICMI) in conflict 
with ABRI 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the second theme in the thesis regarding how the 
corporatisation of Islam influenced wider relations between Muslim and other state 
and societal interests. The analysis moves beyond Suharto's strategies to contain 
associational pluralism and considers the proposition that the wider incorporation of 
Muslim interests (after two decades of de- politicisation), re- politicised state -Islamic 
ties. Incorporated Muslim interests constituted a potentially organised block in 
competition with other interests for political predominance. Consequently, ICMI 
came into conflict with rival segments of the state, especially with the incumbent 
military leadership which was threatened with the loss of its previously predominant 
position. 
In exploring this proposition, there are important contexts and considerations 
to take into account. First, the state -Islamic rapprochement was the outcome of an 
intra -elite conflict during a deepening succession crisis, as competing interests (both 
state and non -state) positioned themselves to take best advantage of an anticipated 
post- Suharto period. In context of the rivalry, Suharto drew on the support of civilian 
leaders and Muslim middle class interests to offset his reliance on the military in order 
to remain firmly in control of the succession process -assuming he intended one to 
take place. ICMUanti -ICMI conflict, it is argued, therefore was part of larger intra- 
elite power struggles. 
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Second, the rapprochement coincided with a period of limited political 
opening, brought about by the intra -elite conflict. The political opening raised 
people's expectations for further political freedoms and political participation and 
stimulated independent organisational activity within society (as discussed in chapters 
8 -9). Under these circumstances, the state -Islamic rapprochement raised expectations 
among members of the newly incorporated Muslim intelligentsia that they would have 
greater room for manoeuvre to pursue their political agendas and influence 
government policy. In other words, they sought increased political participation, 
through their incorporation, in competition with other group interests. 
Finally, the circumstances surrounding the incorporation of Muslim interests 
raise a number of theoretical questions concerning the nature of Suharto's corporatist 
strategies. For at least two decades political exclusion had been a significant feature of 
corporatist structuring. However, chapter two argued that regimes seeking renewal 
alternate between different policy instruments, with inclusionary mechanisms 
sometimes being employed when exclusionary ones lose efficacy and ruling elites 
decide to incorporate new social groups in support of the regime. Did Suharto's 
sponsorship of ICMI, then, signify a shift in corporatist strategy from an exclusionary 
approach to a selective inclusionary one, as he drew on Muslims as a new support 
base? After all, Suharto was trying to coopt (and counter) growing aspirations of 
middle class Muslims at a time of mounting societal demands for participation. A 
shift to inclusionary strategies would have been one way for the regime to maintain 
corporatist containment of interests whilst being more responsive to societal demands 
(of at least one important constituency). Chapter three, in fact, considered how 
Suharto reorganised Golkar to broaden its base of support by appealing to young 
voters, who were increasingly disaffected with the political system. ICMI appears to 
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have been part of this corporatist reorganisation aimed at regime renewal through 
broadening support. 
Before we turn to the chapter analyses, another theoretical issue requiring 
attention is the proposition that adoption of inclusionary strategies carries inherent 
risks and problems for the regime. Stepan, Bianchi, and Ding have identified these 
risks (see chapter two). One risk is that once corporatism becomes too inclusionary, 
competing interests tend to use their acquired positions in the state structure to 
increase their demands on the state. The interests can extend their influence and veto 
powers over state policy, as well as hijack the policy goals of their intended 
incorporation and supplant them with their own "private" objectives. In this way, the 
growing intrusion and penetration of "external" interests threaten the autonomy of the 
state and its leaders. Incorporated, but by no means coopted, actors can behave like a 
"counter- elite," in Ding's terminology, and can attack the policy goals, power 
relations, and institutional apparatus of the state from within! 
We have seen (chapter five) that some members of ICMi's intelligentsia 
behaved like a "counter -elite" and leveled criticism at Suharto and the institutions of 
authoritarianism. It appears that ICMI might have represented a partial shift to 
inclusionary corporatist strategy but Suharto was determined to neutralise the political 
aspirations of the Muslim intelligentsia within the association. Much of the intent of 
the strategy was therefore exclusionary, as it still sought to suppress independent 
political activity and keep Muslim aspirants outside of power sharing arrangements. 
Another means by which regimes can deal with over -incorporation is to 
maintain a shifting power "asymmetry" of competing interests by periodically 
readjusting which groups the regimes choose to incorporate and exclude. By offering 
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an adjustable range of incentives and disincentives to different groups, regimes can 
play these groups off against one another in divide- and -rule fashion. The significance 
of corporatist interests in a political system, therefore, is how they interact, or are 
made to interact, with other types of represented (or underrepresented) interest 
groups. 
Taking into account the above -mentioned points, the chapter examines the 
interactions between corporatised and other state interests. The analysis considers the 
idea that, in order to preserve his power, Suharto periodically readjusted the balance 
between corporatised civilian interests in Golkar and ICMI and rival interests in the 
state. In short, corporatist organisations served Suharto's strategy of divide -and -rule, 
especially as both ICMI and Golkar were drawn into intra -elite rivalries. 
2. Armed Forces -ICMI rivalry 
The tactical incorporation of middle -class Muslim and civilian interests, with 
which Suharto offset his reliance on military support, brought civilian leaders in 
Golkar and ICMI into tension and conflict with disaffected elements in ABRI. The 
argument is made that, in context of the political opening, the contest between ICMI 
and ABRI, to some extent, was an outcome of the repoliticisation of Islam as Muslim 
leaders sought their re -entry into power structures. 
The military was becoming the clear loser in the contest over the future 
succession of an ageing president, as Suharto surrounded himself with loyalists and 
family members in what was becoming an increasingly personalist regime. Suharto 
progressively promoted to the country's political institutions civilian alternatives to 
military men, as he and the military leadership competed over the choice of candidate 
. X.L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977 -1989, Cambridge, 
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for the vice -presidency in 1988, 1993, and 1998. The chapter will look at how 
political interests of the President and ABRI diverged, as Suharto's support hase 
contracted with the rise of a civilian oligarchy (i.e., privileged families). Suharto 
loyalists and family members were promoted up the military hierarchy and were 
strictly subordinated to Suharto's rule, thereby greatly reducing ABRI' s autonomy. 
Before proceeding further, the analysis distinguishes between those elements 
in ABRI, who had been hurt by the rise of civilian/Muslim interests and were opposed 
to ICMI, and Suharto loyalists and beneficiaries within ABRI, who did not openly 
object to ICMI. Among the military officers most antagonistic towards ICMI were 
those associated with General Benny Murdani (discussed below). Under Benny's 
command the military had established a considerable degree of institutional autonomy 
from the president and now this autonomy was being compromised by the 
reconfiguration of civilian -Muslim interests behind Suharto. Benny, and two 
successive commanders of ABRI, General Try Sutrisno and General Edi Sudrajat, 
belonged to the so- called "nationalist" officers, who were opposed to the 
establishment of linkages between Islam and the state. ABRI elements that did not 
openly oppose ICMI included the so- called "Green" or "Muslim" officers, Suharto 
loyalists, and family members, who were the new beneficiaries of power 
arrangements but had become very subordinate to Suharto's authority. 
The first group of disgruntled military officers particularly disliked civilian 
leaders like the Minister of Technology B.J. Habibie and Golkar Chairmen, 
Sudharmono and Harmoko, because of the role they played in assisting Suharto to 
reduce his reliance on support from the armed forces. First, under Sudharmono's 
leadership, the State Secretariat and Golkar became Suharto's main instrument of 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
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civilian elite recruitment into the country's political institutions and government 
bureaucracy. Then ICMI, under Habibie's chairmanship, assumed the role as one of 
Suharto's chief instruments of civilian recruitment to offset ABRI. It appears that both 
ICMI and Golkar served as instruments for Suharto's wider divide -and -rule strategies, 
as he readjusted a shifting balance of forces in his favour. Consequently, significant 
elements of the military leadership, who had initially opposed Sudharmono's 
leadership of Golkar were hostile to cosy state -Islamic relations and Habibie -ICMI 
interests. 
The chapter also considers that aggravating these tensions was the noticeable 
congruence between the ICMI discourse on de- militarisation of society and Suharto's 
measures to create an acquiescent military leadership subordinate to his authority. 
Reinforcing this hostility towards ICMI was the military's historical prejudice against 
Islamic political agendas, and the tendency of leading members of the ICMI 
intelligentsia to consider the goal of demilitarisation as enhancing the objective of 
Islamising society. Perceptions that Habibie was drawing on Muslim support in ICMI 
in order to advance his political career and interests at the expense of ABRI greatly 
contributed to animosities. The analysis now turns to a fuller treatment of the points 
just raised. 
A) Purging Benny's men 
Beginning as one of Suharto's inner- circle, Gen. Benny Murdani emerged as a 
serious threat to Suharto's hold on power. Benny reached the zenith of his power in 
the years after 1983, when concurrently holding positions of Commander -in -Chief of 
the Armed Forces, Chief of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order 
(Kopkamtìb), with its extensive extra - judicial powers of arrest and detainment,_ and 
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head of the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS). However, signs of conflict between 
Benny and the President had appeared by 1988, especially after Suharto appointed 
Sudharmono as Vice- President against the military leadership's wishes.2 
A number of active -duty leaders (associates of Benny) began to withdraw their 
support from Suharto, following which Suharto courted the Muslim constituency to 
offset their support. The military under Benny's command opposed Sudharmono's 
nomination to the vice -presidency, and Kopkamtib embarked on a campaign to 
discredit Sudharmono's chairmanship of Golkar, by claiming that the ruling party had 
been infiltrated by communists.3 Suharto retaliated and, in September 1988, liquidated 
Kopkamtib and replaced it with the institutionally less independent and more 
"civilianised" Bakorstanas.4 With Sudharmono becoming Vice -President, Suharto 
kicked Benny up- stairs to what was then the less powerful position of Minister of 
Defence and Security. However, Benny turned the Ministry into a major power base 
for himself, retained control over BAIS, and remained an intolerable threat to Suharto. 
Suharto moved to emasculate further the intelligence network loyal to Benny. In 
January 1994, BIAS was renamed the ABRI Intelligence Agency (BIA) and its 
"previous operational independence" under Benny "was curtailed. "5 
Between 1988 and 1993, Suharto took measures to purge his rivals within the 
military from the government's political institutions, including Golkar and cabinet 
2 
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posts (see discussion below), and thereby weaken ABRI's dwi fungsi role. Political 
posts were a major source of military career advancement and patronage and any 
reduction of these threatened ABRI's access to benefits and power. In the face of 
rising public criticism over ABRI's dwi-fungsi, Suharto placed the military's 
extensive role in Indonesia's political institutions squarely on the public agenda. At an 
ABRI leadership meeting in 1990, in the spirit of "political openness," Suharto had 
announced that ABRI should take a backseat role in the nation's affairs and "lead 
people from behind" (tut wuri handayani).6 Although tut wuri handayani had long 
been part of ABRI's doctrine, Suharto's statement had definite political overtones, as 
it coincided with the President's initiatives to give civilians a greater role in the 
nation's political institutions. His pronouncement sparked a broadening public debate 
on the issue, as NGO activists, intellectuals, politicians, and elite dissidents intensified 
their criticisms of ABRI's official doctrines It appears that Suharto was attempting to 
turn "openness" to his advantage by using it as a weapon against ABRI, and the 
public controversy stimulated by his statement fitted in well with such a scenario.9 
Suharto's objective was to subordinate ABRI fully to presidential authority, so that he 
could establish his own firm control over the vice -presidential race and the terms of 
future succession. 
6 . Horma, "The Military and Democratisation," pp. 14 -15. 
. Telephone discussion with Robert Lowry, 10 May 2000. 
& 
. In 1997, ABRI- appointed seats in the 500- member national parliament were reduced from 100 to 
75. In 1998, Hahibie's government reduced ABRI's seats to 55. 
Responding to pressures from Suharto and to public criticism, the military leadership announced 
in 1992 that it would thenceforth pursue a policy of "back to basics." The announcement sparked 
rumours that the armed forces might return to the barracks and withdraw from its dominant role in 
politics. Reinforcing public speculation was a public statement in April 1994 by the Commander -in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung, that he would conduct a review of the military's social - 
political role. The armed forces leadership, however, made it clear that they would review the 
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B) ICMI's agendas 
The purge of Benny's network, the Suharto- military rift, and growing concern 
about the succession issue provided the backdrop to ICMI's rise to prominence in the 
early -to -mid 1990s. These factors, and the prevailing climate of political openness, 
encouraged members of ICMI's intelligentsia to pursue, or at least aspire to, agendas 
for the demilitarisation, democratisation, and Islamisation of society which, in turn, 
provided likely points of tension between the organisation and ABRI. Some members 
of the intelligentsia viewed ICMI as a vehicle for gaining access to the power holders 
and decisional structures so that they might influence the direction of national politics 
in support of their agendas. For example, two ICMI intellectuals, Aswab Mahasin (a 
liberal scholar and NGO leader) and Sucipto Wirosardjono (a former bureaucrat at the 
Bureau of Statistics), thought that ICMI gave Muslims "leverage within the 
government" by building networks of contacts with government officials.10 Sucipto 
averred "using their networks [they can] influence the way the system 
behaves...ICMI's role can be observed from how they influence the changing balance 
of power, but in accordance with what is best for the interests of the Muslim 
community. "11 
Thus, it appears that members of ICMI's intelligentsia might have acted like a 
"counter -elite," in Ding's sense of the term, in that they sought to displace (or at least 
modify) the official goals of ICMI with their own, alternative goals. ICMI's 
"unofficial" agendas not only placed the intelligentsia in tension with ABRI but 
potentially brought them into conflict with Suharto. For example, two outspoken 
formulation but not of the substance of the military's social -political role. Lowy, The Armed Forces, 
p.195. 
10 Interview with Sucipto Wirosarjono, (former government statician and ICMI member), 11 
January 1994; Aswab Mahasin, (ICMI intellectual and NGO activist), 4 February 1994. 
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critics of Suharto, Amien Rais and Sri Bintang Pamungkas- before their removal 
from TCMT tried to bring the succession issue into ICMI's discourse and into 
national discourse. Both figures anticipated that Suharto would be out of office in 
1998.12 However, in line with the regime's stance that ICMI should not make political 
statements of any kind, Habibie ensured that the succession issue remained outside of 
ICMI's formal pronouncements» Despite such caution, ICMI members were 
concerned to gain influence over the terms of future succession, as political 
competition between elite groups was much more in the open than had hitherto been 
the case. Consequently, Adi Sasono, Amien Rais, and Dawam Rahardjo were among 
the ICMI interests backing Habibie in opposition to the military's choice of Try 
Sutrisno for the vice -presidency in anticipation of a future presidential race. Support 
for Habibie's vice -presidential ambitions at a time of intensifying intra -elite 
competition provided an inevitable point of conflict between ABRI leaders and ICMI. 
However, ICMI did not have any public political platform that reflected the 
aspirations of the intelligentsia, and their formal goals consequently lacked clear 
articulation or action programs. 
The following analysis first considers ICMI's "unofficial" agendas and then 
looks at points of ABRI -ICMI tension, including ABRI's objections to the agendas. 
. Interview with Sucipto, II January 1994. 
12 Interviews with Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah leader, Head of tCMJ's Council of Experts), 4 
January 1994; Sri Rintang Pamungkas (parliamentary legislator from PPP and member of ICMI and 
CIDES), 8 February 1994. 
. Adi Sasono pointed out that ICMI's think -tank, CIDES, "officially launched discussion on the 
succession issue..,[wel want Suharto out...If Suharto does not go, we [the nationl will be in a difficult 
position." Interview with Adi Sasono (NGO leader who rose to the position of Secretary- General of 
ICMI in 1995 and General Chairman in 2000), 16 February 1994. 
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i. Demilitarisation 
Suharto's retaliation against General Benny Murdani's network corresponded 
with an anti -Benny predisposition among ICMI's intelligentsia and their desire for 
demilitarisation of society. As defenders of the interests of a rising, educated middle 
class, the ICMI intelligentsia were committed to the removal of military influence in 
the country's political institutions. Members of this group also expressed their 
discomfort with the kinds of security- intelligence rationales used by ABRI in its 
suppression of dissent. In particular, they regarded the Catholic general as being 
responsible for much of the New Order state's anti -Islamic political and military 
repression, and they blamed him for ordering the killing of hundreds of Muslim 
demonstrators at Tanjung Priok in 1984. Since 1974, Benny had maintained close 
contact with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a largely 
Chinese -Catholic run think -tank long associated with anti -Islamic measures when the 
Centre was part of Ali Murtopo's empire. Their attacks against Benny Murdani for 
what they regarded was his anti -Islamic security measures, in particular, suited 
Suharto's need to purge the armed forces of Benny's security network and loyalists.14 
This congruence of interests, perhaps, was demonstrated by the appointment, 
in 1993, the former deputy Chief -of -Staff of the Army, Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, as 
senior ICMI adviser to Habibie on the military defence industry. In an interview with 
the national magazine, Editor, in his capacity as Habibie's adviser, Sayidiman insisted 
that the intelligence role of the armed forces must be curtailed. Sayidiman mentioned 
the oversized role of intelligence, which he attributed to Ali Murtopo's Special 
14 This viewpoint was prevalent among Muslim leaders that I interviewed. However, I have 
supplied only a sample of the interviews held. Interviews with Gen. (ret.) Benny Murdani, 5 November 
1997; Toto Tasmara (leader of Bakomubin and BKPRMI), 21 March 1997; Hartono Mardjono (a 
Dewan Dakwah figure, member of Parliament and lawyer by profession), 26 September 1996; A.M. 
Fatwa (a Dewan Dakwah figure who was incarcerated for his alleged involvement in the Tanjung Priok 
riots), 26 June 1996; Dawam Rahardjo (ICMI intellectual and NGO leader), 27 January 1994. 
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Operations and military intelligence officers (Murdani's men) who "still wished to 
maintain" their dominant role.15 
Prominent members of ICMI's intelligentsia promoted this line.16 For 
example, Sucipto Wirosarjono reiterated Sayidiman's statement that "the role of 
military intelligence had to be reduced to its correct proportions ".t7 The TCMI leader, 
Adi Sasono also insisted that the military's role had to be reduced. He grasped the 
portent of tut wuri handayani. He pointed out that "ABRI's" new, "official" policy 
would result in a significantly smaller and more professional military, with civilian 
politicians assuming a greater share of Indonesia's leadership burden.18 
We should condemn militarisation. The military is everywhere [represented 
in the political institutions, government, and its territorial structure]. It is 
too much! We do not need a large and extensive intelligence network [with 
which to] maintain stability. We have to widen the basis of political 
recruitment beyond the military. Civilian professionals should replace [the 
military in politics].19 
It seems, then, that criticism by ICMI of the military (intelligence) network under 
Benny's command was permitted by Suharto as part of his strategy to restrain military 
influence. 
15 
. "Jangan Terlalu Curiga: Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo bicara soal almamaternya dan BUMN," 
Editor, 10 July 1993, p.73. 
16 . Interviews with Dawam, 27 January 1994; Nurcholish Madjid (liberal theologian/scholar and 
TCMT member), 12 January 1994; Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994; Sucipto, 11 January 1994; Sasono, 16 
February 1994. 
17 . Interview with Sucipto, 11 January 1994. 
£8 
. Interview with Sasono, 16 February 1994. 
19 . Interviews with Sasono, 21 January and 16 February 1994. 
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Despite the apparent concurrence of interests, however, Suharto still depended 
on the military and its doctrine to underpin his own power. At the end of the day, he 
sought to attenuate, rather than eliminate, military influence. Public exposure of the 
issue also resulted in a backlash by the armed forces' leadership in defence of their 
dwi-fungsi doctrine.20 Apparently, the ICMI leadership was worried that the 
organisation might face reprisals from an angered military should they push too 
openly against the latter's political interests.21 Thus, the sensitivity of the dwi-fungsi 
issue prevented the Muslim intelligentsia from bringing it, or discourses on 
demilitarisation, into official ICMI discussions. For example, at a meeting with 
IC'_VII's Council of Advisers, according to one of its members, Habibie had broached 
the subject of the need for a de- militarisation of Indonesian politics. The Council of 
Advisers (some of them military veterans) cautioned their Chairman against raising 
the subject of de- militarisation in ICMI, as, they said, it was "a very sensitive word. "22 
Thus, ICMI's Council of Advisors exercised their supervisory role over the 
organisation by helping ensure that ICMI's critical voice stayed within acceptable 
limits, as they even moderated Habibie's stance on the issue. 
Despite ICMI's caution, as discussed below, the congruence of Suharto- 
Habibie-ICMI interests nonetheless caused tensions that led to rivalry with elements 
of the armed forces, particularly with those who had been sidelined by the new power 
configurations. 
w 
. Bob Lowry, The Armed Forces, p.195. 
21 . Interview with Sucipto, 11 January 1994. 
22. Interview with Sucipto, 11 January 1994; interview with Lukman Harun (Muhammadiyah leader 
and ICMI member), 23 January 1994. In an interview by the Tempo newsweekly, Lt. Gen. Harsudiono 
Hartas (the former Kassospol serving under Benny's command) also refold how, in 1993, after he had 
pushed through the nomination of General Try Sutrisno as ABRI's vice -presidential candidate, Habibie 
exclaimed that this constituted "militarism." "Harsudiono Hartas: `Soeharto Menghendaki Habibie'," 
Tempo, 3 May 1999. 
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ii Democratisation 
Members of ICMI's intelligentsia were hopeful that the purging of Benny's 
men during the climate of political openness had provided them with an opportunity 
to influence the political system in the direction of greater democracy. Ramage argues 
that democracy was not the main objective of ICMT's membership, with some 
members considering democracy simply as a means of increasing the participation 
and representation of Muslim interests in the nation's political institutions.23 They 
appealed for the re- allocation of political representation (seats in the National 
Assembly, cabinet posts, and senior government appointments) to Muslims and away 
from what many Muslim leaders regarded as the coalition of Christian and secular 
army modernisers in proportion to their respective percentages in Indonesia's 
population. Muslims were estimated as comprising around eighty -eight percent of the 
population. The call for proportional access was a retaliation against a perceived and 
actual domination of the political power structures by a coalition of individuals, 
whom Muslim leaders regarded as hostile to Islam because of the state's security 
approach towards Islamic movements and the regime's efforts to depoliticise Islam.24 
A broad spectrum of Muslims, not only the [CMT intelligentsia, shared the 
desire for Muslims to gain proportional access to political representation.25 Many 
maintained that during the first two decades of New Order rule (1970s- 1980s), when 
Ali Murtopo and then Benny Murdani were at the peak of their power, Christian and 
zs 
. Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: democracy, Islam, and the ideology of tolerance, 
New York, Routledge, 1995, pp.97 -8. 
za Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp.98 -9. 
. Interviews with Nurcholis, 12 January and 16 February 1994; Sasono, 20 and 21 January and 16 
February 1994; Dawam, 27 January 1994; Sucipto, 11 January 1994; Haidar Bagir (a member of the 
editorial board of the Republika newspaper), 11 February 1994; Arrien, 4 January 1994; Sri Bintang, 8 
February 1994; Imaduddin Abdulrahim (Islamic preacher and ICMI member), 15 February 1994; Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar (close adviser to Hahibie and CIDES member), 7 February 1994; Mahasin, 4 February 
1994; Muslimin Nasution (Secretary to Chairman of Bappenas and ICMI leader), 10 February 1994; 
Lukman Harun (Muhammadiyah leader), 23 January 1994; Jalaluddin Rakhmat (a Muslim intellectual 
of pro- Shi'ite leanings, and ICMI critic), 6 January 1994. 
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secular army interests had gained preponderant control of the political system. 
Murtopo had disproportionately favoured the Christian (Catholic) minority, bringing 
them into the power structure to reinforce a coalition of army "abangan" and civilian 
modernisers who viewed political Islam with great suspicion.Z6 The ICMI 
intelligentsia argued that this Christian -secular -army coalition deliberately locked 
Muslim politicians out of the power structure. The founding of ICMI had given them 
an unparalleled opportunity to redress the imbalances, especially after the 
emasculation by Suharto of Benny's intelligence apparatus.27 A common sentiment 
expressed was that the removal of Benny's network marked the end of the military's 
security approach and "spying on Islam. "28 
As part of the effort to "redress imbalances," members of ICMI's intelligentsia 
established their own think -tank, the Centre for Information and Development Studies 
(CIDES), to rival the intellectual influence wielded by CSIS.29 The ICMI newspaper, 
Republika, also gave organisational form and "Muslim" voice to this rivalry, as it was 
established as a competitor to the Kompas newspaper published by the Catholic - 
owned Gramedia group. ICMI members argued that for too long, because of their 
superior financial resources, Chinese -Catholic interests had preponderant control of 
the national printed media. Republika was the first newspaper that could effectively 
26 . Kamal Muhammad Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernisation in 
Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982 p.6; 
Umar Hasyim, Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan Beragama Dalam Islam Sebagai Dasar Menuju Dialog 
dan Kerukunan Antar Agama, Surabaya, Pt. Bina Ilmu, 1991, p.291; Robinson Pangaribuan, The 
Indonesian State Secretariat 1945 -1993, Perth, Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and 
Economic Change, Murdoch University, 1995, pp.22, 23, 30, 37; Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in 
Indonesia: An East Java Case Study, Cheltenham, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974, pp.35 -6; 
Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1971, p.188; Brian May, 
The Indonesian Tragedy, London, Boston, R & K Paul, 1978 p.238; Interviews with Harry Tjan (a 
founder of CSIS), 29 October 1997; Murdani, 5 November 1997; Toto, 21 March 1997; Hartono 
Mardjono, 26 September 1996; A.M. Fatwa, 26 June 1996. 
. See interviews in previous footnote; Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp.98 -100. 
28 
. Interviews Mahasin, 4 February 1994; Dawam, 27 January 1994; Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994. 
29 Interviews with Murdani, 5 November 1997; Sasono, 21 January and 16 February 1994; 
Sucipto, 11 January 1994; Dewi, 7 February 1994; Nasution, 10 February 1994; Mahasin, 4 February 
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represent the Muslim constituencies on a national scale. Later, Muslim- oriented 
newsweeklies, Ummat and Gatra, were also established. Republika, on various 
occasions, ran articles and editorials that revealed an anti -Benny attitude and 
sometimes reported political events in a manner that reflected hostility towards 
Christian leaders.30 Thus, the argument can be made that, within the framework of 
state -Islamic accommodation, corporatisation of Muslim interests had provided 
Muslim leaders with an organisational means of countering their main rival 
community. They sometimes perceived this rival community, which included 
influential elements in ABRI, in terms of religious difference. 
However, aspirations for democracy went beyond just "redressing 
imbalances" and gaining proportional representation for Muslims. For example, Adi 
Sasono was among a number of Muslim reformers who regarded ICMI, CIDES, and 
Republika as contributing to capacity building aimed at strengthening "civilian 
institutions to offset military power. "31 Sasono insisted that CIDES, in particular, 
provided a forum for opening dialogue on reform with the government. "Reform from 
within the state was instrumental to change [and this was] achievable through working 
with the government [not against it]. "32 Sasono considered that internal reforms were 
necessary in order to bring about "peaceful transformation" to democracy and prevent 
1994; Amien, 4 January; Dawam, 27 January 1994; Nurcholish, 12 January and 16 February 1994; 
Lukman, 23 January 1994; and Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994. 
3o For example, Republika and ICMI adopted a pro -government line against Bishop Belo when, in 
1995, Muslims were forced to evacuate East Timor after a spate of ethnically motivated attacks by 
indigenous Catholic mobs against the Muslim migrant community. In the post -July 27, 1996 
crackdown against pro -democracy groups, the newspaper adopted a pro -government line against 
Catholic priests who had harboured the leader of the left -wing radical Democratic People's Party. In 
early 1998, coinciding with a propaganda campaign against Chinese conglomerates, in which state 
officials held ethnic Chinese businessmen responsible for the economic crisis, Republika ran anti - 
Benny, anti -CSIS editorials and stories. 
31 
. Dawam Rahardjo also maintained that, through ICMI, the Muslim intelligentsia at least had 
"political space to maneouvre. We try to strengthen the middle class. We have a newspaper, 
Republika," to give voice to middle class aspirations. Interview with Dawam, 27 January 1994. 
32 Interview with Sasono, 16 February 1994. 
214 
a process of "social radicalisation" that could lead to "revolution. "33 Dewi Fortuna 
Anwar (a close adviser to Habibie and CIDES member) agreed with Sasono's 
assessment that CIDES had an important role to play in opening dialogue on the 
democratic reform process.34 CIDES gave regular seminars, which were attended by 
government officials, retired military officers, government critics and spokespersons 
of the different political and religious communities. One of the aims of the seminars 
was to raise sensitive issues such as presidential succession, human rights, and 
ABRI's political role and to prepare public officials to think about these issues.35 
For Suharto CIDES must have seemed like a mild and safe forum for 
discussion on democracy and human rights compared to other groups agitating against 
the regime. For example, during the 1990s, a proliferating number of NGOs, student 
groups, publications, and informal seminars became centrally- concerned with issues 
of democracy and human rights and were highly critical of Suharto's rule.36 Despite 
the relative moderation of Muslim intellectuals, in May 1992 (before the founding of 
CIDES), the police closed down an ICMI siminar discussion on human rights that was 
attended by outspoken human rights advocates and Suharto critics. In December, 
CIDES successfully re -held a one -day seminar on human rights, which was critical of 
the regime's track record in this area.37 Habibie was initially alarmed when CIDES 
33 Interview with Sasono, 16 February 1994. 
34 . Interview with Dewi, 7 February 1994. 
35 A number of ICMI members were sceptical about the usefulness of organisations like ICMI, 
CIDES, and Republika for the cause of democracy and viewed them as too co -opted and controlled by 
Habibie and Suharto. For example, Sri Bintang Pamungkas bemoaned how Suharto had "crushed 
Islam's political identity" through decades of the New Order's security approach and now Suharto had 
"lulled Muslims to sleep" with a few small concessions, such as giving them the Republika newspaper 
and an Islamic bank. Masdar Mas'udi (Head of P3M, an NU- affiliated NGO, and liberal scholar) 
regarded ICMI as an "instrument of the ruling political elite that lacked any real links with the 
grassroots." Interviews with Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994; Masdar, 25 January 1994. 
36 Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratisation ": The Indonesian Pro - 
Democracy Movement in a Changing World, Surrey, Curzon Press, 1997, pp. 98 -115, 128 -150; The 
Limits of Openness: Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, 
London, Brussels, Human Rights Watch, 1994, pp.1 -17. 
. Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian 
Middle Class," Indonesia: 56 (October 1993), pp.29 -30. 
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published in its journal, Afkar (February 1993 issue), the papers given by seminar 
panelist. He apparently exclaimed, "Oh my God, how am I going to show this to 
Suharto!"38 
iii. Islamisation 
This section of the analysis deals with Islamisation agendas of ICMT' s 
intelligentsia. Islamisation meant different things for different people. In general, 
there were two orientations - namely, those who aspired to establishing an Islamic 
society and those who advocated, at least partial, Islamisation of the state's laws. 
The first orientation was the most intangible among the different agendas 
aspired to by the ICMI independents. ICMII did not have theorists who were defining 
or systematically expounding upon what was actually an Islamic society. Rather, 
some of them at least had an image of an Islamic society that appealed to ideals of 
economic equity, social justice, democracy, clean government and an enlarged role 
for Muslims in, if not preponderant control of, the political institutions of the nation 
(as considered above). On the whole, these individuals presented themselves as 
purveyors of a "moderateì39 brand of Islam and claimed to aspire to establishing an 
Islamic society in which the values of Islam's religious morality would become a 
dominant social good within an expanding middle class, cosmopolitan culture. They 
hoped that the projection of ICMI as a moderate force would overcome objections 
against organised Islam and improve the chances of Muslims becoming a trusted 
partner in government.40 Aspirations for an Islamic society, therefore, dovetailed with 
democratisation agendas. However, Ramage argues that "it seems clear that 
3s 
. interview with Dewi, 7 February 1994. 
sv This is not to suggest that advocates of Tslamic law did not view themselves as moderates. 
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democratisation is not the primary goal of many ,in ICMI. The main objective, in 
varying degrees, is to encourage the development of an Islamic society. '41 There 
were many advocates of an Islamic society who were not committed to democratic 
values.42 
The more liberal- minded intellectuals and reformers in ICMI argued that Islam 
should be a source of political morality. Adi Sasono expressed this view, stating that 
"Islamic tradition has respect for pluralism, for rights. If we link democracy with 
Islam's teachings then society will understand democracy. Democracy must be 
acculturated in Indonesia -Islam is the key to that process. "43 Dawam Rahardjo 
maintained that "Islamic morality should be reflected in the attitude [and behaviour] 
of the state [actors]. The state should function for the betterment of all people, not to 
control and dominate society. "44 Dewi Fortuna Anwar reinforced this standpoint by 
pointing to the lack of morality in the New Order regime. 
Islam would be an important element to influence morality within the 
power [structure]. The government should be imbued with some of Islam's 
morality, in the way it operates and rules. I am in favour of Islamisation in 
our way of life, in the sense that we will have... less of this corruption, 
less of these abuses of power, less of these human rights abuses -because 
Islam as a religion does not allow you to do [these things].45 
Interviews with Nurcholish, 12 January and 16 February 1994; Sasono, 20 and 21 January and 
16 February 1994; Dawam, 27 January 1994; Sucipto, 11 January 1994; Haidar, 11 February 1994; 
Amien, 4 January 1994; Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994; Imaduddin, 15 February 1994 
41 . Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p.110. 
42 The Muhammadiyah leader, Lukman Harun, and the Muslim preacher, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 
are two ICMI members that come to mind, who advocated the establishment of an Islamic society but 
seemed to have little commitment to principles of democracy. Interviews with Lukman, 23 January 
1994; Imaduddin, 15 February 1994. 
43 Interview with Sasono, 21 January 1994. 
44 Interview with Dawam, 27 January 1994. 
as Interview with Dewi, 7 February 1994. 
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The second orientation, included Muslim radicals and moral conservatives 
who advocated the implementation of Islamic shari'ah (law) in areas of the family 
and criminal law. Among the Muslim conservatives were functionaries and law 
scholars at MIJT, the Department of Religion, and the Faculty of Shar'iah at the 
IAINs, as well as leaders of the voluntary associations, Muhammadiyah and NU, who 
embraced the desire to have an increased role for Islamic shar'iah in the life of the 
state and nation. These conservative scholars and bureaucrats desired to see a greater 
proportion of Islamic laws incorporated in national laws. They claimed that they did 
not seek a dominance of Islamic law and therefore rejected goals for the establishment 
of an Islamic state. Muslim radicals, many of them associated with the organisation, 
Dewan Dakwah, were more firmly committed to the implementation of State Islamic 
Laws, although a range of alternative views also existed within this organisation. The 
"shar'iah- minded" scholars did not necessarily consider ICMI as the principal vehicle 
through which they could achieve their objectives. Nonetheless, they belonged to pro - 
establishment forces that viewed their collaboration with Suharto's circle as an 
opportunity to influence the state to enact Islamic laws. They viewed the state's 
enactment of Islamic family and court laws and the founding of an Islamic bank, and 
other concessions to Muslim interests as a step in the right direction to establishing a 
more Islam- oriented government and society." 
46 
. Interviews with Z. Abidin Abu Bakar (Director of Religious Courts at the Department of 
Religion), 28 June 1996; Busthanul Arifin (Department of Religion), 15 May 1996; H. Ichijanto (legal 
advisor at the Department of Religion), 28 June 1996; Daud Ali SH (University of Indonesia law 
graduate and Dewan Dakwah sympathiser), 14 June 1996; Ibrahim Hosen (Head of MUI's fatwa 
commission), 10 June 1996; Hussein Umar (Secretary- General of Dewan Dakwah), 2 July and 24 
September 1996; Ramlan Marjoned (Dewan Dakwah preacher and BAKOMUBIN leader), 23 August 
1996; Hartono Mardjono, 26 September 1996; Misbach Malim (Dewan Dakwah leader), 15 July and 23 
August 1996; Badruzzaman Busyairi (Dewan Dakwah leader), 16 July 1996; A.M. Fatwa, 26 June 
1996; Muhammad Quraish Shihab (Rector of TAIN Ciputat campus), 16 August 1996; Núryamin Aini 
(law scholar at TAIN Ciputat campus), 16 October 1996; HA Chaeruddin (Chairperson and Dean of the 
Faculty of Islamic Law at TAIN Cipútat campus in an interview -discussion with faculty staff), 27 June 
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There was a possible convergence between the two orientations, as some 
advocates of an Islamic society envisaged that ICMI could be at the vanguard of 
efforts to turn state officials into more pious, practising Muslims. They considered 
that a deepening of religious belief within the state would then radiate out to wider 
society, as it too became more Islamised. ICMI member, Masdar Mas'udi (a liberal 
scholar and NGO leader), argues that there was a growing tendency of Muslim 
"modernists" to "Islamise the state" both by placing more and more Muslims in the 
government bureaucracy and by impementing Islamic laws.47 
In summary, agendas within ICMI for demilitarisation, democratisation and 
Islamisation were evidence of a re- politicsation of Muslim middle class interests. state 
sponsorship of Islam had kindled hopes among its intelligentsia that they might be 
able to advance their political agendas through ICMI. ABRI leaders were unlikely to 
view too kindly any attempts by ICMI's intelligentsia to formulate openly, or to 
realise, their goals. 
C) ABRI's objections to ICMI's agendas 
Objections within ABRI to ICMI' s different agendas arose from ABRI' s 
perceived role as guardian of national stability against the forces of disintegration. 
ABRI leaders perceived themselves as defenders of an Indonesian unitary state based 
on Pancasila -an integralist ideology of a dominant state and subordinate society 
constituting an indivisible organic union. The state ideology precluded establishment 
of an Islamic theocracy or liberal democracy from constitutional possibilities. Military 
1996; H. Moeslim Aboud Ma'ani (General -Secretary at Al -Azhar Pesantren Foundation and Dewan 
Dakwah activist), 18 October 1996; Imaduddin, 2 September 1996; Syukron Makmun (former chair of 
NU's Dakwah Institute), 22 October 1996; Ma'aruf Amin (leader of NU's Syuriah Council), 25 July 
1996; KH Dawam Anwar (leader of NU's Syuriah Council), 18 July 1996; and Abdurrahman, 5 June 
1996. 
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leaders regarded Islamic political and ideological movements, communism, and 
liberal democracy as the three principle threats to the Pancasìla state. In particular, 
they were concerned about Islam's potential as an agent of independent political 
organisation, especially because Muslim leaders could mobilise the masses against 
other religious communities or in opposition to state authority. Military leaders had an 
historical distrust of partisan political parties and religious groups that might assert 
their own "sectarian" interests above and beyond those of the national interest which, 
the leaders argued, could lead to national disintegration." 
Thus, ICMI's agendas for democratisation (demilitarisation), lslamisation, and 
the prospect of Islam becoming a force for democracy, were all good reasons for an 
entrenched military state to deeply suspect ICMI. Islam was a latent political force 
that had immense potential for mobilising Indonesians for various causes and ICMI 
represented an organised block. As Aswab Mahasin observed, "ICMI was a bigger 
threat [to power holders] than unorganised dissenting communities, and ABRI was 
worried about ICMI. "49 Ramage argues that significant segments of the ABRI 
leadership opposed ICMI on the grounds that it acted like a party. ABRI leaders 
pointed out that ICMI had established a nationwide organisational structure, with 
provincial, district (and overseas) branches and was trying to build grassroots support. 
Ramage notes, there was "a generalised concern that ICMI could be a potential 
manifestation of newly politicised Islam. "50 However, it is possible also that ABRI 
leaders were concerned that ICMI provided a means for "civilians" to bypass ABRI- 
dominated Golkar branches in the provinces and districts and would compete for 
47 
. Interviews with Masdar, 29 May 1996; Imaduddin, 15 February 1994; Dawam, 27 January 
1994; Lukman, 21 January 1994. 
48 . Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp.128 -140. 
49 
. Interview with Mahasin, 4 February 1994. 
so Ramage Politics in Indonesia, p.139. 
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people's allegiances at election times.51 A number of ABRI officers also claimed that 
ICMI constituted a sectarian religious threat to the multi- religious nation, and that the 
organisation "surreptitiously" supported an Islamic state in contravention of 
Pancasila.52 
Suharto shared ABRI's allergy to political Islam, inherited from earlier 
periods in Indonesia's pre- and -post -Independence history. Indonesia's recent history 
included Islamic rebellions in Aceh and West Java, and constitutional debates over 
the final form of the post- independence nation -state (Islamic, secular or Pancasila). 
Accordingly, the perception of Islamic threat was imbedded in the psyche of 
commanders who had inherited a deep apprehension about the growth of Islamic 
militancy in Indonesia. 53 In order not to give extra ammunition to ABRI against 
ICMI, members of the Muslim intelligentsia were careful to distance themselves from 
the Islamic state ideal. Of course, many ICMI members also opposed the ideal of an 
Islamic state. They rejected the idea of Islamic clerics gaining control of the state 
apparatus and proclaiming a theocratic state as had occurred in (Shi'ite) Iran.54 In 
addition, although Suharto ensured that ICMI's Muslim intelligentsia did not pose 
such a threat by keeping them outside of key political institutions and the public - 
policy arena, his efforts apparently failed to mollify entirely ABRI's concerns. 
Concerns about ICMI's democratising and Islamising agendas, perhaps, were 
not the main motivation behind ABRI' s apprehension of ICMI. The military 
Interviews with Mahasin, 4 February 1994; Mukti Ali (former Minister of Religious Affairs and 
liberal scholar), 4 January 1994. 
sz Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p.138. 
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Indonesian Konstituante 1956 -1959, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992; B.J. Boland, The Struggle 
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leadership might well have raised the spectre of ICMI as an "Islamic threat," as a 
means of discrediting their political rival, Habibie.55 By associating his chairmanship 
of ICMI with the potential spread of Islamic political ideology, they could hope to 
ruin Habibie's prospects of ascending to the vice -presidency. Habibie was Suharto's 
favoured candidate for the post against the military's candidates. Nurcholish Madjid 
(a liberal scholar and ICMI member) acknowledged this conflict, pointing to the fact 
that "nationalist" officers "were the ones who felt threatened by ICMI because they 
saw ICMI as [synonymous with] Habibie. Everything that Habibie does at the 
bureaucratic level in regard to jobs and money...in their [the nationalists'] thinking 
they will attack ICMI. "56 
Perhaps in cognisance of the potential for destabilising conflicts, the Suharto 
regime fostered a conciliatory approach to Muslim interests providing they did not 
sa Interviews with Dawam, 27 January 1994; Dewi, 7 February 1994; Mahasin, 4 February 1994; 
Nurcholish, 12 January 1994; Sri Bintang, 8 February 1994. 
ss Military intelligence -especially during the periods of Ali Murtopo's special operations and 
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allegedly in an effort to topple the legitimate New Order government. But state officials and military 
leaders used the label of "Islamic insurgency" or "Islamic sedition," in cases such as the Komando 
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pp.12 -17; "Kebangkìtan PKI Antara Agitasi dan Seleharan," "Jejak Langkah Setelah 30 Tahun," 
Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995, pp. 12 -15; Peter Burns, "The Post Priok Trials: Religious Principles 
And Legal Issues,' Indonesia 47 (April 1989); "The Farmers Of Badega Mountain: They Face Forcible 
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Cimerak, Badega, Pulau Panggung, YI.BHI dan Jarim: 1/1990; "Peristiwa Di Way Jepara: 27 Orang 
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manifest themselves as organised political demands. At the same time, once he had 
successfully established his control over an acquiescent ABRI leadership, he sought to 
placate ABRI's concerns about the re- politicisation of Islam. As such, Suharto and his 
ministers made numerous announcements to try to assuage ABRI's suspicions of 
Islamisation, and as firm warnings to the ICMI intelligentsia. They declared that 
ICMI's activities were neither directed towards Islamisation or to the establishment of 
a political organisation or pressure group. They also vociferously denied claims that 
ICMI constituted a pro -Golkar /pro -Suharto power block before the 1992 general 
elections and Golkar's 1993 national congress.' The public denials failed to mollify 
deep- seated suspicions of Habibie, driven, as they were, by the awareness that 
Suharto was using Habibie and Islam in order to diminish the political influence and 
institutional autonomy of the armed forces.58 
s6 Interview with Nurcholish, 16 February 1994. Haidar Bagir made a similar comment that ABRI 
is upset with Habibie over his interference in the military industry, which then affects ABRI's 
perceptions of ICMI." Interview with Haidar, 11 February 1994. 
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D) Which military opposes the ICMI? 
ICMI -military antagonisms partly reflected the psychology of winners and 
losers, in an eminently excluding and including power game of divide and rule. This 
section of the chapter argues that figures who were associated with Benny's declining 
influence, or had been ousted from strategic and political posts by Habibie's 
increasing power were the military officers most inclined to attack TCMI and its 
chairman. Conversely, other santri (orthodox Muslim) generals who had gained 
promotions, either as a result of the ouster of Benny's forces, or because of 
association with Habibie, tended to endorse the ICMI chairman and praise ICMI 
publicly. Ultimately, President Suharto promoted the new generation of Muslim 
generals as part of his divide- and -rule tactics to increase his own autonomy vis -à -vis 
ABRI. 
The promotion of younger military officers caused a long- standing debate in 
the media and among Indonesian analysts, about a rift in ABRI between the so- called 
"Green (Muslim)" officers and "Red- and -White (nationalist)" officers. The new 
Commander -in -Chief of the Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung (appointed in May 
1993) -who, according to one view may have gained his promotion because of his 
links with the technology minister -was one of the rising generation of Muslim 
officers. As ABRI Commander, Feisal oversaw the purging of Benny's intelligence 
network.59 Shortly after assuming office in May 1993, Feisal ingratiated himself to 
s9 Murdani commented on Feisal Tanjung's rise to power as follows: "When Feisal was Military 
Chief of General Staff, Habibie was already assembling recruits from the German school. Habibie 
promised Feisal that he would become Commander of ABRI. Feisal believed Habibie, because he 
[Feisal] did not have a relationship with Suharto himself. When I was close to Pak Harto, I would have 
lunch with him 2 -3 times a week. During my time, ABRI -we were senior to the bureaucrats. Feisal's 
generation have come in much later after the bureaucrats have established themselves. Ministers like 
Habibie are now senior, and ABRI officers (including Feisal) look up to them" Benny's statement 
reflected an ongoing rivalry between ABRI and the civilian bureaucracy and, as such, he was 
expressing his distaste for the fact that senior military officers clearly had become subordinate to 
Suharto and senior civilian bureaucrats like Habibie. Interview with Murdani, 5 November 1997; 
Michael Malley, "The 7th Development Cabinet: Loyal to a Fault ?" Indonesia: 65 (April 1998), p.163. 
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Habibie and ICMI by praising the organisation for what he said was its dynamic role 
in assisting the military with its stability and development goals.60 Feisal was 
responsible for promoting Muslim officers up the military hierarchy, one prominent 
example being the appointment in March 1996 of Syarwan Hamid (the Military's 
Chief of Social -Political Affairs, Kassospol after Lt. -Gen. Hartono). 
Another prominent example was Lt. -Gen. Hartono -a Muslim officer who, in 
January 1994, became the Chief of the Military's Social -Political Affairs (Kassospol) 
before being promoted to Army Chief of Staff, replacing Wismoyo Arismunandar (the 
brother -in -law of Thu Tien Suharto) in January 1995. Lowry notes that Wismoyo "had 
been trying to distance the Army from the President, the new Golkar leader 
(Harmoko), Dr. Habibie, and the C -in -C ABRI [Commander in Chief, Feisal] who 
was believed to be under their influence. "61 Upon his accession to Kassospol, Hartono 
promptly indicated his support for ICMI by announcing that the association was a 
positive development that unified Muslims and therefore contributed to national 
integration.62 Hartono, in particular, was responsible for promoting Muslim officers 
up the military hierarchy to replace Benny's men 63 There was speculation at the time 
that Hartono had received his new post because of Habibie. Nonetheless, he later 
came into tension with Habibie when he decided to back openly the political 
ambitions of Suharto's daughter, Siti Rukmana, against the vice -presidential 
ambitions of the technology minister. Let -Gen. Yunus Yosfiah assumed the position 
of Kassospol in December 1996 shortly after publicly praising Habibie's credentials 
co 
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as a leader of technology. (He was later to become the Minister of Information on 
President Hahihie's cabinet in May 1998)64 
The new generation of officers rejected arguments employed by Benny, 
Admiral Sudomo (another Christian officer), and other older generation officers (who 
regularly cautioned the public of impending Islamic extremist threats to national 
stability). They instead insisted that Indonesian Muslims, for too long, had been 
branded unfairly as such.65 If the newly ascendant generals were happy to deliver 
some praise to ICMI, the Muslim intelligentsia was excited to witness a generation of 
officers who were more sympathetically inclined to Muslim aspirations.66 Its 
members sought to cultivate close relations with the military leadership under Feisal's 
command, and some insisted they trusted his military to run Indonesia. Republika 
. Editor, for example, reported that people believed Habibie had promoted the new Kassospol in 
order to strengthen his own position with the military. "Para Alcor dalam Suksesi 1998," Editor, 10 
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published an article in 1993 proclaiming Feisal as the Muslim community's choice of 
man -of- the -year. 67 
The promotion of Muslim generals helped polarise Indonesian politics into 
ICMUGolkar interests and anti -ICMI officers, who were strongly nationalist in 
orientation and despaired of the alignment of state and Islam. The anti -ICMI officers 
were sidelined as the direct result of a change of guard when Suharto reshuffled the 
upper echelons of the armed forces, with five reshuffles taking place from August 
1992 to August 1994.68 The reshuffling of senior military officers was a common ploy 
that Suharto used in order to keep ambitious generals from becoming too powerful 
and posing a threat to his presidency. 
Consequently, Suharto left Benny Murdani out of the 1993 cabinet. Benny's 
social and political affairs chief, Harsudiono Hartas, who had earlier successfully 
pushed through the vice -presidential nomination of Try Sutrisno (Commander -in- 
Chief of ABRI) against Suharto's choice of Habibie, also seemingly was punished. 
Upon retiring from his post, Harsudiono failed to become Minister of Internal Affairs, 
as he had hoped, and had to settle for a position in the largely uninfluential Supreme 
Advisory Council. In a meeting with Suharto, the General Chairman of Golkar, 
Wahono, also put forward Try as Golkar's choice for Vice President. At Golkar's 
mid -year congress, Suharto had Wahono replaced as the ruling party's chair.64 
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In an interview conducted at the Supreme Advisory Council in 1994, a 
disgruntled Harsudiono bluntly criticised Habibie, Habibie's bureaucrats, and ICMI. 
He claimed that ICMI "radical fundamentalists," as he called its intelligentsia, were 
using Suharto's and Habibie's protection in order to infiltrate the ranks of the armed 
forces, the government bureaucracy, the political parties, the Golkar and the new 
cabinet. They were seeking to change or replace the state's "integralistic" ideology of 
Pancasila with an Islamic state and/or with liberal democratic ideals of 
individualism- anathema, Harsudiono insisted, to the military's "integralistic" and 
collectivist ideals of organic unity between the military -state and society. According 
to Harsudiono, ICMI radicals "must be brainwashed until their minds are empty and 
clean so that `we' can all be of one mind." Finally, he claimed that the decision of 
ICMI members to support General Feisal Tanjung was part of a tactical ploy to gain 
legitimacy and political freedom so that they could "confront the military and weaken 
it from within. These people are too naive, too stupid! If the strategy of infiltration 
continues, conflict will break out [between the ICMI `radicals' and the military]. "70 
Harsudiono's remark about Feisal was an allusion to the power reshuffle that 
witnessed Feisal's men replace Benny's network (including Harsudiono), and the fact 
that the ICMI intelligentsia had pinned its hopes and fortunes on this change of guard. 
Harsudiono perceived that the new coalition of ICMI- Habibie- military interests was 
responsible for his own ouster, In return, the intelligentsia clearly perceived Benny 
and Harsudiono as two major obstructions to the advancement of their own political 
careers. They strongly opposed Try Sutrisno's election (hacked by Benny's men) to 
the vice -presidency. One ICMI intellectual warned that if the armed forces 
° . Interview with Hartas, 15 February 1994. 
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commander became Vice President, it would create the public impression that 
Indonesia was a military state.71 
i. Golkar's national congress of 1993 
The tensions between Suharto- Habibie- civilian interests and the nationalist - 
oriented military leadership centered on Golkar as preparations were made for the 
ruling party's national congress in May 1993. Competition for the post of Golkar 
General Chairperson reflected an ongoing rivalry and mistrust between the military 
and civilian bureaucracy. ABRI leaders were determined to retain a military man in 
the ruling party's top job, as well as to maintain military control over regional and 
branch levels of Golkar. Of greater significance, it was an important staging post in 
the growing power struggle over succession. 
The ABRI leaders fought to have a military man retain chairmanship of the 
government party. The military put forward three senior officers as candidates for 
Golkar's Chair Lt. -Gen. Harsudiono Hartas, General Susilo Sudarman (the 
Coordinating Minister of Politics and Defense), and General Try Sutrisno (the new 
Vice President). Appointed in February, the Commander -in -Chief of the Armed 
Forces, Edi Sudrajat, publicly declared that a military figure was best qualified for the 
post of General Chair. As head of the committee of formateurs responsible for 
selecting the new Golkar chairman, Habibie ignored the wishes of the military top 
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Pak Harto," DeTik, 10 March 1993, pp.4 -5; "Sri Bintang Pamungkas: `Pak Try Kurang Cocok... "' 
DeTik, 10 March 1993; "Dawam Rahardjo: Pak Try SuIit Diterima Presiden!" DeTik, p.12; "Teknolog 
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brass, and pushed through the civilian Minister of Information and Suharto loyalist, 
Harmoko, as the new Chair.72 
Harmoko was the first civilian to lead Golkar. In his capacity as Head of 
Golkar's Board of Patrons, Suharto clearly backed the choice of Harmoko to replace 
the military general Wahono. Analysts interpreted Suharto's choice of laarmoko as 
retribution against the ABRI leadership after they had successfully pushed through the 
candidature of Try Sutrisno for Vice- President.73 In a further move, in late 1995, 
Golkar's Chairman Harmoko arranged the removal of Wahono's team of supporters 
from their positions in Golkar.74 
After Golkar's congress, the Deputy Chairman of the armed forces faction in 
Parliament, Maj -Gen. Sembiring Mehala, was unable to contain his bitterness in a 
public outburst against the election of Harmoko. He warned that Harmoko and 
Habibie depended entirely on Suharto for their political survival and that "Golkar 
without military support will be nothing. If in the next election the military decides to 
support the PDI, this party will surely be the winner, not Golkar. "75 The military 
leadership under Edi Sudrajat's command was clearly displeased with the latest turn 
of events. 
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Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 121 -122; I.iddle, `Politics 1992- 1993," pp31- 
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It was in this context that Suharto appointed Feisal Tanjung as Commander -in- 
Chief of ABRI, with Edi Sudrajat retaining his position of Minister of Defence. The 
Editors of the journal "Indonesia" note that "Gen. Edy Sudradjat in his brief days of 
`record' glory as simultaneously Minister of Defence, Armed Forces Commander, and 
Army Chief -of- Staff, made strategic appointments to assure colonels and brigadier 
generals that `army institutional rationality' would not be interfered with by the 
President. Since then, however, palace countermeasures have been going on in waves 
of reshuffles. "76 Edi subsequently became a major critic of Habibie, Golkar and ICMI, 
as he backed various initiatives to establish organisations, under the banner of 
nationalism, with which to combat cosy state -Islamic relations and to oppose 
Habibie's camp 77 
The military mainstream, therefore, resented Habibie for his central role in 
assisting Suharto to have a civilian bureaucrat assume control of Golkar. Resentment 
of Habibie spilled over into hostility towards ICMI. Suharto tried to manage the 
rivalry in an apparent effort to defuse the potential for open conflict against Habibie 
and ICMI. He became the chief patron of ICMI and endorsed the appointment of the 
new Vice -President, (ret.) General Try Sutrisno, and two former vice -presidents to 
ICMI's Council of Patrons, which took place in August 1993 at the Presidential 
Palace. Try (a man long considered to be in Benny's camp) hitherto was viewed as 
Habibie's adversary and was known to be critical of ICMI.78 
In a sign of rapprochement, after the August meeting, the press carried 
pictures of a gathering of state officials, the military top brass, and sixty ICMI 
members who witnessed Try warmly shaking hands with Habibie. In his public 
Finance as a Key Sector in Indonesia's Development, Canberra, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, 1994, p.58. 
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address, reading from an official text of platitudes, Try outlined ICMI's role in the 
field of technological development, and as a promoter of nationalism and national 
unity. He nonetheless indicated that he was not entirely satisfied with ICMI by 
warning the organisation against becoming "trapped in narrow communalistic - 
sectarian behaviour. "79 Highlighting his intended supervisory role in ICMT, he warned 
its members to demonstrate vigilance (kewaspadaan) in order that they did not "stray" 
from agreed organisational channels and goals.80 Speaking off -the -cuff, he also hinted 
that much still had to be done to mend fences between ICMI and the military, as he 
cautioned ICMI against creating the public impression that "generational" divisions 
existed within the armed forces.ß1 Try's warning was a reference to the inclination of 
ICMI's intelligentsia to view the armed forces as split between pro -Feisal /pro -Islamic 
officers and those anti -Islamic officers aligned against ICMI. 
The appointment of Try to ICMI can be considered as one of several attempts 
by Suharto to maintain a shifting balance of competing interests within and outside of 
ICMI (and Golkar) in order to preserve his own autonomy and power. On the surface, 
at least, relations between Habibie and ICMI on the one hand, and the armed forces' 
leadership on the other seemed to have improved. Despite surface appearances, there 
remained a strong undercurrent of dislike for Habibie's leadership position as 
technology minister and Suharto's close confidant. 
78 
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ii. Defence purchases 
One year later, in mid -1994, a controversy erupted over Habibie's purchase of 
warships from the former East German Navy, as antagonisms between the technology 
minister and his military adversaries became public. Mainstream military officers 
resented Habibie for taking over lucrative state contracts, and making foreign deals 
over their heads, in military hardware purchases. Habibie, like Sudharmono before 
him, was unpopular for commandeering military hardware purchases from the 
defence department. Habibie not only undermined the military's budgetary control of 
defence purchases, but he also deprived them of non -budgetary kickbacks. 
For example, in 1993 he arranged the purchase of twenty -four Hawk fighter 
jets from Britain. In addition, to their chagrin, the armed forces leadership was forced 
to buy aircraft, which were considered inferior to planes available overseas, from 
Habibie's IPTN plant. Creating the greatest controversy, however, was his purchase 
of thirty -nine dilapidated warships from the former East -German Navy. Habibie 
bought the warships at bargain- basement prices but his plans to refurbish them at an 
estimated cost of US$1.1 billion (about three quarters of the official defence budget) 
drew sharp criticism. He had made the latest purchase, debiting it to the defence 
department's budget.82 Habibie's incursions into ABRI's defence budget had become 
intolerable to its institutional interests. 
Consequently, in retaliation, military officers and the economic technocrats - 
who did not share Habibie's vision for a high -tech, high -cost economic take off- 
81 
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forged an open alliance against Habibie's purchase of the ships. The Minister of 
Finance, Mar'ie Muhammad, and the Minister of Defence and Security, General Edi 
Sudradjat, publicly criticised Habibie's purchase and severely slashed his projected 
refurbishment budget to US$320 million R3 Suharto was a shrewd and cautious player 
who had appointed Mar'ie Muhammad, an economic conservative, to the position of 
Minister of Finance in 1993 partly to maintain a check on Habibie's over -zealous 
projects. 
Comprehensive press coverage of the intra -elite dispute, apparently, was one 
of the factors that prompted Suharto's Information Minister to revoke the licenses in 
June 1994 of two national magazines, the Tempo and the Editor, and of the popular 
tabloid DeTik. Habibie was thought to have been behind the decision to ban the 
publications, as Habibie's military antagonists were apparently behind the press 
campaign to expose the ICMI Chairman's had management of defence purchases.R4 
The ICMI intelligentsia closed ranks to defend their beleaguered chairman, insisting 
that he was not responsible for banning the publications. Instead, they accused Tempo 
of conspiring with "non- Muslims and the military to destroy Habibie's reputation 
over the ship purchase. The issue was portrayed not in terms of press or other 
democratic freedoms, but one of Muslims versus non -Muslims. "85 The partiality of 
ICMI against Tempo was not entirely unwarranted, as the news weekly regularly had 
adopted a critical and partisan editorial stance against the Muslim association. 
83 . (See citations in previous footnote); " Mar'ie Memangkas Rp 327 Miliar," Tempo, 11 June 1994, 
pp.25 -6. 
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The public exposure of intra -elite rivalry between Suharto's civilian 
supporters and ABRI had led Suharto to curtail the period of political openness with a 
clampdown on the press. 
iii. Rivalry within ICMI 
Suharto's sponsorship of ICMI had not only created a political divide between 
pro -ICMI and anti -ICMI interests. It had also stimulated rivalry within ICMI between 
competing patrons seeking to use ICMI as a potential client base for the advancement 
of their own future power aspirations. That is, at ICMI's congress in 1995, several of 
Habibie's adversaries joined the Muslim intellectuals association, including Suharto's 
daughter Siti Rukmana (see chapter five). Measures to offset Habibie's influence 
within ICMI also included the appointment in August 1997 of Siti's close ally Lt. 
Gen. (ret.) Hartono, the new Minister of Information, to a senior advisory role within 
ICMI. At the time, Siti gave strong public endorsement to Hartono's entry into 
ICMI.86 
Siti Rukmana, with Hartono's backing, was a credible candidate for the vice - 
presidency in competition with Habibie's backers for the position. There was 
speculation at the time that Suharto might be grooming his elder daughter for a 
dynastic succession. Thus, Hartono might have had his sights on the ICMI 
chairmanship to harness Muslim support behind Siti.ß7 
36 . "Susunan Pengurus ICMI Memasukí Abad 21," Republika Online, IO December 1995. Chapter 
five mentioned Suharto's daughter, Siti Rukmana, as one of Habibie's rivals, who joined ICMI at the 
organisation's national congress. Other new additions to ICMI were the Minister of Industry and Trade, 
who had replaced Habibie's colleague, Satrio Judono, as trade minister under a new rationalisation of 
departments, and economic technocrats, who were opposed to Habibie's vision for a high -end 
technological take -off, Saleh Affif and Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo. 
3 . "Hartono Berpeluang Ketua Umum ICMI," Kompas Online, 7 August 1997; "Hartono dan 
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The contest for vice -presidential stakes highlights the fact that ICMT and 
Golkar had become arenas in which rival patron -client networks competed for 
political advantage. Both ICMI and Golkar provided strategic access to high office for 
senior state officials. In March 1998, however, the armed forces' leadership 
acquiesced to the President's choice of Habibie as Indonesia's new Vice- President 
replacing Try Sutrisno. Nevertheless, many of them were not happy with the prospect 
of the former technology minister becoming Indonesia's future President. New armed 
forces' commander, Wiranto was sworn -in, who, at the time, was regarded as a likely 
threat to Habibie's personal ambitions as well as to the advancement of ICMI's 
interests.88 
iv. Reshuffles 
The Seventh Development Cabinet, in fact, was comprised primarily of 
Suharto loyalists, business associates, family members. ICMI's General -Secretary and 
even senior pro- government members of ICMI, and members of its more outspoken 
intelligentsia were greatly disappointed by their exclusion from the cabinet and 
People's Consultative Assembly.89 Wiranto's political adviser, Lt. -Gen. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, replaced the Habibie stalwart, Let. -Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, as the 
next Kassosspol. Hartono had his position up- graded from information minister to 
Minister of Internal Affairs in the new cabinet. Apparently, Suharto's daughter Siti 
Rukmana, often seen at official ceremonies with Hartono by her side, had facilitated 
the Information Minister's promotion.9° 
Despite these possible ominous signs for ICMI, generals who had supported 
Habibie did gain influential cabinet portfolios. For instance, Feisal Tanjung, who had 
ss John McBeth, "Suharto's Way," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1998, p.20. 
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already reached retiring age for serving officers, was appointed to the high- profile 
position of Co- ordinating Minister for Politics and Security. Lt. -Gen. Syarwan Hamid 
became Deputy Speaker of the DPR representing the ABRI parliamentary faction. 
Although the change of guard represented a regeneration within ABRI's 
officer corps,91 the reshuffles in the military and cabinet were ultimately a re- ordering 
of power configurations which aimed to bolster Suharto's rule with his most trusted 
Ioyalists. As such, and in characteristic divide- and -rule fashion, Suharto retained his 
son -in -law Prabowo Subianto - Wiranto's adversary -and promoted him to the post 
of Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve. Wiranto dominated the Armed Forces 
Headquarters, whilst Prabowo and his allies, mostly from Army Special Forces 
(Kopassus) were in control of Army Headquarters and strategic positions in the 
greater Jakarta region.92 Among the close allies of Prabowo who were appointed to 
strategic military posts were Maj -Gen. Muchdi Purwopranjono as Commander of 
Special Forces, Maj -Gen. Sjafrie Samsuddin as Jakarta Military Commander and Gen. 
Subagio as Army Chief -of- Staff. As discussed in chapter nine, Prabowo cultivated 
close relations with Muslim groups and, in early 1998, in advancement of his own 
career ambitions, appeared to back Habibie for the vice -presidency in rivalry with 
other elites, especially Wiranto. In this way, the Vice -President Habibie, with 
Prabowo's tacit backing, appeared to be placed in an uneasy balance of power against 
Wiranto, presumably with the aim of keeping both parties weak under Suharto's 
command. 
89 . See chapter nine. 
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The discussion to this point has demonstrated that state incorporation of Islam 
had outcomes beyond the immediate stated and implicit objectives of neutralising 
political Islam. One of the broader implications of incorporation was that Muslim 
interests were drawn into partisan struggles that facilitated Suharto's tactics of sowing 
division and circumventing potential threats to his power. ICMI and Golkar also 
became important nerve centres for the negotiation of patron -client struggles. That is, 
patrons like Suharto, Habibie, Sìti Rukmana and Hartono sought to use the institutions 
as client support-hases in advancement of their own careers and survival interests 
against rivals. The biggest cleavage occurred between disgruntled military leaders and 
the newly ascendant pro -ICMI groups. Intra -elite contest, however, remained within 
the predictable limits of New Order politics and therefore did not disrupt a carefully 
maintained power balance underpinning Suharto's presidency. Corporatised Muslim 
and civilian (ICMI/Golkar) interests became important arenas, if not instruments, for 
mediating these contests and reinforcing Suharto's role as the final arbiter of dispute. 
3. Rivalry between ICMI and anti -Habibie bureaucrats 
The kinds of tensions and lines of conflict between pro -Habibie (ICMI) 
interests and their military antagonists found an echo in the state bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratic infighting particularly centred on competition for cabinet positions as the 
succession crisis deepened. As part of divide- and -rule, Suharto had maintained a 
shifting balance of competing interests in consecutive cabinets. The following case 
study illustrates how, after the appointment of the 6th Development Cabinet in March 
1993, ICMI interests were drawn into the contest in defence of their patron against 
other state interests. 
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A) Bureaucratic competition in development cabinets 
The 6`' Development Cabinet comprised an uneasy balance of competing 
interests, especially between the economic conservatives /technocrats and, roughly 
speaking, the economic nationalists (and the respective constituencies they served). 
That is, after a sustained period of economic liberalisation, the economic technocrats 
and the burgeoning interests of private capital were coming up against the entrenched 
rent- seeking practices of privileged family interests. Suharto's children and Habibie's 
family were among those who had built their own economic empires through state 
protection and rent seeking.93 
On the side of state protectionism, Habibie retained his portfolio as Minister of 
Research and Technology. Three of his bureaucratic colleagues from the Agency of 
Research, Technology and Application (BPPT), the Minister of Education and Culture 
Wardiman Djojonegoro, the Minister of Transport Haryanto Dhanutirto and the 
Minister of Trade Satrio Budiharjo Judono also gained ministerial rank in the cabinet, 
They belonged to one stream of economic nationalism (that promoted investment in 
high -end technology) which adhered to a policy of investment in import- substitution 
industries requiring government protection of domestic, particularly indigenous, 
capital. Other economic nationalists were the Minister of Transmigration Siswono 
Juhohusodo (a business client of the State Secretariat), and the State 
Minister /Chairman of the National Planning Board (Bappenas, formerly a preserve of 
the technocrats), Ginanjar Kartasasmita. Ginanjar's career was in the State Secretariat. 
The Co- ordinating Minister of Industry and Trade, Hartarto, ideologically was 
positioned somewhere between the economic nationalists and the technocrats. 
33 . John McBeth, "Family and Friends: Suharto unveils an inner -circle cabinet," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 26 March 1998, p.22. 
239 
From the conservative /technocrats' camp, some ministers were retained from 
the previous cabinet. One important addition was the new Minister of Finance, Mar'ie 
Muhammad, who was appointed to maintain economic austerity and to keep a check 
on Habibie's sometimes run -away budgetary expenditures.94 Meanwhile, three 
influential economic technocrats (of Christian faith), and long -time cabinet members, 
Radius Prawiro, Adri anus Mooy and J.B. Sumarlin were dropped from the cabinet. 
These technocrats, under the early strong influence of Suharto's economics adviser, 
Widjojo Nitisastro, adhered to free -market policies that emphasised non -oil /gas 
exports. The competing economic visions between Habibie and the technocrats has 
been disparagingly termed "Widjojonomics" and Habìbienomics ".95 
The departure of the technocrats from the cabinet, at the same time that Benny 
Murdani was dropped, was seen as serving two main purposes. One was to placate 
Muslim demands for greater, proportional representation in Indonesia's political 
institutions, as Muslim political interests associated with ICMI claimed that Christians 
had, for too long, dominated political institutions disproportionate to their community 
numbers. Consequently, only four Ministers (or 10 percent) of the 6th Development 
Cabinet were non- Muslims.96 The second purpose was Suharto's effort to readjust the 
balance of influence away from the economic technocrats and towards economic 
nationalists after the preceding (Fifth) Development Cabinet had accorded enhanced 
influence to the technocrats. The competing interests brought into the cabinet 
reflected earlier struggles and cabinet compositions, as the pendulum of economic 
94 . "Setelah Soeharto Menelepon di Kala Sahur," Tempo, 27 March 1993, pp.15 -16; "Masa -Masa 
Teknokrat Bertugas," Tempo, pp.17 -19; "Yang Terharu dan Terkagum -kagum," Tempo, 27 March 
1993, pp.19 -26; "Teknolog Mengeser Teknokrat," Editor, 27 March 1993, pp.45 -6. 
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"Teknolog Mengeser Teknokrat," Editor, pp.45 -6. 
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influence swung between the technocrats and nationalists and each school of thought 
sought to gain Suharto's "preferential" ear.47 
A rival of Habibie's, the State Secretary, Murdiono (a military general who 
had spent most of his career in civil administration), was appointed for a second term. 
Both officials were close advisors to Suharto, no doubt competing for influence with 
the President. There existed potential points of tension between the two ministers. 
Vedi Hadiz identified one point of tension, noting that "ICMI's new -found 
prominence has...encroached on Sekneg's [the State Secretariat's] role of controlling 
access to the President. "98 In addition, Murdiono had leaned in favour of policies 
promoted by the economic technocrats, anathema to Habibie's brand of economic 
nationalism. Gaffar also identified an alliance between Murdiono and General Edi 
Sudrajat, one of Habibie's major opponents in the mainstream military.99 Murdiono- 
Habibie tensions stemmed from Suharto's cultivation of rival networks, particularly 
between economics ministers and departments, and allowing disputes to build before 
mediating in favour of one side. 
97 . For example, referring to the Fourth Development Cabinet (1983- 1988), Pangaribuan noted the 
characteristic role performed by Suharto as final arbiter of this dispute. "The technocrats, Sekneg [State 
Secretariat), the Department of Industries under Hartarto, the Minister of Research and Technology 
Habibie, all had their own programs. However, the existence of different concepts and strategies of 
industrialisation actually hampered cooperation within the cabinet. It was at this time that the 
President's role as final decision -maker was crucial." For the duration of the Fourth Development 
Cabinet, Suharto had allowed the State Secretary, Sudharmono, to turn the Secretariat into a formidable 
power base and patronage dispensing machine, as it became an instrument for recruiting civilian elite 
into the government bureaucracy and political institutions, a means of the President extending his 
control over the government administration and reducing his reliance on the military, and one of the 
"most important economic policy -making institutions throughout the 1980s." In particular, under 
Sudharmono's leadership the Secretariat developed protectionist policies favouring indigenous capital 
in order to eliminate Ali Murtopo's influence, which was linked to Chinese domestic capital, in 
economic policy -making. The Fifth Development Cabinet (1988 -1993) represented Suharto's 
correction upon a correction. That is, Suharto appointed the new State Secretary, Murdiono, who had 
hitherto played a mediating role between the economic nationalists and technocrats, to adjust the 
balance back in favour of the technocrats as well as eliminate the State Secretariat's powerful control 
over economic policy -making and elite recruitment. During this period, Murdiono facilitated greater 
co- operation between the State Secretariat and the technocrats, which resulted in the dismantling of 
protectionist policies and a wave of successive deregulations. Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State 
Secretariat, p.58 -63, 74 -80. 
98 . Vedi R. Hadiz, "The Sekneg Experience and New Order Politics," Pangaribuan, The Indonesian 
State Secretariat, p.86. 
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B) Corruption allegations against an ICMI bureaucrat 
Thus, the entry of Habibie's team of bureaucrats and loyalists at BPPT into the 
1993 cabinet, at the expense of other state interests, stimulated continuing intra- 
elite/intra-cabinet conflict. These tensions came to a head in 1995. The political storm 
began on 10 October, when the Inspector General of Development, Maj. -Gen. (ret.) 
Irjenbang Kentot Harseno (a former military adjutant to the President, and a confidant 
of Benny Murdani's), sent the first of three reports marked "top secret" to Suharto of 
corruption allegations against the ICMI bureaucrat, the Minister of Transport 
Haryanto Dhanutirto. Irjenbang's office was loosely within the orbit of the State 
Secretariat. His report, written on State Secretariat letterhead, accused Haryanto of 
diverting Rp. 9 billion of funding, in the form of 392 non -budgetary levies, for his 
own personal enrichment from 18 of 27 state -Owned Companies (BUMN) under his 
supervision at the Department of Transport.10o 
The report was leaked to the press, by an unknown source, and was distributed 
widely to government departments and community leaders. One photocopied report 
landed on the desk of Amien Rais, then the Head of ICMI's Council of Experts 
(before his ouster). A controversy was soon sparked by detailed coverage of the 
corruption allegations, which indicated that Habibie's rivals in the state bureaucracy, 
associated with Murdiono's State Secretariat, were behind efforts to undermine the 
technology minister's reputation. Murdiono promptly gave his public support to 
Gaffar, "Indonesia 1995 ?" p.56. 
100. Among other charges, Trjenbang accused the transport minister of using these state funds to 
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Irjenbang's report and called for an internal investigation of Haryanto. The report 
caused a furore as Muslim interests associated with ICMI closed ranks to defend the 
ICMI bureaucrat against corruption allegations, in an open rift with Habibie's 
antagonists at the State Secretariat 1°1 
After the corruption allegations against Haryanto became public, the ABRI 
fraction and the PDI Fraction of Parliamentary Commission II quickly backed 
Irjenbang's report and demanded Haryanto's immediate resignation. The two 
Parliamentary factions stressed that the source of the leak was not at issue, but the 
contents of Irjenbang's document were of upmost importance because it centered on 
the damaging problem of corruption.102 Meanwhile, Muslim interests centering on 
ICMI considered Irjenbang to have falsified the report, and viewed the vital issue to 
December 1995, pp.25 -7; "Prof K. Harseno: `Jurus Baru' dari Kantor Irjenbang," Tiras, 28 December 
1995, p.24. 
lot According to one analysis, the attempt to undermine Haryanto had Suharto's blessing as the 
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Politik Sebuah Jabatan," Ummat, 22 January 1996, p. 29; "Ilmu Gathuk DiBatik Memo Irjenbang," 
Tiras, 28 December 1995, p.22; "Wawancara Amien Rais: Jangan Mengepel Lantai dengan Lap 
Kotor," Tiras, 28 December 1995, p.63. 
102 . "Menhub Diminta Mundur," Surabaya Post, 16 December 1995; "Dr Soewoto: Soal Mundur, 
Keputusan Presiden," Surabaya Post, 16 December 1995; "Menhub: Tiga Minggu Saya Introspeksi," 
Surabaya Post, 16 December 1995; "Dokumen Rahasia Dan Korupsi," Republika Online, 26 December 
1995. 
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be the source of the leak, which they believed led to the offices of Murdiono's State 
Secretariat and to Irjenbang's office.'°3 
Suharto assigned to the Vice -President, Try Sutrisno, the task of investigating 
the allegations. After a meeting with Suharto and meetings with Try, Haryanto 
announced that he had been reprimanded and requested to undergo a period of 
introspection and to make procedural corrections to the administrative conduct of his 
transport department. After the investigation by the Vice- President's office, Murdiono 
announced the President's decision on 26 December that "there was no valid proof" 
that Haryanto had "used state money...for his own needs or gain ".1 °4 
Other Muslim members of Parliament, Muslim student groups, the radical 
organisation Solidarity Committee for the Islamic World (KISDI) and the ICMI 
intelligentsia were far from persuaded by Murdiono's assurances that he had not 
leaked "state secrets ". They were upset by what appeared to be a government 
whitewash of the case, and what some perceived as Murdiono's backhanded swipe 
against the transport minister. They were convinced that Suharto's investigation was 
not motivated by the desire to establish "clean government," and therefore that it had 
not sought to investigate those responsible for leaking Irjenbang's report to the press. 
Amien Rais was among the ICMI leaders who accused Irjenbang of falsifying the 
report, and added his voice to demands for the government to bring to trial 
whomsoever was found to have leaked the report containing "state secrets ". Amien 
103. "Sebagian Benar, Sebagian Tak Terbukti," Tiras, 28 December 1995, p.25; "Kasus Menhub: 
Angin Politik Berbalik," Tiras, 28 December 1995, p.62; "Jangan Mengepel Lantaì dengan Lap Kotor," 
Tiras, p.63; "Menteri Perhubungan: Setelah Haryanto Bersih," Gatra, 6 January 1996, p.73; Fletcher 
and Loveard, "Suharto Strikes Again." 
100.. Murdiono, nevertheless, caused some confusion by declaring that Haryanto was found to have 
used some state funds for private family travel plans, and other misdemeanours, although largely out of 
mal- administration not as a deliberate act of misappropriation. Most of the funds, he claimed, had been 
used to finance non -budgetary aspects of the Department's activities, a practice not condoned by the 
government. Murdiono insisted that Suharto considered that the controversy was thereby ended and 
required no further investigation. 
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claimed that the offices of Irjenbang and Murdiono were responsible for the leak 
aimed at discrediting Habibie's ministers and ICMI interests.1o5 
Muslim student organisations (including the Muslim University Student's 
Communication Forum, the Islamic University Student's Association, HMI and the 
University Students Solidarity Forum for Anti -Deviationism) held several 
demonstrations outside of Parliament and the Attorney General's office. They called 
for the Attorney General to investigate the leaking of state secrets and to rehabilitate 
Haryanto's name. Protests also occurred in Bandung, Surabaya and other cities. The 
CIDES leader, Egg i Sugjana (an underling of ICMI's General Secretary Adi Sasono), 
organised a student demonstration at Murdiono's offices at the State Secretariat in 
Jakarta, demanding a clarification of earlier accusations against Haryanto. 1°6 
One of the largest protests was coordinated by KISDI and held at the Al- 
Furqon Mosque on the grounds of the Dewan Dakwah organisation. KISDI's leader, 
Ahmad Sumargono, asserted that the leaking of Irjenbang's report was clearly an 
"illegal act" that must face "heavy sanctions." In Manado, North Sulawesi, fifteen 
Islamic organisations representing a broad spectrum of organisational interests, 
including NU, Muhammadiyah and HMI, urged the government to investigate the 
tas 
' Kasus Menhub: Angin Politik Berbalik," Tiras, p.62; "Wawancara Amien Rais: Jangan 
Mengepel," Tiras, p.63; "Kasus Menhub: Angin Politik Berbalik," Tiras, p.62; "Irjenbang: Mengusut 
Sumber Kebocoran itu," Gatra, 13 January 1996, pp.32 -3; "Surat Irjenbang: Memorandum dan Bubur 
Panas," Gatra, p.70; "Menteri Perhubungan: Setelah Haryanto Bersih," Gatra, 6 January I996 p.73; 
"Menelikung Jalan Demokrasi," Ummat, 22 January 1996, p.26; M. Amien Rats, "Resonansi: Posisi 
Moral, "Republika Online, 28 December 1995; M. Amien Rais, "Lomba Korupsi," Republika Online, 
23 November 1995. 
tab According to one report, which evinced an anti -Murdiono stance, the State Secratary responded 
by threatening to "destroy [CMI" if demands continued against him. Although, bowing to pressure he 
also announced that he had directed his Assistant Investigator at the State Secretariat to investigate 
possible sources of the leak: the office of the State Secretariat, the Vice -President's office and 
Irjenbang's office. The investigation found that the leak had not occurred from either of these offices. 
M. Mas'oed, "Analisa Politik: Moerdiono Dan ICMI," Istiqlal, (apakabar @access.digex.net), 10 
January 1996. 
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circumstances surrounding the leak of Irjebang's report. The ICMI leader, Amien 
Rais, went further than most by calling the leak "an act of subversion.i107 
Concluding comments 
ICMI was part of Suharto's corporatist strategy aimed at neutralising Muslim 
political aspirations. Yet, ICMI, and the general Muslim backlash against Haryanto's 
accusers created a highly politicised and potentially embarrassing climate for the 
government. Attempts by Irjenbang and Murdiono to discredit Haryanto had 
backfired. That is, the ICMI intelligentsia redirected the focus of debate from one of 
corruption allegations against Haryanto to one of demands to punish the official who 
leaked the state secrets. Members of ICMI' s intelligentsia perceived that the attack 
against Haryanto was part of a planned strategy by ABRI- linked forces hostile to 
107. Amid demands for Haryanto's "good name" to be rehabilitated, ICMI's General Secretary, Adi 
Sasono, insisted that Haryanto's name had been stained by the mass media, which had uncritically 
accepted Irjenbang's allegations. "I think there is no basis for bringing the case of the Minister of 
Transport to court," Sasono insisted. "He is truly clean. He has the right to be rehabilitated." The Editor 
of Habibie's mouthpiece the Republika daily, Parni Hadi, sharply rebuked the "non- Muslim mass 
media" calling their reportage of the corruption scandal as one -sided in favour of Irjenbang and 
demanded that some of the media be brought to trial. "This is an Indonesian journalistic tragedy," he 
exclaimed. One story circulated, which accused the "Christian" press (most of the newspapers 
identified as such were not even remotely under Christian ownership) of being eager to discredit 
Haryanto in an undisguised attack against Muslim interests. Before a prayer gathering (Tablik Akbar) 
of around 30,000 participants to celebrate New Years' Eve, Islamic preachers in East Jakarta's suburb 
of Kampung Melayu also linked allegations against Haryanto to "Christian" mass media that "did not 
like to see Islam progress." Mas'oed, "Analisa Politik: Moerdiono Dan ICMI,'; "Amien Rais Akan 
Jelaskan Soal Kebocoran Laporan Irjenbang," Republika Online, 2 January 1996; "Sekum: Heboh 
Kasus" Republika Online, 2 January 1996; "Amien Rais Akan Jelaskan Soal Kebocoran Laporan 
Irjenbang," Republika Online; " Risiko Politik Sebuah Jabatan," Ummat, 22 January 1996, p.29; Parni 
Hadi, "Resonansi: Jurnalistic Investigatif," Republika Online, 23 December 1995; Paroi Hardi, 
` Resonansi: Introspeksi "; Republika Online, 30 December 1995; . "Amien Rais Akan Jelaskan Soal," 
Republika Online. 
It was common for a number of Muslim leaders to perceive and/or portray politics as polarised 
between pro -Islamic and anti -Islamic (i.e., secular, nationalist and Christian interests). This tendency 
was most, but not exclusively, prevalent among more radically inclined leaders from the modernist 
organisational stream of Islam, from organisations like Persatuan Islam (Persis), Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia (PII), Dewan Dakwah, KISDI and Muhammadiyah. The repeated stigmatising of opponents 
as "Christian" was, to some extent, a virulent residue of the despised political legacies of Ali Murtopo 
and Benny Murdani, discussed earlier in the chapter. One of the targets of these veiled attacks against 
the Christian or non -Muslim press, in fact, might have been Benny Murdanì who, some Muslim leaders 
appeared to believe, was one of the figures behind the allegations intended to hurt ICMI interests. 
"Tragedi Haryanto Dhanutirto," hmctamar @server.inda.net.Id, (apakabar @access.digex.net), 24 
December 1995. 
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ICMI and Habibie to reduce Muslim influence in, the future People's Consultative 
Assembly and cabinet. They tried to deflect the allegations against the ICMI 
bureaucrat by accusing other senior government officials -Murdiono and Irjenbang- 
of collusion against Muslim interests. They claimed the collusion was part of a 
broader systemic corruption afflicting the New Order political system.' °x 
One interpretation of the corruption controversy is that Suharto's circle did not 
look kindly upon ICMI's role in arousing political opposition to Murdiono, in 
exposing the intra -elite rivalry, or in claiming that the government was systemically 
corrupt. This would have reflected badly on the President's own rule. A corporatist 
organisation, top -heavy in government bureaucrats who were positioned there by 
Suharto in order to subdue the potential for anti -government dissent, in this instance, 
had the contrary effect. It became embroiled in conflict in a manner presumably 
undesired by Suharto's power -holding elite. Had state supervision of ICMI therefore 
failed to suppress political agitations of its intelligentsia? 
An alternative interpretation is that the intra -elite rivalries were simply a 
consequence of strategies pursued by Suharto of cultivating competing patronage 
networks. That is, the President was happy to witness contestations between 
Murdiono and Hahihie, as the two state leaders offset each other's power and, in 
doing so, ensured that Suharto retained his role as ultimate goal -keeper and arbiter of 
dispute. Suharto's attempt to resolve the controversy, by delegating an investigation 
to Vice -President Try Sutrisno's office, did not detract from the fact that the intra- 
bureaucratic conflict arose in the first place from pro- Habibiefanti- Habibie cleavages 
in the cabinet. And Suharto had consistently compiled cabinets to reflect, and 
exacerbate, competing interests, visions and trends in national politics. 
108. "Mahalnya Harga Penyelesaían Yuridis," Ummat, 22 January 1996, p.24 -5. "Menelikung Jalan 
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The ICMI intelligentsia became embroiled in political controversy by siding 
with Habibie against the Minister's detractors. This outcome was contrary to one of 
the main stated aims of ICMI (see chapter five) to remain outside of politics. In the 
final analysis, contests between different patron- client interests Habibie (ICMI) and 
Murdiono /Irjenbang (State Secretariat) -had caused a client -base, the ICMI 
membership, to he drawn into that conflict. The defence of Habibie and of other ICMI 
interests was tied integrally to perceptions about ICM1's own position within future 
power constellations as the 1997 general election and the 1998 People's Consultative 
Assembly election approached.1o9 
C) The 7th Development Cabinet: continuing cleavages 
The swearing in of the 7111 Development Cabinet in 1998 further exacerbated 
the divisions and contest. Some of Vice -President B.J. Habibie's allies were re- 
appointed to a cabinet that was widely recognised as a "crony cabinet" of the 
President's loyalists, business associates and family members. Despite earlier 
corruption allegations, Haryanto Dhanutirto (the new Minister of Food, Horticulture 
and Medicine), was among three of Habibie's associates who were appointed as 
ministers.10 At the end of the day, Haryanto was regarded as a Suharto loyalist. 
Meanwhile, Murdiono was replaced after two stints as State Secretary. "' 
Along with the appointment of former Presidential military adjutant, Wiranto, 
and Suharto's son -in -law, Prabowo, to the military leadership, the cabinet was meant 
Demokrasi," Ummat, 22 January 1996, p.27; Amien Raìs, "Saling Tuduh Antarpejahat," Kompas 
Online. 
109. Interview with Amien, 26 September 1998 in Canberra; "Menelikung Jalan Demokrasi," 
Ummat, 22 January 1996, p.27; " Politik Di Balik Bocornya Dokumen," Ummat, 22 January 1996, p.21; 
Mas'oed, "Analisa Politik". 
11° The other two were Rahardi Ramelan (replacing Habibie as Minister of Technology) and Giri 
Suseno Hadi Hardjono -in a cabinet in which all but one minister were Muslim. 
111. ICMI interests attributed Murdiono's removal to the Minister's embroilment in the corruption 
controversy. The Editors, Indonesia 65 (April 1998), pp.159 -162. 
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to bolster Suharto's authority at a time of deepening economic and political crisis 
when he was experiencing narrowing support for his presidency."' Suharto's 
children, Siti Rukmana and Bambang Trihatmodjo, reportedly had a decisive say in 
the cabinet's formation, which saw Habibie's influence diminish. Economic 
technocrats and conservatives, including Mari'e Muhammad, were displaced by 
economic nationalists under the new Minister of Finance, Ginandjar Kartasismata's 
leadership.L13 
Despite enormous hopes that Habibie's ascension to the Vice -Presidency 
would result in cabinet appointments for the ICMI intelligentsia, Suharto ensured that 
they did not gain a single seat. They were disappointed sorely by their exclusion from 
the 1998 cabinet and from power configurations and began to criticise openly 
Suharto's crony cabinet. Amien Rais and other members of ICMI identified Haryanto 
as one of Suharto's most corrupt ministers.114 They no longer identified with 
Habibie's minister against other state interests, as their stance regarding Haryanto and 
corruption seemed greatly determined by their perception of their own position within 
the power configurations and contests. This time they opposed a cabinet in which 
Haryanto had become a minister and they had become clear losers. 
4. Conclusion 
Muslim interests were brought into state structures that served as mechanisms 
for the regulation of relations between intermediate elite groups and the upper- reaches 
of power; specifically President Suharto's regime. One of the main functions of 
incorporation, as discussed in this chapter, was to regulate the access of these groups 
112 We consider the context of the economic and political crisis in chapters eight and nine. 
i3 See chapter nine for details of the cabinet reshuffle and supporting citations. 
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to patronage and power opportunities, which resulted not only in winners and losers 
but supplied one of the arenas in which struggles for position and power took place. 
This study has shown how corporatist organisations (Golkar and ICMI) can serve 
authoritarian strategies of divide- and -rule with the aim of maintaining an imbalance 
of competing interests. 
Thus, the analysis considered how the corporatist organisations were subject 
to the interplay of patron -client networks and to infra -elite competition, in which 
Suharto was the senior patron and final arbiter of dispute. Consequently, conflict 
occurred between newly incorporated interests (in ICMI), which were seeking access 
to political power and career advancement, and rival interests (military leaders and 
state bureaucrats). Some of the rivals had been sidelined or excluded from power 
arrangements by the rise of the new groups. 
However, incorporation in ICMI also failed to translate into real positions of 
power for its intelligentsia. Suharto had continued to maintain a balance of competing 
interests in the political institutions as a means of preserving regime integrity and 
personal power. The President's reliance on tactics of divide -and -rule, to -date, had 
continued to serve him well by keeping possible rival centres of power, or patron - 
client networks, in a constant state of mutual struggle. It was not necessary for 
Suharto to orchestrate the contests for power; it was sufficient that he presided over 
them and cultivated competing interests in a manner that would reinforce his own role 
as supreme leader of Indonesian politics. In conclusion, incorporated Muslim interests 
helped Suharto maintain a shifting disequilìbrium of forces as they contended for 
political predominance at the time of growing public perceptions of an impending 
succession crisis. 
114. 
"Amien Rais: Kabinet Ini Tidak Profesional," Forum Keadilan, 6 April 1998, p.20; Abu Kainil 
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Insofar as conflict reinforced Suharto's dominance over Indonesian politics, 
and remained within predictable limits by not threatening to spark society -wide 
conflagrations, it can be assumed that intra -elite rivalry was not an undesired 
consequence of state management strategies. However, this chapter has considered 
only an early phase of intra -elite struggle. There were indications that Muslim 
interests in ICMI not only were being drawn into power struggles. They also were 
being re- politicised as state -Islamic accommodation, which coincided with a period of 
political openness, had stimulated rising political aspirations on the part of its 
intelligentsia. Consequently, incorporated Muslim interests were showing early signs 
of moving beyond their state -corporatist containment by formulating their own private 
agendas. Chapter eight examines the expansion of organised societal interests that, as 
a result of infra -elite conflict and the changing composition of Indonesian society, 
were unleashed by a period of political openness. 
(ICMI Komisariat Eropa), "ICMI Tolak Susunan Kabinet," abukamil@yahoo.com, 
apakabar@clark.net. 
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Chapter 8 
Authoritarian institutions confront societal pluralism: 
mobilisations and counter -mobilisations of state and society 
1. Introduction 
By the mid -to -late 1990s, there were growing signs that society could no 
longer be constrained by corporatist arrangments or by the politics of exclusion. Intra- 
elite conflict began to move beyond the predictable boundaries of the New Order's 
exclusionary arrangements and began to re- connect with grassroots politics. 
Disgruntled members of the elite' (including sidelined ABRI generals, disaffected 
politicians, and unincorporated interests) and grassroots activists started identifying 
with, and/or organising, the grievances and causes of some of Indonesia's politically 
excluded classes against Suharto's regime. In particular, elite -level contest stimulated 
society -wide conflagrations, and resulted in a series of anti -regime mobilisations of 
`pro- democracy' forces and state -orchestrated counter -mobilisations of pro -regime 
groups against the mounting opposition. 
Bianchi explains this phenomenon of escalating conflict between contending 
interests. He argues that state offers of special treatment and concessions to one 
associational constituency generates resentment among the neglected groups, which 
then organises to demand greater participation (inclusion) in the public decision - 
making processes and power -sharing arrangements. There is a consequent tendency 
. By "the elite' I mean the "political elite," which includes the ruling elite (the president and his 
immediate circle) and supporting elite (ministers, bureaucrats, legislators, politicians, economics 
advisers and the like) within the state. It also includes leaders of non -government organisations and 
high -profile intellectuals, government opponents, and dissidents, who interact with the state elite, are 
recognised for their contribution to national discourse, or are involved in elite -level political 
negotiation and contest. 
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for contending interests to vie for political predominance which, in turn, can trigger a 
"chain reaction" of mobilisation and counter -mobilisation of differentially affected 
group interests. In particular, disaffected members of the elite begin to cooperate with 
excluded groups in fashioning an alternative pluralist arena with which to counter the 
power of the state. Much of the discussion in this and the following chapters also 
finds explanation in literature about regime transition. Suharto's New Order regime 
appeared to follow a pre -transition sequence, in which deepening intra -elite rivalry 
during a crisis of succession sparked escalating levels of societal mobilisation. A 
hardline reaction of the regime and the apparent failure of the hardline approach to 
stifle dissent followed the societal activation. 
This chapter looks at how sidelined members of the elite, dissidents, the 
intelligentsia, and student -led NGOs began to organise against Suharto's regime and 
the state- Islamic collaboration, as isolated islands of pluralism gradually formed into 
coordinated group actions. The PDT and PPP also showed signs of exiting from their 
corporatist containment as the party leaderships began to identify with grassroots 
opposition to Suharto. Meanwhile, societal activation met with a policy reversal in the 
form of hardline reaction, which brought to an end the period of political openness. 
As part of this hardline policy, Suharto sought to "counter- organise" against 
grassroots opposition by drawing incorporated Muslims and other pro -regime groups 
to the defence of "legitimate government order." However, the institutions of 
authoritarianism were showing signs of decay, because they no longer were able to 
contain, channel, neutralise, or coopt effectively the diversifying demands and 
challenges of society. It is to the broader trends that the analysis now turns. 
254 
2. Organisation of interests against ICMI, Habibie, and Suharto 
Initial signs of challenge to the status quo came from disaffected members of 
the elite who, in the years after ICMI's founding in December 1990, made several 
efforts to organise against the Suharto- Muslim rapprochement. A cross -section of 
interests coalesced in the new organisations under the ideological banner of 
nationalism in opposition to what was perceived as an attempt by Muslim interests in 
ICMI to build formal links between the Islamic religion and the polity. The range of 
interests arrayed in the new organisations against ICMI included retired army 
generals, representatives of minority religions (mainly Christians), unincorporated 
Muslim leaders, and pro- democracy advocates and human rights activists. They 
claimed to be making a principled stand in defence of national unity against the 
danger posed to that unity by the mixing of religion and politics at the level of the 
state. 
The fundamental view that these varied interests promoted was that religious 
tolerance and therefore national unity depended on all citizens being treated equally 
by the government. The state ideology of Pancasila and the Indonesian constitution 
were the accepted common platforms and standards that guaranteed religious 
tolerance, equality of citizenship, and national integrity. The spectre of Muslim 
interests in ICMI using their "primordial" or religious affiliation as a basis for 
channelling their political demands and aspirations was thought to greatly threaten the 
Pancasila and the constitution (the guarantors of tolerance). The groups couched their 
arguments variously, but most concluded the Indonesian nation currently was 
threatened by the virulent rise of sectarianism, with ICMI being the prime example of 
that threat. In order to ward off the imminent threat of sectarianism, they argued, 
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organisations were needed that incorporated a wide variety of religious, ethnic, 
political and other groups that were willing to work together in the national cause.2 
Despite the nationalistic sentiments, sceptics observed that the new coalitions 
of anti -ICMI forces mainly consisted of retired military figures, pensioned state 
officials, and defeated politicians. The Habibie -Harmoko team had ousted many of 
them from their positions in Golkar, the MPR, and the DPR, or they were the losers in 
recent reshuffles of the armed forces and cabinet. Active armed forces leaders and 
cabinet ministers who were opposed to Habibie and ICMI also gave their sometimes - 
strong endorsement to the organisations, usually under the auspices of their 
commitment to the protection of Indonesia's national integrity.3 
The first attempt to organise against the ICMI phenomenon occurred before 
the 1993 political reshuffles (discussed in chapter seven) with the establishment of the 
Democracy Forum in March 1991 under Abdurrahman Wahid's leadership. 
Christians, secular- nationalists, anti -ICMI Muslim intellectuals and pro- democracy 
figures joined the Forum. Its members established the Democracy Forum in reaction 
to what they saw as disturbing signs of religious and ethnic intolerance and 
sectarianism such as the Monitor Affair in October 1990 (see chapter six) and the 
creation of ICMI in December. Forum members were apprehensive about the 
government's highly restrictive brand of authoritarianism which, they believed, left 
people with few channels to mobilise politically and forced them instead to mobilise 
on the basis of volatile ethnic and religious issues. Suharto's government easily 
Z. "Debut Kelompok Pelangi," Tiras, 2 November 1995; "Dari Hotel Aryaduta Sampai Ke Enteos 
Club," Tiras, 2 November 1995; "Wawancara Letjen Bambang Triantoro: Nanti Ada Yang Merasa 
Terpuji dan Terinjak," Tiras, 2 November 1995; "Berebut Label Kebangsaan, " Ummat, 27 November 
1995; "ICMI: Wacana Pasea Politik Aliran," Ummat, 11 December 1995; "Gebrakan Para Mantan," 
Gatra, 11 November 1995; "Keramaían di Bawah Tempurung," Tempo, 4 June 1994; "Lahirnya 
YKPK: Satu Lagi Lawan Tanding TCMI dan Habibie," PIPA, (apakabar @clark.net), 26 October 1995. 
3 . "Dari Hotel Aryaduta campai ke Enteos Club," Tiras, 2 November 1995; "YKPK, Rukunnya 
Orang -orang Kecewa," Gatra, 31 October 1995; "Gebrakan Para Mantan," Gatra, 11 November 1995; 
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manipulated these issues for its own short-term gains, they claimed, and was therefore 
complicit in the rise of sectarianism.4 
By the mid- 1990s, a plethora of new organisations had been created both in 
reaction to ICMI, and encouraged by the period of political openness, although not all 
with nationalism as their ideological platform. In 1991, two separate intellectuals' 
associations for Hindus and Buddhists had been formed. In April 1993, the Vice - 
President Try Sutrisno gave his approval to the founding of the Nusantara 
Intellectuals' Association (ICNU) as a nationalistic vehicle aimed at the bridging of 
divergent constituencies in order to counter sectarian tendencies. In November, the 
New Parkindo (the Indonesian Christian Participation) -an apparent resurrection of 
the old Parkindo (the Indonesian Christian Party) -was established.5 
It was efforts to build a broad coalition of national forces, beginning in 1994 
and gathering momentum in 1995, however, which represented the most concerted 
attempt both to combat ICMI and to open new political space for dissenting groups. 
The banning of Tempo, Editor, and DeTik in June 1994 was a major context of new 
organisational activity of pro- democracy groups,6 as the Suharto- military rift 
widened. Suharto tried to curtail the period of political openness and press freedoms, 
"Wawancara II: Klenik dalam Politik Wayang," Gatra, 25 November 1995; Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, 
"Indonesia 1991: Quest for Democracy in a Turbulent Year," Southeast Asian Affairs, 1992, p.131. 
4 . Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: democracy, Islam, and the ideology of tolerance, New 
York, Routledge, 1995, pp156 -160, 165; Tirtosudarmo, "Indonesia 1991: Quest for Democracy," 
p.128. 
5 . 'Berebut Label Kebangsaan," Ummat; "Ada Pula Parkindo Baru," Gatra, 18 November 1995; 
"ICNU, setelah ICMI," Editor, I May I993. 
. Uhlin argues that "the banning of Tempo, Editor, and DeTik in 1994 was a hard blow against the 
Indonesian press, but it also led to the creation of new groups fighting for press freedom and 
democracy in general." Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave of democratisation" : The 
Indonesian Pro -Democracy Movement in a Changing World, Surrey, Curzon Press, 1997, p.115. For 
example, in June protesters established an organisation called Indonesian Solidarity for Press Freedom 
(SIUPP -these initials were a deliberate play on the acronym for the press publishing licence, also 
called STUPP). In August, a group of journalists and editors established the Alliance of Independent 
Journalist (AJI) as an alternative to the government -sanctioned Indonesian Journalists Association 
(PWI). From June to August, journalists, students NGO groups and other pro- democracy forces held a 
series of demonstrations against the closures. Although the demonstrations met with police repression, 
ABRI permitted a student protest to reach the gates of the Presidential Palace. 
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especially because detailed reporting in the three weeklies had exposed a rift between 
ABRI and Habibie. Elements in ABRI sympathised with the protesters and the 
military "publicly distanced itself" from the closures,? while ICMI in defence of 
Habibie had backed the banning of Tempo.8 Attempts to found nationalist 
organisations largely occurred after the press closures, if not in direct response to 
them. 
Initiatives in 1994 to create a nationalist entity under various acronyms 
foundered before an agreement was reached to form the Association of Pancasila 
Development Intellectuals (PCPP) in mid -1995. Retired military officers, the 
Indonesian Christian University Student Movement (GMKI), the Catholic University 
Student Association of the Republic of Indonesia (PMKRI), and the Indonesian 
Nationalist University Student Movement (GMNI, the students' wing of the former 
Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI) were prominent supporters of the new PCPP. The 
Minister of Transmigration, Siswono Yudohusodo (a former GMNI activist), the 
Environment Minister, Sarwono Kusumaatnadja, the Minister of Defence, Edi 
Sudrajat, and the Secretary of State, Murdiono -four ardent Habibie and ICMI 
adversaries- reportedly attended the opening session of PCPP. Edi and Siswono were 
among the state officials who gave strong endorsements to PCPP, and similar 
nationalistic organisational initiatives, which they hoped would foster national 
reconciliation and promote peaceful coexistence of Indonesia's heterogeneous 
society.9 
7 . The Limits of Openness: Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor, New York, Washington, 
Los Angeles, London, Brussels, Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1994, p.11. 
8 
. See also The Limits of Openness, Human Rights Watch, pp.5 -20 and Ramage, Politics of 
Indonesia, pp.111, 151. 
. "Wawancara Menhankam Jenderal (Pum.) Rdi Sudrajat: Ini Kan Suatu Kebutuhan," Tiras, 2 
Nobember 1995; "PCPP dan Dua Penyakit Masa Kini," Kompas, 10 November 1995; "Siswono Tolak 
Pimpin PCPP dan Kosgoro," Kompas, 8 November 1995; "Ilpaya Berhuru Restu Pak Harto," Tempo, 4 
June 1994; "Ormas Baru Mengepung Habibie," Suara Independen, October -November 1995; 
"Gebrakan Para Mantan," Gatra. 
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It proved difficult for new organisations to escape the interference and divisive 
tactics of Suharto's regime. A fissure quickly developed within PCPP between a 
group led by Muhono (a former military secretary to Suharto) and one led by Sambas 
Wirakusumah (the elder brother of Edi Sudrajat). Muhono was considered to be too 
close to Suharto. As well, he had earlier tried to set up the Indonesian Nationalist 
Intellectuals Association (ICKI) together with General (ret.) Alamsjah Ratu 
Prawiranegara -a pro- Suharto figure who was one of the figures behind the initiative 
to found ICMI.1° However, these two figures also clashed over leadership of ICKI. 
The ICKI initiative, lacking Suharto's approval, was stillborn, while PCPP came 
quickly under Suharto's control. Thus, disaffected members of PCPP left to join 
another more independent vehicle founded in October, the National Brotherhood 
Reconciliation Foundation (YKPK). ' 1 
YKPK was soon branded the "rainbow group" because of its diverse 
membership. Most of the YKPK's members were retired state officials, bureaucrats, 
military officers, and politicians who had been sidelined by Habibie's rise to power. 
For example, the YKPK was led by two disaffected retired generals, Kharis Suhud 
(also the former chair of the MPR) and Bambang Triantoro (the former Armed Forces 
Chief -of -Staff of Social -Political Affairs under Benny Murdani's command of ABRI). 
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Sunarso Djajusman (the former ambassador to Malaysia) and Maj.- 
Gen. Samsuddin (a former MP from the armed forces' parliamentary faction) were 
heads of the Foundation's executive board. There were figures like Jacob Tobing, 
1° 
. Imaduddin Abdulrahim told of how Alamsjah facilitated Imaduddin's first meeting with Habibie 
in order to pursuade the technology minister to establish ICMI. Interview with Imaduddin, 15 February 
1994. For an account of Alamsjah's role see also Robert Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI 
and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia: 56 (October 1993), p.17. 
u 
. "Setelah [slam, Kini Kebangsaan," Tempo, 4 June 1994; " lipaya Berburu Restu Pak Harto," 
Tempo, p.25; " Alamsjah pun Terus Bicara," Tempo, 18 June 1994; "Lahirnya YKPK: Sam Lagi Lawan 
Tanding ICMI dan Habibie," PIPA; "Debut Kelompok Pelangi," Tiras; "PCPP," Forum Keadilan, 23 
October 1995; "Mohono Turun ke Gelanggang," Gatra, 2 September 1995. 
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Marzuki Darusman, and Anton Prijatno, who had served in Golkar under General 
(ret.) Wahono's chairmanship before Habibie ousted his team. Since their removal, 
Wahono and his supporters had become some of the government's most outspoken 
critics. 
A group of NU members close to Abdurrahman Wahid, such as its former 
Secretary General Gaffar Rahman and the former Secretary General of PPP, Matori 
Abdul Djalil, joined YKPK. Maton helped found the National Brotherhood 
Foundation after his failed bid to become the new general chairman of PPP at the 
party's 1994 National Congress, having been defeated by the government- backed 
candidate, Ismail Hasan Metareum. Matori and his supporters were then purged from 
PPP, reportedly for their membership of YKPK. Indonesia's media carried reports of 
a so- called "de- Wahono -isation" of Golkar and "di- YKPK- isatìon" of PPP.12 
One of the main objectives of the "rainbow group" was to prevent Habibie 
from becoming Indonesia's next Vice -President in 1998. General Edi Sudrajat was 
one of the military top brass who had, in 1993, supported Try Sutrisno's nomination 
for Vice -President against Suharto's choice of Habibie, and had since decided to hack 
those forces allied with the rainbow group. As Minister of Defence, Edi had opposed 
openly Habibie over the latter's appropriation of defence contracts. The former 
Minister of Environment and YKPK leader, Sarwono, had strongly criticised the sixth 
development cabinet of 1993, calling it uncoordinated and of low- calibre, and had 
been castigated by Suharto for his criticism. General (ret.) Harsudiono Hartas who, 
together with his mentor General (ret.) Benny Murdani, had been sidelined after the 
12 . " Mereka yang Vokal, Mereka yang Tergusur," Gatra, 28 September 1996; _`Gehrakan Para 
Mantan," Gatra; "Seperti Menepuk Air di Dulang," Tiras, 1 August 1996; "Pidato Wahono: Suara dari 
Masa Persidangan," Tiras, 1 August 1996; "Debut kelompok Pelangi," Tiras; "Profil YKPK: Merah, 
Kurring, Hijau, di Langit YKPK," Tiras, 2 November 1995; "National Brotherhood Foundation 
(YKPK) Discussion: Democracy and Justice Still Limited," Kompas, 9 January 1996: "Ormas Baru 
Mengepung Habibie," Suara Independen. 
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appointment of the new cabinet in 1993, also apparently backed YKPK. Thus, the 
sharp rivalry in the old cabinet had subsequently spilled over into support for 
organisations like YKPK, as the politically marginal forces prepared to retaliate 
against Habibie in the approaching presidential election of 1998.13 
It was hoped that the mushrooming organisations would provide the marginal 
figures with political vehicles with which they could gain access to power and have 
better bargaining positions vis -à -vis Habibie and ICMI in an anticipated post -Suharto 
era. People of aII political shades speculated that the 1998 election would bring about 
a period of transition triggered by presidential succession. The organisations were also 
a response to the inability of the established political system to channel people's 
aspirations. As such, there was a strong tendency of politicians to hark back to a pre - 
Suharto period by trying to resurrect old political affiliations of the 1950s as a means 
of re- channelling people's aspirations. We have already mentioned the New Parkindo. 
On 26 October, a New PNI was created under the leadership of Nyonya Supeni, a 
former PNI leader and ambassador under President Sukarno. Following this, a New 
Masyumi was established but few old Masyumi sympathisers were willing to identify 
with the party, partly out of fear of a military reprisal, but also because they had made 
accommodations with Suharto through ICML 14 
13 . " Mereka yang Vokal, Mereka yang Tergusur," Gatra, 28 September 1996; "Gebrakan Para 
Mantan," Gatra; "YKPK, Rukunnya Orang -orang Kecewa," Gatra; "Siswono: YKPK Organisasi Luar 
Biala," Kompas, 26 October 1995; "Persaingan di Balik Kisruh Kabinet," Suara Independen, 
December 1995. 
' . The New Masyumi no longer served the political interests of ex- Masyumi figures who had 
joined ICMI and hoped for greater access to power through the new arrangements. "'Masyumi Baru' 
Resmi Berdiri Anwar Haryono: Saya Tidak Tahu -menahu," Surabaya Post, 24 November 1995; 
"Menunggu Masyumi Dengan Karoseri Baru," Tiras, 23 November 1995; Wawancara Anwar Haryono: 
Masyumi Baru Membingungkan Masyarakat," Tiras, 23 November 1995; "'Lelucon' di Balik 
Masyumi Baru," Tiras, 23 November 1995; "Itu Akal- akalan Ridwan Saidi Saja," Tiras, 23 November 
1995; "Kembali dengan Wibawa Politik Masa Lalu," Tiras, 9 November 1995; "Wawancara Nyonya 
Supeni: Jangan Lupa, Sampai Kini PNI Belum Dibubarkan," Tiras, 9 November 1995; "Dari Hotel 
Aryaduta campai ke Enteos Club," Tiras; "Orman Baru: Forum Dialog ?" Kompas, 5 November 1995; 
"Berebut Label Kebangsaan," Ummat, 27 November 1995; "Gebrakan Para Mantan," Gatra; "YKPK, 
Rukunnya Orane prang Kecewa," Gatra. 
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An independent elections watch -dog (Komite Independent Pemantau Pemilu, 
KIPP) was also set up on 15 March 1996 to monitor the approaching general election 
and make sure that no ballot -box or other election irregularities occurred. To the 
government's consternation, the formation of KIPP spawned a number of other 
initiatives to establish independent election monitoring bodies in April. In March, the 
former Minister of Internal Affairs, General (ret.) Rudini, made a public appeal to 
Suharto's regime not to suppress new organisations like PCPP, YKPK, the New PNI, 
and the KIPP. He insisted that these organisations reflected a widespread desire of the 
people to participate in the life of the nation. In addition to these organisations, 
political and quasi -political parties, including the People's Democratic Party (PRD), 
and the Indonesian Democratic Union Party (PUDI) were founded. The decision to 
found new quasi- parties was encouraged, no doubt, by the regime's lifting of 
restrictions on freedom of assembly (December 1995) and its introduction, in January 
1996, of regulations enabling people to hold social, cultural and political gatherings 
without official permits.15 Overall, the proliferating "rainbow" groups constituted 
initiatives by opponents of the regime to open up democratic space and establish 
alternative channels of interest representation and political participation outside the 
restrictive corporatist structure. 
Although PRD was viewed as a potentially significant threat to Suharto's 
regime because of its grassroots following (discussed below), the other "rainbow" 
organisations did not constitute a direct threat to power arrangements. As elite- centred 
initiatives with no real grassroots membership, these organisations were limited in 
their ability to represent people's unfulfilled and rising expectations. They were, at the 
is Greg Fealy, "Indonesian Politics, 1995 -96: The Makings of a Crisis," Gavin W. Jones and 
Terence H. Hull (eds.), Indonesian Assessment: Population and Human Resources, Canberra, Research 
School of pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997, pp.27 -9; Ariel Heryanto, 
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end of the day, set up as vehicles with which to promote the ambitions and interests of 
one set of (sidelined) elite figures, who wanted to gain inclusion in the power 
structure, against another set of elite interests that were more closely aIIied to the 
state. 
Having said this, the power holders still perceived the "rainbow" organisations 
as a threat because they operated outside of the authorised political rules, which 
prohibited the formation of new political organisations. Moreover, the highly 
paternalistic state normally regarded open dissent as an intolerable act of 
insubordination or subversion. Although Suharto tolerated a certain level of dissent in 
order, among other things, to allow people to let off steam, he was not accustomed to 
the extent of criticism that leaders of the new organisations directed against the New 
Order establishment. An example of this criticism was, at a two -day national meeting 
of YKPK in Surabaya (8 -9 January 1996), when speakers highlighted the Suharto 
government's failure to provide democratic, accountable and transparent government 
that would permit people's genuine participation. Included among the dignitaries 
present at the national meeting opened by Wahono, were Marzuki Darusman of the 
National Human Rights Commission, the NU Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid and 
several prominent former PPP and Golkar leaders. The "de- Wahono -isation" and the 
"de- YKPK -isation" of the parties had hurt a number of these figures.16 
The Suharto government, no doubt, also was worried about the prospect of a 
domino effect should the new organisations provide an example for others to follow. 
Despite the government's apprehensions, it was not until the '`rainbow" organisations 
"Indonesia: Towards the Final Countdown ?" Southeast Asian Affairs 1997, pp.117 -119; "Early 
Election Fever," INTEL, 25 January 1996 (original source IPS 9 January 1996). 
6 
. "National Brotherhood Foundation (YKPK) Discussion: Democracy and Justice Still Limited," 
Kornpas, 9 January I996; "Bambang Triantoro: Some Are Suspicious of Newly -Formed YKPK," 
Kompas, 10 January 1996; "Seperti Menepuk Air Di Dulang," Tiras, 1 August 1996; "Mereka yang 
Vokal, Mereka yang Tergusur," Gatra, 28 September 1996. 
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lent their support to broader dissent in society coalescing round a faction of PDI led 
by the popularly -elected General Chair Megawati Sukarnoputri, that Suharto's circle 
of power holders decided to take decisive action against them. 
3. Growing dissent of the "rainbow" opposition and state retaliation 
This section of the chapter shifts to an analysis of grassroots agitation, much 
of it led by student, NGO and pro- democracy leaders seeking to harness popular 
dissent. It considers how the newly established quasi -parties and rainbow groups 
joined coalition- building efforts, centred round Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI faction, 
against the political status quo. The analysis also deals with the retaliation by 
Suharto's regime, as it engaged state instruments of coercion and repression and its 
propaganda machine in a systematic campaign to eradicate opposition. Suharto's 
regime resorted to policies of more direct coercion once existing political 
arrangements had clearly failed to ensure the continued exclusion of autonomously - 
organised interests that could mobilise mass society. In addition, Suharto's circle 
sought to mobilise pro -government forces, including incorporated Muslim interests, 
against the opposition. Finally, this section considers how societal interests retaliated 
against harsh state repression, reprisals and manipulations, as these interests sought to 
create new space for their own -long denied - participation in the political life of the 
nation. 
Increasing challenges to, and confrontation with, the established order came 
from elements both within and outside of the state's corporatist structure. That is, a 
faction led by the PDI General Chairperson, Megawati Sukarnoputri, became a 
catalyst for coalition building against Suharto's regime. This was despite the fact that 
PDI, until then, had been a largely subordinate and compliant part of the corporatised 
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party system. Megawati was the first popularly elected party leader since the 
beginning of the New Order and she came to represent a symbol of opposition. Some 
scholars argue that disgruntled segments of ABRI backed Megawati's nomination to 
PDI leader (December 1993) in possible rebuke to Suharto for reducing the military's 
political role in Golkar and as a counter to Habibie and Muslim political interests» 
Megawati's election was an historic defeat for Suharto, as it was the first time that 
heavy state interventions had failed to impose a pro- regime leader on a political 
organisation. Subsequently, a diverse array of pro- democracy groups, new "rainbow" 
organisations, NGO activists, disaffected government opponents, and millions of 
supporters rallied to her political banner in reaction to efforts by Suharto's regime to 
derail her from leadership of the party. 18 
Megawati was perceived as a threat to the political status quo largely because 
Suharto's regime did not tolerate any form of organised opposition to its rule, and 
because it constituted a challenge mounted from within the authorised political 
arrangements. It appeared as if PDI might break Ioose from its corporatist 
containment, as it became a crucial rallying point for the forces of opposition. The 
attraction of grassroots movements to Megawati's banner was diametrically opposed 
to the established party system, which sought to prevent the autonomous mobilisation 
of social- political forces and the institutionalisation of opposition. Megawati was 
highly critical of the government's record of corruption and cronyism, and had her 
name put forward as a presidential candidate. Suharto was unwilling to tolerate 
17 
. Lowry only went so far as to say "it is clear that some elements of ABRI saw a strong PDI as a 
potential counter to the lure of Islam and a reaction to tensions within Golkar." Robert Lowry, The 
Armed Forces of Indonesia, NSW, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1996, p.204; Angus McIntyre, "Working 
Paper No. 103: In Search of Megawati Sukarnoputri," CIayton, Monash Asia Institute, Centre of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1997, p.13; Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 
Melbourne, Oxford, Auckland, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.230 -232. 
s 
. McIntyre, "In Search of Megawati," pp.12 -13; Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 
pp.230 -232; Heryanto, "Indonesia: Towards the Final Countdown ?" pp.113, 120 -121; Ryaas Rasyid, 
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anything less than his own unanimous endorsement as Indonesia's next President at 
the People's Consultative Assembly session of 1998, and Megawati threatened his 
chances of being elected unopposed. Suharto was also backing his daughter Siti 
Rukamana's campaign to bring about a Golkar victory in the PDI stronghold of East 
Java, which necessitated the defeat of the new chairwoman. Megawati's popularity as 
the eldest daughter of late President Sukarno -deposed by Suharto -her image as an 
incorruptible democrat and motherly figure, and her symbolisation of Sukarno's 
comeback against Suharto's corrupt and arbitrary regime, attracted millions of new 
followers to PDT. Suharto was, no doubt, worried about the potentially disruptive 
consequences to the status quo of having Megawati represented in the People's 
Consultative Assembly. The President had to prevent such a possibility from ever 
occurring. t 9 
Suharto's battle against Megawati began in earnest after her assumption of the 
PDI leadership since 1993. Since then, constant attempts were instigated by officers 
loyal to Suharto to unseat Megawati, including the setting up of government- backed 
rival boards of PDI. For instance, Gen. Hartono (then the Army Chief -of- Staff) 
supported a rival board led by Yusuf Merukh against the PDI chief. At the provincial 
level, similar splits also were created in 1994 as the government was behind the 
setting up of rival boards.20 
"Indonesia: Preparing for Post -Soeharto Rule and Its Impact on the Democratization Process," 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1995, p.154. 
19 . McIntyre, "In Search of Megawati," PP 17 -19; Fealy, Indonesian Politics, 1995 -96," p.30; 
interviews with Marzuki Darusman (leader of Komnas HAM), 16 July 1997; Bondan Gunawan 
(member of Forum Demokrasi and Nur Kebajikan Foundation -he later became the State Secretary in 
President Abdurrahman Wahid's cabinet), 25 July 1997. 
2° 
. In East Java, for instance, a government- sponsored candidate Latif Pujosakti was chosen as PDI 
leader for the province. PDI's Central Council under Megawati's leadership refused to acknowledge his 
election and nominated its own candidate. In West Java, two wings were formed and Megawati's wing 
accused the government of being behind the split. In Central Java, the government embarked on a 
campaign to discredit the pro -Mega provincial chair with the local branch of the military intelligence 
body 13 akorstanasda employing its discourse on vigilance ( "kewaspadaan "), by declaring that the chair 
had Communist Party links. Megawati was forced to replace the chair but the provincial government 
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The manipulations were just one recent example of a common practice of 
Suharto's circle to interfere in the selection of party leaders, with the aim of 
cultivating rival factions in order to weaken the internal cohesion of parties. It was a 
classic example of Suharto's exclusionary politics and tactical use of divide- and -rule 
based on fragmenting and neutralising opposition and preventing grassroots 
mobilisation. 
In 1996, the situation heated up considerably as the Commander -in -Chief of 
the Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung, the Chief -of -Staff of Social -Political Affairs, Let. - 
Gen. Syarwan Hamid, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Let. -Gen. (ret.) Yogie S. 
Memet, were behind efforts to establish a rival PDI congress in Medan. They 
recruited a former General Chairperson of PDI, Soerjadi, and the head of PDI's 
parliamentary faction, Fatimah Achmad, to lead the campaign against Megawati. In 
East Java, the provincial government refused to allow Megawati to attend a PDI 
meeting to be held in January. The government- backed faction engaged in a number 
of meetings and actions to support Fatimah's and Soerjadi's leadership of PDI.21 
nonetheless refused to acknowledge Megawati's new candidate for the job. "Megawati di Lingkaran 
Kubu," Gatra, 8 June 1996; 1996: Tallan Kekerasan: Potret Pelanggaran HAM di Indonesia, Jakarta, 
Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, 1997, p.8; Greg Fealy, "Indonesian Politics, 1995 -96," 
p.31. 
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Continues 1' General Secretariat PRD (apakabar @clark.net), 24 June 1996. 
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The state -sponsored measures to cow and drive into retreat opponents met 
with initial stiff resistance. In fact, societal reactions against state interventions, were 
framed by the kinds of non -participatory, non -representational architecture of state 
design, which provided the basis for state societal interactions at times of social - 
political stress. Of key significance in this state architecture were the repressive 
security apparatus and corporatist barriers to viable channels of political participation 
and interest mediation. Thus, Indonesia's popular classes retaliated against their 
political exclusion as they sought re -entry into politics, not through existing channels, 
but through acts of civil and mass protest. In June, hundreds of thousands of 
Megawati supporters demonstrated against the planned Medan congress in cities and 
towns throughout Indonesia.22 
On 20 June, security forces violently broke up about 12,000 pro -Megawati and 
pro- democracy supporters as they were conducting a peaceful long -march to the 
National Monument in Central Jakarta. Megawati rejected the results of the Medan 
congress, held between 20 -23 June, which elected Soerjadi as the new party leader. 
Megawati supporters defiantly occupied the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, holding a 
series of "Mimbar Bebas" (Free Speech Forums), at which they publicly aired their 
views and condemnation of Suharto's rule. Feisal Tanjung declared that the Free 
Speech Forums had to be halted, as they constituted a "plot" (makar) to destroy or 
topple the legitimate government.23 
zz This included Megawati supporters holding protests in East and Central Java, on 4 June, to 
protest against the anti -Mega factions and Suryadi's challenge. In East Java, the supporters stabbed 
their hands and signed their support for Megawati in their own blood. Sucipto's faction established a 
Command Post on 6 June in Surabaya to rally support against the congress. On 17 and 18 June, it 
formed a "Mega Support Front" together with pro- democracy student activists and PRD members and 
marched down the main streets of Surabaya to make a last ditch protest against the Medan congress. 
. 1996: Tahun Kekerasan, pp.8 -i l; Heryanto, "Indonesia: Towards the Final Countdown ?" p,114; 
Author's own eyewitness accounts outside the PDT headquarters in JI. Diponegoro, Central Jakarta, 
during the days of Free Podiums. 
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By mid -1996, therefore, Megawati's PDI began to represent the re -entry of the 
masses into politics after thirty years of de- politicisation, thereby constituting a direct 
challenge to the Suharto circle's ruling formula that relied on a heavily circumscribed 
political system. At this point, newly established organisations and hitherto 
unorganised, illegal and unrepresented social and political forces began to gravitate to 
PDI, forming a loose pro -Mega alliance. The Council of Indonesian People (MARI), 
founded in June, became an umbrella organisation in support of Megawati's PDI. 
MARI included among its affiliate members the New Masyumi, the new PNI, the 
unrecognised political parties PRD and PUDI, the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute 
(YLBHI), the independent trade union (SBSI), the Alliance of Independent Journalists 
(AJI), NGO's, and Muslim and Christian students groups. Suharto's circle regarded 
this new "rainbow coalition" as an intolerable threat to the regime's survival 
interests.24 
YKPK leaders gave their support to the pro -Megawati opposition forces. They 
issued a petition of concern on 1 July, entitled "Return to the Nation's Noble Ideals," 
about the direction of Indonesian politics. The petition, signed by leaders of YKPK, 
the NU General Chairman, and leaders of Muslim, Catholic, and nationalist university 
students' organisations (PMII, HMI, PMKRI and GMNI), was widely seen as 
criticising the government's interference in PDI's internal affairs.25 
One of the rainbow coalition's members, the People's Democratic Party 
(PRD), established under a different name in 1994, but declared a party in April 1996, 
was a worry to Suharto's coalition because it successfully organised its activities at 
the grassroots. Any hint of organised grassroots activity threatened the state's 
24 . McIntyre, "In Search of Megawati," pp.17 -19; Heryanto, "Indonesia: Towards the Final 
Countdown ?" pp. 115 -119; Greg Fealy, "Indonesian Politics, 1995 -96, p.31. 
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exclusionary political arrangements designated by the "floating mass" policy. PRD 
had spread its activities to struggles on behalf of industrial workers, and worked 
together with student activists and artists on its various social and political agendas. 
Its members were radical and leftwing student and labour activists who, among their 
demands, regularly called for a lifting of restrictive political laws, a higher minimum 
wage, a new President and new parties, and the scrapping of the armed force's dwi- 
fungsi doctrine. PRD leaders expressed much of their political protest in Marxist 
language, which was anathema to the anti -communist military establishment.26 
By 1996, a new phenomenon had clearly entered New Order politics as PRD, 
together with its student wing (Solidarity of Indonesian University Students for 
Democracy, SMiD), and its affiliate organisation, PPBI (Indonesian Centre for 
Labour Struggle), organised several large -scale workers' strikes and student 
demonstrations, which carried political demands against the government. Gradually 
students, workers, NGO activists and other "pro- democracy" forces came to identify 
with each other's grievances and causes and to build anti -government alliances. SMID 
launched several mass actions in Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Medan, Lampung 
and Menadao on 14 May. Pro- democracy activists organised one of the largest strikes 
on 23 May. An estimated ten thousand workers from eleven factories in Tanjungsari, 
East Java demonstrated, during which at least one factory was damaged, and security 
police arrested the suspected organisers.27 Coinciding with this, fifteen university 
zs Kernbali ke Cita -Cita Luhur Bangsa, signed by Bambang Triantoro, Abdurrahman Wahid, and 
A. Dahlan Ranuwiharjo on 1 July 1996, Jakarta; "Petisi 96: Suara Pelangi Setengah Hati," Gatra, 13 
July 1996. 
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Countdown," pp.117 -118. 
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Berdarah: Insiden Surabaya," Secretary General SMID Press Release (apakabar @clark.net), 20 May 
1996. 
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students from SMID held a three -day hunger strike (20 -23 May) on the grounds of 
East Java's Provincial Parliament in Surabaya. They protested the military's brutal 
crackdown on demonstrators at a university campus in Ujung Pandang, South 
Sulawesi, which had left several students dead.28 
The mass protests of 1996 indicated a discernible change in public mood. A 
growing number of people no longer were prepared to tolerate, as a foregone 
conclusion, that Golkar would dominate general elections and that the elections 
offered no prospect of altering power configurations. Many had grown tired of the 
reality that the elections and parties served the main purpose of endorsing President 
Suharto's unopposed dominance of the political system. More than on any previous 
occasion during the New Order period, Indonesians were beginning to agitate against 
restrictive political rules and coercive measures that kept them cordoned off from 
political participation. Hence, PRD members, student activists, and disaffected 
members of the New Order elite alike called for the revocation of restrictive political 
laws, a reduction of presidential power, the elimination of corruption and the removal 
of the military from its privileged position in the nation's political institutions. This 
represented a new and, to Suharto, threatening democracy discourse, which rejected 
the ideological rationales and structures of authoritarianism. 
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. State -sponsored attacks against the hunger strikers in an attempt to evict them from the steps of 
Parliament created a strong reaction. East Java chapters of GMNI and the Indonesian Legal Aid 
Foundation YLBHI, themselves members of PDI's support organisation MARI, protested the incident. 
YLBHI called the attack a violation of people's freedom of speech and human rights. SMID activists 
demonstrated outside of the Brawijaya Military Command calling on the military to arrest the thugs. 
Their protest was in reaction to a statement by the East Java Military Commander, Lt-Gen. Imam 
Utomo, who sought to discredit the SMID by accusing it of orchestrating the brutal attack on students 
in order to boost its own popular appeal. 
On 24 May, students at 11`s March University in Surakarta, Central Java, demonstrated against the 
incident. A week later, on 4 June in Jakarta, hundreds of students, NGO activists and supporters of 
PLDI held a protest action called "Prayer of Concern over the 40 Day Makassar (Ujung Pandang) 
Tragedy ". Demonstrating youths marched to the YLBHI office, the Ismail Marzuki Park and marched 
on the office of the Co- ordinating Minister for Politics and Security in Central Jakarta. They unfurled 
banners which read "New President, New Party! Smash Military Dominance!" Demonstrators clashed 
violently with security forces that were guarding the front yard of the legal aid office. (See citations in 
the previous footnote.) 
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A) Policy reversal: Suharto retaliates 
In retrospect, the period of political openness, which Suharto had initially tried 
to stem in June 1994 with the press closures, had stimulated a substantial level of 
societal activation in the following years. By 1996, however, the level and 
diversification of opposition activity became intolerable to Suharto's regime and, 
accordingly, begun to elicit more stringent responses. One of the means by which 
Suharto responded to Megawati supporters and pro -democracy activists was to 
instigate a sophisticated public opinion- building campaign aimed at stigmatising and 
discrediting the opposition forces in preparation for a planned harsh crackdown. 
ABRI hardliners who were loyal to Suharto branded dissenters as enemies of the state 
who were seeking to overthrow Suharto's government. They reintroduced ABRI's 
discourse on vigilance ( "kewaspadaan "), and claimed that the PRD, pro -Megawati 
groups, student agitators, labour strikers and government opponents were agents of 
instability who were adopting organisational methods and ideology reminiscent of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).29 
Among the generals acting under Suharto's instructions, who stigmatised 
opponents with the PKI label, were the Commander of ABRI, Feisal Tanjung, the 
Army Chief of Staff, Hartono, the ABRI Chief of Staff of Social and Political Affairs, 
Syarwan Hamid. There was the ABRI Chief of Staff for General Affairs, Suyono, the 
former Governor of the National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas) and Habibie's 
29 Since at least late -1995, in fact, government officials and army generals referred to the "rainbow 
groups" supporting Megawati's PDI as "formless organisations ( OTB's)" that had been infiltrated by 
PKI. The generals insisted that PKI -infiltrated OTB's were seeking to pit communities against one 
another, to stir up ethnic and religious strife, and to destabilise the government through instigating 
social unrest and "spreading slander" through the distribution of "illegal" leaflets. (The following 
articles were in the single issue of Forum Keadilan) "Mewaspadai t.awan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk," 
"Letjen TNI Soeyono: `Saya Tidak Menuduh Mereka PKI," "Curiga Lima Belas dalam OTB," " Letjen 
(Pur.) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo: 'Kaum Komunis dan Liberalis Iogin Menjatuhkan Pemerinrdh, "' 
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advisor, Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo and the three regional commanders of East, West 
and Central Java.30 Feisal, Hartono, and Syarwan also were responsible for rallying 
the interests of incorporated Muslims behind the state's anti -Megawati campaign. 
The East Java commander, Lt. -Gen. Imam Utomo, offered a typical example 
of the military's anti -PRD campaign, which was implemented throughout the country. 
In early July, he ordered his troops to break -up student and workers' 
demonstrations.31 He claimed that the protest actions were not genuine and that 
organisations like PRD wished to bring about a communist -type resurgent socialist 
movement. On 9 July, the day of a mass demonstration, he held a press conference, 
with East Java's Chief Prosecutor, the Vice -Chief of Police, and other military 
officers at his side, at which he condemned the PRD actions.32 
Finally, on 26 July (one day before a military crackdown on the PDI 
headquarters), Suharto announced that there were `bald devils riding on the back of 
PDI. "33 A week later, he convened a full cabinet meeting and made it clear who the 
Forum Keadilan, 6 November 1995; " Kebangkitan PKI Antara Agitasi dan Selebaran," "Jejak Langkah 
Setelah 30 Tahun," Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995. 
30 
"Mewaspadai Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk," "Letjen TNI Soeyono: `Saya Tidak Menuduh 
Mereka PKI," "Curiga Lima Belas dalam OTB," " Letjen (Pur.) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo: 'Kaum 
Komunis dan Liberalis Ingin Menjatuhkan Pemerintah, "' Forum Keadilan, 6 November 1995; 
"Kebangkitan PKI Antara Agitasi dan Selebaran," "Jejak Langkah Setelah 30 Tahun," Forum 
Keadilan, 23 October 1995. 
31 Apparently taking his orders from Lt. -Gen. Hartono in Jakarta, who reportedly ordered the Fast 
Java Commander to investigate PRD's role in the demonstrations, he launched a propaganda campaign 
against PRD, SMID and other pro- democracy forces. 
32 Utomo announced that the dissemination of propaganda and pamphlets by PRD, which launched 
piercing criticisms against the military and state, had become intolerable. In particular, he intimated 
insult over PRD pamphlets that allegedly had called the armed forces the "dogs of industry," accused 
the New Order regime of "murdering millions of communists," and demanded the revocation of 
restrictive political laws and the removal of ABRI's dwi fungsi role. "24 Orang Pengunjuk rasa buruh 
`diamankan', Pangdam: Gebuk jika terlalu," Surya, 9 July 1996; "Aktivis `Digebuk "', Memorandum, 9 
July 1996; "Ketua Bakorstanasda Jatim Soal Demo Buruh: Ada yang Sengaja Ingin Hidupkan Gerakan 
Sosialis," Surya, 9 July 1996; "'Ini Keterlaluan' Pandam tentang Unjuk rasa Belasan Ribu Karyawan," 
Jawa Pos, 9 July 1996; "Ratusan pemuda gelar kontra demonstrasi, Pangdam: PRD coba hidupkan 
PKI," Surya, 11 July 1996. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1996 quoted in Greg Fealy, "Indonesian Politics, 
1995 -96," p.33. 
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"bald devils" were, by identifying PRO as the prime culprit responsible for 
masterminding the Jakarta riots on 27 July.34 
Jun Honna identifies how ABRI leaders deployed the kewaspadaan ideology 
in order to protect ABRI's "role perception" and corporate interests - -exemplified by 
its dwifirngsi doctrine -against mounting popular criticism and to serve Suharto's 
political objective of discrediting the pro -democracy movement, and its liberal and 
left -wing ideas, with a "counter- democracy" discourse. Honna writes that 
kewaspadaan, "which was first intended to standardise the military's threat perception 
regarding national stability was...transformed into ABRI's security -intelligence 
project aiming to discipline political ideas in society ".35 The military had returned to 
its reliance on identifying shared threats to national aspirations, in order to justify a 
more active policy of discrediting and eliminating opponents. 
B) The crackdown 
The full extent of the state's repression was engaged to remove the opposition 
forces coalescing around Megawati's PDI. In a blatant show of force, supporters of 
the government -installed PDI leader, Soerjadi, and police mobile brigade (Brimob)36 
stormed the PDI headquarters on 27 July, brutally ousting Megawati stalwarts 
defiantly occupying the premises. The military clearly backed the operation and there 
were indications that they recruited thugs dressed as Soerjadi supporters for the attack 
as 
. Jawa Pos, 8 August 1996; and Republika, 9 August 1996 quoted in Greg Fealy, "Indonesian 
Politics. 1995 -96," p.33. 
s 
. Jun Honna, "The Military and Democratisation in Indonesia: The Developing Civil -Military 
Discourse During the Late Soeharto Era," Thesis (Ph.D.), Canberra, Department of Political and Social 
Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1999. 
36 1996: Tahun Kekerasan, p.49; A report by the National Commission of Human Rights 
(Komnasham) mentioned that the security forces were complicit in the 27 July incident. Munawir 
Sjadzali and Baharuddin Lopa, Keterangan Pers Tentang Laporan Komnas HAM Mengenai Peristiwa 
27 July 1996 di Jakarta, 10 October 1996; McIntyre, "In search of Megawati," p.18. 
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against the PDI headquarters 37 Violence spilled out onto the streets of Jakarta in two 
days of destructive rampage, as Megawati supporters and thousands of Jakarta's urban 
classes clashed with anti -riot military units.38 
It was in the aftermath of the riots, however, that Suharto's coalition launched 
its most systematic witch -hunt against the opposition forces, driving them over the 
next few months into temporary retreat.39 State security forces conducted sweeping 
investigations and extra - judicial arrests of thousands of PRD radicals, MARI activists, 
and PDI leaders. The Attorney General conducted an investigation into Megawati's 
alleged involvement in the riots. Investigated were figures like Ridwan Saidi (chair of 
the New Masyumí), Nyonya Supeni (chair of the new PNI), Goenawan Mohammad 
(the chief editor of the banned Tempo magazine and KIPP member), and Berar Fathia 
(of MARI). Retired generals, such as Rudini, Wahono, and Bambang Triantoro 
(leader of YKPK) -who appeared to support the rainbow coalition and publicly 
criticised Suharto- reportedly were investigated. The PRD head, Budiman 
Sudjatmiko, and three other party leaders who had gone into hiding were arrested in 
late September and placed on charges of subversion. The leader of the independent 
worker's union SBSI, Muchtar Pakpahan, a man already facing jail terms for his 
alleged involvement in a worker's demonstration in Medan in 1994, was arrested on 
subversion charges. The "paranormal" and vocal anti -government critic, Permadi 
Satrio Wiwoho, was held for questioning after the riot.40 The fact that PDI became a 
37 Loren Ryter, "Pemuda Pancasíla:. The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto's Order ?" Indonesia: 
66 (October L988), p.68. 
38 . The author was a participant- observer to the unfolding events and riots of the 27th and 286, 
insofar as he was caught in the middle of the riots and clashes between police -military units and 
protestors. 
39 Sjadzali and Lopa, Keterangan Pers Tentang Laporan; 1996: Tahun Kekerasan, pp.I7 -18; 
Author's own eyewitness accounts of incidents on 27 and 28 July 1997 in Menteng- Central Jakarta 
locations. 
b0 . The government had already brought blasphemy charges (for insulting the Prophet Muhammad) 
against Permadi, with the trial opening on 6 July 1995, after he had publicly contradicted a statement 
made by the military commander of Central Java that Megawati was unfit to lead the PDI. Earlier in the 
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major source of opposition to the regime demonstrated the recent failure of the 
corporatised party arrangements to contain and neutralise political dissent. The 
systematic use of state coercion against the opposition was itself a clear indication of 
the failure of corporatism to maintain peaceful state- society interest relations. 
4. State orchestrated counter -demonstrations 
The argument can be made that, faced with the societal challenges, Suharto 
abandoned the strategy of corporatist containment and came to rely on direct 
repression of dissent. He began to use corporatist organisations for purposes that were 
at variance with the original purposes of establishing and maintaining a de- politicised 
environment. That is, he contributed to a politicisation of state -society relations by 
mobilising state -backed Muslim groups against the opposition. He did this as part of a 
propaganda campaign, both before and after the crackdown, with his loyalist generals 
organising pro -government militant youth groups, paid ruffians and Muslim 
organisations into a series of counter demonstrations against the "rainbow" alliance. 
The organisation of counter -demonstrations serves the purpose giving the appearance 
of furnishing the government with the legitimacy or credibility of popular support, as 
pro- regime forces can be mobilised behind various causes against detractors. 
The period after the July riot provided the setting large -scale and sustained 
government- arranged oaths of loyalty, as Suharto's circle mobilised Muslims and 
other groups in wholesale condemnation of PRD and forces coalescing round 
Megawati's PDI. In particular, Suharto's circle drew on the support of corporatised 
Muslim organisations like MUI, ICMI, the Pondok Pesantren Co- operation Body 
year, in March, and in retaliation against Permadi, the government sought to mobilise Muslim outrage 
against the Permadi for having, in April 1994, called the Prophet a dictator at a gathering of students at 
Gadjah Mada University. At the gathering Permadi had been highly critical of Golkar, Harmoko and 
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(BKSPP), BAKOMUBIN, mosque organisations -and pro- regime Muslim leaders 
from the NU, the Muhammadiyah, and the Dewan Dakwah -to denounce PRD and 
the "rainbow" alliance. The orchestration of counter -demonstrations involved the 
deployment of incorporated Muslim interests as an instrument of the state's policy of 
exclusion by seeking to isolate and discredit dissent. In particular, at a time of 
growing middle class hostility to Suharto, the bringing of a substantial portion of the 
Muslim middle classes behind the regime could hope to divide and dissipate anti - 
regime energies. The regime could combat the opposition's value -orientation of 
democracy and human rights with an anti- democratic discourse, which gave priority 
to political legitimacy and stability of the established order. 
There was an indication that Suharto's circle had anticipated the need for 
Muslim approval of its pre -planned attack against Megawati's supporters at the PDI 
headquarters. For instance, Gen. Hartono met with Toto Tasmara and other 
BAKOMUBIN leaders at Tommy Suharto's corporate headquarters (the PT Humpus 
building) a few days before the 27 July incident.41 Hartono advised the organisation's 
leaders that shortly a movement, "PDI anarchy," would take place and result in 
destruction that would hinder national development. He said that there needed to be a 
moral invitation in order that the nation would behave in accordance with the Islamic 
culture of harmony.42 This meeting demonstrates that ABRI was gauging Muslim 
responses and seeking community support for its attack on the PDI headquarters. It 
was also a grand manipulation of the idea of harmony, encouraging Muslim leaders to 
co- operate with ABRI against social "disorder," in this case against Suharto's 
adversaries associated with Megawati's PDI faction. 
Habibie and had focused on the issue of the presidential succession. 1996: Tahun Kekerasan, pp.34 -5; 
Greg Fealy, "Indonesian Politics, 1995 -96," pp.32 -4. 
41 . See chapter five for an account of BAKOMUBIN and other state -corporatist initiatives. 
42 . Interview with Toto Tasmara (leader of BAKOMUBIN and BKPRMI), 13 November 1997. 
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After the riot, on 28 July leaders of BAKOMUBIN organised Muslim leaders 
to appear at the DPR.43 They spoke before the Golkar, ABRI, and PPP factions at the 
DPR calling for introspection and denouncing the PDT riots, pro -democracy groups 
and government critics.44 In an interview, Toto explained that ABRI leaders felt they 
had the support of Muslim leaders. The BAKOMUBIN hung posters in the DPR's 
lobby declaring "Vigilance against Neo- Communists using the mask of Human Rights 
and Democracy, False Fighters For Democracy; Beware of Anarchism, Communism, 
Secularism, Vandalism. "45 
On the 29`h, MUI grabbed the initiative from BAKOMUBIN by gathering 
Muslim leaders at the National Monument in Central Jakarta. The collaborating 
Muslim leaders issued a joint statement supporting the armed force's version of 
events surrounding the PDI riots. They readily parroted the language of the armed 
force of threats from communist party elements in PDT, and treacherous "formless 
organisation" and third party activities threatening national stability.46 Members of 
ICMI's intelligentsia, and other Muslim leaders, contributed to the anti -opposition 
rhetoric. For example, the General Chairman of Muhammadiyah (and head of ICMI's 
43 
, Tnterview with Toto, 13 November 1997. 
44 . M. Syafi'i Anwar et.al., "Mawas Diri Setelah `Sabtu Kelabu "', Ummat, 2 September 1996; 
"Keprihatinan Muballigh Atas Insiden Kerusuhan PDI," Serial Kutbah Ju'mat, September 1996; H. 
Ramlan Mardjoned, "Kemunafikan," Serial Khotbah Ju'mat, September 1996. Natsìr Zubaidi `PRI) 
Sebuah Gerakan ` Radikal Kir': Mimbar Bebas Ditunggani oleh Pelbagi Interest dan Over Dosis," 
Serial Kutbah Ju'mat, September 1996; "Apel Siaga Orde Baru Mengganyang Komunisme," Media 
Dakwah, September 1996; H. Hussein Umar (Sekjen DDII Pusat): Paling Awal Umat Islam Anti PKI," 
Media Dakwah, September 1996; Dr. Ir. AM Saefuddin, "Budiman hanya Cucunya Setan Gundul," 
Media Dakwah, September 1996; KH. Hasan Basri (Ketua Majelis Ulama Indonesia), "Tidak Salah 
Kalau Kita Reaktif," Media Dakwah, September 1996. 
ns 
"Tragedi PDI," Serial Khotbah Ju'mat, September 1996. 
4fi 
. The Head on the Women's wing of NU (Muslimat), Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, attended the 
meeting at which the joint statement was made. According to Aísyah, "Representatives of all Islamic 
organisations attended. At the meeting the MITI condemned the riots. Without avail, I tried to suggest a 
softening of MUI's language. Not long after this gathering at the MUI headquarters the social political 
wing of ABRI invited all Islamic groups to attend the armed forces' clarification of events surrounding 
the riots." Interview with Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, 11 March 1997; "Mawas Diri Setelah `Sabtu 
Kelabu "', Ummat, p.31; "Teror Telepor Bom Setelah Huru -hara," Gatra, 10 August 1996; "Wawancara 
Suhardiman: Ada Koalisi Pelbngi Anti Kemapanan," Tiras, 25 July 1996; "Masa Megawati 
Ditunggangi PKI Baru: Jakarta pun Dibakar dan Diguncang," Media Dakwah, August 1996. 
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Council of Experts), Amien Rais, alluded to the fact that "people power," as he called 
it, was unacceptable to Indonesia's cultural traditions and that Muhammadiyah's 
masses could be brought in to counteract the anti -regime forces. He likened the 27 
July riots to the "trauma of Communism ".47 Another prominent Muhammadiyah and 
ICMI leader, Lukman Harun, announced that the "PKI is our country's and nation's 
enemy, and the Muslim community has a huge responsibility [to counter the enemy]. 
It is appropriate that the Muslim community respond harshly to the [27 July] 
incident. "48 The General Chairman of IN's Ansor Youth insisted that his supporters 
were "ready to help ABRI to eliminate the new communist movement ".49 A few 
Muslim leaders supported the government's decision to charge PRD and pro - 
democracy activists under the state's harsh anti -subversion laws.5° 
The right -wing Dewan Dakwah, having itself fostered warm relations with 
"Muslim" generals and with Habibie's ICMI, was particularly vociferous in 
denouncing a host of pro- democracy, labour and farmers' rights groups. Dewan 
Dakwah's various media denounced the MARI, PRD, "paranormals" (Permadi), and 
retired officers critical of the regime (an allusion to the YKPK). Responding to the 1 
July statement of concern, one article referred to the YKPK leaders and the NU 
General Chairman as politically sidelined interests who espoused democratic ideals 
but were really seeking to undermine Islam and topple the legitimate government. 
Relying on its propensity for conspiracy theory, the Dewan Dakwah linked to the riots 
a variety of "PKI penetrated" groups, including "socialists, Christians /Jews, upholders 
of human rights, and NGO western agents "51 The Dewan Dakwah's strong reaction 
. "Mobilisasi Massa, Perlukah ?" Gatra; "Mereka Pun Uniuk Gigi," Gatra. 
48 . "Teror telepor Born Setelah Huru -hara," Gatra. 
49 "Teror telepor Born Setelah Huru hara," Gatra. 
5° 
'Bolehkah Mereka Dipidana Subversi," Gatra, 17 August 1996. 
51 . "Sekjen DDII Hussein Umar: Alhamduhlillah Umat Islam Tak Terpancing," Tekad, 5 August 
1996. 
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against the "rainbow coalition" was partly provoked by the burning by rioters of the 
Al- Irsyad's (a small radical Islamic organisation) headquarters just down the street 
from the Council's own central office.52 However, the Council was probably most 
inspired by its need to demonstrate its loyalty to the armed forces as it joined regime - 
arranged condemnations of the pro -democracy forces. 
Over the next few months, whilst the security apparatus conducted sweeping 
arrests of opponents, the government sponsored similar mass ritual oaths in which 
pro -government leaders continued to condemn PRD, MARI and pro -Mega PDI 
activists and liken them to communist party agitators of a by -gone era.53 These efforts 
culminated on 29 September -1 October, with a state -sponsored mass rally, a five - 
kilometre parade, and an exhibition of photos and documents in Jakarta. MIA and 
ICMI had leading roles in organising the two -day event, which was held to 
commemorate Pancasila Day and to re -live the so- called "tragic events" of the 
"Communist Party coup" of 1965. The Secretary of WTI and ICMI Vice- Secretary, 
Jimly Asshiddiqie, chaired the Implementation Council for the event. The MJ's 
52 Interview with Hussein Umar, 24 September 1996; "Percayalah Komunisme Masih Hidup," 
Media Dakwah, September 1996; "Manuver politik kelompok Pelangi," Media Dakwah, August 1996; 
"Massa Megawati Ditunggangi PKI Baru," Media Dakwah. 
53 For example, on 9 August, Yusuf Hasyim (the NU leader of Tebuireng Pesantren, Jombang, 
Central Java, and the uncle and adversary of the NU General Chairman) helped organise a meeting of 
200 ulama at the Shangri-la Hotel in Surabaya. At the meeting, attended by East Java's Brawijaya 
Military Commander and its Governor, the ulama publicly denounced the 27 July riots. Two days later, 
Suharto's generals marshalled together a crowd of between 30 -50 thousand people in Jakarta to declare 
their oath of allegiance to the government and to denounce PRD as the architect of the riot. Chief of 
ABRI's Social and Political Affairs, T.t. -Gen. Syarwan Hamid, the Jakarta regional military 
commander, Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, the Jakarta regional police chief and the Jakarta governor were among 
the state officials who attended the public gathering. 
On 31 August and 1 October, two separate mass gatherings of Indonesia's main Islamic youth 
organisations were held in East Java. Clad in distinct military -style uniforms, the Barisan Ansor (the 
para- military wing of GP Ansor) organised the first gathering of approximately 40,000 of its supporters 
at the Brawijaya Stadium, Kediri. The Muhammadíyah Youth Preparedness Command arranged a 
gathering of around 70,000 of its supporters at the Tenth of November Gelora Stadium in Surabaya. As 
on other such occasions, East Java s Governor and top -military brass attended the mass meetings. "Pro - 
Government Rally Condemns Riots," Indonesian Times, 12 August 1996; "Over 50,000 Rally Behind 
Jakarta Government," Straits Times, 12 August 1996; "Teror Telepor Bom Setelah Huru- hara," Gatra; 
"Apel Siaga Orde Baru Mengganyang Komunisme," Media Dakwah, September 1996; "Pasang-Surut 
Aksi Massa," Gatra, 5 October 1996; "Mobilisasi M assa, Perlukah ? ", Gatra, 5 October 1996; "Mereka 
Pun Unjuk Gigi," Gatra, 14 September 1996. 
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Ansor Youth played an organising role on the Council. This event was arranged to 
coincide with a mass gathering of Muslim students from Tebuireng Pesantren held at 
Blitar, East Java. Government dignitaries and military and police chiefs were in force 
at all of the mass gatherings, which were brought together at the behest of military 
leaders. Government officials and rally organisers insisted, however, that the mass 
rallies were spontaneous demonstrations of popular support for the government 
against its "enemies .54 
The degree to which pro -government Muslim leaders adopted ABRI's 
language of vigilance in identifying "the common enemy again indicates the success 
of hardline military leaders to inculcate parts of society with its security -intelligence 
mentality. The fact that corporatist institutions contained program outlines which 
reflected this mentality, and that the main emphasis of these organisations was on 
their pembinaan (guidance) function, probably goes some way to explaining how 
ABRI had so successfully inculcated its ideas of national threat. Admittedly, the PKI 
was a shared historical threat deeply imbedded in the psyche of ABRI officers and 
Muslim leaders alike. Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, the "rainbow" alliance 
presented a real threat to the political ambitions of incorporated Muslim interests. 
The support of these collaborating Muslims for Suharto's regime was 
informed by the fear of placing at risk closer relations between Islam and the state, 
which had gradually been fostered since the late 1980s. This "honey moon" period of 
state -Islamic relations since the creation of ICMI led to the belief and hope that if 
Muslims patiently stood in the wings, they would eventually inherit a significant share 
of political influence and power.55 Megawati's rising star, and the coalition of anti - 
ICMI forces, threatened to upset this aspiration and, therefore, it was in the interest of 
54 . "Islam dan Komunisme," Gatra, 5 October 1996; "Gelombang Menggempur Hantu 
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incorporated Muslim groups to side with Suharto's regime and have PDI removed 
from the political contest. In line with this thinking, an article by Media Dakwah 
affirmed that PPP could become an Islamic party to once again prevent a resurgence 
of nationalism and communism.56 The Chairman of Dewan Dakwah, Anwar Harjono, 
expressed the political aspiration that PPP could work in partnership with Golkar, and 
could position itself as the people's representative to form the next government.57 
Anwar's political vision was one that excluded PDI from future power configurations. 
Collaborating Muslim interests expressed the anti- "rainbow" rhetoric. Not all 
Muslims leaders were willing to join Suharto's regime in its condemnation of 
Megawati's forces. A sworn rival of ICMI, Abdurrahman Wahid, counselled his 
constituency not to follow suit with other Islamic organisations and to refrain from 
giving a ritual oath of loyalty to Suharto's government.58 
Assessment 
Suharto's crackdown had driven the opposition into retreat and left it divided 
and in disarray, yet its anti -PRD rhetoric and propaganda campaigns appeared to lack 
credibility among broad sections of society, as well as among segments of the state 
elite. Fealy notes that, in the long term, the post -27 July events "seriously undermined 
confidence in the regime's competence and harmed the prospects for a smooth 
transition to a post -Soeharto era ".59 Megawati 's forced ouster caused an immense loss 
Komunisme," Gatra, 5 October 1996; "Alamak, Itu Kan Politik," Gatra, 5 October 1996. 
ss A.M. Fatwa, "Golkar dan Aspirasi Ornat Beragama," Republika, 12 March 1997. 
56 
, Askoda, "Mewaspadaì Arab Politik Ram," Media Dakwah, 1994. 
5' 
. "Wawancara Anwar Harjono: Ada Saksi yang Tidak Pemah Tidur," Jakarta, Humas Manajmen 
Kampanye Pemilu 1997 DPP PPP. 
58 
. Ahdurrahman's usually critical voice became somewhat muted in late -1996, once he had made 
his rapprochement with Suharto, Siti Rukmana and General Hartono. Heryanto, "Indonesia: Towards 
the Final Countdown ? ", p.111. 
59 Fealy, "Indonesian Politics 1995 -96," p.34. 
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of legitimacy for Suharto's rule and opened the way for future and even more serious 
challenges to the survival chances of the Suharto regime 6° 
Hitherto, PDI had been an integral component of the New Order's 
corporatised party system based, among other things, on heavily circumscribed 
politics in which a loyal opposition was not tolerated. Megawati's faction of PDI 
threatened the ruling formula, as opposition forces rallying to her banner mounted a 
challenge to the political status quo. Chapter six considered the idea that unequal 
access to political resources had caused autonomous interests associated with NU to 
compete for political predominance with state- sponsored Islam. This chapter has 
demonstrated the actual pitting of corporatist (Muslim and Golkar- affiliate) groups 
against pro- democracy forces (including disaffected NU interests, sidelined ABRI 
officers, the minority Christian community, student, NGO and labour activists). 
Suharto, in fact, regularly created divisions across the political spectrum, between 
different constituencies, parties and organisations and fostered splits within the 
different organisations, including Golkar, PDI and PPP. In his attack on Megawati's 
faction, his regime had mobilised incorporated Muslim groups against another part of 
its corporatist system (PDI). It had done this specifically because PDI under 
Megawati's leadership threatened to move beyond the established rules of the game 
by seeking to represent grassroots interests. However, in its exuberance to remove 
Megawati as a political force, Suharto's coalition had unintentionally emasculated 
PDI to the point of electoral impotency. The corporatist design of two parties plus 
Golkar was reduced thereby to a direct pre -election race between Golkar and PPP.61 
w See chapter nine. 
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5. Election fever: PPP assumes the mantle of opposition 
If Suharto had sought to remove dissenters in order to facilitate his unopposed 
re- election at the 1998 People's Consultative Assembly, the government's reliance on 
repression coupled with Golkar's no- holds -barred campaign strategy, may have had 
some other unintended repercussions for the power holders. One such repercussion 
was the steady increase in conflict between the government's election machine Golkar 
and the Islamic- oriented PPP, which was well evident by early 1996. Tn short, the 
state's continued exclusion and repression of opposition, instead of containing 
political forces within predictable and acceptable boundaries, unleashed further mass 
resistance. That is, the other corporatised party, PPP, assumed the mantle from the 
decimated PDI, of opposition party against Suharto. State deployment of incorporated 
Muslim interests against the "rainbow" opposition had not prevented Islam, itself, 
from becoming a major banner of social -political protest. The chapter, therefore, next 
considers the rising conflict between PPP and Golkar within the context of election 
contests. 
The provinces of East, West and Central Java, which contained most of 
Indonesia's voting -age population (69.7 million or 56 percent of voters from a 
registered 124 million voters by one count),62 were of strategic importance to 
Golkar's campaign. Suharto's daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, in her capacity of 
Head of Golkar's Central Committee, was placed in charge of Golkar's crucial 
campaigns in East and Central Java. The Army Chief of Staff, General Hartono, 
accompanied Siti on her regular rounds of rural pesantren in the two provinces to 
drum up support for Golkar. He caused a controversy when, on 13 March 1996, he 
announced before a gathering of Golkar supporters in Central Java thát members of 
61 . Louise Williams, "Victory at a cost," Aria OnLine, 31 May 1997. 
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the armed forces were Golkar cadres. Wearing a- grey Safari suit and yellow Golkar 
jacket, he stood beside Siti and declared that, "as a Golkar cadre," he "took his orders 
from the Head of the Central Committee. "63 The next day, at Sabilil Muttaqin 
Pesantren in Magetan, East Java, he repeated his comments. In another publicity stunt, 
Siti Rukmana gave her strong endorsement to General Hartono, the new Minister of 
Information, when he joined ICMI's and MUI's senior advisory boards.64 This 
manoeuvre was undoubtedly aimed at consolidating the support of Muslims behind 
Golkar, at a time when some of that support may have been in doubt, as well as 
perhaps promoting Hartono's own ambitions for Vice- President.65 
Hartono's statements outraged leaders of PPP and PDI, and the ABRI 
leadership, which was supposed to maintain a non -partisan stance toward the three 
parties, sought to distance itself from his comments. Nonetheless, his strident 
assertions highlighted the intensity of competition that was mounting in the pre - 
campaign months in which Golkar, with ABRI's backing, was launching an early and 
aggressive foray into Muslim and PDI constituencies. In January 1996, Harmoko and 
Siti Rukmana appeared before tens of thousands of Golkar supporters at Sri Wedari 
Stadium in Solo, Central Java. In a symbolic gesture, Harmoko embraced a becak 
driver and promised to improve the working hours for labourers.66 In doing so, 
Harmoko was attempting to appeal to the grassroots in an effort to counter the popular 
appeal of Megawati's PDI, in a like manner that Golkar sought to win the traditional 
Muslim vote from PPP. 
62 "Kekuatan Pohon beringin Mengejar Target Suara," Forum Keadilan, 2 June 1997. 
63 Utung Widyanto, "Konsolidasi Jalur A Golkar: Bila Netralitas Bermakna Ganda," Tiras, 28 
March 1996; Lowry, The Armed Forces, pp.211 -212. 
64 
. At the time, there was speculation in the printed media as to whether Hartono had been demoted 
from his senior position in ABRI, or whether Suharto had placed him there as a staging post for the 
vice -presidency, as Hartono was considered a possible candidate for the post. One rumor in circulation 
was that Suharto had intended to drop Hartono altogether but Siti managed to persuade her father to 
give the information ministry to Hartono as a concession. 
bs Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, p.143. 
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As mentioned in chapter six, Suharto pulled -off a major coup by winning over 
the NU Chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid's support to Golkar's campaign, who then 
facilitated Siti Rukmana's visits to rural pesantrens to gain access to NU's Muslim 
masses. In doing so, the government had shrewdly eliminated the possibility of 
Abdurrahman bringing his NU constituency firmly behind Megawati's PDI, as he had 
earlier intimated. With Abdurrahman's support, the government also could continue 
to exploit divisions within Islam, as the NU Chairman was a rival of PPP's Chairman 
Metareum and was staunchly opposed to the rise of modernist Islam in ICMI.67 This 
was at a time that PPP's General Chairman had become increasingly critical of the 
government's aggressive election campaigning, and Abdurrahman's apparent support 
for Golkar could bring a significant portion of NU's masses behind Golkar and act as 
an effective foil to PPP recalcitrance. Moreover, the support of NU's constituency and 
of incorporated Muslim (mainly) modernists behind Golkar, could significantly 
reduce what limited influence PDI and PPP had in determining the outcome of the 
election campaign. 
Golkar's early campaign- related activities stimulated reactions and counter - 
activities from PPP and PDI, as neither party wished to be totally sidelined by the 
government's powerful electioneering machine. In particular, PPP leaders complained 
about government -Golkar interference and intimidation aimed at driving their party 
supporters into retreat. For example, the Islamic magazine. Panji Masyarakat, aired 
opinions that sympathised with the plight of Megawati's PDI faction and criticised 
Suharto's government for interfering with the internal affairs of both PDI and PPP.68 
The usually cautious General Chair of PPP, Ismail Hasan Metareum, a figure 
acceptable to the government, who generally endorsed major government decisions, 
66 Joko Supono, "Golkar: Konsolidasi di Tengah Terpaan Isu," Tiras, 11 April 1996. 
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began on this occasion to level caustic criticism against Golkar. He expressed his 
upset over the defection of around 3,000 PPP supporters who declared their allegiance 
to Golkar at a meeting in Sukabumi, West Java on 11 March. Ismail accused Golkar 
of practising "political thuggery" and claimed it had rallied together disaffected PPP 
leaders and their supporters, bringing them to the gathering by bus at which PPP 
leaders were given Golkar jackets and party cards.} On another occasion, Ismail 
called on the government to change Indonesia's Election Laws of 1985 so that they 
would be more open, honest and fair to all three parties. The Minister of Internal 
Affairs responded to some of Ismail's criticisms by insisting that PPP's Chairman was 
í1I and, by implication, not fully in charge of his mental faculties, when he made his 
comments 70 
The PPP Chairman issued his complaints in response to what PPP leaders 
considered to be Golkar's unfair practices, election fraud and intimidation at the 1992 
general elections and in anticipation of future unfair practices, which seriously hurt 
PPP's election chances, they claimed. Leaders of five PPP branches declared that if 
Golkar's unfair practices were repeated in 1997, they would stage a walkout of 
Parliament in rejection of the election results.71 Reports of Golkar's unfair practices 
soon entered the medía in 1996. For example, in January, as PPP commemorated its 
anniversary, the party's flags and banners were banned in Kendal, Sragen and Batang 
regencies, East Java. Written on the banners were messages such as "It Is Not a 
Matter of Win -Lose, the General Election Must be Honest and Fair," "The Matter Is 
67 . Rasyid, "Indonesia: Preparing for Post -Soeharto Rule," pp.155 -6. 
es "Gebrakan Kevokalan PPP," Panji Ma.ryarakat, 15 -31 January 1996. 
h9 . Other accounts reported incidents of growing dissent within PPP, as disaffected leaders at 
branch and provincial level (West Java, West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, Riau, and West Nusa 
Tenggara) protested the selection of leaders by PPP's Central Leadership Council. "Upaya Partai 
Bintang Menjera' Preman Politik," "Bintang-Bintang yang Bertebaran," Fachry Ali, ` Politik dan Masa 
Depan PPP," `PPP Hijrah ke Golkar: Penggembosan di Hari Supersemar," Tiras, 28 March 1996; Joko 
Supono, "PPP: Bintang dan Goyangan -Goyangan," Tiras, 25 April 1996. 
. " Gebrakan Kevokalan PPP," Panji Masyarakat, 15 -31 January I996. 
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to Uphold Justice," and "PPP Must Always Be with the Muslims ".72 The prohibition 
may have been reasonable had Golkar not planned to hoist its own party flags and 
banners. In June, for instance, leaders of the PPP- affiliated Development Youth 
Organisation in Surakarta, Central Java, lodged a complaint against a plan by Golkar's 
youth affiliate AMPI to hoist Golkar flags in 8,500 villages, one year before the 
official campaign date.73 
By the commencement of the official campaign in April, PPP had assumed 
much of the mantle of opposition to Suharto's government and to Golkar's election 
campaign. Party leaders and campaigners of PPP saw clearly the historic opportunity 
handed to them with the decimation of Megawati's PDI. As Jusuf Syakir, leader of the 
Party Council explained 
with the still chaotic situation in PDI, PPP sees the opportunity to recruit as 
many as possible of Megawati's PDI masses...PPP's image as the party 
that can defend as well as struggle for their interests must be upheld before 
71 
. "Gebrakan Kevokalan PPP," Panji Masyarakat. 
72 "Flags and Banners of the United Development Party Are Banned in Central Java," Republika, 
13 January 1996. 
. One month earlier, there were reports of an "irregular" census being conducted by local 
authorities in East and Central Java, asking known PPP households who they were going to vote for at 
the election. The census was viewed as a blatant form of intimidation aimed at persuading people to 
vote for Golkar. Also in May, leaders of pesantren in PPP strongholds in Central Java complained 
about the fact that local authorities had failed to register voting -age Muslim students on the electoral 
list. Pesantren leaders complained that perhaps the authorities regarded the Muslim students as "too 
green" (PPP supporters) or that the authorities had "forgotten that students also had the right to vote ". 
Early in the year, PPP and POI held counter- rallies (to Golkar's mass rallies), which frequently turned 
violent. For example, on 17 March, after a rally at Beran Field, Sleman, Yogyakarta PPP supporters 
noisily toured the Central Java city on motorcycles only to end up rioting. On the 20th, PDI supporters 
toured Yogyakarta and clashed with crowds of onlookers, reportedly injuring one senior police officer. 
The Chair of Yogyakarta's chapter of PPP regarded the violence as representing an articulation of 
protest by PPP supporters against the "political injustice" (of Golkar's campaign). "Pemasangan 
Bendera Tak Etis," Jawa Pos, 4 June 1996; "Sensus Politik: Saya Kasih Petunjuk Menangkan 
Beringin," Tiras, 2 May 1996; "Ribuan Santri Belum Didaftar," Jawa Pos, 21 May 1996; Joko Supono, 
"Brutalitas: Suhu Yogya Mulai Memanas," Tiras, 4 April 1996. 
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them...we have a `golden opportunity' ...[it] only comes once...we are 
convinced that our votes will increase.' 
He spoke of the need to present PPP as a viable alternative that promoted necessary 
change in order to address the community concerns of the Democracy Party 
supporters. 
Metareum made a surprisingly frontal attack on government corruption, 
collusion, dishonesty and misuse of power. He appealed to the higher moral fibre of 
Muslim ulama, suggesting the party was the ulama's inheritance, the ulama were the 
source of its inspiration determining the party's political morality and ethics.75 In a 
broadside against Golkar's "immorality," he asserted that 
We still witness the growth of immoral politics, the politics of achieving 
objectives by any means, along with deceiptful political communication 
...shamelessly... Golkar claims to be the most meritorious group in this 
Republic. It is the most New Order, the most Pancasilaist -in short, it is 
everything. In fact, Golkar's marketing method tends to force...we witness 
an old style of politics- namely, the political style of "preman" [paid 
thugs]...Golkar entices people to change party [affiliation] with promises 
of a picnic...by giving pocket money...so that people will vote for the 
party. Golkar also threatens civil servants with dimissal they do not vote for 
the party 76 
. "Wawancara: Drs H Jusuf Syakir Ketua DPP PPP (1994- 1999), Kita Tahu yang Diinginkan 
Masyarakat," Jakarta, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu 1997 DPP PPP. 
5 . "Kolom Buya: Ulama dan Pemilu yang Bermoral Oleh H Ismail Hasan Matareum, SH Ketua 
Umum DPP PPP," Jakarta, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu 1997 DPP PPP. 
. "Kolom Buya: Mewaspadai Politik Gaya Preman Oleh H Ismail Hasan Matareum, SH Ketua 
Umum DPP PPP," Jakarta, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu 1997 DPP PPP. 
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Identifying PPP as synonymous with Islam and morality (by enforcing the 
"sole foundation" law in 1985 the government had sought to discourage parties from 
identifying themselves with distinct constituencies), Metareum directly appealed to 
the grass roots. In his effort to open a breach in Golkar's campaign, he dug up local 
issues of simmering social discontent, linking them to Islam's /the PPP's ability or 
promise to construct honest, open and just government. He appealed to the ulama not 
to break ranks with the PPP in order to join Golkar.77 He claimed that the party stood 
for weak economic classes, such as small business people and traders, "becak" (push 
bike passenger service), "ojek" (motorcycle), and bus drivers, farmers and youth. He 
raised the highly sensitive issue of forced land eviction and the inalienable right to 
ownership, as well as the right to political freedoms and personal security from law 
enforcement officers. In this all -out campaign effort, he also targeted economic 
monopoly (of the Chinese) in collusion with state officials, "greasing the wheels with 
money," and sending indigenous business people bankrupt. He discussed government 
credit discrimination that favoured large malls and privately -owned shop complexes 
at the expense of wong cilik (the little people).78 
In particular, Matereum's public criticism of the state's deployment of paid 
ruffians and security forces behind Golkar's election campaign suggests that even 
New Order elite members were becoming fed up with the state's coercive politics of 
exclusion. That is, once Muslim interests allied to PPP were on the receiving end of 
state -sponsored intimidation they began to bluntly reject such tactics and instead 
protested against state directed violence. Moreover, a New Order stalwart like 
. "Ulama Berpolitik Akan Mendorong Pemilu Bermoral," Suara Pembaruan, 23 Febuary 1997; 
"PPP asks ulama to reach political consensus," The Jakarta Post, 24 February 1997. 
'8 . "Kolom Buya: Pilihan Partei Persatuan Oleh H Ismail Hasan Matareum, SH Ketna Umum DPP 
PPP," Jakarta, Humas Manajemen Kampanye Pemilu 1997 DPP PPP. 
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Matereum, in order to defend the interests of PPP against Golkar's heavy- handedness, 
also had begun to appropriate the democracy discourse of regime opponents. 
The PPP's campaign strategy and language touched a raw nerve among 
Indonesia's Muslim masses in an already volatile situation, sharpening social 
discontent, as PPP supporters were willing to defend their party at almost any cost it 
seemed. PPP campaigners from NU, numerous of them revered mama and kyai of the 
traditional pesantren system, called upon the loyalty of their millions of rural 
followers, in their determination to arouse the emotions and allegiances of their 
devout followers against Golkar. Metareum's campaign language had set the tenor of 
more radical statements by less constrained local Muslim leaders. Several sources 
agree that certain NU leaders affiliated with the PPP proclaimed that to struggle for 
the "star party" was to fight an Islamic "Jihad" (Holy struggle or war), to oppose 
injustice and the like.79 At a campaign sermon, the charismatic kyai and NU Ieader, 
Kholil As'ad of Situbondo (East Java) proclaimed that "if the PPP had not defended 
the religion of God, I certainly would not have gone to such pains to attend this 
meeting. I do all this only in order to struggle in the Path of God. "80 The call to Jihad 
can be viewed as the Muslim- oriented PPP's counter -discourse to the state's 
propaganda of vigilance and intelligence- security approach. That is, local Muslim 
leaders who campaigned for PPP no longer adopted the language of kewaspadaan 
towards pro- democracy forces, but replaced it with religious symbolism of resistance. 
In what became a remarkably new phenomenon in Indonesian politics, 
displaced PDI supporters joined PPP campaigns in an anti -regime "people 
movement," calling themselves Mega -Bintang. (Bintang or Star is the emblem of the 
. Interviews with leaders of GP Ansor (Bangil, East Java), 10 August 1997; KH. Choiron Syakur 
(Chairman of the Pesantren Wahid Hasyim in Bangil), 10 August 1997; Hj. Ahmad Jaman (leader of 
Ansor, Pasuruan), 10 August 1997; KH. Hafid Hasyim (leader of Pesantren Darul Ilium in Pasuruan), 
10 August 1997. 
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PPP and name of popular, jailed PPP leader). PPP's campaign strategy of attracting 
disaffected Megawati supporters to the "star party's" ranks seemed to have worked. 
However, scenes of brutality marred the election campaign, as Golkar supporters and 
anti -riot troops and police clashed with Mega -Bintang crowds in the streets of 
numerous towns, in hotly contested electorates inside and outside of Java. 
Sparking PPP indignation was the overzealous methods, unfair practices and 
campaign restrictions against the Islamic -oriented party, with Golkar monopolising 
the pre- election atmosphere. For example, the government issued a ban on Mega - 
Bintang placards and symbols being displayed at rallies, and ordered PPP to stop 
holding rallies before the official campaign period commenced, although Golkar 
continued to conduct rallies. Subsequently, citing the level of campaign- related 
violence, the government banned public rallies and restricted campaigning to indoor 
meetings, media broadcasts and printed materials. After a three -day meeting in 
Jakarta, PPP announced that the campaign restrictions were undemocratic and that the 
party would disregard the rules. PPP also approved a boycott of the elections by seven 
branches in Central Java in response to the refusal by the police to permit public 
campaigning in that province.B1 
In addition to the government's campaign restrictions, one of the main factors 
that reportedly sparked PPP reactions was Golkar's crusade to turn towns and streets 
sn "KB Cholil As'ad Syamsul Arifin: Tak Teriakkan `Hidu Bintan  p g, "' Jawa Pos, 12 May 1997. 
. "PPP Minta Aparat Tidak Bertindak Sebagai Kader OPP Tertentu," Humas Managemen 
Kampanye Pemilu 1997, DPP PPP Jakarta; "DPC Se- Jateng Sepakat Teruskan Kampanye," Humas 
Managemen Kampanye Pemilu 1997, DPP PPP Jakarta; "Kampanye 1997: Di Antara Rusuh dan 
Boikot," Tempo Online, 5 May 1997; "Wawancara Bachtiar Chamsyah: `Justru cara Aparat yang 
Membangkitkan Emosi Massa Kami," Tempo Online, 19 May 1997; "Kekuatan Pohon Beringin 
Mengejar Target Suara," Forum Keadilan, 2 June 1997; Ed Aspinall, "What price victory? The 1997 
elections," Inside Indonesia, July- September, 1997; Louise Williams, "Jakarta acts against alliance," 
Asia OnLine, 14 May 1997; "Protests count for nothing at poll," Asia OnLine," 24 May 1997; Louise 
Williams, "Jakarta poll riots flare," Asia Online, 22 May 1997; Louise Williams, "Growing violence a 
sign of Indonesian regime's legitimacy is leaking away," Asia OnLine," 21 May 1997; Massa di 
Pekalongan Meneriakkan Gantung Soeharto!" SiaR (apakahar @clark.net), 14 April 1997; Geoff 
Forrester, "Towards March 1998, with Determination," Hal Hill and Thee Kian Wie (eds.), Indonesia's 
292 
yellow as it painted public facilities, buildings, vehicles and roadsides in its party 
colour. Consequently, street battles were commonly provoked by tit- for -tat exchanges 
that typically began either with one party removing the street banners, posters and 
flags of another, or with exchanges of taunts followed by rock throwing and clashes, 
with sometimes serious casualties.82 
Central Java was the scene of the earliest and initially worst campaign 
violence. Central Java's northern coastal town of Pekalongan, one of the few towns in 
Indonesia held by PPP, recorded the first major instance of campaign- related violence 
in late March 1997, one month before the official campaign period. Angry PPP 
supporters, joined by locals (and Megawati sympathisers), burnt down a stage that 
was to host a Golkar rally by Suharto's daughter, Siti Rukmana. Local Muslims 
expressed outrage over the fact that the stage was erected in an Islamic boarding 
schoolyard next to a mosque, and that Golkar used Islam "superficially" in its 
campaign to attract supporters. They were incensed by the fact that the popular 
Muslim musician, Rhoma Irama, and the equally popular preacher, Zainuddin MZ- 
previously PPP campaigners -had moved over to Golkar, and that Golkar had the 
temerity to campaign in this PPP bailiwick. The East Java Police later arrested a 
Muslim preacher for his alleged use of prayer meetings to stir up anti -government 
sentiment in which he apparently criticised both Suharto's daughter and the Golkar 
Chair Harmoko, and called Rhoma and Zainuddin traitors to Islam.33 
Technological Challenge, Canberra, Singapore, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
Australian National University, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998, p.60. 
82 See citations in previous footnote. 
83 . "Rhoma, Zainuddin Dan Mbak Tutut Tetap Tampil Di Pekalongan," Suara Pembaruan, 26 
March 1997; "Rhoma Irama: 'Saya Pilih Karena Golkar Berkuasa "', Humas Managemen Kampanye 
Pemilu 1997, DPP PPP Jakarta; "Massa di Pekalongan Meneriakkan `Gantung Soeharto!" SiaR 
(apakabar @clark.net), 14 April 1997; Forrester, "Towards March 1998 with Determination," p.60; 
Williams, `Protests count for nothing at poll," AsiaOnline; Williams, "Growing violence a sign," 
AsiaOnline; "Campaign Violence in Indonesia: `Suppressed Rage' and calls for Reform," USIS 
Foreign Media Reaction Report, 28 May 1997. 
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The burning of the stage was provoked initially by a dispute over the removal 
of PPP flags by Golkar rally organisers. The incident spilled over into massive anti- 
government riots, which deteriorated into attacks against the commercial and 
residential properties of Indonesia's ethnic -Chinese minority, the usual scapegoat of 
political and social tensions in Indonesia.R4 
Pekalongan, and surrounding districts and towns, remained flashpoints of 
violent clashes between PPP supporters and Golkar supporters from March to the end 
of the campaign in late May. In early May, outside of Pekalongan town, PPP mobs 
attacked a housing complex for civil servants and Chinese. They reportedly threw 
molotov cocktail bombs into the houses, burnt the contents and yelled "Hang 
Suharto!"85 Among the districts in Central Java that continued to experience unrest 
were Kudus, Jepara, Demak, Rembang, Magelang, Kendal, Semarang, Wonosobo, 
Banjarnegara, Solo, Surakarta and Yogyakarta -all containing significant PPP 
pockets and therefore constituting major targets of Golkar's aggressive campaign. On 
numerous occasions, PPP crowds confronted heavily -armed anti -riot troops, who 
sometimes unleashed volleys of rubber bullets, tear gas and water canons to break -up 
84 . The mobs damaged or destroyed at least 60 Chinese -owned shops, a bank, and two trucks 
loaded with Batik cloth. Pekalongan was a Batik -producing town and Chinese traders owned many of 
the Batik manufacturing and trading houses, in which local Indonesians (mainly Muslims) were low - 
paid wage labourers. Muslims in Pekalongan felt betrayed by the government's development policies 
and the most striking example of economic disparity existed between themselves and their Chinese 
employers. Similar local resentments were held against Chinese traders and owners of capital 
throughout Indonesia's other cities and towns, as they were perceived as being an opulently rich class, 
mostly of a Christian or non -Muslim faith, who achieved their wealth by unfair means in collusion with 
government officials and local generals. The pre- campaign period, in fact, saw the vulnerable ethnic 
Chinese and Christian communities became a regular target of Muslim mob violence in East, West and 
Central Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Jenny Grant, "PPP Rallies in Pekalongan, Chinese Close 
Doors," apakabar @clark.n.et, 12 May 1997; Jenny Grant, "Waves of political riots," VOA 
(apakabar @clark.net), 10 April 1997; "More than 30 Arrested After riots in Java," Dow Jones News 
Service, 29 March 1997; Louise Williams, "Poll tension: police fire rubber bullets at crowd," Sydney 
Morning Herald, 28 March 1997; Louise Williams, "PPP Rallies in Pekalongan, Chinese Close 
Doors," apakabar @clark.net, 12 May 1997; Louise Williams, "Poll march shuts down Java town," 
Asia OnLine, 30 April 1997; Louise Williams, "Indon police fire on Muslim riot mob," Asia OnLine, 
28 March 1997. 
85 . "Massa di Pekalongan Meneriakkan `Gantung Suharto! "; "PPP supporters returning from rally 
`beaten up by mob' in coastal city," Straits Times, 14 May 1997. 
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rallies. On one occasion in Kudus, PPP supporters clashed with anti -riot police when 
holding a campaign boycott over the Regent's issuance of a regulation banning PPP's 
vehicle and motorcycle cavalcades.86 
In some of these districts and towns, PPP leaders complained about the use, 
especialIy by Golkar -affiliate youth organisations, of thugs against PPP rallies. The 
Yogyakarta chapter of PPP decided to withdraw from the campaign after Golkar's 
militant youths attacked PPP supporters returning home from a rally in Kotagede and 
damaged the PPP branch office in Yogyakarta. There were some reports of thugs 
wearing Ninja outfits attacking PPP's branch offices. The PPP also gave accounts of 
"preman" -type activities in Wonosobo, Banjarnegara and other districts, in which 
knife- wielding and rock -throwing youths incited pay -hack raids on villages and PPP 
convoys. Blaming paid thugs for instigating, what otherwise would appear to have 
been, PPP -directed violence was sometimes possibly motivated by the desire to clear 
PPP's image of brutality. The New Order state was, nevertheless, known for its 
deployment of " preman" to achieve certain political ends, and PPP leaders claimed 
that it was to tarnish the opposition party's image and reduce its appeal for 
electorates.87 
Similar riots and street clashes occurred in PPP strongholds in East Java 
province, in the districts and towns of Bangkalan (Madura), Surabaya, Pasuruan, 
Gresik, Jombang, Bondowoso, Malang, Jember and Banyuwangi. A report by the 
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OPP Sebelum Kampanye," Forum Keadilan, 28 April 1997; "Konvoi Massa PPP Macetkan Arus 
Latin," Surabaya Post, 3 May 1997; "Violence erupts once again," scmp.com (apakabar @clark.net), 22 
April 1997; "Kerusuhan Dua Bulan Terakhir," Suara Merdeka, 26 April 1997; "Clashes at towns on 
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s7 "Bentrokan di Daerah -daerah Panas," Forum Keadilan; "Kampanye DigeIar Nyawa pun 
Berguguran," Forum Keadilan; "kampanye 1997: Di Antara Rusuh dan Boikot," Tempo Online; 
"Wawancara Bachtiar Chamsyah: `Justru cara Aparat yang Membangkitkan Emosi Massa Kami," 
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Pasuruan branch of the N17 on 7 May 1997 captured the campaign -related conflict by 
the opposing Golkar and PPP supporters in that district. The report noted that on PPP 
rally days, its supporters displayed total disrespect for religious leaders who supported 
Golkar, throwing insults at them. PPP supporters tore down Golkar banners, and 
damaged parked vehicles, while at Golkar rallies, PPP supporters carrying sharp 
weapons clashed with Golkar campaigners and security police.88 
The closing days of the official campaign recorded the greatest amount of 
violence and bloodshed. In Jakarta, PPP supporters eclipsed Golkar rallies with 
Jakarta's traffic heavily congested or brought to a standstill. In PPP pockets in 
Jakarta's poorer suburbs, such as Cawang, Kampung Melayu, Depok and Ciputat 
rioting and street battles broke -out between convoys of PPP sympathisers and anti -riot 
forces and Golkar supporters. On 23 May, the last day of the campaign, PPP 
supporters in a retaliatory raid against Golkar sacked the trading city of Banjarmasin. 
Reportedly, Golkar campaigners on motorcycles, who were creating a din outside of a 
mosque during mid -day prayer, incited the PPP supporters into violence. Jakarta had 
to send in crack troops to bring peace to the city, after a day of carnage, which left 
over one hundred people dead. The election period left an estimated 300 people dead 
and hundreds wounded, although a large number of campaign- related deaths were due 
to traffic accidents. By any account, this was an historical calamity.89 
Tempo Online; "More than 30 Arrested After Riots in Java," Dow Jones News Service; "Clashes at 
towns on election trail," hkstandard.com. 
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1997; "Bentrokan di Daerah -daerah Panas," Forum Keadilan. 
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One of the outstanding points about the campaign rallies, was that PPP 
supporters continued to enter the streets by their thousands to vent their frustrations 
against the regime, even after the more moderate national and regional party leaders 
had called off rallies in order to avert further bloodshed. PPP supporters and 
sympathisers had become a mass dynamic in their own right, without the need for 
leadership in order to take action. The uncoordinated mass actions return us to the 
point that state -societal interactions were framed by the non -participatory, non- 
representational architecture of state design. Like the PDI masses before the post -July 
crackdown, PPP and Mega -Bintang masses had little choice but to participate directly 
through demonstration and protest. These were the only remaining outlets for the 
bottled -up frustration of economically and politically marginalised electorates. 
Previous elections had served as opportunities for Indonesians to let off steam, but in 
a fairly controlled and manageable environment. This time, however, violence 
appeared to escalate out of control and move beyond predictable or acceptable limits 
for the regime. 
However, it was easy for the state's security apparatus to disperse such 
leaderless actions, which often resulted in rioting and were open to manipulation by 
security forces.90 Immediately after the campaign, Suharto's government placed a 
strict ban on all street rallies and brought 20,000 troop reinforcements into Jakarta to 
re- establish order before the scheduled poll of 29 May. The armed forces announced 
that it would shoot rioters on sight, and a steady calm soon returned to Indonesia. The 
MUI Chairman outraged Indonesia's educated elite when he reinforced the military 
threat by proclaiming that to shoot rioters and looters was permitted ( "halal ") by 
9° 
. Aspinall, "What price victory: The 1997 elections," Inside Indonesia; Williams, 'Protests count 
for nothing at polls," Asia OnLine. 
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Islam. Again, a leader of a corporatist organisation sought to provide Islamic 
legitimacy to the regime's repressive actions. 
6. Conclusion 
The chapter has considered how different members of the elite, who were 
disaffected with the conduct of New Order politics, began to identify with growing 
resentment in society against Suharto's corrupt and arbitrary rule. Suharto's rule was 
underpinned by a political system that was weighted heavily in favour of the regime 
and fortified by Golkar's landslide victories at the five -yearly general elections. The 
unleashing of public resentment and social protest, and the organisation of sidelined 
elite against Suharto's regime, became increasingly apparent as the 1997 general and 
the 1998 presidential elections drew near, and as anticipation of a presidential 
succession increased. Contending elite interests aligned to and against Suharto's 
regime jostled for advantage before a succession took place. This was why the 
"rainbow" forces in organisations like YKPK had as one of their central objectives, 
the prevention of Habibie from becoming Indonesia's next Vice -President. 
Constitutionally, the Vice- President would automatically inherit the presidency if 
Suharto stepped -down mid -term, as many speculated he would. Should Habibie 
become Indonesia's next President, then it would he Hahibie's main supporters in 
ICMI, Golkar and the military that would ascend to power. Meanwhile, those civilian 
and military figures who had lost out in power contests to Habibie since the 1993 
reshuffles would stand to be further marginalised from power. 
The "rainbow" groups identified with mounting grassroots opposition to 
Suharto's rule. Meanwhile, members of the intelligentsia, opposition politicians, and 
pro- democracy activists played important roles in organising societal protest. There 
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even were significant efforts to build an opposition coalition, which transcended class 
and group interests, round Megawatt's PDI. After the removal of Megawati as party 
leader, more spontaneous attempts were made to form a loose coalitional grouping of 
Mega -Bintang supporters with which to combat the strength of Golkar. This was a 
phenomenon never before observed in Indonesian politics. Nevertheless, the 
coalition -building initiatives were tactical rather than enduring. The frailty of 
coalition building, and the lack of co- ordinated planning between opposition groups, 
contributed significantly to the failure of societal interests to combat the state's much 
superior resources. One reason for this failure was that disaffected members of the 
political elite (reformers and dissidents both within and outside of the state) generally 
did not attempt to build grassroots support for their organisations. This was 
notwithstanding efforts by PDI and PPP party leaders to organise grassroots following 
for the purpose of contesting the election. Disaffected members of the elite were more 
interested :n gaining concessions from the regime, in terms of their own participation 
in the political system, in competition with Muslim interests backing Habibie, than 
with creating societal movements that one day might bring down Suharto's regime. 
Largely, this elite- centred approach was a product of decades of Suharto's patronage 
games, divide -and -rule tactics, and the "floating mass" policy, which still effectively 
severed links between elite level politics and the masses. 
As one of his divide- and -rule tactics, Suharto sought to draw on Muslim 
support, including his mobilisation of incorporated Muslim interests, in order to 
discredit the rival forces. The recruitment of incorporated and collaborating Muslims 
behind his anti- Megawatí/PDI campaign, nonetheless, did not prevent the Muslim 
community from becoming a source of opposition to Golkar during the election 
campaign. Instead, Muslim interests associated with PPP became alienated by the 
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government's over -zealous Golkar campaign, and began to support grassroots causes 
against key aspects of Suharto's corrupt and arbitrary rule. The "Mega -Bintang" 
phenomenon was the peak of this trend of opposition. Opposition to the regime from 
within PDI and PPP demonstrates the increasing ineffectiveness of exclusionary, or 
for that matter inclusionary, corporatism in trying to contain societal interests. The 
systematic use of repression against the opposition was further evidence of this 
failure. 
Despite the growing opposition to Suharto's rule in the pre -election period, 
Golkar won 74.5 percent of the votes cast (its largest victory yet at the polls), with 
PPP coming second (22.43 percent), and PDI trailing with only 3.07 percent.91 In the 
subsequent months until the holding of the March 1998 session of the People's 
Consultative Assembly, Suharto once again demonstrated his mastery at establishing 
his control over Indonesia's political system. In March, he was re- elected unopposed 
for a seventh term as President, with his largest mandate yet ensuring that the 1,000 - 
member People's Consultative Assembly would be filled with compliant politicians, 
Suharto stalwarts and family members. Given his commanding control of Indonesian 
politics, an analyst at the time might have been forgiven for concluding that the 
mounting pre -election opposition and violence was fairly inconsequential to the 
overall political process.92 
The PPP Chairman and leaders did complain about vote rigging after the poll, 
with several branches threatening to boycott the election results. In some parts of the 
country, PPP supporters rioted in protest over the election result with at least one 
rioter being shot dead. In the district of Sampan, Madura (East Java) the government 
even conducted an unprecedented re -count of dozens of polling booths in an effort to 
91 . Forrester, "Towards March 1998, With Determination," p.62. 
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assuage PPP tensions. At the end of the day, . however, PPP, under Metareum's 
leadership, assumed its more characteristically accommodating stance and signed the 
official election results, which still saw the Islamic- oriented party increase its share of 
the vote from 1992. In an interview, Metareum admitted that neither a boycott nor 
protest would measurably alter the established political arrangements.93 
Was it the case, then, that Golkar's overzealous campaign strategy, had been 
an outstanding success, as it did garner a robust result for Golkar in the face of rising 
opposition? To the contrary, analysts had quite correctly perceived at the time that the 
Suharto government still had a price to pay for the underlying resentment to its rule, 
harboured by Indonesia's politically excluded and disadvantaged classes. Seismic 
shifts were destined to occur in the Tectonic plates of Indonesian politics, as long - 
suppressed resentments of Suharto's rule and intra -elite machinations were eventually 
to erupt into the open and bring about the demise of President Suharto and his New 
Order. The 1997 election contest had set in motion a new dynamic, providing an early 
example of agitation by Indonesia's excluded lower classes. By identifying with the 
concerns of Indonesia's hitherto disenfranchised "floating mass," Indonesia's elite 
thereby had shifted political competition beyond the predictable boundaries of the 
New Order political system. The ramifications of this shift in politics were soon to be 
felt. 
9 Aspinall, "What price victory; Forrester, "Towards March 1998, with Determination," p.67; 
Williams, "Protests count for nothing at poll." 
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Chapter 9 
The unravelling of Suharto's regime: Muslims join call for 
change 
1. Introduction 
By early 1998, major cracks were appearing in the established political arrangements 
underpinning Suharto's rule. A nascent university student movement mobilised 
against Suharto and by May spearheaded a popular challenge to the New Order. As 
the deepening political crisis converged with a debilitating economic crisis, the 
reliance of Suharto's regime on old tactics and patterns of survival politics was no 
longer able to cope with the nature of the growing pressures for change. These 
pressures emanated from broad sections of society as well as from key elements of the 
New Order elite. The legitimacy of Suharto's continued right to rule rested on the 
twin claims that his New Order could deliver the benefits of economic development 
and political stability to its people. Indonesia's economic collapse of 1997 -1998, 
which witnessed most businesses go into insolvency, placed millions of Indonesians 
out of work and threatened to have almost 50 percent of Indonesians living below the 
poverty line by 1999, undermined Suharto's first claim to power. Political signs of 
instability evident in 1996, and spiraling out -of- control by mid -1998, undermined his 
second claim to power. The Suharto regime's inability to cope with the Asian 
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economic meltdown of the late 1990s exacerbated the ongoing political crisis of 
presidential succession and resulted in Suharto's resignation on 21 May. 
The analysis focuses on two aspects of the popular challenge to Suharto. First, 
the student movement is examined, with attention given to the role of Muslim student 
organisations in opposing Suharto. Second, a study is made of incorporated Muslim 
interests as they withdrew their support from Suharto. There are two interrelated parts 
of the argument presented. The first part of the argument reinforces discussion (in 
chapter eight) that managing state -society relations through policies of exclusion 
could no longer contain social interests or deter them from organising against the 
political status quo. In Huntington's terms (1968), people's demands for political 
participation were outstripping the poorly -institutionalised structures of authoritarian 
rule, which were unable to absorb the multiplying demands. The establishment since 
the early -1990s of a growing number of independent organisations and coalitions 
unrecognised by the state, and intensification of protest actions and unrest were strong 
indications of mounting societal pressures for participation. These organisations and 
activities both by- passed and, thus, fundamentally challenged corporatist structures. 
The second part of the argument is that Muslim interests associated with ICMI 
turned against their patron when their expectations of finding a role in the cabinet 
remained unfulfilled. Suharto's corporatist strategy through ICMI, until this point, had 
succeeded in dampening the political dissent of Muslims to his rule. However, by 
denying significant inclusion of these interest in political institutions, Suharto 
effectively scuttled what remained of Muslim support for his presidency. Instead, 
Muslims joined opposition voices in the call for Suharto to resign and threw their 
support behind Habibie's presidency. After having been sidelined from the 7`h 
Development Cabinet announced in March, ICMI members were among `strategic 
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insiders' who defected from Suharto because of his failure to overcome the political 
and economic crisies. In the past, exclusion of the majority of Indonesians from 
political participation had relied on a consensus of strategic (middle and elite) classes 
that had a stake in the maintenance of Suharto's rule. Suharto had managed challenges 
to his presidency by maintaining shifting alliances of supporting elite groups and by 
isolating opponents. However, the cabinet line -up (consisting of his most trusted 
Ioyalists, family members, business associates, and corrupt bureaucrats) disrupted the 
managed consensus of supporting elite for his regime. This time the sidelining of elite 
interests from power had the effect of tilting the otherwise careful balance of forces 
against the status quo. Fewer and fewer elite and middle class groups had a stake in 
Suharto's narrowly based, coercive and repressive rule and hence supported the 
student -led impetus for political change. The brief convergence of elite disaffection 
and societal pressures for Suharto to resign contributed to a volatile and politicised 
environment. A detailed analysis of the elite defections is not given, as the analysis 
focuses primarily on the defection of corporatised Muslim interests.' 
2. The university student movement 
Early in 1998, students supported by Indonesia's educated classes, were the 
first to call for major reform of the political system and for Suharto to step down. It is 
After thirty -two years of rule, the causes of Suharto's forced resignation from office on 21 May 
were, nonetheless, multi- stranded and complex. However, a discussion of these causes is beyond 
the central thesis concerning pluralist challenges to authoritarianism in general and to exclusionary 
corporatist structures in particular. Other authors have analysed most of these causes and, 
therefore, the international and economic dimensions, including the role of the IMF will not be 
specified here. Suryadinata, Leo. "A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto and 
Rise of Habibie," Southeast Asian Affairs 1999; Hill, Hal. "The Indonesian Economy: The Strange 
and Sudden Death of a Tiger," Forrester, Geoff and May, R.J. (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto," 
Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing, 1998; McGillivray, Mark and Morrisey, Oliver. "Economic 
and financial meltdown in Indonesia: prospects for sustained and equitable economic and social 
recovery," Budiman, Arief et.al. (eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Clayton, 
Monash Asía Institute, Monash University, 1999; Evans, Kevin. "Economic Update," Forrester, 
Geoff (ed.), Post -Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaas, (Indonesian Assessment 1998), Research 
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common for students to spearhead protest movements, however -in the case of 
Indonesia university students represented a section of society greatly affected by the 
state's tight corporatist controls since the Minister of Education's Campus 
Normalisation Act of 1978.2 Under the normalisation policy, which prohibited 
independent student councils and political activities on campus, students were 
effectively excluded from participation in Indonesia's formal political processes.3 
However, the recent student agitations were largely the result of a new period of 
relative openness, beginning in the late- 1980s, when the government offered some 
respite to its tight controls by replacing the closely- monitored student coordinating 
bodies with less restrictive student senates.' By the mid- 1990s, students had already 
begun to engage in organisational activities and agitation to test the boundaries of 
New Order tolerance, as the case of SMID in 1996 attested (see chapter eight). 
Although, in reaction, Suharto's government clamped -down on student -led labour 
strikes, hunger strikes and demonstrations, it had, in retrospect, failed to silence the 
call for political change. 
In the final analysis, the period of openness, followed by a repressive 
clampdown on political activism in the 1990s, had the unintended outcome of raising 
people's expectations for change. It was therefore, perhaps, no coincidence that 
students were at the forefront of a movement, in which its most activist members 
called for the lifting of political controls and the return to full participation of 
Indonesia's otherwise "floating mass" in a totally -reformed and "democratic," 
political system. 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Bathurst, Singapore, 
Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999. 
2 . See chapter four for discussion on campus normalisation. 
3 
. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, "Trends in Indonesian Student Movements in 1998," Geoff Forrester &R.J. 
May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto, Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing, 1998, p.172. 
° . "Reinkarnasi Dewan Mahasiswa." Ummat, 20 April 1998. 
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Starting in February 1998, the student demonstrations were triggered by rising 
prices of basic commodities, as the value of the rupiah all but collapsed and millions 
of average Indonesians were left with little or no purchasing power for staple foods 
and sundry items. From late -February to mid- March, thousands of students held 
protest actions and hunger strikes throughout the country in Java (Jakarta, Bogor, 
Bandung Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Solo), Sulawesi (Ujung Pandang), Kalimantan 
(Banjarmasin), and Sumatra (Medan, Palembang and Bengkulu). To their key 
demands for price reductions on, and distribution of, basic commodities, students 
added calls for far -reaching economic and political reforms, including a change of 
national leadership and clean government.6 
In a demonstration of their open rejection of Suharto's New Order, on 25 
February, at the University of Indonesia's Salemba campus in Central Jakarta, 
students and alumni covered over with a white cloth the large campus sign, which 
read "Welcome to the Campus of the New Order Struggle ". This action would have 
been an unimaginable feat of courage just months earlier, and would certainly have 
drawn the full opprobrium of the state's security forces. The following day, students 
at the University's Depok campus in South Jakarta erected a huge banner on which 
was written "Campus of People's Struggle ", as they vigorously denounced the New 
Order. At the different campuses, assistant rectors, former rectors, deans, academic 
staff and alumni joined the protests and sometimes lent strongly worded support to the 
students' actions, although they were not so forthright in condemning the New Order. 
6 . `Para Mahasiswa Di Yogya, Bandung Dan Banjarmasin Protes Kenaikan Harga," Suara 
Pembaruan, 24 February 1998; "Mahasiswa Bali, Yogyakarta, Bandung, Ujungpandang Unjuk 
Keprihatinan," Suara Pembaruan, 5 March 1998; "Aksi Mahasiswa: Kampus Pun Mulai Bemyanyi "', 
Tiras, 9 March 1998; "Kesempatan Terakhir Sang Mandaritas," Ummat, 9 March 1998. 
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Rather, they stressed the need for reform through constitutional channels, in 
preference to the certain alternative of unrest. 
The demonstrations in the different Indonesian towns and centres remained 
orderly and peaceful and ABRI ensured that they were kept within the confines of 
campuses by maintaining tight security at the perimeters of universities. But organised 
student protests grew in size and intensity after the March sitting of the MPR's 
General Assembly which re- elected Suharto as president but failed to address 
adequately people's major concerns. The announcement of the 7th Development 
Cabinet (consisting mainly of Suharto loyalists) demonstrated the government's lack 
of resolve to implement genuine economic or political reforms, causing the rupiah to 
plummet from 2,500 in July 1997 to below 10,000 to the US dollar. 
Thereafter, demonstrations began to spill out onto the streets, and the first 
major clashes between students and the security forces occurred, as anti -riot troops 
resorted to tear gas, batons and rubber bullets. Student demands began to focus on 
calls for "total reform," in rejection of official pleas for gradual reform. To the slogan 
of "reduce prices" protesters added, "we reject the 7th Development Cabinet ".8 The 
new Minister of Education and Culture, Wiranto Arismunandar, came under 
9 
. "Kerisauan Mahasiswa Dan Ilumni -UI Diungkapkan Di. Kampus Salemha," Suara Pembaruan, 
26 February 1998; "Mahasiswa UT Proklamirkan Kampus Perjuangan Rakyat," Suara Pembaruan, 27 
Febuary 1998; "Aksi Unjuk Rasa Masih Merebak Di Berbagai Kampus Di Indonesia," Suara 
Pembaruan, 11 March 1998; "Gelombang Demo: Kami Benar -benar Sedang Marah," Ummat, 16 
March 1998; "Penggulung Gelombang Suara Kampus," Ummat, 29 April 1998; "Kesempatan Terakhir 
Sang Mandaritas," Ummat; "Demo Mahasiswa: Gugat Sistem Kedap Suara," Tiras, 23 March 1998; 
"Reformasi: Rekomendasi Kampus Kuning," Gatra, 18 April 1998; "Korupsi dalam Diskusi," Forum 
Keadilan, 20 April 1998; "Suara -Suara Kritis yg Mulai Didengar," Forum Keadilan, 20 April 1998. 
. "Police fire tear gas at Soeharto protesters," The Age, 13 March 1998; "Aksi Mahasiswa YES, 
Petualang Politik NO," Gatra, 14 March 1998; "Gelombang Demo," Ummat; "Mereka Terus 
Mendesakkan Reformasi," Ummat, 11 May 1998; "Aksi Mahasiswa Masih Berlanjut: Terjadi Aksi 
Lempar Batu Dan Semprotan Air," Suara Pembaruan, 12 March 1998; "Aksi Mahasiswa: Hapuskan 
KKN," Suara Pembaruan, 17 March 1998; " Unjuk Keprihatinan Di Berbagai Kampus: 26 Korban 
Luka -luka, 7 Dirawat Inap," Suara Pembaruan, 18 March 1998; "Aksi Mahasiswa Di Berbagai 
Kampus," Suara Pembaruan, 19 March 1998; "Dialog Diwarnai Protes," Suara Pembaruan, 25 March 
1998; "Mahasiswa: Mereka Telah Keluar Kampus," Gatra, 18 April 1998; "Demo Mahasiswa: Kini 
Namanya Gerakan Horisontal," Gatra, 25 May 1998; "Menunggu Ujung Aksi Mahasiswa Dan Fartai 
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particularly sharp rebuke because of his reputation as one of the New Order's most 
hard -line officials, when he was Rector of the Bandung Institute of Technology, and 
because, as minister, he uncompromisingly continued to enforce the government's 
policy of campus normalisation.9 
A) The role of Muslim students 
One of the features of the student movement was the forging of cross -campus 
communication networks with student leaders organising joint protests with students 
from several campuses at a time. Islamic student organisations performed an 
important role in the coordination of demonstrations. For example, on 29 March 
representatives of Campus Dakwah Institutes (LDK) from 60 tertiary institutes 
established the Muslim University Students Action Front (KAMMI) in Malang, and 
organised several cross -campus actions of students from both secular and Islamic 
tertiary institutes. The Yogyakarta League of Muslim University Students (LMMY)- 
a front for the Islamic University Students Association (HMI) -was responsible for 
holding similar joint demonstrations. state -run and private Islamic universities and 
tertiary institutes, such as IAINs, the Islamic University of Indonesia and the 
Muhammadiyah University played prominent roles in nationwide demonstrations.10 
Baru," Ummat, 13 April 1998; "Demo Mahasiswa: `Indonesia Milik Kalian, Orang Muda ", Ummat, 4 
May 1998. 
9 . `Puas Tak Puas Kabinet Baru," Forum Keadilan, 6 April 1998. 
° . "Unjuk Rasa Di Bandung, Surabaya Dan Yogyakarta, Formulir Diedarkan Di ITS Meminta 
Pendapat Tentang Pertanggungjawaban," Suara Pembaruan, 3 March 1998; "Unjuk Rasa Mahasiswa 
Di Yogyakarta, Ujungpandang, Surabaya, Semarang Dan Jakarta," Suara Pembaruan, 4 March 1998; 
"Mahasiswa Bali, Yogyakarta, Bandung, Ujungpandang Unjuk Keprihatinan," Suara Pembaruan, 5 
March 1998; "Aksi Unjuk Rasa Masih Merebak Di Berbagai Kampus Di Indonesia," Suara 
Pembaruan, 11 March 1998; "Mahasiswa UI Kembali Gelar Unjuk Rasa, Di Solo Terjadi Bentrok," 
Suara Pembaruan, 26 March 1998; "Demo Mahasiswa: Gugat Sistem Kedap Suara," Tiras, 23 March 
1998; "Bentrokan: Dari Kampus Turun Ke Jalan," Tiras, 30 March 1998; "Mahasiswa: Mereka Telah 
Keluar Kampus," Gatra, 18 April 1998; 'Demo Mahasiswa: Kini Namanya Gerakan Horizontal," 
Gatra, 2 May 1998; "Demo Mahasiswa: `Indonesia Milik Kalian, Orang Muda ", Ummat, 4 May 1998. 
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Mosques served as one of the main centres for organising the student 
operations. For example, in March the Islamic student organisations, including HMI 
and the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI), held protests at the Al -Azhar Mosque in 
Jakarta (a centre of student activities), which resulted in the issuance of an "Al -Azhar 
Declaration ". The declaration was part of countrywide demonstrations over an interim 
list of proposed cabinet members in circulation in early March. Students rejected the 
list because it included too many corrupt bureaucrats and Suharto loyalists and did not 
give representation to Muslim or students' aspirations." 
The fact that mosques became important centres of student activities was 
rooted in the de- politicisation of campuses in 1979, after which they served as 
alternative venues for the organisation and expression of political grievance. Mosques 
had allowed students to organise their activities outside the purview of the state and 
its university administration.12 Since the normalisation policy, throughout the 
country's universities, students had begun to organise themselves into numerous, tiny 
and difficult -to- monitor Islamic usroh and haragoh groups, cells and clubs, 
unmediated by the state.13 Over the next two decades, although students were 
prohibited from conducting overtly political activities on campus, Muslim students 
were able to operate autonomously from the university hierarchy through their 
. Interview with members of the Youth Islamic Study Club (YISC) at Al -Azhar Mosque on 18 
October 1996; "Menolak Kabinet Korup dan Nepotis," Ummat, 23 March 1998; "Demo Mahasiswa: 
`Indonesia Milik Kahan," Ummat. 
12 . Interviews with Imaduddin Abdulrahim, 15 February 1994 and 2 September 1996; Rifki 
Rosyad, "A Quest For True Islam: A Study Of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in 
Bandung, Indonesia," Canberra, Research School of Pacific and Asian. Studies, Thesis (Masters), 
February 1995. 
13 Although some of these groups were mutually exclusive entities with restricted memberships, 
others were organised by a hierarchy of murabbi (mentors, leaders). They provided a potential breeding 
ground for future political actions. The Secretary General Of Dewan Dakwah, Hussein Umar -a fiery 
preacher in his own right -was a senior murabbi who played a prominent role in organising Islamic 
groups on campus. Suharto's New Order state tried to counter the proliferation of unmediated student 
groups by coopting preachers like Hussein and sponsoring them to press the government's message at 
universities. It also established state -guided pesantren kilat (fast -track courses in Islamic_ morality for 
students) on campus and organised children from their pre -school years onwards into Qu'ran recital 
310 
religious activities. Robin Madrid argues that, by 1998, Muslim students (or Islami 
students in his terminology) functioned with a high degree of autonomy, were 
"experienced in organising campus activities and mosque- related social activities," 
"were part of various Indonesia -wide student networks," and "were used to engaging 
in political analysis. "t4 
B) Fragmented student movement 
Despite some coordination of cross- campus protest activities, in many 
respects, the student movement was a fractured one that lacked nationwide cohesion. 
Edward Aspinall observes that the heterogeneous movement was divided roughly into 
those students who evinced a moderate and cautious stance and more radically 
inclined and militant student activists. State -authorised student senates and Muslim 
organisations represented the first tendency and the outlawed, but underground, PRD 
and its front organisation, the People's Struggle Committee for Change (KPRP), were 
representatives of the second, militant tendency. In outlook, tactics, and demands 
these two tendencies differed markedly. The moderates saw themselves as a moral 
force guarding the "purity" of their movement from contamination of other political 
forces and interests. Therefore, they rejected collaboration with the ruling elite and 
opposition politicians and were wary of making any links with Indonesia's lower 
classes (labour, peasants, and the urban dispossessed). At first, they rejected pleas and 
taunts by radical groups to leave the campuses and take to the streets. They heeded the 
warnings of ABRI not to risk confrontation with the security forces or the potential 
for rioting that might result from non -students joining their cause. In their demands, 
clubs and other state -approved social activities. Interview with Ahmad Syafi'i (senior researcher at the 
Department of Religion), 7 April 1997; Rosyad, "A Quest For True [slam." 
4 . Robin Madrid, "Islamic Students in the Indonesian Student Movement, 1998 -1999: Forces for 
Moderation," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars: 31 ;3) (1999), p.21. 
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they also avoided controversial issues such as calling for an end to ABRI's dwi fungsi 
doctrine, as taken up by the radicals.ts 
In particular, before May, Muslim student organisations were constrained in 
their criticisms of Suharto and the New Order, and kept their protests within the 
confines of campus. KAMMI was among those organisations that joined street 
protests only in the last days of Suharto's rule, when opposition against him was 
overwhelming. The reason for this, explains Madrid, was because the Islamic students 
saw themselves as a movement for moral regeneration that eschewed violence and 
rejected the Marxist language and confrontational tactics of more left -wing radical 
student organisations.'6 It is also probable that much the Muslim student movement 
initially subdued its criticisms of Suharto because Muslims were beneficiaries of the 
state -Islamic rapprochement of the 1990s and feared state reprisals against Islam 
reminiscent of the pre- accommodation period.17 After the appointment of the cabinet 
in March, however, Muslim students became openly critical of Suharto but KAMMI 
only joined street protests on 20 May when Suharto's downfall was imminent. 
By contrast, the most radical groups considered that building alliances with the 
urban lower classes and taking to the streets, against ABRI's firm warnings, was 
critical to their anti- regime struggle. The more militant among them deliberately 
sought confrontation with the security forces as a means of drawing public attention 
to their struggle. Rather than the non -violent and gradualist stance of moderate 
student reformers, many of the radicals called for "total reform" or revolutionary 
overthrow of the regime 18 
15 Aspinall, "The Indonesian student uprising," pp.218 -219, 222 -224. 
" . Madrid, `Islamic Students," pp.21 -26. 
17 . Rifki Rosyad, for example, argues that, since the founding of ICMI, many members of the 
Muslim student movement later tended to gravitate into positions within the state bureaucracy and 
become co- opted. Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam." 
is Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam." 
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Another problem facing the student movement was that it failed to gain the 
support of national political leaders. For students to have a chance of bringing about a 
fundamental change of regime, they needed the combined support of national 
opposition leaders. However, a number of students expressed their disappointment 
with the failure of the most prominent opposition leaders- Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Amien Rais and Megawati -to reach a shared understanding about the goals and 
direction of the reform movement. Historical and personal mistrust still ran deep 
between Amien Rais and his Muhammadiyah organisation (Islamic modernism) on 
the one hand, and Abdurrahman and his supporters in the Nandlatul Ulama 
organisation (Islamic traditionalism), on the other.19 More fundamentally, although 
students demonstrated a great capacity to engage in collective group actions to press 
their demands on the state, deep mistrust existed between middle class and elite 
actors, the student movement, and the urban lower classes. This mistrust militated 
against the building of lasting opposition coalitions that could bridge class differences 
and form into a strong movement with which to seize power. 
The fractured nature of opposition, partly, was the result of Suharto's divisive 
politics that sought to play off these historical divisions by offering organisational 
interests unequal access to patronage and power opportunities. Also reinforcing 
antagonisms was decades of state suppression of autonomous political organisation, 
through corporatist containment. This severely stunted the development of open 
political competition, which otherwise might -if given the chance to become 
19 . There was a notable tendency for Abdurrahman and Megawati to align themselves with 
nationalist causes for a religiously -neutral state against what they saw as the inclination of modernist 
Muslims associated with Muhammadiyah and ICMI to sponsor Islamic causes. 
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institutionalised -have led to a normative consensus about the rules of the political 
system within which contest would occur.20 
C) Military responses to the student movement 
Rival factions of the military adopted two different approaches in their 
handling of student demonstrations. On the one hand, the stated position of ABRI, 
under General Wiranto's leadership, was that of conciliation with students and 
tolerance of protests providing they remained within the perimeters of university 
campuses. On the other, the Special Forces (Kopassus) under the indirect command of 
Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto (the Commander of Army Strategic Forces) instigated 
military terror, kidnappings and repression of students in an attempt, many believed, 
to undermine Wiranto's strategy of moderation and to discredit his command of the 
armed forces. 
Reformists within ABRI, who were keen to protect the military's institutional 
interests and professionalism in an increasingly destabilised political climate, 
influenced Wiranto. They saw the need for peaceful presidential succession, and 
recognised the necessity for gradual and negotiated reforms as a means of 
reconsolidating their power within established institutional arrangements. They also 
felt strong loyalties to their patron, Suharto, and knew the risks to their own political 
careers if they opposed the president. They, therefore, were unprepared to take direct 
action against him. From the reformist camp was Wiranto's social and political affairs 
chief, Lt. -Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono. Bambang initiated a series of dialogues and 
meetings with moderate community leaders, intellectuals, university hierarchy and 
20 . This line of argument, although containing a large element of truth, tends to underestimate the high degree of 
diversity of, and competition between, social -political interests well before the New Order was established. For 
example, during the 1950s period of parliamentary democracy, factionalism within and between national political 
parties was rife and contributed to the denouement of constitutional democracy. 
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students in order to sound out their views on political reformation, including 
presidential succession.21 
Wiranto also was possibly acting on Suharto's instructions as a tactical ploy to 
divide the student movement. It appears, to some extent, that Wiranto's lenient 
approach had as its purpose to drive a wedge between the student -led opposition. This 
could be achieved by offering student moderates the choice of negotiated settlement, 
whilst promising harsh action against radical students who chose to take their 
demands to the streets. In all likelihood, the holding of dialogues with ABRI would 
dissipate the students' resolve and energy to continue their struggle.22 Meanwhile, 
dialogues with ABRI would quarantine the problem by restricting it to the military's 
security and order concerns. 
Thus, many student activists remained deeply suspicious of the military's 
motives and feared that dialogue was simply a tactic to keep them off the streets. They 
mostly rejected Wiranto's offer for dialogue, and Gen. Feisal Tanjung refused the 
students' requests for dialogue with the President. Feisal announced that the 
appropriate channel for them to express their wishes was through established 
hierarchy (the university administration) and by conducting themselves according to 
the protocol of polite observance (tata krama).23 Suharto's rebuff demonstrated that 
the regime still would not countenance the participation of students outside of the 
21 " Mutasi ABRI: Dari Cijantung ke Merdeka Timur," Gatra, 28 March 1998; `Pangab: ABRI 
Siap Berdialog Dengan Amien Rais, Mega Dan Gus Dur -Aspirasi Mahasiswa Sangat Dihargai," 
Suara Pembaruan Daily, 13 March 1998; "Menhankam/Pangab Jenderal TNI Wiranto: ABRI Harus 
Ekstra Sabar," Suara Pembaruan Daily, 20 March 1998; "Adu Sabar Setelah Penolakan Dialog," 
Ummat, 6 April 1998. 
2z This might explain why Suharto, through his Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, 
Feisal Tanjung, rejected student requests to meet directly with the President. Student meetings with 
Suharto would be an admission that political solutions could be found to the crisis and that student 
demands were legitimate. 
u 
. "Menko Polkam: Tidak Mungkin Mahasiswa Berdialog Dengan Presiden," Suara Pembaruan 
Daily, 27 March 1998; The Minster of Internal Affairs (ret. Gen.) Hartono also rejected outright any 
notion of holding dialogue between student representatives and Suharto. "Hartono Kok Ngono ?" 
Ummat, 4 May 1998. 
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formal mechanisms of New Order hierarchy, which, in fact, ensured their exclusion 
from political participation. 
An outcome of the military's restrained response to the student movement, 
however, was that student leaders and academics became emboldened vocally to press 
their demands on the state, as they tested the limits of New Order tolerance. The 
approach by Prabowo's Special Forces of direct repression against student 
demonstrators, was in stark contradiction to ABRI's public position of moderation, 
and further served to crystallise indignation against Suharto's New Order. In 
particular, the deployment of troops with live ammunition against students at the 
prestigious private Trisakti University on 12 May, and the consequent killing of four 
students, sent the situation spiraling out of control. Speculation at the time was that 
Prabowo's tactic was to create instability and thereby prove that Wiranto's lenient 
approach had failed to quell the student opposition or to calm down political tensions. 
Officers serving under Prabowo later faced military tribunal for their alleged role in 
the kidnappings of radical activists, for which eleven soldiers, including several junior 
officers, were found guilty in a trial that lasted from December 1998 to April 1999.24 
By 14 May, in Jakarta's central business district, menacing black plumes of smoke 
bellowed out of ransacked buildings as fires claimed an estimated one thousand or 
more lives -and the public mood swung more assuredly against Suharto's rule.25 
24 . "Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations," Jakarta, 
Brussels, ICG Asia Report No.12, (2 February 2001), pp.3 -4. 
zs 
"Demo Mahasiswa: Kini Namanya Gerakan Horisontal," Gatos, 2 May 1998; "Demo 
Mahasiswa: `Indonesia Milik Kalian, Orang Muda ", Ummat, 4 May 1998; Louise Williams. 
"Protesters shot in police clashes," The Age, 4 May 1998; Louise Williams, "Police shoot to quell 
rioters," The Age, 6 May 1998; "Mereka Terus Mendesakkan Reformasi," Ummat, 11 May 1998; 
"Soeharto opposition gains in strengthy," The Age, 11 May 1998; Louise Williams, "Defiant students 
take protests off campus," The Age, 13 May 1998; Louise Williams and Cerrase Greene, "Deaths rile 
PM," The Age, 14 May 1998; David Lamb, "Campus deaths fuel protests," The Age, 15 May 1998; 
Louise Williams, `Riots shake Soeharto," The Age, 15 May 1998; "Demo Pun Jadi Mimpi Buruk," 
Gatra, 16 May 1998; "Massa Hantu Merayap dan Memicu Kerusuhan Itu," Gatra, 16 May 1998; 
"Mereka Ingin reformasi Tapi Jakarta Dijilat Api," Gatra, 23 May 1998; "Gelombang Aksi Setelah 
BBM Naik," Ummat, 18 May 1998; Menabur Angin, Menuai Badai," Ummat, 18 May 1998 
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D) Concluding remarks 
Despite its fragmented nature, the student movement had articulated a broadly 
shared desire for change, thus inspiring support from the middle and lower class 
sections of society. One of the demands aired by students had been the lifting of 
corporatist curbs on campus life and the return to independent student councils. More 
broadly, they called for the revocation of political laws and political arrangements that 
had excluded the vast majority of Indonesians from participation in the formal 
structures of politics.26 They declared that the political parties and the parliament had 
failed to channel the aspirations of the people and, therefore, students were filling the 
representational void by direct forms of participation. By early April, more cautious 
reformers and public intellectuals (all with civil- servant status) at the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI), some of whom had criticised Suharto in the past, 
identified with the students and made scathing criticisms of the New Order political 
system.27 
In the end, the escalation of anti -Suharto student demonstrations from late - 
1997 to mid -1998 was indicative of the failure of the New Order corporatist structure 
to contain and exclude the political activism and participation of students. Student 
demonstrations that had begun peacefully ended up by pitting a cross- section of 
society against the most repressive arm of the state, its security forces. The desire for 
change could not be extinguished. Finally, internal division within ABRI made 
impossible a coordinated response to mass demonstrations and the contradictory 
ze "Reinkamasi Dewan Mahasiswa," Ummat. 
27 . One LIPI researcher, Syamsuddin Harts, referred to the "hegemonic party system" as part of the 
"sterile condition of conventional instruments of politics." The head of the LIPI research unit for 
politics, Mochtar Pabotinggi, rejected as ludicrous the notion that parliament represented the people. 
He instead called the DPR/MPR the "Regime's" Representative and Deliberative Councils. "Ketika 
DPR mandul," Ummat, 6 April 1998; "Orde Baru Jangan Ditumbangkan," Ummat, 11 May 1998. 
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responses of reformists and hard- liners within ABRI only intensified opposition to the 
regime? 
3. Former ICMI leader in the vanguard of protests 
The Muhammadiyah General Chairman, Amien Rais, was the most prominent 
national leader to express sustained support for student demands in favour of political 
and economic reform. As an outspoken academic at Gajah Mada University he 
already had a considerable student following. After his forced resignation as the head 
of ICMI's Council of Experts, he became one of the most visible symbols of 
opposition against Suharto's corrupt and authoritarian government and his popularity 
soared among students.29 Overall, ICMI had failed to co -opt Amien or silence his 
dissenting voice over presidential succession, Suharto's family wealth and other 
controversial issues. He could not channel his aspirations through the ICMI and, once 
he was forced outside of the organisation, he appealed to the idea of building a 
coalition of opposition groups against Suharto's power in order to resolve Indonesia's 
crisis.30 
Between January and May, Amien identified with students holding nationwide 
vigils and demonstrations calling for political reformation and for Suharto to step 
down as president. He denounced Suharto's government for engendering "corruption, 
collusion, nepotism, greed and moral denigration" and alluded to the self- serving 
n Edward Aspinall, "Opposition and Elite Conflict in the Fall of Soeharto," Geoff Forrester and 
R.J. May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto, Bathurst, London, Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd, C. Hurst 
& Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1998, pp.144 -5. 
Although, minority religious groups and NU youth groups were among those who remained 
distrustful of the Muhammadiyah leader because of his former involvement in ICMI. 
70 . According to Amien, the coalition would have to include all social forces including the armed 
forces, Golkar, the existing parties, mass organisations, business people, religious groups and NGOs. 
"Amien Rais: `Kalau Saya Jadi Presiden", D &R, 10 January 1998; "Komitmen Amien Rais: Gerakan 
Moral atau Manuver Politik," Tiras, 30 March 1998; Ken Young, "The Crisis: Contexts And 
Prospects," The Fall of Sneharto, Geoff Forrester & R.J. May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto, Bathurst, 
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nature of Suharto's family business empires. He drew on his growing popularity by 
threatening to bring the Muslim masses onto the streets as a "people power" against 
Suharto's rule.31 This contrasted dramatically to his statement in mid -1996 against 
pro- democracy forces allied to Megawati, in which he had condemned "people 
power" and backed state repression.32 
The student movement offered Amien an ideal opportunity to demonstrate his 
credentials as a national leader of moral standing. At the Indonesian Legal Aid 
Institute in September 1997, he declared his preparedness to be nominated as an 
alternative presidential candidate to Suharto. Later, on 15 January, at the Yogyakarta 
residence of the chairperson of the New PM, Nyonya Supeni, he met with the 
opposition PDI leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. In front of the small gathering, 
Nyonya Supeni read out a statement of concern about the monetary crisis and 
announced that both Amien and Megawati were putting themselves forward as 
presidential candidates.33 
The meeting at Nyonya Supeni's house represented a phenomenon of 
emerging tactical alliances against Suharto, which revealed a growing disaffection 
London, Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd, C. Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1998, pp.120 -121; 
Aspinall, "Opposition and Elite Conflict," p.145. 
31 
. Louise Williams, "Muslim leader calls for alliance to end Suharto's grip on power, The Age, 6 
January 1998; Louise Williams, "Warning Signs for Suharto," The Age, 28 February 1998; "Armen 
Rais: `Kalau Saya Jadi Presiden...7 D&R; "Komitmen Amien Rais," Tiras. 
32 . See chapter eight. 
33 Among those at the gathering at the time were the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Rudini 
who, in 1996, had publicly defended the various forces for change coalescing around Megawti's PDI 
against Suharto. Other figures present at the gathering, later referred to as "28 October Group," 
included Suharto critics Ali Sadikin (Jakarta's former governor and leader of the "Petition of 50 "), 
Baharuddin Lopa (the Secretary General of Komnas HAM), and Sri Edi Sasono (elder brother of the 
gaoled Sri Bintang Pamungkas and avid supporter of the student -led reform movement). On the whole, 
these were people who had been pushed to the margins of power by earlier political struggles and had 
remained mild irritants as they continued to criticise aspects of Suharto's New Order. "Caton Presiden: 
Impian Arrien dan Mega," Gatra, 24 January 1998; "Demonstrasi: Benteng Istikamah," Gatra, 14 
Febuary 1998; "Pencalonan Presiden: Membuka `Irigasi' Politik," Tiras, 2 Febuary 1998; "Wawancara 
Megawati: ' Harus Berani Introspeksi "', Tiras, 2 Febuary 1998; "'He Is the Problem': On Suharto -and 
other issues," Asiaweek Online, 16 March 1998; "Amien Rais Dan Megawati Bertemu Lagi Di Yogya," 
Republika Online, 26 January 1998; "Tekad: Fenomena Politik Pinggiran," Republika Online, 2 
Febuary 1998; Margot Cohen, "Daring to Say No: Muslim groups search for alternative to Suharto," 
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with established arrangements under Suharto's control, as it aimed to bring together 
leaders of different political camps -nationalist, Islamic traditionalist and Islamic 
modernist. However, it also represented the failure to build an enduring or viable 
alliance against Suharto, as the NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid failed to appear at 
the meeting. After the meeting, Megawati also tried to play down the significance of 
the meeting by rejecting suggestions that she was seeking an alliance with the 
Muhammadiyah chairman.34 
Two factors contributed to the failure of alliance building. One, according to 
Marcus Mietzner, was that Suharto shrewdly announced that Habibie was his 
candidate for the vice- presidency. He did this in a successful hid to bring the Muslim 
modernists behind Habibie and the President, thereby splitting the opposition and pre- 
empting the establishment of an alliance of nationalists, Islamic traditionalists and 
modernists against his rule. However, its is doubtful that any tactical alliances -had 
they been forged in the first place -between these civilian leaders, who viewed each 
other as rivals for the presidency, would have continued for long. The second was that 
ABRI threw its support firmly behind Suharto and Hahibie, extinguishing any doubts 
in the minds of competing elite members that the military leadership was divided over 
Indonesia's future leadership, or that it might countenance disruption to the General 
Assembly of the MPR in March.35 
Like his colleagues in ICMI, Amien therefore toned -down his demands for 
reform when Habibie's ascent to the vice- presidency was imminent, and the prospects 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 January 1998, pp.18 -20; Marget Cohen, "Campus Crusaders: 
Students raise temperature of the protests," Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1998, p.26. 
34 "Wawancara Megawati: `Harus Berani Introspeksi," Tiras, 2 February 1998. 
3s Marcus Mietzner, "From Soeharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and political Islam 
during the transition," Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post -Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos, (Indonesia 
Assessment 1998), Bathurst, Singapore, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999, 
p.71. 
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of ICMI gaining access to the corridors of power and influence over government 
policy -making, consequently, had improved. For example, just prior to the holding of 
the Special Assembly of the MPR, at the fifth -anniversary meeting of the ICMI think - 
tank CIDES held on 26 February, Amien acknowledged, what seemed then, the 
inevitable outcome of Suharto continuing in office. Flanked by ICMI luminaries, 
Amien insisted that all parties should give the government a "fair chance" by allowing 
it a six -month to one -year grace period to prove itself (in overcoming the monetary 
crisis), and invited the participants to pray for a "happy ending" for the government.36 
Amien's supporters in the student movement expressed concern that the 
Muhammadiyah chairman was moderating his tone, and might sell out on the reform 
movement, because he seemingly had struck some kind of deal with Habibie 
regarding the vice- presidency.37 Both Amien and the ICMI intelligentsia were hopeful 
that the Muslim intellectuals' association would bring them closer to power and, at 
this point, Amien gave tacit backing to Habibie's vice- presidency.38 
It became increasingly clear that Amien's vacillation between confrontation 
with Suharto's government and conciliation depended on his assessment of the 
shifting balance of power. As such, Amien renewed his attack on Suharto's 
government in reaction to an interim list of proposed cabinet members (released to 
coincide with the MPR session of 1 -11 March) and when conciliation had clearly 
provided no benefits to Muslim interests. The list created great consternation in ICMI 
36 At the function, Habibie's advisor on military defence Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo spoke on the 
subject of constitutional and gradual reform, while another Habibie loyalist the Chief of Social and 
Political Staff, Let. -Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, attended. Other members of ABRI's top -brass were present at 
the meeting, including General Wiranto's senior advisor Lt.-Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono. They 
apparently had warned Amien to restrain his attacks against Suharto, to secure the MPR session against 
the possibility of mass unrest. 
7. "Dan HUT Cides ke -5," Republika Online, 27 Febuary 1998; Cohen, "Campus Crusaders," p.26; 
"Amien Rais: Ledakan Politik Bisa Terjadi Jika Krisis Moneter Tak Dapat Diatasi," Suara Pembaruan, 
27 Febuary 1998. 
38 . "Wawancara Dr. Amien Rais: Tak Ada Komitmen Apa Pun dengan Habibie," Tiras, 23 Febuary 
1998; "Komitmen Amien Rais," Tiras. 
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circles as it had denied its intelligentsia ministerial posts and, instead, accorded 
several positions to ICMI bureaucrats who were considered to be unrepresentative of 
Muslim interests. Amien closely identified with the concerns of the ICMI 
intelligentsia and, on the 1O`h and 11th, visited the University of Indonesia and Gajah 
Mada campuses. Before thousands of student demonstrators, he proposed ten points 
of reform for clean government, criteria for the selection of cabinet members, and the 
setting up of an independent team to evaluate the future cabinet and to audit the 
personal wealth of ministers. He bemoaned the failure of the government to recruit 
Adi Sasono and other ICMI intellectuals into the cabinet, asserting that it was "no 
longer appropriate that we mention ICMI. ICMI indeed has been abandoned".39 
At a 16 March rally in Jakarta, Amien sharply criticised the newly sworn -in 7`h 
Development Cabinet. He singled out as corrupt and unprofessional new ministers 
such as Suharto's golfing partner and timber tycoon the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Bob Hasan, and the Minister for Tourism, Culture and Arts, Abdul Latief. 
As labour minister, Latief had allegedly been implicated in a big corruption scandal. 
Amien also criticised as corrupt Haryanto Dhanutirto, the former minister of transport 
and new Minister Foodstuffs, Horticulture and Medicine -an ICMI official that the 
ICMI intelligentsia had earlier gone to great pains to defend from corruption charges. 
Amien exclaimed, "this cabinet is like a political joke ".40 He called on Suharto's 
government to return its mandate to the MPR, if it could not solve the crisis within a 
period of six months. 
By late -March, the pendulum of Amien's stance again swung back in favour 
of conciliation and he announced that he would support Suharto's government if it 
39 
. Amien Rais: "Tidak Profesional, Kuat Nepotisme," Ummat, 23 March 1998; "Membelah Kocek, 
Memhersihkan Kabinet," Ummat, 23 March 1998; "Kampus Kian Mengelegak," Ummat, 23 March 
1998; "Kabinet Baru Di Mata Ormas Islam," Ummat, 30 March 1998; "Skenario Di Batik Kabinet 
Baru," Tiras, 23 March 1998. 
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overcame the crisis. The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Subagyo Hadisiswoyo, with Gen. 
Prabowo, at his side, declared that the recent attitude and comments made by Amien 
were "sufficiently mature ".41 Amien's conciliatory approach was closely linked to his 
regular meetings with the military's top brass. He had cultivated close relations with 
Prabowo and spoke warmly of the general (a known supporter of Habibie) as well as 
meeting with senior officers of the rival camp under General Wiranto's command. 
Amien understood, as did other civilian leaders, that for any future government to 
survive- whether it be one led by him, Habibie or another Ieader-it would require 
the backing of ABRI. He therefore proceeded carefully with his calls for reform and a 
change of government, it seemed, by trying to keep the military leadership on side, 
whilst seeking to draw them closer to the aspirations of the reform movement. In late 
February, Amien had talked of there being "a strong understanding that the armed 
forces must not confront their own people, let alone shoot them ".42 It is obvious that 
one of the results of negotiations with the military top brass was that Amien 
sometimes subdued his attacks against Suharto's government. 
Overall, Amien's tactic regarding ABRI was to appeal to its senior leaders to 
side with the people -driven reform movement against the narrow interests of 
Suharto's regime. After the Trisaktí shootings and the broad moral outrage sparked by 
Amien's plea to ABRI became more of an ultimatum. At a memorial service for 
the victims, he presented ABRI with two stark choices of either protecting the 
interests of the wealthy Suharto family or defending the people's interests.43 A week 
later, however, he was forced to cancel a plan to bring his millions of supporters onto 
. Cohen, "Campus Crusaders," p.26; "Amien Rais: Kabinet Ini Tidak Profesional," p.20. 
61 "KASAD: Sikap Amien Rais Cukup Dewasa," Suara Pembaruan, 26 March 1998; "Wawancara 
Dr. Amien Rais: 'Kita Masih Boleh Optimis... "', Tiras, 23 March 1998. 
42 . Louise Williams, "Warning Signs for Suharto," The Age, 28 February I998. 
43 Louise Williams, "Muslim leader supports student protesters," The Age, 12 May 1998; Ed 
Aspinall, "Opposition and Elite Conflict," pp.146 -7. 
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the streets of Jakarta on the anniversary of National Awakening Day (20 May). This, 
reportedly, was because a senior general had threatened to create a bloody Tienanmen 
Square incident in response.44 
Thus, it appears that Amien's vacillation between condemning Suharto and 
giving Suharto a chance to undertake reform was influenced by his own search for a 
leadership role, amid a rapidly deteriorating and uncertain situation in which he 
adjusted his stance to the contingency of developments. He was acutely aware that for 
any reform to succeed it would require ABRI's imprimatur and the kind of reform he 
sought was not the "total reform" enunciated by the more radical student activists. 
Rather, it was one of measured reform that would better locate him in future power 
configurations (of a more democratically elected government) after the anticipated 
political demise of Suharto. Amien was an ambitious politician who aspired to 
gaining, if not the presidency, a central role in the new government. Moreover, his 
removal as the head of ICMI's Council of Experts had not entirely precluded him 
from being an aspirant "insider" who still supported ICMI against its opponents. In 
February and March, at least, his attitude towards Suharto did appear to be influenced 
by his assessment of the prospects of ICMI's intelligentsia entering government. 
However, despite Amien's prevarications, state strategies of incorporation had 
never really succeeded in co- opting the Muhammadiyah leader. The most recent 
backdoor negotiations between state officials (Habibie and senior military officers) 
and Amien failed to silence his dissenting voice. As a leader of ICMI he had already 
levelled criticism against Suharto's rule. Since his sacking as ICMI's Head of the 
Council of Experts, and the exclusion of ICMI's intelligentsia from power, Amien 
stepped up his attacks against Suharto and threatened to bring a "people power" 
44 Ken Young, "The Crisis: Contexts And Prospects," p.107. 
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movement onto the streets. The growing student -led reform movement provided the 
necessary momentum for him to pursue his objectives more aggressively. At the end 
of the day, as General Chairman of the Muhammadiyah and popular Gajah Mada 
academic, he had sufficient means and support to promote his leadership ambitions 
outside of state institutions, once the ICMI option fell through. 
4. The ICMT intelligentsia turns against Suharto 
If Amien Rais was at the forefront (albeit equivocally) of the student -Ied 
demonstrations, the more cautious ICMI intelligentsia also began to articulate 
dissension from Suharto's rule. Before the holding of the MPR General Assembly, 
they tentatively expressed their support for reform but, at this stage, muffled any 
criticisms they might have had for Suharto's presidency. The General Secretary of 
ICMI, Adi Sasono, gave his support to the reform movement. He planned to have 
CIDES sponsor a national dialogue on reform, to which he would invite senior state 
and military officials as well as critics of the government, Megawati, Amien Rais and 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Even Sasono's cautious proposal was viewed as too much of a 
threat to the regime. Consequently, the Chief of ABRI's Social and Political Affairs, 
Yunus Yosfiah; declared that he saw no need for national dialogue outside of existing 
channels, as the Parliament was the appropriate forum for debate.45 
Aspirations of the ICMI intelligentsia for change were constrained and, to 
some extent, determined by their perceptions of relative advantage and disadvantage 
in intra -elite competition for the spoils of office and patronage. They subdued their 
calls for reform when they thought that they would be rewarded with positions in 
government because of their loyalty to Habibie. This is not to suggest that members of 
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the intelligentsia were not committed to democratic reform (see the discussion in 
chapter seven concerning ICMI agendas). Thus, when the CIDES finally met on 26 
February, participants (including Amien Rais) discussed the need for reform, but used 
the occasion to declare their support for Habibie's candidacy as Vice -President and 
Suharto's return to office. 
Their main concern before March was to promote the prospect of their 
chairman Habibie becoming the next Vice- President, a staging post many believed to 
the presidency, and they realised this required Suharto's imprimatur. With Habibie as 
Indonesia's future president, they could hope, as Habibie's most trusted advisers, to 
exert real influence on government policy. Therefore, senior ICMI leaders, Adi 
Sasono, Jimly Asshidiqie, and Achmad Tirtosudirjo, and intellectuals like Dawam 
Rahardjo and Nurcholish Madjid, promoted Habibie's credentials as a man of 
research and technology, with "democratic" leanings, a reform- minded man who was 
well qualified to lead Indonesia into a new era of "global knowledge economy ".46 
They backed Habibie in tough competition with the technology minister's 
opponents in Golkar, who preferred the choice of Harmoko, Try Sutrisno or other 
candidates for the strategic post. Suharto's children, Siti Rukmana and Bambang 
Trihatmojo, the majority of Golkar MP's, and Golkar member organisations such as 
the Self -help Family Association (MKGR), the Total Self -help Cooperative 
(Kosgoro), and the Central Organisation for Indonesian Socialist Functionaries 
45 Margot Cohen identified public dissension of ICMI independents from Suharto's rule as early as 
December 1997. Cohen, "Daring to Say No "; "CIDES: Dialog Versi Adi Sasono," Gatra, 17 January 
1998; `Sekum ICMI Adi Sasono: Unjuk Rasa itu Wajar dan Sehat," Ummat, 9 March 1998. 
46 . "Prof Dawam Rahardjo: Wapres Harus Komplementer dengan Presiden," Republika Online, 2 
Febuary 1998; "15 Tokoh Muslim Bertemu Habibie," Republika Online, 22 Febuary 1998; `Dari HUT 
Cides Ke -5," Republika Online, 27 Febuary 1998; Adi Sasono: "Harmoko, Habibie dan Emil Salim," 
Republika Online, 18 Fehuary 1998; "Dari Teknolog Melenggang Ke Kursi Wakil Presiden," Tiras, 9 
March 1998; `Peran Wapres: Bukan Sekadar Ban Serap," Tiras, 9 March 1998; Adi Sasono, "Habibie 
Bisa Membantu Presiden," Tiras, 9 March 1998. 
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(SOKSI) strongly opposed Hiabibie's candidacy for the second -in- command 47 
Suharto's nomination of Habibie as the sole candidate for the vice -presidential post 
subsequently saw power struggle spill over into competition for cabinet posts. 
Contests for cabinet posts 
This contest became obvious with the holding of the MPR General Assembly, 
when the interim list of proposed cabinet members went into circulation (discussed 
above). With Suharto's close associates and family members gaining the lion's share 
of posts, finally it dawned on the ICMI intelligentsia that Suharto would not 
countenance their presence in government, or their direct input into policy. The state's 
strategy of incorporation no longer suited them and, consequently, they began to turn 
on Suharto's New Order. They were slipping inexorably from being aspirant insiders 
into an irrevocable position of disadvantaged outsiders who would have Iittle stake in 
the current status quo under Suharto's leadership. 
On 12 March, ICMI held a plenary meeting and outlined six points of concern 
over the proposed cabinet list then in circulation. A meeting at ICMI headquarters 
followed this on the 13th, at which Adi Sasono, accompanied by Habibie adviser, 
Marwah Daud Ibrahim, and ICMI intelligentsia, declared that "I hope the cabinet list, 
which has been circulated, does not become reality ".48 An editorial board of the 
magazine, Urnmat, which included ICMI intellectuals and other reform minded 
luminaries, proposed an alternative "wish list" of cabinet ministers in rejection of the 
interim list. The Ummat's list gave prominent roles to ICMI members and figures 
sympathetic to the cultivation of small- scale, non -Chinese business interests. Topping 
the Ummat's list was Adi Sasono, as Secretary of State, and the pro -ICMI Muslim 
47 
, "Suharto's Way," Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1998. 
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general, Syarwan Hamid, as Minister of Internal Affairs, and the ICMI moderate, 
Nurcholish Madjid, as Minister of Education and Culture. Another ICMI member and 
Gajah Mada academic, Mubyarto, would gain Minister of Cooperatives, Habibie's 
adviser, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Minister of Social Development, and the economist 
and pro -Megawati PDT leader, Kwik Kian Gie, Minister of Industry and Trade." 
Yet, the aspirations of pro -ICMI Muslim interests were not accommodated, as 
the government's interim list turned out to be a close approximation of the cabinet 
announced by Suharto on the 14th and sworn in on the 16`h of March. The hopes of the 
ICMI intelligentsia that, with Habibie as Vice -President, their own access to power 
and influence over government policy would be enhanced were shattered. 
Consequently, they became openly critical of Suharto and his newly appointed 
cabinet, in which Suharto's children reportedly had played a role in choosing 
ministers and diminishing Habibie's influence.so 
Prominent Muslim leaders announced their immense dissatisfaction over the 
fact that those ICMI leaders who had gained cabinet portfolios were government 
bureaucrats regarded as unrepresentative of the Muslim community's aspirations. 
They expressed regret that figures like Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo, Marwah Daud 
Ibrahim and Jimly Assidiqie- leaders who were considered to represent Muslim 
interests in ICMI -were overlooked. The general chairmen of Muhammadiyah, 
KISDI, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and PM IT strongly articulated this viewpoint. A despondent 
Dawam Rahardjo best expressed the profound sense of betrayal. He complained that 
48 . "Mbak Tutut Jadi Menteri, Wajah Baru Berseri," Forum Keadilan, 6 April 1998; "Kabinet Baru: 
Deng.an Sejumlah Persoalan Baru," Gatra; "Kemasygulan Kaum yang Tertinggal," Forum Keadilan. 
° "Siapa Dipilih Presiden Terpilih ?" Ümmat, 16 March 1998. 
so 
. Sudarsono et.al. " Kemasygulan Kaum yang Tertinggal," "Puas Tak Puas Kabinet Baru," Forum 
Keadilan, 6 April 1998, pp.18 -19, 22; McBeth, "Family and Friends," Far Eastern Economic. Review; 
"Wapres: Habibie Bukan Wapres Biasa," Tiras, 30 March 1998. 
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the ICMI intelligentsia had, until then, continually defended government officials 
against criticism and in return the government had simply abandoned them. 51 
ICMI's Secretary General was more stoic in his response but nonetheless 
admitted his disgruntlement at the results, whilst calling for patience of his co- 
religionists in order to avoid social conflict.S2 ICMI was not alone in expressing its 
disenchantment over the cabinet, as Indonesian's social -political organisations 
(including the Parliamentary faction of the Islamic -oriented PPP), which were not 
included on the cabinet, protested their exclusion.53 
Events through to the middle of March, then, saw the ICMI intelligentsia shift 
its position from one of cautiously broaching the need for reform to one of open 
disaffection as they were displaced from power. Mutual displeasure and antagonisms 
between Suharto's circle and ICMI spilled over into a tug -of -war over the choice of 
the organisation's new general chairman. At ICMI's plenary meeting held on 12 
March for the election of a new chairman, the rumour circulated that Suharto wanted 
Azwar Anas, the former Coordinating Minister for Community Welfare, as ICMTs 
new head. The ICMI intelligentsia, not wanting a government bureaucrat in the top 
job, hurriedly collected signatures in support of their own candidate. Their choice was 
General (ret.) Achmad Tirtosudirjo (a founder of HMI and former head of Bulog who 
was already in his 7Os) as chairman in charge of the daily affairs of ICMI. Achmad 
was elected by acclamation. Habibie remained the de jure General Chairman until his 
election to the presidency. 
. Sudarsono, "Kemasygulan Kaum yang Tertínggal' ; "Yang Memble, yang Bersih, dan yang Tak 
Layak," Untmat, 16 March 1998; "Kabinet Baru? Wes..Ewes..Ewe.." Ummat, 23 March 1998; 
"Kabínet Baru Di Mata Ormas Islam," Umcoat, 30 March 1998; "Kabinet Baru: Dengan Sejumlah 
Persoalan Baru," Gatra, 21 March 1998; "Skenarío Di Balik Kabinet Baru," Tiras, 23 March 1998. 
Z Sudarsono, " Kemasygulan Kaum yang Tertinggal "; John McBeth, "Suharto's Way," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1998. 
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The Muslim intelligentsia hoped that Achmad would provide the opportunity 
for ICMI to loosen its dependence on Suharto's circle and promote its own agendas. 
Meanwhile, Achmad promised that he would try to make the organisation a more 
independent and critically vocal forum for "voicing injustices experienced by the 
people ".54 Ongoing frictions and the battle for control of ICMI, between its 
bureaucrats and its reform- minded members, on this occasion were resolved in favour 
of the latter. Whereas Suharto's circle had promoted ICMI bureaucrats to cabinet 
rank, the cost of this uncompromising policy (of rewarding his closest loyalists with 
posts) was that ICMI's intelligentsia sought to unhitch the association from 
bureaucratic influence and control. Failing to gain inclusion in the power structure, 
they wished to make ICMI a much more autonomous associational expression of their 
interests, unfettered by the constraints and controls of corporatism. 
Habibie tried to placate the discontent of the intelligentsia by appointing Adi 
Sasono and other ICMI supporters as advisors to the Vice -President's office. In 
return, Achmad Tirtosudirjo and other ICMI figures talked optimistically of the 
organisation assuming the role of think -tank on government policy.55 According to 
Asiaweek, Hahibie's new reform- minded advisers believed that they could transform 
Habibie and "remake him -in their own image," to become "a Muslim who is 
progressive, sophisticated, market -oriented and media -savvy; someone who cares 
54 
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about social justice, democracy, human rights, the environment. "56 Although, Adi 
cautioned, "we can't expect dramatic changes while Suharto is in power ".57 
Efforts to mollify ICMI aspirations did not prevent them from attacking 
Suharto's rule. However, they began to call for the President to step down only after 
the honor of the Trisakti incident, student abductions and ensuing anti -Chinese riots 
of 14 -15 May. Elite opinion and public opinion began to turn resolutely against 
Suharto as it no longer tolerated such crude methods of terror-against Indonesia's 
most treasured youth, university students -as a means of managing dissent and 
instability. Reflecting this outrage and disaffection over their own displacement from 
power, ICMI's chairman and general -secretary became more outspoken in their 
support for the reform movement. 
For example, after a meeting of the Central Leadership Council of ICMI, 
Achmad Tirtosudirjo and Adi Sasono announced that ICMI supported student 
demands for "total reform ". However, it is doubtful that, at the time, that they actually 
desired "total reform ", as they were not seeking a significant shift in power 
configurations but a realignment of them under Habibie's future presidency. ICMI 
still provided an important vehicle for achieving this. They proposed that a Special 
Session of the MPR be held and the cabinet be reshuffled, in an allusion to the need 
for Suharto's government to resign.58 On 16 May, Adi Sasono gave a fiery anti - 
Suharto speech before an emotionally charged audience at Al -Azhar Mosque.S9 The 
56 
"A Perception Problem: How the new v.p.'s advisers are fighting it," Asiaweek, 16 March 1998. 
57 . "A Perception Problem," Asiaweek. 
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press reported Achmad Tirtosudiro as calling for Suharto to resign before the 20m of 
the month.6° 
To conclude, Amien Rais had led the defection from Suharto; eventually some 
of ICMI's senior leaders and intelligentsia followed suit. Incorporation in the existing 
state structures no longer worked for members of ICMT's intelligentsia nor for a 
number of its leaders. The March cabinet appointments of Suharto loyalists proved 
beyond a doubt that Muslim interests in ICMT would not benefit politically from 
continued accommodation with Suharto. The cabinet composition also demonstrated 
that Suharto was not serious about implementing reforms. 
Although Suharto had previously disappointed the intelligentsia by not giving 
its members cabinet positions in 1993, this had not led to their defection from the 
president. The difference this time was the political context of deep crisis and 
intensifying intra -elite rivalry before an anticipated post -Suharto period. The 
momentum of student -led public protest and societal activation provided much of the 
impetus for change. Only in mid -May 1998, however, when public sentiment had 
turned assuredly against Suharto, did more cautious TCMI leaders and intellectuals 
find the courage to call openly for Suharto to resign. It appears that some members of 
the intelligentsia hoped that under a Habibie presidency they would gain strategic 
positions in a reconfigured power structure and would be able to promote democratic 
reforms.67 
Before the clear shift in public mood, members of ICMI's intelligentsia for 
several years had wished to see Suharto resign. However, with the exceptions of 
Amien Rais and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, most of them, before this time, had been 
unwilling to air their views publicly. They had long desired political reform but also 
60 "Soeharto Diminta Mundur," Ummat, 25 May 1998. 
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realised that, through incorporation in ICMI, Suharto gave them protection from rival 
groups, especially from nationalist elements in ABRI. It was also too dangerous to 
oppose Suharto, with the imprisonment of Bintang having demonstrated this danger. 
Until this point, incorporation and the threat of sanctions had acted as relatively 
effective mechanisms for neutralising dissenting voices in ICMI. 
5. Suharto losing control 
The groundswell of student -led opposition (and emerging chaos) to Suharto's 
New Order thus far discussed created tremendous pressures on the political elite to 
call for the President's resignation. Confronted by crisis, corporatism and repression 
failed to contain societal demands for participation. From 18 May until their removal 
on the 24th, in an act of open defiance, thousands of students occupied the Parliament 
Building in the South Jakarta suburb of Senayan and met with the parliamentary 
factions. A veritable cornucopia of student umbrella organisations crowded the 
parliamentary compound. Muslim leaders and organisations comprised a significant 
segment of the student -led reform movement pushing for change of government in the 
last days of Suharto's presidency. Representing Islamic organisational presence was 
the umbrella KAMMI, the Regional Corps of HMI Alumni (KAHMI), and the 
Indonesian Muslim Community Movement for Reform (Gemanusi) -an umbrella to 
organisations like HMI, the Muhammadiyah University Students Association, 
Muhammadiyah Youth, Indonesian Muslim Youth (PE), the Indonesian Muslim 
Youth Movement (GPII), and the NU's Ansor Youth. Also calling for Suharto to 
61 . This point is discussed further in chapter ten on Habibie's presidency. 
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resign were the Muslim Community Co- ordinating Body (BKUI), the Dewan Dakwah 
and KTSDT.62 
Some of the Muslim organisations had been established recently as vehicles 
specifically for the promotion of reform, indicating the fluidity of the situation and the 
tendency of groups to coalesce into larger associational units. Others had been 
staunch supporters of Suharto since the state -Islamic rapprochement, but now 
withdrew their support. Tn addition, the varied new organisational entities constituted 
an expression of greater pluralism as students, and Muslims, began to break out of 
state -imposed corporatist constraints. Indicative of this challenge to the hierarchical 
political order, was the appearance at Parliament of different professional layers of 
society, including academics, intellectuals, NGO leaders and other middle class elite 
to address the students and contribute to demands for Suharto's resignation. National 
leaders, including the General Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Dewan Dakwah leaders, 
representatives from the National Reform Movement, the former head of Indonesia's 
Legal Aid Institute, and former ministers and retired ABRI officers arrived outside 
Parliament to address students with rousing messages of support.G3 
This was the first time, since the founding of the New Order, that a cross - 
section of society had gathered en mass outside Parliament to declare their common 
support for the struggle for change. At the time, some observers might have believed 
that they were witnessing a microcosm of a future civil society in Indonesia. 
However, as subsequent events proved, the unity deriving from the shared desire to 
remove Suharto soon dissipated, after the president stepped down. The opposition 
62 "Wawancara f: Minta Presiden Mundur," Gatra, 23 May 1998: Reformasi: Kabinet Krisis Kini 
Dirombak," Gatra, 23 May 1998 ; "Show of Force: Belasan Rihu Massa," Gatra, 30 May 1998; 
"Soeharto Diminta Mundur," Ummat, 25 May 1998; "Detik -Detik Menjelang Pak Harto Berhenti," 
Forum Keadilan, 15 June 1998; "Dan Pak Harto pun Berhenti," Forum Keadilan, 15 June 1998; 
"Mereka Menduduki Kantor Para Wakìlnya," Forum Keadilan, 15 June 1998; "Voice of Ire," Ear 
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forces that were gathering outside parliament lacked any coordinated plan of action to 
bring about a change of regime, to take over power, or to build a new government. 
Many students were distrustful of politicians. The reform movement was weak and 
divided, but this did not prevent the different elite, middle class, and student activists 
from coming together at a critical point of political tension to assert their demands 
collectively. 
The greatest surprise came with the bombshell announcement by the 
parliamentary speaker, Harmoko that the DPR leadership had decided, in the interests 
of national unity, that President Suharto should resign "wisely" and with "dignity ". 
Students were jubilant as one of the deputy speakers for Parliament, Lt. -Gen. (ret.) 
Syarwan Hamid, thrust his fist into the air in a victory signal. Support for Suharto was 
rapidly crumbling, as loyalists and sycophants alike were caving in to public pressure 
and responding to the obvious dissipation of support for Suharto among elite circles, 
including the military hierarchy.64 
The clear loss of legitimacy and support suffered by Suharto by mid -May 
caused a defection of New Order stalwarts from the President. Even members of 
Suharto's palace circle finally regarded the President's resignation as a necessary step 
in order to minimise the potential damage of the reform momentum to personal 
careers and established institutions. A major blow to Suharto was when on the 19th 
fourteen economics ministers refused to serve on his reshuffled cabinet. At the 11'6 
hour, the military also withdrew its support from Suharto in an effort to protect its 
own institutional interests and salvage a badly tarnished professional reputation. The 
fall of Suharto de- legitimised much of his New Order, which was already under 
63 See citations in previous footnote. 
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challenge from broadening societal pressures, and created the conditions for the 
unravelling of authoritarian institutions. Yet, as much as this open defiance of Suharto 
by regime insiders might have seemed to represent a political breakthrough for pro - 
reform forces, much of the politics that finally brought Suharto down consisted of 
behind -the- scenes manoeuvring, backroom deals and pact- making. The circumstances 
of elite defections from Suharto and divisions in the military have been discussed by 
other authors and take us too far away from the central thesis.65 
6. Conclusion 
An analysis was made of the withdrawal of Muslim support from Suharto in 
the context of broadening dissent against his rule. Under circumstances of deepening 
political and economic crisis, students galvanised into an anti -regime movement in 
retaliation against two -decades of exclusion from political arrangements. This gave 
greater impetus to disaffected elite members to oppose Suharto's rule. In this context, 
ICMI leaders and the intelligentsia were among the defecting elite interests that had 
lost out in recent power struggles to Suharto's family interests. However, it must be 
noted that throughout his presidency, Suharto had managed to maintain exclusionary 
corporatist barriers to Muslim access to power. The wider incorporation of Muslim 
interests in state structures in the 1990s also had succeeded in muffling much of the 
critical voice of Muslims, while still denying them real positions of power. 
Nonetheless, the shift in corporatist strategy to greater inclusion of Muslim interests 
raised expectations -among ICMI -linked interests at least -for greater representation 
of Muslims in the near future. The refusal of Suharto to provide ICMI members with 
cabinet posts at a time that elite opinion was turning against him lost the president the 
6s Aspinall, "Opposition and Elite Conflict "; Young, "The Crisis: Contexts And Prospects "; 
Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, "Romancing the dual function: Indonesia's Armed Forces and the fall of 
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support of Muslims. The withdrawal of Muslim. support from Suharto was not the 
decisive factor that brought his presidency to an end. The mounting pluralist 
challenges against the authoritarian regime followed by elite defections, however, did 
indicate that corporatist exclusion was no Ionger a viable strategy of social -political 
management. 
Soeharto," Geoff Forrester & R.J. May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto, Bathurst, Crawford House 
Publishing, 1998. 
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Chapter 10 
Habibie and party pluralism 
1. Introduction 
President B.J. Habibie's `reform development government' represented a 
significant, but not complete, departure from the authoritarian legacy of Suharto's 32- 
year period of rule. During his short tenure (May 1998 -October 1999), Habibie 
delegated to a `team of seven' advisers, within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the task of drafting a series of new political laws on parties, elections 
and the composition of legislative bodies. The reforms were to lay the ground for 
multiparty democracy to be realised with the holding of Indonesia's first 
democratically contested general elections in 44 years. Consequently, as curbs were 
lifted on party organisation, unrepresentative political arrangements that had been the 
mainstay of Suharto's rule were progressively dismantled or rendered irrelevant. The 
lifting of restrictions on press freedom opened the floodgates to public criticism and 
scrutiny of Habibie's government, the military, authoritarian political institutions and 
corrupt practices. 
The chapter examines how ICMI and Golkar fared during Habibie's presidency 
once the corporatist and other curbs were lifted on political organisation. An analysis 
is made of the splintering of group interests as members of the political elite left 
corporatist organisations and formed or joined new political parties with which to 
contest the elections. An examination also is made of the state's mobilisation of 
Muslim groups against the `pro- democracy' opposition as Habibie sought to stave off 
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challenges to his rule. The argument is made that, although corporatist arrangements 
were dismantled, the president and his armed forces commander, Wiranto, still relied 
on the politics of exclusion -namely, the exclusion of opposition political parties 
from the MPR, and the use of state -directed intimidation and repression against 
dissent. Authoritarian habits and (coping) strategies remained a salient feature of 
politics, as they coexisted with, and sometimes were reinforced within the context of, 
the emerging multiparty politics. 
A) Corporatism dismantled 
The ruling party, Golkar, lost its single- majority status and control over the 
authorised party system, which was eroded at the June 1999 election and then 
removed with the convening of the new Parliament (the People's Representative 
Council, DPR) in October. The `mono -loyalty' of public servants to Golkar, through 
their membership of the compulsory civil servants union, Korpri (otherwise 
guaranteeing their vote would go to the ruling party), was abandoned. Internal 
factional disputes resulted in some of Golkar's affiliate organisations and members 
splintering away from the party to re -group into new political entities. The military 
Ieadership gave public assurances that it would remain outside of partisan politics and 
would not, as in the past, campaign in the elections on behalf of a political party, 
namely Golkar. Finally, Golkar's supervisory hoard, and Suharto's controlling 
position over Golkar as head of the board, was eliminated.' In short, all of these 
measures cut the ruling party from its New Order moorings and threatened to leave it 
adrift in its own irrelevance within the newly -evolving political system. The challenge 
"Beringin Goyah, ke Mana Habibie Bersandar ?," Forum Keadilan, 22 Febuary 1999; "Golkar I: 
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facing Golkar cadres was to refashion the organisation and turn it into a viable party 
with strong grassroots support to compete effectively in the scheduled elections. Like 
Golkar, the two subordinate, and emasculated members of the state -corporatist party 
system, the United Development Party (PPP), and the Indonesian Democracy Party 
(PDI), were struggling to find a role in the unfolding political system. 
The lifting of restrictions on parties heralded a new phenomenon of `wild - 
growth' democracy, as new parties proliferated. Many of the parties were formed on 
the basis of old affiliations or aliran -the primordial /communal sectarian loyalties 
long suppressed by Suharto's New Order -with Islamic, Christian, nationalist, 
socialist, Sukarnoist, and other parties coming into existence. The ethnic Chinese also 
were allowed to form parties after three decades of political exclusion and persecution 
as a pariah class. Forty -eight of the more than one hundred parties were registered to 
compete in the election in June. The five main parties to contend the elections were 
the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI -P) led by Megawati, the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) led by Amien Rais, the National Awakening Party (PKB), 
which served as a vehicle for Abdurrahman Wahid's presidential aspirations, PPP, 
and the renamed Golkar Party. 
A striking feature of the proliferation of new parties was that the Islamic 
politics that Suharto and his military backers had fought so hard to stifle was 
reconstituted under Habibie's government and the political freedoms it spawned. 
Dozens of Islamic parties came into existence in preparation for democratic elections. 
There were new organisations like the Masyumi, the New Masyumi, and the Crescent 
Moon and Star Party (PBB), which were all descendants of the Masyumi party 
(banned by President Sukarno and suppressed by Suharto). There were three parties 
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besides PKB representing different factions of NU, the Community Awakening Party 
(PKU), the Nandlatul Ulama Party (PNU), and the Islamic Community Party (PUI). 
The Muslim organisations and parties at a special session of the People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) in November 1998 successfully lobbied to have the 
Pancasila sole foundation law, requiring that all social -political organisations be based 
solely on the state ideology, rescinded. The government followed this on 29 April 
1999 with its announcement of the official withdrawal of Pancasila (P4) 
indoctrination courses and the liquidation of the BP -7 agency responsible for 
administering the courses. Consequently, Muslim parties once again were permitted to 
adopt Islamic ideology as their foundational principle. The PPP, for instance, chose to 
return to Islam, in place of Pancasila, as its party ideology. The decades of state's 
ideological control of Islamic, social and political organisations seemed to be over. 
Although Habibie's reformers paved the way for multiparty democracy, the 
DPR was fashioned to include appointees and some corporatist (functional) 
representation. The 500- member DPR still included 65 appointees from special 
(functional) interest groups (especially Islamic minority groups), and 38 ABRI- 
appointed seats. Although appointees to the parliament were greatly reduced, through 
its allocated seats, ABRI could hold the balance of power in the fragmented MPR and 
thus provide the decisive votes to ensure a presidential nominee and political system 
favourable to the military. in the regional parliaments, retired military officers joined 
different parties (especially Golkar and PDI -P) in an attempt also to exert future 
influence on politics and tilt `pluralist democracy' in their favour. 
Although restrictions were lifted on political organisation, the biggest 
headache for Habibie's government was how to manage this resplendent burst of 
2. 
"Sidang untuk Reformasi Pro Status Quo," Forum Keadilan, 16 November 1998. 
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party pluralism in a manner that would reinforce national stability and stave off 
challenges to his own leadership. With few pundits believing that this apparent 
political lightweight would survive the distance of even a transitional period in office, 
Habibie seemed determined to prove otherwise as he sought to win domestic and 
international support for his presidency by demonstrating that his government could 
implement timely reforms. With the scheduling of new political and electoral laws, a 
distinct possibility existed that Indonesia's hitherto excluded citizenry would 
participate in a robust and healthy democracy. 
B) Muslims in government 
Habibie's decision to surround himself with trusted loyalists in a reshuffled 
cabinet, and to deny posts to his traditional adversaries and new pro- democracy 
parties ensured that political rivalries would continue along old lines of conflict for 
the duration of his administration. Until the holding of planned presidential elections, 
the new part ies were given no place or representation in the DPR, which was 
responsible for passing new laws. Habibie's political antagonist, Abdurrahman Wahid 
(and his supporters in NU) were denied cabinet posts. For several months, therefore, 
the parties were unable to have direct influence on public policy and the political 
system remained, in significant measure, exclusionary. 
The clear winners in the new cabinet were Habibie's closest advisors and 
aides, many of them who belonged to ICMI. Although there is nothing unusual about 
a President appointing his closest advisers and aides to cabinet posts, Habibie's 
administration still lacked the legitimacy of freely contested elections and surrounding 
himself with loyalists reinforced old lines of conflict (to be discussed). ICMI's 
Secretary General, Adi Sasono, achieved cabinet rank as the Minister of Cooperatives, 
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with the mandate to give financial assistance to the economically devastated 
indigenous business class. The reform -minded ICMI intelligentsia formed the core of 
presidential advisers, almost a kitchen cabinet. Habibie also conferred cabinet rank 
upon his loyalist generals, the so- called `Green,' or Muslim, officers. The pro -Habibie 
officer, Syarwan Hamid, was rewarded for his defiance against Suharto with the 
position of Minister of Internal Affairs, replacing Lt. -Gen. (ret.) Hartono (who was 
disliked for his role in establishing greater control over the ICMI intelligentsia). The 
former ABRI commander and Suharto loyalist, Gen. Feisal Tanjung, was retained as 
Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security. Lt. -Gen. Yunus Yosfiah was rewarded 
for his loyalty with the position of Minister of Information. 
The change of government saw the realisation of a strategy long propounded 
by some of the ICMI intelligentsia. That is, they had maintained that, if they waited 
patiently in the wings, under the protection of Suharto and Habibie's patronage, 
eventually they would outlive Suharto's presidency and inherit a major share of 
influence and power. Suharto's strategy of incorporating Muslim interests in ICMI, in 
the long run, had benefited a few members of its intelligentsia by bringing them into 
the corridors of power. This was an unintended consequence of New Order political 
arrangements, which had sought to neutralise Muslim political interests and exclude 
them from power arrangements. 
2. Fragmentation of Golkar 
The new administration was driven by the need to consolidate power behind 
Habibie's weak presidency and to project his authority, in the face of many 
adversaries who wished to see his transitional leadership foreshortened. In particular, 
the privileging of Habibie's Muslim aides and bureaucrats in the political structures 
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ensured that power contests would continue, and sharpen, along pro -Habibie and anti - 
Habibie `nationalist' lines that had characterised the last years of Suharto's rule. As 
politics was inexorably shifting to a more open, democratic culture, old political rivals 
positioned themselves to take best advantage of the new arrangements. 
This section of the chapter considers how Golkar underwent a process of 
fragmentation, as the party became polarised between supporters of Habibie and his 
adversaries. This fragmentation was the consequence both of the re -play of earlier 
power struggles and of new pressures caused by multiparty politics, as the freedom to 
join any number of new parties undermined the rationale of a person's incorporation 
in Golkar. The first contest between the Habibie camp and rival interests in Golkar 
occurred in the lead up to an extraordinary congress in July 1998. 
A) The Golkar congress of July 1998 causes split 
The congress was vital to Habibie's political survival as the President's 
backers in Golkar, most of them associated with ICMI, sought to gain control of the 
party and have their candidate, the State Secretary, Akbar Tanjung, replace the 
Suharto sycophant, Harmoko, as new Party Leader. Control over Golkar was still 
important because the party could use its parliamentary majority to influence the 
direction of political reforms, either to the benefit or detriment of the governing elite. 
Meanwhile, different factions representing Suharto's family, retired military officers, 
and nationalist elements in Golkar sought retaliation against the president. They 
backed former Defence Minister Edi Sudradjat, a long -time rival of Habibie, for the 
chairmanship. Suharto's children, Siti Rukmana and Bambang Trihatmodjo, the 
former Indonesian Vice -President, Try Sutrisno, (also the chairman of the association 
of retired ABRI officers, Pebabri) and retired officers campaigned for Edi. With 
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Akbar winning a comfortable majority, his military detractors in Golkar began to cry 
foul by accusing both Habibie and Wiranto of engaging `New Order methods' to 
bring about a victory.3 
One of the immediate consequences of the internal struggle for control of 
Golkar was that some of the defeated elements left Golkar and founded the Barisan 
Nasional (National Front) as a publicly vocal, but politically emasculated, anti - 
Habibie power bloc. Following this, some of them established their own political 
party under Edi Sudradjat's leadership, the Unity and Justice Party (PKP), with which 
to contest the general elections. In a bid to defeat Habibie's anticipated leadership of 
Golkar, they also lent their support to PDI -P's election campaign.' This splintering 
away from Golkar reflected the growing dynamism of party -based pluralism, which 
permitted disaffected elements to re- channel their interests though alternative political 
vehicles. It also represented a polarisation along old lines of conflict. That is, many of 
the Barisan and PKP's leaders were figures who had been sidelined since Golkar's 
1993 congress, had subsequently joined the pro -Megawati opposition alliance in 1996 
and supported the nationalist organisation, the National Brotherhood Reconciliation 
Foundation (YKPK).5 With the faces of political adversaries remaining constant, the 
"Secular Soldiers: Old generals face off against Habibie's Islamic allies," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 29 October 1998; John McBeth, "Perwira TNI -ABRI 1945 dan Pasca 1945: Pemerintah 
Pengaruh Keputusan MLB Golkar," Kompas CyberMedia, 14 July 1998; "Golongan Karya: Di 
Pasar Loak Golkar," Tempo, 26 October 1998. 
4. Long -time affiliate member organisations also left Golkar, with MKGR establishing its own party 
and Sons -Daughters of ABRI Pensioners', Communication Forum (FKPPI) and Kosgoro joining 
Barisan Nasional. "Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI: Sikap Politik Ganda," Gatra, 20 Febuary 
1999; "Jalan Panjang Dari Sanur," Tempo, 19 October 1998; "Golongan Karya: Di Pasar Loak 
Golkar," Tempo, 26 October 1998; "Try, Edi join breakaway Golkar party," Tempo Interaktif, 12 
Febuary 1998; "Try, Edi, dan Eksponen Golkar Dirikan Partai Baru," Republika, 2 December 
1998; "Golkar 34 Tahun: Memangkas Akar Atau Benalu," Tajuk, 1 -15 October 1998; "Beringin 
Itu Belum Tumbang," Forum Keadilan, 22 Febuary 1999. 
s' For the past decade, they had remained unreconciled to Habibie's aspirations - for the vice - 
presidency, his close relations with Suharto, and the state -Islamic accommodation represented by 
the ICMI phenomenon. Some of them were fresh recruits to the "reform" ethos, who had been the 
New Order's most hardline generals from the "nationalist" mainstream. Prominent among this 
group were disaffected figures like Sembiring Meliala and Harsudiono Hartas, who had hacked 
Try Sutrisno's vice -presidency against Ilabibie's candidature in 1994. Another figure joining 
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political struggles of 1998 -1999 under Habibie's leadership recalled the pattern of 
winners and losers in power contests of the mid -1990s during Suharto's rule. 
The winners on this occasion clearly were Habibie's Muslim supporters as 
Golkar positions were filled by the President's advisers and bureaucrats from ICMI 
and by cadres from the Islamic university students and alumni associations, HMI and 
KAHMI. As a former HMI chairman, the new Golkar Chair, Akbar Tanjung, drew a 
lot of support from these last two organisations.6 
B) Golkar's national work meeting of March 1999: further schisms 
A second division in Golkar occurred in the lead up to the party's national 
work meeting scheduled for 8 -12 March 1999, Habibie's colleagues in ICMI 
promoted their mentor as Golkar's sole presidential candidate for the MPR election in 
November, while H1VII /KAHMI interests backed Akbar Tanjung in competition with 
Habibie.7 At one level, the rift illustrated the difficulty Golkar cadres faced in 
reforming the party and making a clear break with its corporatist past. That is, Akbar 
represented entrenched interests in Golkar that were alienated by efforts of the 
Internal Affairs Minister, at the behest of Habibie, to push through election law 
reforms. Akbar was indignant over a new regulation on the neutrality of civil servants, 
Barisan was Gen. (ret.) Kemal Idris, who had been responsible for the "half- coup" against 
President Sukarno in 1952, was instrumental to Sukarno's ouster in 1966, and had been a thorn in 
President Suharto's side for much of the New Order period. Sacked by Habibie for opposing Akbar 
Tanjung's candidacy, the former Transmigration Minister, Siswono Yudohusodo, and the 
Secretary General of Golkar (the former Environment Minister), Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, also 
became leading Barisan members. These two ministers had earlier, in the mid- 1990s, sympathised 
with YKPK and Megawati's PDI against Habibie. David Jenkins, "Habibie flogging a lame horse," 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 1998; "Perwira TNI- ABRI," Kompas; "Golkar 34 
Tahun: Memangkas Akar," Tajuk; "Langkah Mega Ke Kursi Presiden," Tempo, 12 October 1998; 
"Di Pasar Loak Golkar," Tempo; " Barisan `Sakit Hati' Nasional," Ummat, 16 November 1998. 
e. 
"Semangat `Aral Bukan Habibie' di Golkar," Tempo, 8 March 1999. 
Akbar's faction argued far the retention of Golkar's five proposed candidates- Akbar, Habibie, Wiranto, Ginandjar 
Ksrtasismata and the Sultan of Yogyalcarta, and that the leadership isaw should not be settled until after the elections (as this 
would give Akbar's faction the time and opportunity it mesas to win support for his presidential candidacy). _Meanwhile, 
Habrbie's faction realised its nest chances would be to bulldoze through a victorybefore anyeledions were held "Golkar: 
Trama Suka Mendukung Habibie," Forum Keadilan, 23 May 1999. 
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which sought to prohibit government ministers and senior officials from campaigning 
in the elections and freed civil servants (Korpri and the association for the wives of 
civil servants, Dharma Wanita) to vote for any party. Such measures were perceived 
as greatly hurting Golkar's election machine. Under the new regulations, as cabinet 
minister, Akbar no longer would be able to retain his position as Golkar chairman. 
The new Chair of the Golkar parliamentary faction and Akbar supporter, 
Marzuki Darusman, declared that if government officials were banned from 
campaigning, Golkar would withdraw its support from Habibie. As the deputy 
chairman of Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights, Marzuki's threat sat 
awkwardly with his image as a reformer, who might have been expected to welcome 
an end to Golkar's days of pork -barrelling. This point considered, the issue was 
resolved when Akbar bowed to the requirement that bureaucrats no longer campaign 
for the party, resigned as minister, and chose to devote his energies to his own 
presidential ambitions as Golkar chains 
Despite its reform agenda, Habibie's team of ministers and aides also engaged 
Golkar's traditional machinery and well -worn practices of pork -barrel politics.9 
Habibie's team embarked on an all -out vote -buying campaign in the provinces. 
Initially only 10 out of 27 provinces backed Habibie as sole candidate. However, 
within 24 hours of the final session of the national meeting, amid accusations by party 
insiders of massive vote buying, 20 provinces had swung in favour of Habibie's sole 
Marzuki was an old Golkar cadre for 14 years who Suharto (Golkar's Chairman of the Board of 
Patrons) removed from Golkar over an interview statement in which Marzuki declared that he 
"wanted to be president." Keith Loveard, "Test of Strength," The Bulletin, 24 November 1998; 
Margot Cohen, "No Fear or Favour: Golkar will have to play by new election rules," For Eastern 
Economic Review, 11 February 1999; John McBeth, "Little Choice: Golkar finds no alternative to 
Habibie," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1999; "KPU: Menterì Berkempanye Tergantung 
Fatwa," Tempo, 5 April 1999; "Habibie is `Golkar's best of the worst'," Tempo lnteraktif 17 May 
1999; "Paket 1 Plus 4, Setelah Habibie Mendobrak," Tempo, 24 May 1999. 
9. The newsweekly Tempo identified the ICMI leaders Achmad Tirtosudiro, Jimly -Assidigie, 
Marwah Daud Ibrahim and Dewi Fortuna Anwar as senior advisers to Habibie, who had a role ìn 
organising support for the President. `Pertarungan: Satu Nol huat Rudy,' Tempo, 24 May 1999. 
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candidacy for president.10 Reliance on such tactics reflected attempts by Habibie's 
government (including ICMI interests) to consolidate their political advantage and 
translate it into enduring power before the holding of elections. It also brought into 
question the government's commitment concerning its restrictions on the practice of 
bureaucrats campaigning for Golkar at the elections. 
C) Golkar -ICMI tensions 
A third rift in Golkar occurred between its General Chairman, Akbar Tanjung, 
and the Minister of Co- operatives and ICMI Secretary General, Adi Sasono. Sasono, 
who had originally entered Golkar to defend Akbar's candidacy for party chair against 
Edi Sudradjat's `nationalist' group, backed Habibie against Akbar for the presidential 
stakes. Sasono and ICMI supported the unsuccessful candidacy of Habibie's adviser, 
Marwah Daud Ibrahim, for chair of Golkar's parliamentary faction against the final 
victor, Marzuki Darusman. Members of Akbar and Marzuki's team retaliated by 
calling on Sasono to resign from Golkar for refusing to campaign in the general 
elections for the party.lt Sasono responded by insisting that he decided not to 
campaign for Golkar because, as Minister of Co- operates, he would be accused of 
using government facilities to buy votes. However, by this stage Sasono had been 
isolated within Golkar by Akbar's faction. 
Following this, there were signs that the Minister of Co- operatives was 
preparing an alternative vehicle to that of GoIkar and ICMI with which to realise his 
political ambitions. Sasono was widely viewed as the man responsible for launching 
1° The Minister of Justice, Muladi, and Golkar leader, Slamet Yusuf Effendi, were identified as fund 
dispensers as they lobbied the Head of Golkar's Central Java chapter. The State Minister for Youth 
and Sports lobbied the Jakarta chapter, the Head of the Supreme Advisory Council and strong 
Habibie supporter, Ahmad A. Baramuli, lobbied Eastern provinces, and other ministers and Golkar 
leaders were identified as lobbying other provinces. 
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the new People's Sovereignty Party (PDR), whose leaders were known proteges and 
confidants of Sasono from the ICMI think -tank, CIDES, the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (where Sasono received his engineering degree) and the co- operatives 
department. Although Sasono denied any links with the party, analysts conjectured 
that the party would become an alternative political vehicle to Golkar for the Minister, 
and possibly for President Habibie should Golkar prove an insufficient political 
machine. The East Java chapter of PDR strengthened such speculation when it 
announced that Habibie and Sasono were its choice of `national leaders.' 12 
There were signs that support for Habibie and Golkar might disintegrate even 
further, as the ICMI membership increasingly was split between support for Golkar 
and support for the new, mostly Islamic, parties such as PPP, PBB, PKU, and the 
more nationalist- oriented PAN. Although the Muslim parties initially considered 
forming a coalition with Golkar and supporting Habibie, many party leaders 
eventually withdrew their support and sought a separate `Islamic' alliance.13 
This fracturing of support for Habibie within ICMI and Golkar reflected a 
natural progression as the new Islamic parties offered more autonomous vehicles 
through which competing politicians could pursue their political aspirations and 
agendas. This splintering of support occurred during a pre -election phase that was in 
extreme flux, as different party leaders manoeuvred into a series of shifting `potential' 
alliances of contending parties in anticipation of forming a governing coalition. At 
11. Adi Sasono was Golkar's campaign coordinator for the Central Java province. "Beringin Itu Belum 
Tumbang," Forum Keadilan, 22 February 1999. 
12_ 
"Gerakan Adi. Sasono Untuk Hancurkan PDI Perjuangan " SiaR, 25 November 1998; "Adi Sasono: 
'Saya Bukan Orang yang Berbahaya ?'," Tempo, 14 December 1998; "Derum Mesin Politik Adi 
Sasono," Gatra, 23 January 1999; "Sensasi Orang Pekalongan," Gatra, 23 January 1999; 
"Merangkal Massa Jaringan Koperasi," Forum Keadilan, 25 April 1999; "Adi dalam Tuduhan 
yang Kreatif," Forum Keadilan, 25 April 1999; "Adi Sasono: ` Orang Mau Berbuat Baik, Kok 
Dicurigai'," Forum Keadilan, 25 April 1999. 
13. The ICMI leader, Dawam Rahardjo, a former, if somewhat disgruntled, supporter of Habibie 
reportedly declared that 50 percent of ICMI cadres backed Amien Rais's PAN and not Golkar SiaR 
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one stage, there was speculation that Golkar might form an alliance with PDI -P and 
PKB. This sparked retaliations from Muslim modernists, who then sought to establish 
a rival coalition of Islamic parties, which most likely would include Amien Rais's 
PAN, and threatened to withdraw their support from Habibie.14 
In summary, there was a progressive slippage of support for Golkar, on the 
one hand, and Habibie, on the other, as competing factional interests entered into 
general election mode and fiercely contested the presidential stakes. This slippage was 
a consequence of pluralist politics heralded by the proliferation of parties. Both 
Golkar and ICMI, then, were fracturing along lines of new political entities and old 
political loyalties, with the future of these two organisations cast in doubt, unless they 
could transform themselves successfully into highly competitive grassroots parties. In 
retrospect, the political reforms promoted by Habibie in order to maintain his own 
presidency contributed to an erosion of his already tenuous hold on power, as the 
dynamism of party -based competition chipped away at the shibboleths of 
authoritarianism. The New Order under Habibie's leadership was being demolished 
from within, seemingly with the President's blessing. 
(apakabar @saltime.radix.net), 19 May 1999; "Ada Tuduhan Money Politics," Gatra, 23 January 
1999. 
4' Habibie's close adviser, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, also seemed to dissent from the president when she 
cautioned that "conservative forces" associated with Golkar, PDI -P and PKB -the three largest 
parties as votes were being tallied -were most likely going to govern Indonesia, and that they were 
not inclined to push through essential political reforms. She bemoaned the fact that, in her opinion, 
Amien Rais's PAN was the most reform -oriented party that had consistently defended democratic 
change, yet was unlikely to have much influence on the future direction of government policy. 
ICMI's General Chairman, Achmad Tirtosudiro, announced that the Muslim intellectuals 
association officially backed Habibie for president. Nonetheless, even he suggested that Adi 
Sasono, Amien Rais and the Chairman of PBB, Yusril Isba Mahendra, were acceptable presidential 
candidates. "MPR akan Dikuasai Kelompok Konservatif Anti Reformasi," Republika, 15 June 
1999. 
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3. The politics of survival: a return to New Order tactics 
The political system was moving in the direction of greater political pluralism 
as elite interests organised to contest elections. Although the exclusionary corporatist 
arrangements had been dismantled, sobering counter trends to the democratic opening 
also were at play as the authoritarian habits of the past three decades were brought 
into tension with the emerging democratic pluralism. 1-Tabibie's administration still 
came to rely on the politics of exclusion -- namely the intimidation and repression of 
opposition --in order to stave -off challenges to his presidency. These counter trends 
became most evident with the holding of an extraordinary session of the MPR on 10- 
13 November to debate and pass the government's new laws on elections, parties and 
the composition of parliament. The extraordinary session became the focus of anti- 
government student demonstrations, state -organised counter -demonstrations, and 
military repression, which created a cycle of violence and replay of politics 
reminiscent of the late -Suharto period. 
The extraordinary session of the MPR had provided a renewed common 
purpose to an otherwise fragmented student and pro- democracy movement, which had 
contributed to Suharto's downfall and once again resolutely articulated a range of 
political and economic concerns. Students and other advocates of `total' political 
reform viewed Flabibie's government as little more than a continuation of Suharto's 
New Order legacy, lacking the will or popular mandate to implement democratic 
change successfully. The demonstrating students, who sought to march on and occupy 
parliament in protest over the passing of the political laws, formed loose coalitions of 
cross -campus and pro -democracy groups. These included the Unified People's Action 
(Akrab), which comprised the Jakarta Communication Forum of Student Senates 
(FKSMJ), the Satgas Student Family of ITB, the University of Indonesia Larger 
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Family, and the National Coalition for Democracy (KND). There were student 
coalitions like City Forum (Forum Kota), the Student Action Front for Reform and 
Democracy (Famred) and the Student and People Committee for Democracy 
(Komrad).15 
Many student leaders were disheartened by, in their eyes, the slow pace and 
limited scope of the government's program for constitutionally measured change. 
They suspected that the drafting of new political laws and regulations were aimed at 
facilitating the government's re- election at fresh polls. They were uncompromisingly 
opposed to the government's retention of ABRI seats in parliament, as they called for 
an elimination of dwi fungsi, and were disappointed that the Assembly proceedings 
did not pass a separate law for the investigation and trial of Suharto. Of particular 
threat to Habibie's government was the prospect that students, supported by 
nationalist politicians from Edi Sudradjat's camp, would call for the government's 
replacement with a provisional presidium or people's council until the holding of 
elections. The Barisan leader, Kemal Idris, stated that he was `prepared to die' in the 
fight against Habibie, `He's a Suharto crony.'16 
Another threat to Habibie was Megawati Sukarnoputri who was making a 
powerful comeback to politics after she had legalised her PM faction's existence with 
a change of name to PDI -P and held a party congress in Bali (8 -10 October 1998). Old 
opponents of Habibie, including Barisan leaders, regrouped under Megawati' s party 
banner as the PDI -P's escalating popularity threatened to swamp the president's 
prospects for re- election. PDI -P declared the MPR proceeding invalid in protest over 
the fact that it, along with the other pro -reform parties, was denied participation at the 
15- For details on the student movement, see Edward Aspinall, "The Indonesian student uprising of 
1998," Arief Budiman et. al., (eds.) Reformasi: Crisis and change in Indonesia, Clayton, Monash 
Asia Institute, 1999, pp.212 -238; "Mengusik Sidang, Mengharap Habibie Terbenam," Forum 
Keadilan, 16 November 1998. 
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extraordinary MPR proceedings.17 In short, the main forces that Suharto's 
authoritarian government had suppressed were re- emerging as a clear threat to 
Habibie who, in order to consolidate power in the interim period before elections, also 
largely excluded political opposition from decision -making processes in the MPR. In 
this way, his administration tried to exert as much control as it could over the drafting 
of new laws and constitutional amendments. 
Finally, Habibie's government was fearful of mobilisations of grassroots 
causes against his leadership, as Jakarta's residents and urban poor joined the student 
protesters on several occasions. Popular discontent had been deepening against the 
incumbent government because of its apparent failure to convincingly tackle the 
problem of widespread corruption of government officials or to alleviate the 
tremendous hardship and depravation experienced by millions of Indonesians as a 
consequence of economic collapse earlier in the year. In the vacuum of legal 
uncertainty, peasant farmers and urban unemployed were among those who had taken 
matters into their own hands. They made raids on food stocks and crops, reclaimed 
vast tracts of land that had been alienated by the state, and sought retribution against 
regional, district and local government officials and agencies.18 
It was under these circumstances of growing challenge that Habibie, with the 
backing of his armed forces commander, General Wiranto, returned to a reliance on 
familiar New Order tactics. Such tactics included counter -mobilising Muslim interests 
against student demonstrations, deploying civilian vigilantes, thugs and paramilitary 
groups in the streets as a form of extra -legal crowd control, and using outright military 
repression of opposition. The New Order phantom of authoritarianism appeared to be 
16. Akankah Senayan Berdarah- darah ?," Tempo, 9 November 1998. 
17' "Terpilihnya Seorang Calon Presiden,' D&R, 17 October 1998; "Mengusik Sidang, Mengharap 
Habibie Terbenam," Forum Keadilan. 
16. Soetrisno, `Current Social and Political Conditions', pp. 163 --9. 
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making a ghastly but predictable return. Islam also was becoming a more politicised 
commodity, following on from mobilisations of Muslim interests against pro - 
democracy forces during Suharto's last years in office. 
A) State -directed mobilisations against opposition 
Pro -Habibie Muslim interests allied to formerly corporatised organisations like 
ICMI and the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) played a central role in providing 
manpower and Iogistical support to the establishment of civilian security militia 
(Pengamanan Swakarsa) for the safeguarding of the SI MPR proceedings. With an 
elevated position in ABRI doctrine and practice, civilian security militias like Pam 
Swakarsa were a creation of the state (military).19 It appears, however, that there were 
misgivings within the military over the use of Pam Swakarsa and the role of Wiranto 
in supporting the militias is unclear. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the militias could 
have operated so brazenly as they did without tacit approval from Wiranto. Thus, in 
tandem with the growth of multiparty politics, New Order elements that still 
dominated government were digging their heals in and employing state -orchestrated 
violence in order to fend off the multiplying challenges of democracy. 
The difference this time, was that an estimated thirty thousand Pam Swakarsa, 
bearing sharpened bamboo poles, entered the Jakarta streets in public view to 
intimidate and battle demonstrators in order to defend the MPR session. As such, the 
New Order policy of utilising civilian militias to do its dirty work was much more in 
the open than on previous occasions. The Pam Swakarsa comprised several different 
elements, with the largest contingent being Muslim recruits plus the usual component 
of state -funded Pancasila and Pancamarga youth, unemployed and school dropouts 
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who were recruited from the streets. There were Muslim storm troopers recruited by 
radical Muslim organisations like KISDI and new entities established for the 
occasion, Furkon (Forum for Upholding the Constitution and Justice) and FUNGSI 
(Muslim Supporters of the Constitution Forum).20 
MUI created, and held leadership position in, Furkon, which based its 
swakarsa operations at Istiqlal Mosque in Central Jakarta, where MUI also had its 
headquarters.21 Various other Muslim groups not linked to Furkon, going under such 
names as `Batalyon Al- Ghifari,' `Banten army,' and Istiglal army,' were organised 
separately as civilian volunteers.22 In addition, the Minister of Cooperatives, Adi 
Sasono, and his underlings at CIDES (ICMI), Eggy Sudjana (an experienced agitator 
behind an array mass actions), Moh. Jumur Hidayat, and Edhi Santoso were attributed 
with having organised Muslim militias to confront student demonstrators. 23 
There were some strong indications that Pam Sawakarsa was an army- backed 
operation. For example, the General Chair of Furkon, Faisal Bild, claimed that he had 
distributed Rp. 50 million to more than 20 swakarsa units and insisted that Gen. 
Wiranto and Golkar's Deputy House Speaker, Abdul Gafur, supplied his funds.24 
19. As Bourchier has illustrated, the establishment of civilian militias in collaboration with the military 
was uniquely located in Indonesian defence doctrine, with the term `Sistem Keamanan Swakarsa' 
(Civil Security System) in parlance since at least 1982 Bourchier, `Skeletons, vigilantes', p.157. 
20. 
"Cap Komunis dan Anti -Islam sebagai Teror," SiaR News Service, 4 November 1998; "Nestapa 
Pam Swakarsa," Ummat, 23 November 1998; "Pam Swakarsa: Aktor atau Korhan ?," Tempo, 30 
November 1998; "Ketika Senayan Beralih Rupa," Tempo, 30 November 1998. 
u. For example, MUI's General Secretary Nazri Adlan was one of Furkon's leaders from Mitt. 
"Brigade Muslim Siaga, Banser Menjaga Kiaì," Tempo, 16 November 1998; "Pam Swakarsa: Di 
Mana Ada Forkot di Situ Ada Furkon," Tempo, 23 November 1998. 
22. The head of FUNGSI was an identified gangster. KISDI Chairman, Achmad Sumargono, had 
fostered close ties with the discredited former commander of Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad), 
Lt.Gen. Prabowo Subianto, and had been a member of Ali Murtopo's clandestine Special 
Operations in the 1970s. Sumargono acknowledged his former close relations with Prabowo in an 
interview by the Dateline program. Dateline, 8.30 report, SBS television, 9 February 2000; "Cap 
Komunis dan Anti -Islam," SiaR News Service. 
23. "Gerakan Adi Sasono Untuk Hancurkan PDI Perjuangan," SiaR, 25 September 1998; "Adi Sasono 
di Balik Pengiriman Pam Swakarsa Asal Banten," SiaR News Service, 11 November 1998; 
"Kelompok CIDES Harus Bertanggungjawab Atas Terbunuhnya 6 Pam Swakarsa," SiaR News 
Service, 16 November 1998; "Adi Sasono: 'Saya Bukan Orang yang Berbahaya ?'," Tempo, 14 
December 1998. 
24. 
"Ini Dia Komandan Lapangan," Tempo, 30 November 1998. 
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Claims of direct ABRI involvement in creating the swakarsa units also came from 
other militia members and informants.Z5 Maj. Gen, Kivlan Zein (the former Chief of 
Staff of Kostrad under Gen. Prabowo Subianto's command, before both officers were 
dismissed) was identified as one of the officers involved in organising Muslim 
recruits. Although Wiranto denied any association with the Pam Swakarsa operations, 
he defended their existence and rejected public calls to disband them. Under new 
restrictive laws on holding demonstrations, swakarsa units obtained police permits to 
conduct their operations, yet student demonstrators were withheld permission. The 
civilian militias also formed a front guard before lines of anti -riot police in their 
clashes with pro- democracy demonstrators.26 
Military officers reportedly gave Muslim units of Pam Swakarsa pre -field 
briefings on the righteousness of their struggle against the students.27 Consequently, 
as a result of military briefings, in its slogans and statements, the Muslim contingent 
of the militia claimed to be fighting an Islamic Holy struggle to defend the state and to 
safeguard the constitutional processes of the MPR against the students. Pro -MPR SI 
Muslim organisations, such as Furkon, had begun their propaganda campaign against 
the student movement as early as September and espoused ABRI's kewaspadaan 
(vigilance- security) approach, which had been developed by ABRI's National 
Resilience Institute (Lemhanas) during the New Order period. This approach had 
commonly identified the `Extreme left' (Communism) and the `Extreme Right' 
(political Islam) as threats to national stability, and frequently branded opponents of 
is. "Yapto: Pam Swakarsa PP Resmi Diminta Polri," Detikcom, 11 November 1998; `Pam Swakarsa: 
Aktor atau korban ?," Tempo; "Saya Ikut Merekrut Pam Swakarsa," Tempo, 30 November 1998. 
26. 
" Achinad Sumargono: `Kaiau Status Quo ini Menguntungkan Islam, Mengapa Tidak ?," Tempo, 23 
November 1998; "Wiranto: `Semua Dipolitisir Ke Saya," Tempo, 30 November 1998; Harold 
Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie: military- civilian relations since May 1998," Budiman et. al. (eds.), 
Reformast, p.133. 
27. 
"Iní Dia Komandan Lapangan," Tempo; "Yapto: Pam Swakarsa PP Resmi Diminta Polri," 
Detikcom; "Pam Swakarsa: Aktor atau korban ?," Tempo; "Saya Ikut Merekrut Pam Swakarsa," 
Tempo. 
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the regime with these appellations.2R This time, however, ABRI had mobilised the 
`Extreme Right' against regime opponents, identified as the `Extreme Left.' 
Muslim politicians and leaders joined the government -initiated propaganda 
campaign against the state's `enemies' and in defence of the MPR proceedings. These 
leaders were mostly drawn from the Islamic modernist stream of Islam and the non - 
Abdurrahman Wahid aligned members of NU's traditionalist stream, and were 
affiliated with TCMI and MUI. They perceived themselves as being under threat from . 
nationalist politicians who were hacking Megawati's presidential ambitions and 
wanted to oust Habibie and Islam from power.29 
The deployment of civilian militias was evidence that the army, even after the 
formal liquidation of its social -political affairs posts, still exercised a formidable 
social and political role underwritten by it dwi-fungsi doctrine. Many of the pro- 
28. In line with the vigilance approach, Furkon arranged a mass "Alert" meeting (Apel Siaga) of 
approximately 25 thousand Muslims at Istiqlal Mosque on 30 September, at which leaders invoked 
hysteria of the Communist threat and identified the cross- campus City Forum and the People's 
Democracy Party (PRD), as communist -infiltrated organisations." On a separate occasion, a banner 
written by the state -corporatised mosque organisation, Indonesian Mosque Communication Body 
(BKPRMI), proclaimed: "PKI -Style Riots, Pillage, Terror, Instability, Sabotage." "Perang 
Spanduk: Hantu Spanduk Datang Lagi," Tempo, 12 October 1998; "Pam Swakarsa: Aktor atau 
Korban ?," Tempo. 
29. They gave an early endorsement of the SI MPR at the 3rd Indonesian Muslim Congress, held from 
3 -7 November at the Stadion Utama Senayan (Grand Senayan Stadium) in Jakarta. Prominent 
modernist leaders such as Anwar Harjono and Hussein Umar of the anti -Christian propagation 
council, Dewan Dakwah, Yusril Ihzra Mahendra of PBB, and Achmad Sumargono (KISDI), and 
pro -government leaders of Nandlatul Ulama, KH Ali Yafie, Syukron Makmun, and KH Ilyas 
Ruchiyat (also leaders of ICMI and MUI), participated in the congress, which was attended by an 
estimated 1 ,500-strong crowd from 30 Islamic organisations. Among its declarations, the congress 
reinforced a ruling by MUI (issued on 29 October) that Indonesia's future president must be a 
Muslim male and, therefore, their political rival from the nationalist camp, Megawati, could not 
legally become Indonesia's next president under Islamic law. The Muslim leaders had sought to 
draw upon quasi- religious justification as a way of de- legitimising her candidacy. The congress 
was an early example of mounting opposition of a coalition of Islamic parties and interests 
(including PPP) in their vehement rejection of the growing prospect of Megawati becoming 
Indonesia's next president. In a clear sign that Megawati was the most popular candidate, mass 
rallies in support of PDI -P, held in Jakarta and other main cities on Java and Bali were beginning 
to dwarf the rallies of other parties. Thus, the congress was an early sign of the closing of ranks 
between the government and its Muslim supporters in reaction to the mounting calls from students 
and nationalist politicians for a presidium government to replace Habibie and in reaction to 
Megawati's growing popularity. "Peta Politik Pasca -SI MPR 1998," Republika, 15 November 
1998; "Saefuddin Menghadang Mega, Bali yang Berang," Tempo, 2 November 1998; " Irrdon 
Moslem Congress Prefers Male Above Female President," Antara, 6 November 1998; 
"Inkonstitutìonal, Menolak Wanita Jadi Presiden," Kompas, 9 November 1998. 
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Habibie /pro -MPR Muslim leaders and organisations earlier had participated in state - 
directed counter -mobilisations against Megawati's PDI coalition in 1996. This is not 
to suggest that Muslim leaders did not mobilise grassroots support independently of 
the state against the `pro -democracy' groups. As mentioned in chapter eight, these 
Muslim leaders had considered Megawati to be a threat to the political interests of 
Islam. On this occasion, Muslim interests were mobilised in defence of Habibie's 
presidency against student groups and nationalist interests deemed hostile to Muslim 
political interests. In an attempt, once again, to dissipate and neutralise the energies of 
the student -led pro- democracy movement, the military had tried to consolidate behind 
the government status quo groups and anti- democratic forces. Central to the defence 
of the MPR proceedings was defence of the military's dual function and its allocated 
seats in parliament against student -led opposition that had pushed for revocation of 
the doctrine in order to realise fully civil and political liberties. 
The main significance of the Pam Swakarsa phenomenon was that it constituted 
another state -directed mobilisation of anti -democratic forces for the purpose of 
preventing other social groups from engaging in political mass actions. Arguably, this 
might have been necessary for an interim period in order to permit the government to 
prepare the ground for Indonesia's elections. Had student -led demonstrators occupied 
the parliamentary (DPR/MPR) building during this crucial session, they might 
successfully have disrupted the political process and jeopardised the very reforms 
they claimed to defend. Both the government and society were faced with the 
dilemma of how to end old habits of mobilisation and counter -mobilisation so that a 
healthier process of political participation could be instituted. 
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B) Government strong -arm tactics backfire 
The street stand -offs reached a climax with the so- called "Semnaggi" incident 
or `Black Friday' the 13th. Members of Indonesia's urban educated classes were 
shocked that Habibie's administration repressed student demonstrators in a manner 
reminiscent of the Tri Sakti shootings before Suharto's downfall. This time anti -riot 
troops opened fire with rubber bullets and live rounds on crowds outside Atma Jaya. 
University, killing at least 15 protesters and wounding hundreds. The Semanggi 
incident brought Habibie's government into disrepute as a broad range of political 
organisations and community groups demanded government accountability over the 
deaths. Calls for Habibie to sack Wiranto as Defence Minister and ABRI Commander 
intensified in the days and weeks after the incident. ICMI leaders in cabinet and on 
Habibie's staff were among those demanding that Wiranto resign. There were also 
calls for Habibie to step down, and students led mass protests to strategic locations in 
Jakarta (Freedom Palace, Parliament, Attorney General's Office) and other cities.3° 
Public reaction grew over the black Friday bloodshed. Even Habibie's Muslim 
supporters reproved the government for its use of force. The pro -Habibie Muslim 
leaders might have supported the MPR proceedings, but they were unprepared to 
condone the state's latest bloody suppression of innocent civilians. 
On 16 November, three days after the Semanggi incident, a forum of religious 
scholars and community figures from Jakarta, Bogor, Tanggerang and Bekasi 
organised a Muslim community mass gathering (Apel Akbar Umat Islam) at Al Azhar 
Mosque in South Jakarta. Following on the heels of a 3rd Muslim congress, Muslim 
leaders at the gathering again endorsed the MPR proceedings and issued a statement 
denouncing those who wished to bring about its defeat. The difference this time, was 
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that the Muslim leaders called for an immediate government response to the black 
Friday incident, criticised the security forces, requested a full investigation into the 
shootings, and questioned whether Wiranto should continue as commander of the 
armed forces and minister of defence. A number of Muslim university students 
associations HMI, KAMMI, IMM, Forma Indonesia and Forum Salemba issued a 
joint statement urging Habibie's government to immediately rescind ABRI's dwi- 
fungsi doctrine and its seats in parliament and place Suharto on tria1.31 
As a direct beneficiary of Habibie's presidency, ICMI, however, more or less 
endorsed the regime's standpoint. It released a statement of 12 demands, which called 
for a reduction of ABRI seats in the parliament rather than the elimination of dwi- 
fungsi and requested students to stop demonstrating. It sought specific concessions for 
Muslim political interests such as recognition that reform should be based on Islam's 
moral culture.32 
It can be concluded from the fallout from the Semanggi incident, that the 
attempts by Habibie's government to organise pro- regime Muslim interests, thugs, 
state violence and intimidation against political opposition and dissent, to a great 
extent, had backfired. Such New Order instruments of coercion were not equipped to 
deal with the fluidity of post -Suharto politics. The existence of dozens of political 
parties and independent monitoring bodies, an increasingly independent parliament, 
press freedom and deep community distrust of the government all militated against 
the quiet acquiescence of Indonesia's citizenry. The result was that Habibie and 
3o. 
"Mahasiswa Tembus Istana Merdeka," Kompas Cybermedia, 3 December 1998; Louise Williams, 
"Jakarta on the `edge of chaos'," The Age, 15 November 1998; Keith B. Richburg, "Riots Follow 
Peaceful Jakarta Protest," Washington Post Foreign Service, 15 November 1998. 
31. 
"Hasil SI MPR, Sah Secara Konstitutional," Kompas, 16 November 1998; "Dari Presiden Laki -laki 
hingga Tolak Dwifungsi," Urrunat, 16 November 1998. 
32. 
"12 Seruan ICMI," Republika Online, 7 December 1998; "ICMI calls on students to stop 
demonstrating," Tempo Interactif 12 May 1998; "ICMI asserts support for Habibie's 
government," Tempo Interactif 7 December 1998; "Dazed and Confused," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 
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Wiranto were forced to make a hasty retreat as they promised to take firm measures 
against the military officers responsible for the bloodshed and sought to mend fences 
with their main detractors among the national elite.33 Even more than on the prior 
occasions of 27 July 1996 and May 1998, the ground had worn thin beneath military - 
hacked coercion. Broad public opinion condemned the transparent efforts by ABRI to 
bolster its own security operations with civilian stooges. These developments -of 
societal demonstrations, counter -demonstrations, and regime repression -were 
reminiscent of cycles of protest and repression that occurred during the New Order, in 
the pre -election climate of 1996 and 1997. 
4. The General Election of 1999: Democracy prevails? 
Compared to the storm of Semanggi, the general election was conducted in an 
atmosphere of relative calm as the political elite turned to the business of contesting 
office. For the first time in 44 years, Indonesians had the opportunity to participate 
freely in the political system and help determine the next government. The election 
also provided the first litnis test of political organisation in Indonesia since the lifting 
of authortiraian controls. The question arose as to whether corporatist organisations 
like ICMI, MUI, PPP and Golkar would drift into irrelevance and finally disband? 
The Golkar Party sought to renovate its image and transform its organisation in order 
to attract grassroots support, but its links with Suharto's New Order left it publicly 
maligned. Serious doubts arose as to whether Golkar would survive the elections as a 
viable party, as public rage and dismal turn-out of party supporters forced it to cancel 
numerous campaign rallies in Java. The PPP also assumed again the Islamic Kabah as 
33_ 
"Menhankam/Pangab Jenderal TNI Wiranti: Secara Konsisten ABRI Mengakui Dan Menghukum 
Yang Bersalah," Suara Pembaruan Daily, 23 November 1998; "Peta Politik Setelah Korban 
Berjatuhan," Umcoat, 23 November 1998; "Presiden Habibie Soal Tragedi Semanggi: Sanksi 
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its party symbol, and sought to portray itself as avictim, rather than agent, of the New 
Order in a concerted effort to distance itself from Suharto's legacy and win support. 
At the polls, Megawati's PDI -P picked -up the largest bloc of votes, achieving 
34 percent of the votes cast. The Golkar party had consolidated with some success 
behind Habibie as the second largest vote- winner, but well behind PDI -P with 22 
percent of the votes. Abdurrahman Wahid had been in the political wilderness 
throughout much of the Habibie period because of a stroke. His PKB received the 
third Iargest bloc of votes, but well below the other two parties at 12 percent. PPP 
won 11 percent of the vote and Amien Rais's PAN came fifth with 7 percent.34 The 
parties that ran on a self -consciously Islamic ticket -except PPP -were all but 
decimated, and would be unable to contest future general elections because they did 
not meet eligibility requirements under new electoral laws. This came as a major blow 
to Muslim leaders who had believed that democracy would bring about a majority 
victory for political Islam. Whereas ICMI had provided little if any representation of 
Muslim interests under Suharto- although it did offer some representation within 
Habibie's power structure- Muslim parties had now demonstrated their 
ineffectiveness as vehicles for channelling the interests of Muslim politicians. If the 
general election could be considered a test of Islam's political appeal and strength, the 
poll results demonstrated that Muslim constituencies did not care much for the 
political cause of Islam. 
International and domestic election watchdogs gave the election a clean bill of 
health for democratic transparency. In contrast to the 1997 election campaign, which 
recorded the greatest levels of violence for an election campaign during the New 
Order, this time the campaign was surprisingly peaceful and without significant 
Tegas bagi yang Bersalah," Kompas CyberMedia, 18 November 1998; "Mendesak, Tindakan 
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violent incident. However, one striking feature of the democratically contested 
elections was that Megawatt's overwhelming lead did not translate directly into her 
election to the top executive post of Indonesian President. This was largely because of 
her inability to consolidate her advantage by failing to secure support behind her 
candidacy in the intervening period between the general election and the MPR general 
session. Instead, through clever behind- the -scenes horse -trading and compromise 
between Islamic minority parties, Habibie's faction of Crolkar and PKB, Abdurrahman 
Wahid was elected as Indonesia's fourth president. Abdurrahman received much of 
the support by default. That is, after the MPR had rejected Habibie's report on his 
tenure as president, his faction -not wanting to see Megawati as president- instead 
backed Abdurrahman. The Islamic minority parties threw their weight behind 
Abdurrahman because they preferred a Muslim cleric in the top executive post to a 
woman, who seemed to represent the interests of nationalism against political Islam. 
They had cried foul of the general election results and dragged their feet on endorsing 
them. They had sought, instead, inclusion in the MPR based on their special status as 
a minority interest. Megawati had to settle for the much less influential position of 
Vice- President.35 
5. Conclusion 
Political developments during the period of Habibie's transition administration 
confirmed a number of democratic trends and anti -democratic counter -trends. 
Political reforms paved the way for multiparty democracy, which resulted in a 
proliferation of new parties that competed in democratic elections. In this competitive 
Tegas terhadap Para Penjahat," Kompas, 27 November 1998. 
34. 
`Indonesia's Crisis: Chronic,' p.3. 
`Indonesia's Crisis: Chronic,' P.4. 
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climate, corporatist institutions unravelled, became irrelevant, or, as was the case for 
the Golkar Party and PPP, sought to reinvent themselves so that they could participate 
in the new arrangements. The days of corporatist exclusion were well and truly over. 
However, Habibie and Wiranto still relied on the politics of exclusion (denying 
representation in the MPR to opposition parties, intimidation, and repression) in an 
unsuccessful effort to defeat opponents before the holding of elections. As part of 
intimidation, Muslims were organised into Pam Swakarsa militias and counter - 
demonstrations against student and pro- democracy demonstrators. Although much of 
the contest during Habibie's administration was conducted along the lines of 
multiparty politics, old power conflicts also continued to colour political competition. 
As such, national political leaders perceived the contests largely in terms of these 
rivalries (between the forces of Islam and the forces of nationalism) in a winner -take- 
all endgame. Several ICMI leaders also found a key role in Habibie's government 
either as close advisers or cabinet ministers. Habibie's leadership and patronage of 
ICMI had therefore benefited a number of the organisation's members, who had 
hoped that their limited inclusion in state structures under Suharto would provide 
them with political power. 
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Conclusion 
As part of regime maintenance and survival strategy, the Suharto regime 
organised state -society relations along exclusionary corporatist lines. Islamic 
organisation was a major target of exclusionary arrangements. The exclusionary 
strategy served three main purposes. One was to inhibit the autonomous 
organisational capacity and demand -making of group interests so that people's 
participation in the formal political system would be greatly restricted and challenges 
to the regime's exercise of power would be minimised. Another was to provide an 
institutional means of communication and linkage between state and societal interests. 
This was done in order to ensure that communication with the state occurred on the 
regime's own terms, through these formal mechanisms, and not through alternative 
political vehicles. These mechanisms mostly served to transmit government messages 
downwards to communities, but also as an information gathering mechanism to 
monitor society in order to identify communal antagonisms and political dissent 
before they threatened stability. A third was to mobilise communities for various 
political and economic- development objectives, which included mobilising support 
for Suharto's presidency whilst neutralising the potential of that support to engage in 
independent political action. 
In line with these purposes, corporatised interests had their energies and 
program activities diverted from overtly political concerns into New Order 
development- oriented projects. Exclusionary corporatism, therefore, served a dual, 
but inter- related, purpose of insulating the state from societal demands whilst helping 
furnish the Suharto regime with support and legitimacy derived from targeted political 
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mobilisations of the populace and from the development orientation of organ isational 
activities. 
Beyond Suharto's strategies and objectives, the thesis responded to a number of 
questions posed in chapter one. The first set of questions concerned Muslim responses 
to exclusionary corporatism. Questions 1 -2 queried the extent to which different 
Muslim interests embraced, became co -opted by, and/or resisted capture by the state. 
Question 3 asked whether capture resulted in significant political benefits and 
opportunities for the incorporated interests, or whether these interests were mostly 
denied access to political goods (i.e., representation, policy input, and governmental 
office). 
Certainly from the 1970s to the mid- 1980s, there was a significant level of 
resistance to corporatist capture (especially from NU) when relations between Suharto 
and Muslim political interests largely were antagonistic. For those interests that had 
been captured in a variety of arrangements, corporatism mostly served to shut them 
out of power -sharing arrangements. However, this situation changed in the late 1980s, 
with a rapprochement occurring between Suharto and Muslim leaders. There was a 
discernible shift in state corporatist strategy in general from an exclusionary one to 
one that appeared, on the surface at least, to be part ially inclusionary. An indication of 
this shift was that Suharto widened the scope of incorporation as he sought to co -opt 
strategic middle- strata elite (especially Muslims) into existing power arrangements 
behind his presidency. To this end, Golkar underwent a number of civilianisation and 
recruitment campaigns, and ICMT was established as a new vehicle of Muslim 
support. 
In large numbers, Muslim leaders embraced ICMI as a sign of improving 
relations between Suharto and Islam. However, as Suharto expanded incorporation of 
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new groups and extended state jurisdiction over Muslim community organisation, he 
tried to maintain exclusionary corporatist barriers to people's participation in the 
political system. Muslim leaders discovered that their incorporation did not translate 
into commensurate political goods. Although ICMI leaders did gain some 
representation in the MPR and DPR, most of its members were effectively denied 
meaningful participation in the political system and were not rewarded with strategic 
positions in government. Nevertheless, ICMI members felt that, through 
incorporation, they had achieved substantial progress -in terms of less military 
supervision of Muslim organisational activities, more freedom to organise and 
publicise Islamic ideas, and greater access to patronage and decision -makers. 
NU was divided in its responses to corporatist capture. On the one hand, several 
NU leaders and components of the organisation were drawn into state structures, 
through Golkar, PPP, MUI, ICMI and other entities. On the other, the NU General 
Chairman represented orientations which resisted corporatist capture and strove for 
NU' s political independence and economic self- sufficiency from the state. 
Question 4 queried whether incorporation in state structures stimulated conflict 
between captured interests and other social interests, as rival interests competed for 
access to political goods. This question Iargely was answered in the affirmative: 
incorporation of Muslim interests triggered conflict between segments of the state 
(elements in the military and civilian bureaucracy) and ICMI and between 
components of NU and ICMI. However, this conflict, for a period, remained within 
the predictable limits of the political system and appeared to reinforce Suharto's role 
as senior patron of the state and final arbiter of dispute. 
The next set of questions (5 -6) asked whether corporatist strategies worked 
successfully as a mechanism for obstructing the growth of associational pluralism, or 
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whether corporatisation of interests contributed to the pluralisation of social 
organisation. We asked whether state capture of Muslim interests contributed to a re- 
politicisation of group interests resulting in an organisation and counter -organisation 
of group interests. First, from the 1970s until the mid- 1980s, it appears that strategies 
of corporatist exclusion did indeed inhibit associational pluralism. The enforcement in 
1985 of Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of organisational existence was 
the pinnacle of these efforts backed by arrests of extremists. However, after 1988, the 
partial shift to inclusionary strategy had the effect of re- politicising group interests 
after two decades of depoliticisation and corporatist exclusion. State capture of 
Muslim interests contributed to the organisation and counter -organisation of 
competing group interests and to a concomitant increase in associational pluralism. 
Before elaborating this conclusion, however, there are a number of political and 
economic contexts which have to be considered in assessing the role of corporatism in 
facilitating societal pluralism in the post -1988 period. The political context from the 
late 1980s until, at least, the mid -1990s was one of a deepening intra -elite rivalry 
(especially between Suharto and segments of the military leadership) during a 
protracted succession crisis, coinciding with economic liberalisation followed by a 
limited political opening. The net effect of these factors was to generate greater 
autonomous activity within society, including increased associational capacity and 
pluralism. This impacted on authoritarian structures as demands for political 
participation, civil liberties, reform and democracy intensified. 
Suharto tried to deal with challenges to his presidency. The shift in corporatist 
strategy was in response both to his conflict with military leaders and to growing 
demands for participation. He continued, as he had in the past, to sow division and 
fragment group interests. First, he exploited internal organisational rifts (e.g., NU and 
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PPP), and rivalries between organisations (e.g., segments of NU and ICMI) with 
corporatism providing one of the means of splitting group interests through segmental 
capture of organisational components, and by alternately favouring one (incorporated) 
constituency over another (excluded) constituency. Second, corporatism helped 
regulate the access of state and non -state interests to patronage and power 
opportunities, which resulted in not only winners and losers but supplied one of the 
arenas in which struggles for position took place. 
Corporatism helped Suharto to readjust the balance of competing interests as he 
played off different aspirants for power whilst seeking to remain the senior patron and 
final arbiter of disputes. In particular, incorporated Muslim interests were drawn into 
partisan struggles that facilitated Suharto's tactics of sowing division and 
circumventing potential threats to his power. He brought Muslim (civilian) interests 
into state structures in an attempt to offset his reliance on the military, as well as tried 
to absorb and neutralise the rising Muslim middle -class aspirations for change. He 
later sought to redress imbalances once he had more fully subordinated the military to 
his authority by placing a military loyalist, two former Vice -Presidents, and family 
members in supervisory roles over ICMI. In other words, Suharto used the 
corporatised Muslim interests to help him maintain a shifting disequilibrium of forces 
as rival interests competed for political predominance at the time of growing public 
perceptions of an impending succession crisis. 
However, Suharto's tactics proved an insufficient means of dampening societal 
demands and challenges from opposition. Although Suharto was a recognised master 
of divide- and -rule, in the new context of political openness and growing pluralist 
pressures for change, there were distinct risks associated with this partial shift to a 
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more ìnclusìonary strategy, which had implications beyond previous experiments with 
state corporatism. 
To begin with, several ICMI members constituted a potential counter -elite or 
opposition to Suharto from within these state structures. The intra -elite conflict and 
the period of political openness encouraged them to pursue the fulfilment of their own 
agendas for increased representation for Muslims, Islamisation of state and society, 
and reform of the political system including a process of demilitarisation. This brings 
us to the observation that the broader the interests absorbed into state arrangements, 
the more likely it is that those interests would make demands for their full 
representation in the system. Correspondingly, this would produce pressures for a 
change in the nature of the political system as an increasing number of interests 
competed for access to political goods. 
Second, although Suharto neutralised the most outspoken ICMI members who 
criticised his presidency, the mobilisation of Muslim support behind his presidency 
and against opponents created a reaction from disaffected members of the elite, 
especially from those who had been displaced from power by the newly -incorporated 
Muslim interests. An increasing number of the sidelined members of the elite and 
regime opponents began to organise alternative vehicles for their political 
participation outside of the corporatist arrangements, for re- inclusion in a "reformed" 
political system, and in protest against the state -Islamic accommodation. In short, 
corporatist inclusion of Muslim interests had contributed to a re- politicisation and 
multiplication of organised group interests demanding participation. 
Consequently, the institutions of authoritarianism were showing signs of decay, 
because they were no longer able to contain, channel, neutralise, or co -opt effectively 
the diversifying demands and challenges of society. Suharto's counter -mobilisation of 
372 
incorporated Muslim interests and other pro- regime groups against dissent had the 
effect of further politicising state -society relations. In these circumstances, the 
hardline military clampdown on dissent created deep social resentment and dismay, 
which, in the context of the 1997 -1998 economic collapse, triggered further 
oppositional mobilisations against Suharto's rule. Recourse to crude state repression 
and tenor was a clear sign that corporatism was failing as a strategy for the 
containment of society's latest associational dynamism. 
Questions 7 -9 asked whether Muslim responses to pluralist challenges were 
conditioned by their own location inside or outside of the state corporatist 
arrangements. We asked whether captured Muslim interests contributed to anti -regime 
organisation, or whether they reinforced the authoritarian structures of the Suharto 
regime. The simple answer is that Muslim responses both to Suharto's rule and to the 
growing pluralist challenges were conditioned, but not wholly determined, by their 
location inside corporatist arrangements insofar as Muslim leaders perceived that they 
could gain political advantage from their incorporation. More broadly, calculations of 
relative advantage and disadvantage vis -a -vis rival political interests in contests for 
power in an anticipated post -Suharto period greatly influenced the positions adopted 
by incorporated (and unincorporated) interests. 
Thus, Suharto was able to mobilise Muslim political opinion against the pro - 
democracy /pro -Megawati forces in 1997, not just because of the state -military's 
sophisticated propaganda campaign, but also because Muslim leaders at the time 
perceived Megawati to be a threat to their own political ambitions. In particular, these 
Muslim leaders felt the state -Islamic accommodation to be endangered by Megawati's 
rising star. On several occasions, ICMI leaders and members also were drawn into 
struggles in support of their General Chairman against his rivals until their support 
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clearly failed to furn ish them with much -hoped -for positions in the 1998 cabinet. 
Until this time, most ICMI members remained compliant supporters of Suharto, or 
were unwilling to voice their criticism too openly. They began publicly to support the 
student -led reform movement only after they had become disaffected by their failure 
to gain political appointments. Another crucial factor was that ICMI figures, including 
its most senior leaders, became emboldened to attack Suharto's rule once the tide of 
opinion had resolutely turned against the president in his last days of office. 
Thus, the critical voice of Muslims was greatly constrained by their capture in 
state structures in a manner that reinforced authoritarian institutions. ICMI members 
did not significantly contribute to anti- regime mobilisations or to growing pluralist 
challenges, although, as argued, the creation of ICMI did trigger the counter - 
organisation of group interests outside of corporatist structures. 
Our answer to the above questions shifts somewhat when we consider the role 
of the corporatised parties in anti -regime struggles. Until the 1997 general election, 
PPP and PDI had been mainly compliant components of the established political 
system -this was despite moments of resistance from PPP at earlier elections. 
However, from the mid 1990s until the pre -campaign period in 1997, PDI under 
Megawati's leadership became a major rallying point for opposition and anti- regime 
coalition -building initiatives as illegal and underground organisations and quasi - 
parties coalesced behind Megawati's campaign banner. Numerous politically 
sidelined (non -ICMI) Muslim interests also supported Megawati at the time. After the 
political decimation of PDI, PPP assumed the mantle of opposition party against 
Golkar during the election campaign, largely because of disaffection over Golkar's 
heavy- handed tactics (backed by the security forces) to win over voters. In short, 
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opposition to Suharto emerged both from outside and inside the state corporatist party 
arrangements as increasing numbers of people became disaffected with his rule. 
The NU General Chairman, who had remained at the political margins outside 
of state structures, also initially supported Megawati and the forces for change. 
However, Suharto managed to bring the Chairman behind the Golkar campaign of 
Suharto's daughter. The NU Chairman, in fact, appeared to assume stances according 
to his own calculations of relative advantage and disadvantage vis -à -vis rivals for 
power. In particular, the divide -and -rule tactics pursued by Suharto provided much of 
the framework of the Chairman's retaliations and reconciliation, as the NU Chairman 
sought to bring NU into a better bargaining position with state power and to displace 
the political influence of ICMI. 
Finally (question 10), we asked to what extent can we attribute the failures of 
exclusionary corporatism to this form of coerced organisation or to external factors 
such as intra -elite conflict and economic crisis? The answer to this question has 
largely been provided by the above points -namely, state corporatism was part of the 
authoritarian institutional nexus (which included patronage games, divide -and -rule 
strategy, and repression), which proved unable effectively to respond to multiplying 
pluralist challenges, internal fragmentation of the state, and societal mobilisations, 
The effectiveness of exclusionary strategy lies in the co- optation of strategic 
allies who collaborate with the regime against excluded groups. A shift in strategy to 
more inclusionary forms of state corporatism reflects the growing demands for 
participation from diversifying group interests. However, this kind of incorporation 
appears unable to satisfy those demands and contributes to pluralist challenges to 
regime survival. The problem was compounded for Suharto, once his power had 
sharply narrowed -based on mostly family interests and Suharto loyalists -with ever 
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increasing regime members being sidelined from power -sharing arrangements. In 
these circumstances, exclusionary (and inclusionary) corporatist strategies became 
superfluous because the careful balance between regime collaboration and exclusion 
was shattered. Economic crisis acted on the political crisis and exposed the weakness 
of authoritarian institutions, including corporatist structures, and forced Suharto's 
resignation. 
Broader questions 
What does this study tell us about Suharto's management of state -Islamic and 
state -societal relations? Did Suharto get his management strategy wrong? In 
particular, was his downfall mostly the result of political and economic factors 
outside of his control, or did he precipitate his own demise through the kinds of 
strategies he pursued? Was the shift in corporatist strategy, however partial, in 
retrospect, a mistake on Suharto' s part? 
In effect, the shift to greater inclusion of Muslim interests- however 
controlled -helped undermine a major pillar of Suharto's institutional control: 
Namely, the exclusion of most societal interests from participation in the formal 
political system. The consequent re- politicisation of group interests, with ICMI 
significantly contributing to organisation, counter -organisation and mobilisations of 
group interests, was one of the factors that appeared to hasten an end to Suharto's 
rule. Suharto's use of incorporated Islam with which to offset his reliance on the 
military and his harnessing of Muslim interests against opposition contributed to the 
re- politicisation process. The political opening, which was a result of economic 
liberalisation and infra -elite rivalry, was, nonetheless, an underlying factor sparking 
anti -regime societal mobilisations. 
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The question arises as to whether it was wise strategy for Suharto to use Muslim 
support as a means of offsetting his reliance on the military. After all, he had other 
well -established mechanisms (such as army reshuffles and patronage games) at his 
disposal for dealing with over -ambitious military officers, without entailing the far - 
reaching social consequences implicit in the substantial incorporation of Muslim 
political interests. From a regime survival perspective, would Suharto have been 
wiser to continue a strict framework of exclusion of all Muslim political and 
organisational interests? Restated in broader terms, did the demise of Suharto's 
authoritarian rule lie in the liberalising moments rather than in the weakness of its 
institutional structures? Are the lessons to be learnt from Suharto's mismanagement 
of state and society relations that, if they wish to survive, authoritarian regimes 
should maintain an iron grip on social organisation and keep group interests 
suppressed? 
It needs to be stressed, however, that, in the 1990s, social, political and 
economic change was creating a dynamic beyond the control of Suharto, and his 
authoritarian institutions and survival strategies were poorly equipped to deal with the 
fundamental nature of the change. In particular, state corporatism failed as a 
mechanism to contain the new burst of societal activation and corresponding state 
fragmentation. Comparative studies (Latín America, East Asia, and Africa) of state 
corporatism inform us that such systems of interest exclusion have broken down in 
the face of liberalising and democratising processes. This is notwithstanding that 
sometimes countries experience regime reversal to something approaching 
authoritarianism. In the final analysis, although Suharto's restructuring of the 
corporatist framework contributed to the breakdown of the regime, this restructuring 
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was a response -among many other responses -to much broader challenges facing 
the regime. 
A final question arises. What, if anything, can studies of state corporatist 
organisation vis -à -vis other group interests and societal movements tell us about 
state- societal interactions? Chapter 10 concerning the Hahihie presidency possibly 
throws some light on this question, as corporatist arrangements quickly unravelled or 
were rendered irrelevant as a diverse range of independent political parties were 
established in preparation for democratic elections. A splintering of group interests 
occurred as the political elite left the enforced corporatist amalgams and joined the 
new parties. Thus, the emerging multiparty system provided the context for new lines 
of contest, which had largely been suppressed by exclusionary corporatism. However, 
a great deal of political contest was still conducted along the lines of earlier struggles, 
especially between political Islam and "nationalists. The Islamic -nationalist rivalries, 
as did the traditionalist- modernist rivalries internal to Islam, in fact, pre -dated the 
New Order period and had their roots in the colonial period. Quite clearly, Suharto's 
management strategies of divide- and -rule and corporatist fragmentation were not 
primarily responsible for political and communal cleavages. To a large extent, the 
corporatist framework aimed to reduce "traditional" lines of division as well as to 
help demarcate future political contests to the greater benefit of regime maintenance 
and survival. 
The usefulness of the analytical framework of state corporatism is that it brings 
attention to some of the specific ways by which Suharto sought to exploit and further 
fragment political divisions to the benefit of regime survival. The analytical 
framework identifies the actual linkages constructed between the state, Islam and 
other social interests and the particular kinds of group interactions in response to this 
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linkage system. Analysis of state corporatism- does not seek to explain an entire 
social- political reality. Instead it focuses on these specific configurations or linkages 
of power relations in seeking to explain the evolving state -societal interactions 
leading to both political stasis and change. 
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